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INTRODUCTION 
THE COLD WAR is OVER; the nuclear arms race, at least in its most sinister 
form, is rapidly passing into history. Certainly grave nuclear menaces re­
main: the possibility of terrorist groups or such rogue states as North 
Korea or Iraq's acquiring nuclear weapons; the danger of regional nuclear 
exchanges—between India and Pakistan, for example; the future of 
aging nuclear power plants; the disposal of tons of radioactive wastes that 
will remain lethal for millennia. Nevertheless, the nuclear arms competi­
tion between the United States and the Soviet Union that terrified the 
world for more than forty years is, blessedly, a thing of the past. 
I was forcibly reminded of this in December 1993 when I partici­
pated in a Defense Department symposium convened to develop plans 
for converting nuclear missile silos into national historic landmarks. Silos 
that once housed nightmarish weapons of mass destruction may soon 
become tourist stops for family vacationers on their way to Yellowstone, 
Glacier, or Mount Rushmore. 
As the Cold War recedes further into the past, the moment is oppor­
tune for those who lived through all or part of that stressful time to begin 
seriously the process of historical assessment—not just of the diplomacy 
of the Cold War, but of its social and cultural ramifications as well. It 
is also a timely moment to remind the rising generation—for many 
of whom the Cold War and the nuclear arms race are merely words 
on the pages of history textbooks or grainy images in television docu-
mentaries—of the diplomatic, strategic, and technological realities 
that for decades profoundly shaped Americans' historical experience. 
This book is one historian s effort to explore one aspect of that vast and 
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complex reality: its intense and continuing impact on American con­
sciousness and culture. 
As I sought to conceptualize the cultural effects of the nuclear arms 
race for this book, I found myself thinking metaphorically In August 
1946, at Bikini atoll in the Marshall Islands, the United States conducted 
the first of what would prove to be a long series of atmospheric tests of 
nuclear bombs in the South Pacific. In 1949, the Soviet Union exploded 
its first atomic bomb, launching its own decades-long cycle of atmo­
spheric tests. By the mid-1950s, with the development of hydrogen 
bombs a thousand times more powerful than the city-destroying atomic 
bombs of 1945, the pace and intensity of each nations testing program 
quickened. Atmospheric testing by the two superpowers continued until 
the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. (Testing by France and 
China continued for many years.) 
Beginning with the U.S. Bravo test series of 1954, the public gradu­
ally awakened to a scary by-product of these tests: Cancer-causing stron­
tium 90 and other radioactive materials released by the explosions were 
drifting over the globe and filtering back to earth, contaminating pas­
tures, farmlands, lakes, and rivers. Concerned scientists raised the alarm, 
and despite a disinformation campaign by federal officials pooh-poohing 
the health hazards of radioactivity, the media publicized the danger, and 
the public became deeply alarmed. These fears, mobilized by activist or­
ganizations, played a crucial role in generating political pressure for a test 
ban—pressure that culminated in the 1963 treaty by which the signato­
ries (the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain) pledged to 
confine their tests to underground sites. In a larger sense, the test ban 
campaign helped lay the groundwork for a broader environmental move­
ment that remained important in the 1990s, forty years after the initial 
wave of public fear and activism. 
The whole episode proved a classic illustration of the phenomenon 
of unintended consequences. The government agencies, weapons design­
ers, and military strategists who planned and conducted these tests did 
not deliberately set out to poison the environment or to cause strontium 
90 to accumulate in mothers' milk, babies' teeth, or the grass eaten by 
grazing cows. And they certainly did not intend to stir a hornets' nest of 
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reaction against tests and, to some extent, against the arms race itself. 
But these consequences followed directly from their actions. 
This book is a study of the phenomenon of such unintended conse­
quences. When President Franklin Roosevelt in 1939 authorized the re­
search that led to the successful testing and use of the atomic bomb six 
years later, he had little awareness (so far as we know) of the far-reaching 
political and diplomatic ramifications of his decision, or of the social, 
cultural, and ethical consequences. When President Harry Truman made 
the fateful determination in 1945 to authorize the dropping of two 
atomic bombs on Japan, he may well have had larger postwar strategic 
calculations in mind (historians and the public still debate the question), 
but he almost surely had little idea that the use of the new weapon would 
resonate powerfully in American life for half a century and beyond, shap­
ing not only Cold War strategy and diplomacy, but also the nations art, 
literature, ethical discourse, religious life, and mass culture. 
As journalists of the mid-1950s reported on the deadly by-products 
of H-bomb tests that were coursing through the atmosphere and settling 
inexorably back to earth, they popularized a term that atomic scientists 
had been using at least since 1946: fallout. Soon the word, often as part 
of the phrase "radioactive fallout," became all too familiar to ordinary 
citizens. 
I've chosen this term as the title of this book, for the "fallout" from 
nuclear weapons was cultural as well as chemical. As early as 1954, Time 
magazine used the word in this metaphorical sense: "The most recent 
H-bomb test [by the Soviets]," Time observed (December 20, 1954), 
"was made in Siberia about three months ago, but the fallout of fear and 
worry . . . has by no means died away." 
The "fallout" from the nuclear arms race, with its endless rounds of 
nuclear tests, was clearly not limited to strontium 90 and other deadly 
substances; it also worked its way into the mental and imaginative world 
of an entire generation, adults and children alike, producing not only 
nightmares, worried conversations, and activist campaigns, but also a di­
verse array of cultural artifacts, ranging from poems, novels, and paint­
ings to popular songs, slang, movies, advertisements, radio shows, and 
television specials. Without close attention to this larger impact of the 
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nuclear reality, large swaths of American thought and culture in the years 
after 1945 become opaque and incomprehensible. 
This book probes the political, social, psychological, and cultural 
fallout of the atomic bomb from August 1945 to the mid-1990s. But 
it is not a conventional work of cultural history, and this invites some 
explanation and perhaps a bit of autobiography. My training is as a histo­
rian, and I have worked on a broad range of topics dealing with Ameri­
can social and cultural history. In 1980, having completed a book on 
moral reform in the American city, and on the lookout for a new project, 
I somewhat fortuitously decided to explore the intellectual and cultural 
impact of the atomic bomb in American life—a topic then very much 
neglected. As my research proceeded, and I realized the scope of what I 
had undertaken, I narrowed the time frame of my study to the years from 
1945 through 1950. The results appeared as By the Bomb's Early Light: 
American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, published 
by Pantheon in 1985 and reprinted by the University of North Carolina 
Press in 1994. 
Except for an epilogue briefly sketching the rhythms of America's 
political and cultural responses to the bomb from 1950 to the early 
1980s, By the Bomb's Early Light was wholly concerned with the imme­
diate postwar period. (An introduction written for the 1994 reissue 
touches briefly on the eventful decade that began in the early 1980s.) 
My rationale for limiting that work to the immediate postwar years still 
remains valid. In that fleeting period, nearly every theme, motif, and fear 
that would shape Americas nuclear discourse for the next half century 
first emerged, in embryonic but clearly discernible form. 
But the publication of By the Bomb's Early Light did not end my en­
gagement with nuclear issues. Indeed, the writing of that book appears 
in retrospect as only a way station in a lifelong encounter that began with 
my own early nuclear memories, long before I took up the topic as a 
matter of scholarly interest. Those memories begin with the first news of 
the atom bomb in August 1945, and my hazy but very real awareness, as 
a ten year old, of the spike of fear that followed. Among my father's pa­
pers is a yellowing 1946 pamphlet entitled "A Statement of Purpose by 
the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists," with passages under­
lined by my largely apolitical, businessman father. 
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Then came the nervous talk of atomic confrontation when the Rus­
sians exploded their first atomic bomb in 1949 and the Korean War 
broke out soon after. Even sharper fears of nuclear war in the later 1950s 
and early 1960s followed, stirred by such movies as On the Beach, 
President John E Kennedy's sparring with Soviet premier Nikita Khrush­
chev over Berlin, and the terrifying Cuban Missile Crisis. This, in turn, 
was succeeded by the uneasy interlude in the later 1960s and 1970s when 
Vietnam, Watergate, and other crises dominated the headlines with­
out ever fully effacing ones awareness of the superpowers' arsenals of 
doomsday weaponry—arsenals that seemed to grow in numbers and 
menace despite periodic "arms control" treaties that were supposed to 
be reassuring. 
My research on By the Bomb's Early Light m the early 1980s coincided 
with the wave of heightened nuclear fear that gripped the nation during 
President Ronald Reagan's first term. The nuclear-weapons freeze cam­
paign, a grassroots movement calling for a halt in the testing, production, 
and deployment of nuclear weapons, emerged as the political manifesta­
tion of this fear. At the same time, a tidal wave of movies, television pro­
grams, rock songs, and science-fiction stories bore witness to the public's 
renewed obsession with the specter of nuclear holocaust. This out­
pouring of cultural expression spurred by nuclear fear echoed two earlier 
cycles, first in the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima and then in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, when nuclear alarms and threats had similarly 
unleashed surges of media commentary, political activism, and cultural 
attention. 
President Ronald Reagan, ever the master of television, undercut the 
freeze campaign with his dramatic 1983 proposal for a Strategic Defense 
Initiative, quickly dubbed "Star Wars" by the media and the public. By 
the end of Reagan's second term and into President George Bush's ad­
ministration, upheavals in Moscow, the opening of the Berlin Wall, and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union itself heralded the demise of the Cold 
War, the end of the superpowers' nuclear arms race, and ushered in noth­
ing less than a new era in world politics. 
Curiously, however, the nuclear theme lived on, not only in serious 
discussion of the real dangers that remained, but also as a motif in pop 
culture and as a topic of sometimes bitter public debate. In 1995, the 
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National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution an­
nounced an exhibit observing the fiftieth anniversary of the atomic 
bombing of Japan and featuring the Enola Gay, the airplane that carried 
the bomb to Hiroshima. A storm of controversy erupted as veterans' 
groups, patriotic organizations, and headline-seeking politicians realized 
that the exhibit would graphically portray the devastation and human 
suffering the bomb had inflicted and, even more provocatively, include 
a full range of views by diplomats, military leaders, and historians ex­
ploring the murky reasons behind Truman's fateful decision to use the 
bomb against a nation already tottering on the brink of defeat. Half 
a century on, the events of August 1945 still stirred uneasily in the 
nations memory. 
As a historian, citizen, and (intermittent) activist, I observed and, in 
small ways, participated in these events. Having chosen a research topic 
that in 1980 seemed far from the center of public awareness, I found 
myself by 1982 caught up in a sometimes hectic round of public speak­
ing, journalistic writing, and activist strategizing at the local level as the 
freeze campaign gained momentum. This book, Fallout, thus offers a 
somewhat episodic record of Americas political and cultural encounter 
with nuclear weapons, both as I have written about this encounter as a 
scholar and as I have experienced it as someone caught up in the events 
of my time. 
The essays reprinted here vary widely in character, from newspaper 
op-ed columns, book reviews, and journalistic forays to personal reflec­
tions and more conventional cultural history that one finds in scholarly 
periodicals. For all their diversity, however, these chapters share a com­
mon theme: the impact of nuclear weapons in American life from 1945 
to the present. 
The occasions that called forth these essays are as varied as the pieces 
themselves. In part 1, the two opening csszys on the earliest reactions to 
the atomic bomb (chapters 1 and 2) appeared in August 1985—the for­
tieth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Japan—as an op-ed piece in 
the New York Times and an article in the New Republic, I wrote the essay 
on Truman and the bomb (chapter 3) for a 1984 conference on the cen­
tennial of Harry Truman's birth and then expanded it as a chapter in a 
1989 book on his presidency. Chapter 4 includes a 1987 review of a book 
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on early Cold War diplomacy, and a 1982 review essay (my first pub­
lished work on the nuclear theme) on a book about nuclear-war planning 
in the late 1940s. 
The three essays in part 2 (chapters 5—7) focus on seemingly quite 
diverse but in fact interwoven aspects of Americas nuclear culture during 
the high tide of the Cold War in the later 1950s and early 1960s: the 
health professionals and civil-defense experts who insisted that with 
proper planning, nuclear war would not be so bad; "Project Chariot," 
Edward Teller's bizarre scheme to use nuclear explosions in a zany "public 
works" project to convert the outlet of a small stream in Alaska into a 
major world port; and what many consider the greatest film ever made 
on a nuclear theme, Stanley Kubricks Dr. Strangelove. Divergent as they 
seem, these three essays nicely complement each other, since the techno­
cratic mode of thinking revealed in the civil-defense and medical plan­
ning for atomic war and in Project Chariot (what C. Wright Mills in 
another context called "crackpot realism") forms the real-life context for 
Kubrick's black comedy. 
Once again, the nature and the tone of these three chapters reflect 
the circumstances of their original publication: a 1985 article in the Jour­
nalofthe American Medical Association marking the fortieth anniversary 
of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings; a 1995 review essay in the Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists; and a 1995 contribution to a general-audience 
book on the way moviemakers have handled historical themes. 
Part 3, "Going Underground," offers two perspectives on Americas 
nuclear culture in the years after the 1963 test ban treaty, when the na-
tion's overt political and cultural engagement with the nuclear threat 
somewhat diminished—but by no means disappeared. Chapter 8, based 
on an essay first published in the Journal of American History, presents a 
bird's-eye overview of these years, and explores some of the reasons for 
the "nuclear apathy" that some observers discerned. Qualifying this view 
of pervasive apathy, chapter 9, drawn from my 1992 book When Time 
Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture, suggests 
that attention to atomic war continued to flourish in these years in an 
unlikely source: popular writings on Bible prophecy. 
Part 4 (chapters 10-13), on the "Reagan Round" of nuclear fear, ac­
tivism, and cultural attention in the early 1980s—and its waning later 
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in the decade—reprints some of my late 1980s essays on such topics as 
the nuclear-freeze campaign, the commercial by-products of Reagan's 
Star Wars scheme, and the views of college students on nuclear issues as 
the Cold War wound down. These essays appeared in the Nation and, 
again, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a magazine that has provided 
a forum for thoughtful commentary on nuclear issues from the very be­
ginning of the atomic age. 
Part 5, focusing on the period since the end of the Cold War, docu­
ments the "nuclear fallout" that continues to affect American culture and 
politics. Chapter 14, written with Eric Idsvoog, explores the persistence 
of nuclear menace in video games, Hollywood movies, and blockbuster 
novels of the 1990s. 
The year 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of both the end of World War 
II and the atomic bombing of Japan, and especially the angry controversy 
surrounding the National Air and Space Museum's abortive Enola Gay 
exhibit, provided another occasion for consideration of the cultural reso­
nances of America's half-century encounter with nuclear weapons. With 
these reflections (chapters 15 and 16), written more than fifteen years 
after I initially turned my scholarly attention to this topic, the book 
closes. 
The very diversity of these essays and of the publications where they 
originally appeared is a major reason that the idea of gathering them into 
a single work originally appealed to me, as the chances of anyone's having 
read more than three or four of them when they first saw the light of day 
are surely rather remote! I have arranged these varied essays in a generally 
chronological order—based on the progression of historical events rather 
than the dates of composition—moving through the successive stages of 
the nuclear era, from the dawning of the atomic age in August 1945 to 
the retrospective moment of 1995 half a century later. Each section and 
each chapter has a brief introduction relating it to the book's larger con­
tours and themes, and also suggesting something of the circumstances 
under which it was written. This epoch is not only one that I have stud­
ied as a professional historian; I have also lived through it, and its issues 
and concerns have engaged me as a citizen. Fallout \s an amalgam of both 
my scholarly and my personal encounter with the bomb. 
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The text of the essays as reprinted here is close to that of the original 
publication. I have, however, made some changes, excisions, and addi­
tions to avoid duplication, smooth flow, cut excessive detail, or eliminate 
material not germane to the purpose of this book, such as paragraphs in 
book reviews that focused purely on matters of style or organization. 
I have made these changes silently, rather than burdening the text 
with ellipses and brackets that, as someone has said, make the act of read­
ing as laborious as climbing an endless series of picket fences to reach 
one's destination. Some of the pieces originally included footnotes, but 
for this book, with its more personal format, the scholarly apparatus has 
been dropped. The place of first publication of every chapter is clearly 
indicated, making it easy for anyone to consult the original text or, for 
those essays originally published in scholarly books or journals, to check 
a footnote. 
Inevitably in a work that draws upon essays and reviews written on 
a single broad theme over a fifteen-year period, certain events, individu­
als, and historical developments are alluded to more than once, though 
in different contexts and from different perspectives. While most repeti­
tions have been quietly edited out, not all could be eliminated without 
doing violence to the coherence and integrity of specific chapters. Where 
redundancies still remain, I trust the reader will riot find them unduly 
distracting, and will understand the reason for their presence. 

I

EARLY RESPONSES 

HI. G. Wells predicted atomic bombs as early as 1914, and in the late 1930s some 
scientists and science-fiction writ­
ers wrote of the vast and mysterious 
power of atomic energy. Neverthe­
less, President Truman's announce­
ment of the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima on August 6,1945, sent 
shock waves eddying across 
America. Suddenly, unexpectedly, 
the nation and the world were 
hurled into the atomic age. 
The reaction took many forms. 
Journalists, editorial writers, and 
religious leaders offered their per­
spectives. City planners, educators, 
social scientists, physicians, and 
other professionals saw opportu­
nities to further their interests. 
Marketers and mass-culture pro­
ducers seized on the national obses­
sion with atomic energy. In a curi­
ously symbiotic way, the responses 
and views of Harry Truman, the 
man who had made the fateful 
decision to drop the bomb, initially 
both mirrored and influenced 
popular attitudes toward the new 
reality. Meanwhile, out of public 
view, statesmen and strategists, too, 
struggled to adjust their thinking to 
the atomic bomb. The selections in 
part 1 explore some of the strands 
of this earliest phase of Americas 
rendezvous with the atom. 

I

THE DAY AMERICA FIRST 
HEARD THE NEWS 
August 6, 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the atomic , bombing of Hiroshima, came at a moment of transi­i tion in Americans' perception of nuclear issues. The 
nuclear-freeze campaign, rhetorically checked by President 
Reagan's "Star Wars" address of March 1983, was clearly on 
the wane. But the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union 
launched by Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, who came to 
power in March 1985, had barely begun. U.S.-Soviet talks 
on bilateral nuclear-missile reductions in Europe, side­
tracked during Reagan's first term, had at last resumed, but 
Reagan's November 1985 meeting with Gorbachev in Ge­
neva still lay several months in the future. 
Amid much uncertainty, nuclear jitters persisted. The 
fears roused by the rhetoric and the actions of Reagan's 
first term, and the resulting surge of antinuclear activism, 
remained potent cultural forces. In this context, the Hiro­
shima anniversary attracted much media attention, in­
cluding a Time magazine cover featuring a mushroom cloud. 
In this setting, I wrote the following, which appeared as an 
op-ed piece in the New York Times on August 4, 1985. 
WHERE WERE YOU when you first heard about the atomic bomb? My guess 
is that most Americans over the age of fifty can answer that question 
instantly. 
August 6, 1945, was one of those days that stick in the brain. The 
most trivial details of such days can often be recalled decades later, simply 
5 
6 CHAPTER ONE 
because they are associated with the moment one first hears a piece of 
shocking or frightening news. 
I must confess that the radio newscasts of that distant August after­
noon have blurred a bit in my mind. But the newspaper memory remains 
starkly vivid. I can visualize just where the afternoon edition of the Day­
ton Daily News was lying in our kitchen when my eye caught the riveting 
headline. I can recall reading it aloud to my parents, mispronouncing 
the strange new word "A-tome" because I had never heard anyone say 
it before. 
Other people, older than I, were also deeply shocked by Truman's 
announcement. It was a moment that, even then, struck many as a radi­
cal turning point in human history, and a surprising number felt im­
pelled to put pen to paper and record their feelings and reactions. 
In New York City, Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review of 
Literature, spent the night of August 6 composing an impassioned essay, 
"Modern Man Is Obsolete." The atomic bomb had made nationalism 
outmoded and dangerous, he argued, and only a world government 
could save mankind. In Charlotte, North Carolina, a country-music 
singer, Fred Kirby, also spent a sleepless night after hearing the news. The 
next day, he wrote "Atomic Power," a song evoking grim images of divine 
judgment and apocalyptic destruction. It caught on immediately and, 
for several weeks early in 1946, was on Billboard's list of top country 
favorites. 
At his summer cottage in Kennebunk, Maine, the Rev. John Haynes 
Holmes of New York City's Community Church was enjoying the ocean 
view when he heard the report. "Everything else seemed suddenly to be­
come insignificant," he wrote a few days later. "I seemed to grow cold, as 
though I had been transported to the waste spaces of the moon. The 
summer beauty seemed to vanish, and the waves of the sea to be pound­
ing upon the shores of an empty world. . . . For I knew that the final 
crisis in human history had come. What that atomic bomb had done to 
Japan, it could do to us." 
In Pelham Manor, New York, Patricia E. Munk had just returned 
from the hospital, having given birth to her second son, when the word 
arrived. "Since then," she wrote in a letter six days later, "I have hardly 
been able to smile, the future seems so utterly grim for our two little 
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boys. Most of the time I have been in tears or near tears, and fleeting but 
torturing regrets that I have brought children into the world to face such 
a dreadful thing as this have shivered through me. It seems that it will be 
for them all their lives like living on a keg of dynamite which may go off 
at any moment." 
The atomic bomb announcement elicited very little celebration. A 
few newspapers published gloating editorials and cartoons; a radio come­
dian joked about Japans "atomic ache." Another said the bomb "made 
Hiroshima look like Ebbetts Field after a game between the Giants and 
the Dodgers." For most Americans, however, the news brought not joy 
but profound apprehension. 
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch warned on August 7 that science may 
have "signed the mammalian world s death warrant, and deeded an earth 
in ruins to the ants." The next day, the Milwaukee Journal published a 
map of Milwaukee overlaid with concentric circles showing the pattern 
of destruction in Hiroshima. 
The more highly placed the observer, it seemed, the deeper the un­
easiness. Washington, a reporter wrote, was "pervaded by a sense of 
oppression." "For all we know," intoned the radio announcer H. V. Kal­
tenborn in his broadcast on the evening of August 6, "we have created a 
Frankenstein! We must assume that with the passage of only a little time, 
an improved form of the new weapon we used today can be turned 
against us." 
This primal fear of extinction cut across all political and ideological 
lines, from the staunchly conservative Chicago Tribune, which wrote of 
an atomic war that would leave the earth "a barren waste, in which the 
survivors of the race will hide in caves or live among ruins," to the liberal 
New Republic, which on August 20 offered an almost identical vision of 
a conflict that would "obliterate all the great cities of the belligerents, 
bring industry and technology to a grinding halt," and leave only "scat­
tered remnants of humanity living on the periphery of civilization." 
From our contemporary perspective such cataclysmic imagery may 
seem so familiar as to be almost trite—if visions of universal destruction 
can ever become trite. But it is sobering to realize how quickly these dark 
visions surfaced. Within hours of Truman's announcement, and years be­
fore the world's nuclear arsenals made such a holocaust likely or even 
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possible, the prospect of global annihilation already filled the nations 
consciousness. In the earliest moments of the nuclear era, the fear that 
would come to haunt millions of people not yet born in 1945 had 
already found urgent expression. 
In most cases, our memories of eveft the highest moments of public 
drama are eventually filed away. They become a reassuring part of our 
general stock of recollections, to be brought out and nostalgically relived 
from time to time. But August 6, 1945, is different. After forty years, it 
still has not receded into that safe and static realm we call "the past." 
Kaltenborns Frankenstein still roams; the Post-Dispatch's kingdom 
of the ants still waits in the wings. The stab of fear we felt when we read 
that first newspaper headline or heard that first radio bulletin may not 
occupy the center of our awareness, but it remains with us still. 
How AMERICANS IMAGINED THE 
BOMB THEY DROPPED 
This essay, adapted from an article published in the Au­gust 12 and 19, 1985, issue of the New Republic, fur­ther underscores the upsurge of journalistic attention 
to America's nuclear history elicited by the fortieth anni­
versary of the first use of the atomic bomb. In this piece, 
I offered an overview of the nation's earliest,, confused re­
sponses to the atomic bomb in the immediate postwar pe­
riod and reflected on Americans' forty-year effort to come to 
terms with the fact that their nation had used the bomb to 
destroy two cities in 1945. 
"HIROSHIMA." "NAGASAKI." The very words, familiar to the point of banality 
but restlessly alive, remind us that we have yet to assimilate fully what 
they represent to our political, cultural, or moral history. "After the pas­
sage of nearly four decades and a concomitant growth in our understand­
ing of the ever growing horror of nuclear war," declared the American 
Catholic bishops in 1983, "we must shape the climate of opinion which 
will make it possible for our country to express profound sorrow over the 
atomic bombing of 1945- Without that sorrow, there is no possibility of 
finding a way to repudiate future use of nuclear weapons." 
Catholic bishops choose words with precision. Not remorse, not 
shame—only sorrow. Yet even that minimal standard seems beyond us. 
Peace activists will observe the anniversary of the bombing on August 6, 
but most Americans will ignore it, lapse into banalities about the distant 
beginnings of the "atomic age," or debate once again the well-worn polit­
ical questions surrounding the decision to drop the bomb—important 
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questions, to be sure, but so familiar that they have taken on a ritualized 
quality, in which every response to every point is known in advance. 
The bishops are far from alone in concluding that we have failed as 
a people to come to terms with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As early as 
1946, Mary McCarthy described Hiroshima as "a kind of hole in human 
history." A few year ago I interviewed Ralph Lapp, the Manhattan Proj­
ect physicist who later became a vigorous critic of the nuclear arms race. 
One of his comments was particularly striking: "If the memory of things 
is to deter, where is that memory? Hiroshima . . . has been taken out of 
the American conscience, eviscerated, extirpated." 
To understand why, we must go back to the beginning. How did 
Americans first respond to the knowledge that official actions taken by 
their leaders had resulted in the instantaneous obliteration of two cities 
and the death of well over 100,000 human beings? In the public-opinion 
polls, the approval ratings stood at about 85 percent, with what Fortune 
magazine called "a considerable minority of disappointed savagery" wish­
ing that even more Japanese cities had been wiped out. A Wisconsin 
woman expressed her genocidal impulses in a letter to the Milwaukee 
Journal: "When one sets out to destroy vermin, does one try to leave a 
few alive in the nest? Certainly not." 
At all levels of American culture, there was an almost compulsive 
post-Hiroshima effort to trivialize the event and avoid its deeper impli­
cations. The New Republic, ridiculing reports from Japanese sources of 
contamination by radiation in the destroyed cities, commented on Sep­
tember 24, 1945: "If radioactivity is present in the soil, such plants will 
be marked by an unusual number of sports and mutations. Here is the 
ideal job for Emperor Hirohito, an amateur geneticist. . . . Let him go to 
Hiroshima, sit among the ruins, and watch the mutations grow." By 
1947 the Manhattan telephone directory listed forty-five companies that 
had incorporated the magic word "atomic" in their names, among them 
the Atomic Undergarment Company. General Mills that year offered 
kiddies a genuine "Atomic cBomb' Ring" for fifteen cents and a Kix cereal 
box top. 
There were exceptions, of course, to this denial of the enormity of 
the event. From the first, some Americans reacted to Hiroshima and Na­
gasaki with dismay and anguish. "King Herod's slaughter of the inno­
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cents—an atrocity committed in the name of defense—destroyed no 
more than a few hundred children," a professor at Chicago Theological 
Seminary wrote in Christian Century magazine. "Today, a single atomic 
bomb slaughters tens of thousands of children and their mothers and 
fathers. Newspapers and radio acclaim it a great victory. Victory for 
what?" A somewhat unexpected voice of moral protest was that of David 
Lawrence, editor of the conservative magazine United States News. And 
in the African American press, such intellectuals and organizational lead­
ers as W. E. B. Du Bois, Langston Hughes, Walter White, and others 
raised charges of racism in the decision to use the atomic bomb against 
a darker-skinned people. 
Generally speaking, however, the media and the public as a whole 
approved of the bombing of Japan. This was, after all, wartime. For 
nearly four years Americans had been subjected to anti-Japanese propa­
ganda, some of an incredibly crude racist character, and this racism 
spilled over into initial reactions to the bomb. The Philadelphia Inquir­
ers political cartoonist pictured an apelike creature staring up in gaping 
incomprehension as the bomb bursts overhead. 
President Truman's initial announcement linked Japans surprise at­
tack at Pearl Harbor to the retribution meted out at Hiroshima, and this 
moral symmetry appealed to many early postwar commentators on the 
bomb. In his influential 1946 book Dawn over Zero, William L. Laurence 
of the New York Times, the Manhattan Project's official chronicler, de­
scribed his feelings aboard the plane headed for Nagasaki: "Does one feel 
any pity or compassion for the poor devils about to die? Not when one 
thinks of Pearl Harbor and of the Death March on Bataan." Given the 
intensity of this war spirit, it is hardly surprising that with rare exceptions 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki figure hardly at all in early postwar American 
fiction or poetry. 
Awareness of the magnitude of the civilian toll at Hiroshima was 
initially blunted by President Truman's announcement, which declared: 
"The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiro­
shima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to 
avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians." Of course, Americans 
quickly realized that Hiroshima was not a Japanese Fort Benning, but a 
major city. Even then, however, they did not respond with the shock that 
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a totally unprecedented innovation in strategic bombing policy might 
have elicited. By August 1945, Americans were conditioned, to accept 
the slaughter of civilian populations as a legitimate military practice. At 
Dresden, Hamburg, and other German cities, and then in the Japanese 
war, the obliteration of cities had become the de facto Allied bombing 
strategy. More civilians died in the Tokyo firebombing raid of March 10, 
1945, than perished at Hiroshima. 
The most compelling factor of all in shaping the initial American 
response to Hiroshima was surely the universal insistence of policymak­
ers and opinion leaders that the only alternative to the atomic bomb 
would have been a land invasion of Japan costing hundreds of thousands 
of American lives. A few challenged this assertion. The Manhattan Proj­
ect scientists who had urgently advocated a demonstration shot prior to 
all-out military use continued to raise questions after the war's end. Re­
ports of Japanese peace feelers in early August quickly surfaced after V-J 
Day. In Fear, Wan and the Bomb (1948), the Nobel Prize-winning British 
physicist (and political leftist) P. M. S. Blackett suggested that power cal­
culations involving the Soviet Union had figured importantly in Wash-
ington's decision. 
For the vast majority of Americans, however, the theme that the 
atomic bomb "saved American lives" took deep root, obviating the need 
for any further discussion. Blackett s realpolitik argument was angrily de­
nounced by most American reviewers. (Not until the 1960s, in a very 
different political climate, would this "revisionist" interpretation gain a 
serious hearing.) Dwight Macdonald was one of the very few to challenge 
the moral legitimacy of this argument; it could, he said, be used to ratio­
nalize "any atrocious action, absolutely any one." But his was a lonely 
voice in 1945. Some took the argument even further, claiming that the 
bomb had saved Japanese lives as well by bringing a hopeless struggle to 
a decisive conclusion. As the Chicago Tribune put it in commenting on 
the American leaders' atomic bomb decision: "Being merciless, they were 
merciful." A Tribune editorial made the point visually, picturing a dove 
of peace flying over Japan with an atomic bomb in its beak. 
Any consideration of the early cultural response to Hiroshima must 
take into account John Hersey s remarkable work of 1946. Published first 
in a single issue of the New Yorker 2nd. then as a book, and now reissued 
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with a new chapter for the fortieth anniversary, Hersey's Hiroshima, with 
its straightforward factual account of the experiences of six ordinary men 
and women during and after the atomic bombing, helped transform the 
caricatured "Japs" of wartime propaganda back into Japanese—into fel­
low human beings. This was unquestionably a significant achievement, 
and one for which Hersey has been deservedly praised. But it has proven 
extraordinarily difficult for critics and cultural historians to zsscss his 
works broader impact. For many readers the effect seems to have been at 
once intensely moving and curiously passive. Hersey's restrained, unin­
fleeted New Yorker prose offered a kind of expiation and catharsis, a clos­
ing of accounts on a troubling episode, rather than a challenge to push 
on to a deeper, more threatening engagement with it. 
That the response of most Americans to Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
froze immediately at the surface level, never moving to a deeper plane of 
moral complexity, is surely attributable in large part to the fact that the 
nations media and molders of opinion quickly turned to other aspects 
of the atomic energy story. Within hours of Truman's announcement, 
newspapers and magazines were offering detailed explanations of nuclear 
physics, long self-congratulatory histories of the Manhattan Project, and 
euphoric discussions of an atomic-energy Utopia of limitless power, 
atomic cars and planes, medical wonders, boundless leisure, and revolu­
tions in agriculture. That this latest scientific wonder had burst on the 
world's consciousness through the obliteration of a city seemed merely a 
regrettable piece of bad luck—rather as though electricity, with all its 
benefits, had first become known through the mass electrocution of sev­
eral hundred thousand people. 
Some went further, suggesting that the destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki had been an essential step in making atomic energy available 
for peaceful purposes. Similarly, those who believed that the atomic 
bomb would assure world peace by making war too horrible to contem­
plate stressed the symbolic importance of the event. "Never in all the 
long history of human slaughter have lives been lost to greater purpose," 
Reader s Digest declared reassuringly in November 1945; all mankind was 
now united by bonds "fused unbreakably in the diabolical heat of those 
explosions." 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki penetrated the postwar American 
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consciousness in another important symbolic respect as well: as examples 
of what might lie ahead for American cities. At the moment of victory, 
the nation suddenly felt itself naked and vulnerable, and Hiroshima be­
came the emblem of that vulnerability. "In that terrible flash 10,000 
miles away," wrote Washington correspondent James Reston in the New 
York Times, men and women in the capital had "glimpsed the future of 
America." 
The immense symbolic and polemical value of Hiroshima and Naga­
saki was heavily exploited by activist scientists and others who in 1946 
sought to arouse public support for the Acheson-Lilienthal international 
control plan. "Only one tactic is dependable—the preaching of doom," 
one scientist told the New Yorker; anything else was "met with yawns." 
Without international control of the atom, Americans were endlessly 
warned, the fate of these two cities would be theirs as well. 
Highly effective as propaganda, this shorthand use of "Hiroshima" 
and "Nagasaki" as abstract cautionary devices further diminished the ca­
pacity of Americans to respond directly to the actual fate of two real 
cities. The emotional thrust of the 1946 fear campaign was directed for­
ward to possible future atomic holocausts, not backward to what had 
already occurred. Indeed, one international control activist urged the 
pacifist A. J. Muste to mute his criticism of the atomic bombing of Ja­
pan, since it was diverting attention from the important political task at 
hand. Muste, however, like the Catholic bishops in 1983, was convinced 
that the nuclear future and the nuclear past were inextricably linked. 
Without confronting Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he later wrote, "no polit­
ical or moral appraisal of our age is adequate, no attempt to find an 
answer to its dilemmas and destiny offers hope." 
This brings us to the final, perhaps the underlying, reason why the 
American people proved so reluctant to grapple with the full implica­
tions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the war, and why after forty years 
we still approach with such uncertainty the events of that distant August. 
The nuclear obliteration of two cities on orders from Washington forced 
Americans of 1945—and forces us today—to face up to the extent to 
which the fighting of World War II had descended into wholesale, indis­
criminate slaughter. And this recognition, in turn, seems seriously to 
compromise the moral clarity of what has come to be called "The Good 
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War." In contrast to the ambiguities of some of Americas military in­
volvements since 1945, World War II united the American people in 
what was seen almost universally as a wholly justifiable struggle against 
forces that represented the very embodiment of evil. But the nuclear dev­
astation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, coupled with the destruction of 
other cities by "conventional" means, adds an unsettlingly discordant 
note. To contemplate Hiroshima and Nagasaki unblinkingly is to con­
front our recent moral history in the most radical way imaginable. Few 
were ready to do that in 1945. Few have been prepared to do it since. 
Thus the American cultural and intellectual engagement with Hiro­
shima has remained episodic and inconclusive. The reasons are clear 
enough. Hiroshima challenges not only our view of World War II, but 
also some of our most deep-seated beliefs about the meaning of our na­
tional experience. For years, cultural historians have noted the power and 
the tenacity of the myth of American innocence: the belief that we are 
somehow set apart from the other nations of the world, our motives 
higher, our methods purer. This myth has never lacked critics, of course, 
and as early as the 1920s it came under massive challenge. But it re­
mained potent well after World War II, and is far from dead today. It is 
very difficult, to say the least, to fit Hiroshima into a moral schema 
rooted in a national mythology of innocence and exceptionalism. 
Hiroshima raises in the starkest imaginable fashion that most trou­
blesome of ethical dilemmas: At what point are good motives corrupted 
and perverted by the means employed to achieve them? If that point was 
not reached at Hiroshima—and certainly at Nagasaki—at what conceiv­
able point in the actions of a nation-state would it be reached? These are 
not questions for which our image of America has prepared us. Consider, 
for example, Freeman Dyson's reflections, in Disturbing the Universe, on 
the anger of many American atomic scientists when J. Robert Oppenhei­
mer, in a famous comment of 1948, described them having "known sin": 
They lacked the tragic sense of life which was deeply in­
grained in every European of my generation [the genera­
tion of the First World War]. They had never lived with 
tragedy and had no feeling for it. Having no sense of 
tragedy, they also had no sense of guilt. They seemed 
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very young aiyL innocent although most of them were 
older than I was. They had come through the war with­
out scars. Los Alamos had been for them a great lark. It 
left their innocence untouched. That was why they were 
unable to accept Oppys statement as expressing a truth 
about themselves. 
Hiroshima challenges another foundation stone of American culture 
as well: our proud pragmatism, the tradition of William James and John 
Dewey. Absolutist thinking must be abandoned, James insisted; the best 
test of truth is its practical usefulness in helping us achieve our purposes. 
Give up abstract moralizing, Dewey agreed; accept reality as it actually 
presents itself and concentrate on shaping it toward intelligently formu­
lated social ends. The same experimental method that gave rise to mod­
ern science, he said, must now be applied in the social realm. In practice, 
this philosophy led Dewey to lend enthusiastic support to American in­
tervention in World War I. That conflict, he believed, could be utilized 
by engaged intellectuals for progressive purposes at home and abroad. 
The pragmatic tradition is not conducive to the taking of principled 
moral stands. (Those like Jane Addams and Randolph Bourne who did 
take such a stand in 1917—18 found themselves exiled to the margin, if 
not ostracized.) But if Hiroshima does not demand that one at least most 
seriously consider such a stand, what situation possibly could? The ex­
perimental ethic is serviceable when the results of a failed "experiment" 
can be corrected with relative ease. It is less satisfactory in helping us 
formulate a position toward decisions like the one President Truman 
faced in August 1945—and others may face in the future. 
Finally, our national discourse over Hiroshima remains so deeply 
troubling because it is not merely about a past event, however divisive or 
traumatic, but also about contemporary public policy issues of the grav­
est import. Culture and politics are never wholly separable, of course, 
but in this instance they are interwoven in a particularly complex and 
volatile way. Our sporadic but continuing effort to come to terms with 
Hiroshima is part of our larger struggle to clarify, collectively and indi­
vidually, our view of World War II, our vision of America, our character­
istic approach to issues of ethics and value, and is, finally, a way to 
comprehend the nuclear reality itself 
PRESIDENT TRUMAN, THE AMERICAN 
PEOPLE, AND THE ATOMIC BOMB 
Iike the essays reprinted in chapters 1 and 2, this one, too, was occasioned by an anniversary: not another I A-bomb anniversary this time, but the centennial of 
Harry Truman's birth (1884). In 1983,1 received an invita­
tion to participate in a scholarly conference marking this 
event, to be held the following year at the Smithsonian Insti­
tutions Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
This conference provided an occasion for me to link my 
research on the responses of the American people to the 
atomic bomb, a topic in which I was then immersed, with 
Trumans own public pronouncements and (scanty) private 
reflections on the bomb. 
As I prepared my paper, I was struck by the parallelism 
of the responses the bomb elicited from the American people 
and from the American president—responses ranging from 
giddy euphoria and rigid self-justification to sober second 
thoughts and uneasy fears. This chapter is adapted from the 
paper I first presented orally at that 1984 conference, and 
then expanded for the published volume of conference 
papers (Michael J. Lacey, ed., The Truman Presidency [New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989]). My principal 
memory from the conference itself is of Truman adviser 
Clark Clifford commenting emotionally on how many lives 
the atomic bomb had spared, Japanese as well as American, 
by rendering unnecessary an invasion of Japan—a faithful 
echo of an argument Truman himself had often advanced. 
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FOR MILLIONS OF AMERICANS born before World War II, memories of Presi­
dent Truman are inextricably interwoven with memories of the atomic 
bomb. To be sure, Franklin D. Roosevelt had launched the Manhattan 
Project, but that was all in secret. It was Truman who announced the 
staggering news to the world on August 6, 1945, who was central to the 
controversies of 1946-47 over both domestic and international control 
of atomic energy, who announced the first Russian atomic-bomb test in 
September 1949, and who in January 1950 authorized development of 
the hydrogen bomb. 
For anyone interested in Harry Truman and his presidency, the ques­
tion of the atomic bomb is clearly central. For the historian concerned 
with the bombs effect on American thought and culture, Truman is a 
key figure. Curiously, however, neither Truman scholars nor historians 
studying the evolution of popular attitudes toward nuclear weapons have 
given Truman's comments about the atomic bomb the close attention 
that one might expect. We have excellent studies of Truman s role in the 
diplomacy, strategy, and domestic politics of the early postwar period as 
they related to the atomic bomb, but relatively little attention has been 
given to a systematic analysis of his views on the atomic bomb per se. 
One reason for this is probably the elusive nature of the evidence. 
Truman had a good deal to say about the atomic bomb, as about most 
subjects, but much of it was ad hoc and fragmentary. Rarely, if ever, did 
he offer a comprehensive account of the development of his view of the 
bomb and its meaning. Adding to the challenge is the fact that Truman 
commented on the bomb at three quite distinct levels of discourse, two 
of which have only gradually become accessible to historians. The first 
level (public pronouncements, formal addresses, messages to Congress, 
and so on) has, of course, been known for decades, and much of it is so 
familiar as to be difficult to read with a fresh eye. The second level (oral 
and written communication that passed between Truman and his advis­
ers) has unfolded only gradually and in piecemeal fashion with the publi­
cation of memoirs by participants and the opening of various manuscript 
and archive collections. Finally, there is the intensely interesting level of 
Truman's relatively uncensored private reflections, expressed in diary jot­
tings or in personal letters to his wife, Bess, or his daughter, Margaret. 
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Much of this material, often in striking variance to his public pronounce­
ments, has become available only in the past few years. 
This essay draws together some of what we know about Trumans 
thinking on this subject and relates it to the larger pattern of American 
attitudes toward the atomic bomb in the early postwar years. Such an 
effort is revealing in several ways. First, it brings into sharp focus aspects 
of Trumans character and his mode of dealing with issues. Second, it 
illustrates how profoundly the advent of this awesome new force could 
disrupt and disorient even so down-to-earth a man as Truman, produc­
ing some quite striking contradictions and inconsistencies. Third, Tru­
mans response to the bomb, in all its ambiguity, mirrors in an uncanny 
fashion the larger response of the American people. The uncertainties 
and ambivalences in Trumans own mind on this subject were simultane­
ously being played out on the larger stage of public discourse and cultural 
expression in this early post-Hiroshima period. Finally, of course, the 
views expressed by Truman and top members of his administration on 
the atomic bomb are important to the cultural historian not only because 
they mirror the broader national response, but also because they helped 
shape it. 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DROPPING THE BOMB 
President Truman was lunching with the crew of the USS Augusta on 
August 6, 1945, steaming westward across the Atlantic en route home 
from the Potsdam conference, when a radio message from Secretary of 
War Henry L. Stimson informed him that the atomic bombing of Hiro­
shima had been a "complete success." "This is the greatest thing in 
history," he spontaneously exclaimed. After breaking the news to the 
cheering sailors, he rushed to the wardroom to tell the officers, amid 
more cheers and excitement. 
Meanwhile, in Washington, a prearranged news release had been 
issued that morning by the White House under Trumans name, in­
forming the world that an atomic bomb had been "loosed against those 
who brought war in the Far East." In this critically important announce­
ment, which shaped Americans' initial perceptions of the bomb, Truman 
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offered only two brief justifications for its use against Japan. First, he 
cited Tokyo's surprise attack on the United States in 1941: "The Japanese 
began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many­
fold." Second, he noted that the Japanese had rejected the Allied surren­
der ultimatum issued at Potsdam on July 26, 1945—an ultimatum that 
had warned them of "complete and utter destruction" if they did not 
surrender unconditionally. 
In less formal comments at this time, Truman further justified the 
atomic bombing on two additional grounds: Japan's wartime atrocities 
and the racist assertion that the Japanese were subhuman creatures to 
whom the moral restraint that nations (at least professedly) observed in 
wartime need not apply. These interwoven themes emerged most clearly 
in Truman's response to a post-Hiroshima telegram from an official of 
the Federal Council of Churches, an association of liberal Protestant de­
nominations, urging that no further atomic bombs be dropped. Tru-
man's answer, written on August 9 with the knowledge that a second 
atomic bomb would in fact be dropped momentarily, declared, "Nobody 
is more disturbed over the use of the atomic bomb than I am, but I was 
greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl 
Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they 
seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them. 
When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It 
is most regrettable but nevertheless true." 
As wartime passions subsided after Japans surrender, another justi­
fication emerged. The atomic bomb was the only alternative to an inva­
sion of Japan that would have cost many American lives. The gist of this 
argument was contained in Truman's message to Congress of October 3, 
1945, on the subject of atomic-energy legislation. "We know," the presi­
dent declared unequivocally, "that [the atomic bomb] saved the lives of 
untold thousands of American soldiers who would otherwise have been 
killed in battle." Truman became more specific in his address at the 
annual Gridiron Dinner in Washington on December 15, 1945. Pur­
porting to describe his thought process at the time he made the atomic-
bomb decision, he declared, "It occurred to me, that a quarter of a 
million of the flower of our young manhood were worth a couple of 
Japanese cities, and I still think they were and are." 
 21 Truman and the Atomic Bomb
This argument was most fully elaborated in an extremely influential 
February 1947 Harper's magazine article by former secretary of war 
Henry L. Stimson. Had the atomic bomb not been employed as it was, 
Stimson contended, a full-scale invasion of Japan, first of Kyushu and 
then of the main island of Honshu, would have been necessary. This 
would have extended the war through 1946, he insisted, and entailed 
horrendous losses: "I was informed that such operations might be ex­
pected to cost over a million casualties to American forces alone. Addi­
tional large losses might be expected among our allies, and of course, if 
our campaign was successful and if we could judge by previous experi­
ence, enemy casualties would be much larger than our own." Repeat­
ing this argument in his 1953 memoirs, Winston Churchill inflated 
Stimsons projection of a million American casualties (i.e., killed, 
wounded, and missing) into a million American deaths, plus a half million 
British ones. 
With the passing years, Truman insisted ever more rigidly that the 
atomic-bomb decision was totally justified, that he had never had a mo-
ment's second thoughts, and that he would unhesitatingly make the same 
decision again. "I regarded the bomb as a military weapon," he wrote in 
his 1955 memoirs, "and never had any doubt that it should be used." 
A fundamental element of Truman's public persona was his cocky self-
confidence, with no hint of self-doubt or even of second thoughts about 
his major decisions. As he wrote in 1957, "I hardly ever look back for 
the purpose of contemplating what might have been.'" Nothing illus­
trates this trait more clearly than the tone of absolute assurance he 
adopted in all public comment on the atomic-bomb decision. From Au­
gust 6, 1945, until his death in 1972, Truman invariably rejected with 
great vehemence any suggestion that the atomic destruction of two cities 
might have been unnecessary militarily, tragic in its long-range implica­
tions, or problematic on ethical grounds. When J. Robert Oppenheimer, 
in a White House meeting with Truman shortly after the war, expressed 
remorse over the dropping of the atomic bomb and alluded to scientists' 
feelings that they had blood on their hands, Truman contemptuously 
ridiculed this "crybaby" reaction. (According to one version of the en­
counter, Truman pulled a handkerchief from his pocket and derisively 
offered it to Oppenheimer to wipe the blood off his hands.) 
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So intent was Truman on maintaining his posture of absolute certi­
tude regarding this question that he eventually erected a kind of invisible 
shield around the subject to ward off any probing by himself or anyone 
else. In one of his now-famous unmailed letters, he in 1962 unleashed a 
memorable blast at diplomatic historian Herbert Feis, who was raising 
troublesome questions as he sought to re-create the strategic considera­
tions underlying the bomb decision. Wrote Truman to Feis: 
It ended the Jap War. That was the objective. Now if 
you can think of any other . . . egghead contemplations, 
bring them out. You get the same answer—to end the 
Jap War and save lA of a million of our youngsters and 
many Japs from death and twice that many on each side 
from being maimed for life. 
It is a great thing that you or any other contemplator 
"after the fact" didn't have to make the decision. Our 
boys would all be dead. 
The following year, in another unsent letter, this one to Chicago Sun-
Times columnist Irv Kupcinet, Truman wrote, "I knew what I was doing 
when I stopped the war that would have killed a half million youngsters 
on both sides if those bombs had not been dropped. I have no regrets 
and, under the same circumstances, I would do it again—and this letter 
is not confidential." Toward the end of his life, when the producers of a 
television special on his career suggested a trip to Hiroshima in connec­
tion with the atomic bomb episode, Truman proclaimed, "I'll go to Ja­
pan, if that's what you want, but I won't kiss their ass." 
Why did Truman react so violently to even the whisper of doubt 
about his atomic-bomb decision? Why the insults, ridicule, contempt, 
and abuse toward those who tried to penetrate his shell of self-righteous 
certitude? In part, of course, this was simply another manifestation of 
the cocky self-confidence so central to Truman's public image. Was more 
involved? Did the strident certainty that eventually reached self-parody 
perhaps mask a bad conscience? Despite the evidence of Alamogordo, 
did Truman still not wholly grasp, prior to August 6, the bomb's full 
destructive magnitude? In his memoirs, he makes clear that he carefully 
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went over the atomic-bomb target list of Japanese cities with his military 
leaders, and in retrospect he insists that he was fully aware that the bomb 
"would inflict damage and casualties beyond imagination" and was "po­
tentially capable of wiping out entire cities." Yet on July 5> as the final 
order for the bombs use was being drawn up, he wrote in his diary, "I 
have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objec­
tives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and chil­
dren. . . . He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military 
one." In the same vein, the August 6 news release described Hiroshima, 
a city of 350,000, simply as "an important Japanese Army base." 
In the days immediately after August 6, before Truman's pronounce­
ments about the bomb decision became so rigid, there are hints that he 
was shaken and dismayed as the full horror of the civilian toll sank in. 
On August 7 (in significant contrast to his assertion two days later, 
"When you deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast"), Truman 
rejected Senator Richard B. Russell's demand that the Japanese must be 
brought "groveling to their knees," commenting: "I can't bring myself to 
believe that because they are beasts we should ourselves act in the same 
manner." And, according to Henry Wallace's diary, at the cabinet meet­
ing of August 10, the day after the Nagasaki bombing, "Truman said he 
had given orders to stop atomic bombing. He said the thought of wiping 
out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn't like the idea of 
killing, as he said, 'all those kids.'" 
Obviously, such sketchy evidence as this does not prove conclusively 
that Truman felt uneasy about his decision. Yet if the full evidence of the 
bomb's power to obliterate entire cities did shock and somewhat unnerve 
him, making a mockery of his earlier insistence on "purely military" tar­
gets, the very stridency of his later efforts to place his decision beyond 
the reach of criticism or even discussion may have been his way of dealing 
with fugitive doubts that he never openly expressed and perhaps never 
fully acknowledged even to himself. 
How successful were Truman's efforts to explain and justify his 
atomic-bomb decision? From the first, the president's contention that 
the atomic bomb was the only alternative to an invasion of Japan aroused 
skepticism in some quarters. As early as 1946, on the basis of a detailed 
study of the state of the Japanese war effort by the summer of 1945 and 
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exhaustive interviews with high Japanese officials, the United States Stra­
tegic Bombing Survey concluded that Japan would have surrendered 
"certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in all probability prior to 
November 1, 1945, . . . even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, 
even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been 
planned or contemplated." 
Beginning with Gar Alperovitzs Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and 
Potsdam (1965) and continuing with such works as Martin J. Sherwins 
A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (1977), a 
considerable body of historical scholarship has emerged that reinforces 
the conclusion of the Strategic Bombing Survey and convincingly shows 
that calculations involving the Soviet Union were more fundamental to 
the decision-making process than Truman's or Stimson's version of that 
process acknowledged. These works have made clear that Japan was al­
most desperately seeking to end the war by July 1945 and that, thanks 
to the breaking of the Japanese communications code, these efforts were 
known to President Truman. Truman's own memoirs acknowledge that 
as early as the end of May, after the Okinawa campaign, Acting Secretary 
of State Joseph Grew (the only high administration official with ex­
tended experience in Japan) informed Truman of his belief that the Japa­
nese would surrender if they were assured that the emperor could remain 
on his throne. 
The Truman diaries and family letters that have become available to 
scholars in the past few years further support the revisionist critique of 
the Truman-Stimson version of the atomic-bomb decision. For example, 
when Stalin reaffirmed at Potsdam his Yalta pledge to declare war on 
Japan three months after Germany's surrender, Truman was exultant. 
"He'll be in Jap War on August 15," Truman wrote in his diary on July 
17. "Fini Japs when that comes about." To Bess he wrote: "I've gotten 
what I came for—Stalin goes to war on August 1 5 . . .  . I'll say that we'll 
end the war a year sooner, now, and think of the kids who won't be killed. 
That is the important thing." By mid-July, in short, Truman knew that 
Japan was on the verge of surrender, and he was convinced that the Soviet 
Union's forthcoming declaration of war would provide the final push. 
As historian Robert Messer has recently argued, the issue occupying 
Trumans mind in these critical days was not the nightmare of a costly 
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land invasion of Japan, but the precise means by which Japans imminent 
collapse would be achieved. 
As the stunning success of the Alamogordo test became apparent, 
Truman realized that the United States, and not the Soviets, could pro­
vide the final blow. "Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in," 
Truman wrote in his diary on July 18. "I am sure they will when Manhat­
tan [the atomic bomb] appears over their homeland/' When Stimson 
flew to Potsdam and gave Truman a full briefing on Alamogordo, the 
president was (according to Stimsons diary) "tremendously pepped up" 
and displayed "an entirely new feeling of confidence." Repeatedly Tru­
man thanked Stimson for the report and for "being present to help him 
in this way." In a 1948 letter to Margaret, Truman regretted that he had 
worked so hard at Potsdam to get Stalin to reaffirm his pledge to enter 
the Pacific war: "All of us wanted Russia in the Japanese War. Had we 
known what the Atomic Bomb would do we'd have never wanted the 
Bear in the picture." 
The precise casualty estimates that Truman cited so authoritatively 
whenever he discussed the hypothetical invasion that the atomic bomb 
allegedly prevented have come in for critical scrutiny as well. After an 
exhaustive study of this aspect of the debate over the atomic-bomb deci­
sion, Rufus E. Miles Jr., a former senior fellow of Princetons Woodrow 
Wilson Center, argued in the Fall 1985 issue of International Security 
that the figure of a quarter million casualties was "an 'off-the-top-of-the-
head' estimate made in the early spring of 1945, before the war and navy 
departments realized how rapid was the deterioration of Japans capacity 
to resist, and then uncritically repeated on various occasions after the 
situation had radically changed." 
Truman's immediate purpose, however, was to persuade not histori­
ans but the American electorate that the atomic bombing of Japan had 
been necessary and praiseworthy, and in this he succeeded brilliantly. 
Public opinion polls in the autumn of 1945 revealed overwhelming 
approval ratings; in newspaper editorials, approval was practically 
unanimous. 
Truman's arguments all struck a responsive popular chord. His link­
ing of Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima resonated strongly with Americans, 
who recalled vividly the treachery of December 7, 1941, and for whom 
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"Remember Pearl Harbor" had been the most powerful of wartime 
slogans. Countless post-Hiroshima editorials, cartoons, and letters to 
the editor enthusiastically endorsed Truman's assertion that the atomic 
bomb was fair retribution for Japanese atrocities in the Philippines and 
the brutal island campaigns of the Pacific. Some of this commentary re­
flected the same racism that underlay Truman's description of the Japa­
nese as beasts. As John Dower argued in War without Mercy: Race and 
Power in the Pacific War (1986), American anti-Japanese propaganda dur­
ing the war was deeply racist, and it is hardly surprising that racist ar­
guments and images should have been employed in the rush to justify 
the atomic bomb. Some newspaper letters expressed regret that atomic 
bombs had not been used to destroy all human life in Japan. 
Truman's claim that the only alternative to the atomic bomb would 
have been a protracted land war also went largely unquestioned. But why 
did most Americans believe so eagerly and uncritically that, if the atomic 
bomb had not been used, the war would have dragged on for perhaps 
another eighteen months at a hideous cost in blood and suffering? Why, 
in the face of the mounting body of historical evidence to the contrary, 
do many, perhaps most, Americans still remain firmly convinced that 
the bomb "saved hundreds of thousands of American lives"? The answer, 
presumably, is that myths of this tenacity serve necessary psychological 
functions. As Rufus E. Miles Jr. has observed: 
The use of these figures [estimating invasion casualties] 
by Truman and others can be explained by a subcon­
scious compulsion to persuade themselves and the 
American public that, horrible as the atomic bombs 
were, their use was actually humane inasmuch as it saved 
a huge number of lives. The larger the estimate of deaths 
averted, the more self-evidently justified the action 
seemed. Exaggerating these figures avoided, in large 
part, the awkward alternative of having to rethink and 
explain a complex set of circumstances and considera­
tions that influenced the decision to drop the bomb. 
Not everyone concurred in the government's rationalizations. The 
nuclear annihilation of well over a hundred thousand men, women, and 
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children of a defeated nation teetering on the brink of surrender was not, 
for some, so easily dismissed. Even in the perfervid emotional climate 
of the war and its immediate aftermath, a small minority of Americans 
expressed grave reservations about the official deeds performed in their 
name. Others who did not categorically condemn Truman's decision 
were nevertheless unprepared to accept his strident insistence that the 
action was so obviously justified as not even to merit reflection or debate. 
These responses, too, constituted a part of the post-Hiroshima cultural 
and moral landscape, and as such they deserve attention and study. But 
the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of Americans, as well as 
the nation's principal media outlets, found little to question in the 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The pattern of Truman's 
own response to the bomb—vociferous public justification with an un­
dercurrent of barely acknowledged uneasiness and doubt—accurately re­
flected and encapsulated the reaction of the larger American public. 
THE LARGER MEANING OF ATOMIC ENERGY 
What of the atomic future? What were the implications of the un­
leashing of the atom? And what larger meanings could one extract from 
this momentous event? Here, too, the responses of President Truman, 
both public and private, paralleled and helped shape those of the larger 
public. Again his initial announcement of August 6, 1945, must be 
the starting point. This eleven-hundred-word message provided no in­
formation, even of the sketchiest sort, about the probable human or 
physical toll at Hiroshima. The Alamogordo test and the scale of destruc­
tiveness it had demonstrated were passed over in silence. Radiation was 
unmentioned. 
Rather, the theme of the message was upbeat and positive. The 
drama and vast scope of the Manhattan Project were vividly evoked, un­
derscoring the supremacy of U.S. industrial might and technological 
know-how: 
We now have two great plants and many lesser works 
devoted to the production of atomic power. Employ­
ment during peak construction numbered 125,000 and 
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over 65,000 individuals are even now engaged in op­
erating the plants. Many have worked there for two and 
a half years. Few know what they have been produc­
ing. They see great quantities of material going in and 
they see nothing coming out of these plants, for the phy­
sical size of the explosive charge is exceedingly small. We 
have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific 
gamble in history—and won. 
Truman's announcement dwelled on the scientific achievement of the 
Manhattan Project even more than on its technological wonder. For the 
United States in 1945, news of the atomic bomb came embedded in a 
glowing hymn of praise to science: "The greatest marvel is not the size 
of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its cost, but the achievement of scientific 
brains in putting together infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held 
by many men in different fields of science into a workable plan. . . . The 
brain child of many minds came forth in physical shape and performed 
as it was supposed to do. . . . What has been done is the greatest achieve­
ment of organized science in history." 
This dramatic scientific breakthrough, Truman continued, held vast 
promise for enlarging human knowledge; it ushered in "a new era in 
man's understanding of nature's forces/' Truman reiterated the point in 
his October 3, 1945, atomic-energy message to Congress. Although the 
atom posed "potential danger," it was "at the same time . . . full of prom­
ise for the future of man and for the peace of the world." 
As for immediate practical benefits to be expected from this triumph 
of science, Truman's August 6 announcement struck a cautious note, 
warning that only after "a long period of intensive research" would 
atomic energy be available for nonmilitary purposes. But soon the cau­
tionary note faded in a glow of hyperbole. Atomic energy, proclaimed 
Truman in his October 3 message, "may someday prove to be more revo­
lutionary in the development of human society than the invention of 
the wheel, the use of metals, or steam or internal combustion engines." 
Speaking extemporaneously at a county fair in Missouri at about the 
same time, he predicted that knowledge of the atom would lead to "the 
happiest world that the sun has ever shone upon." 
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The positive side was also emphasized in several of Truman's State of 
the Union messages, although the advent of the atomic bomb, surely a 
major event of 1945, was not even mentioned in Truman's first such mes­
sage in January 1946. When he first raised the subject of atomic energy 
in his January 1947 speech, it was in the context of the atom's great 
promise: "In the vigorous and effective development of peaceful uses of 
atomic energy," the president declared, "rests our hope that this new 
force may ultimately be turned into a blessing for all nations." Truman 
expressed similar bright hopes in the rest of his State of the Union 
messages. 
If Henry Stimson was Truman's principal collaborator in the cam­
paign to justify the decision to drop the atomic bomb, his most effective 
lieutenant in promulgating the message of the peaceful atom was David 
E. Lilienthal. As head of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1930s, 
Lilienthal had emerged as a tireless public advocate for large-scale federal 
development projects. As chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) from its creation in 1946 until 1950, Lilienthal brought the same 
zeal and eloquence to spreading the vision of a world transformed by 
atomic energy. Often featured in the press as "Mr. Atom," Lilienthal 
labored mightily to flesh out Truman's message and give a benevolent 
aura to the new atomic reality. While debunking the more ludicrously 
exaggerated claims of some popularizers, Lilienthal extolled the atom's 
peacetime promise in numerous speeches and magazine articles. In a 
nationally broadcast 1948 high school graduation address delivered at 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, he spoke with almost grating optimism of the 
vast future benefits of atomic energy, promising "one of the blessed peri­
ods of all human history." 
Lilienthal frequently described atomic energy as simply a form of 
solar energy—and potentially as beneficial. As he told another high 
school graduating class in 1947, the sun was nothing but "a huge atomic-
energy factory." Such pronouncements reflected Lilienthal s almost mys­
tical belief in the power of positive thinking—his conviction that merely 
to turn peoples thoughts from the atomic bomb to speculation about 
possible peacetime applications, whatever the actual reality, was a sig­
nificant social achievement. 
Truman strongly backed LilienthaTs efforts to turn the public mind 
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from atomic weapons to the promise of atomic energy. Dramatizing this 
theme, at the initiative of the AEC he sent a telegram to an international 
conference of cancer specialists meeting at St. Louis in 1947, announcing 
that scientists all over the world would be given access to radioactive iso­
topes (by-products of the government's nuclear-weapons program) to aid 
in the fight against cancer. During a February 1950 meeting with Tru­
man, two weeks after the president's hydrogen-bomb decision,, Lilienthal 
noted in his diary Truman's full agreement "that my theme of Atoms for 
Peace is just what the country needs." 
Reflecting Lilienthal's upbeat emphasis, the AEC in the late 1940s 
initiated the preparation of booklets, films, exhibitions, and curricular 
materials publicizing the atom's beneficent promise. Prominent in this 
effort was the Brookhaven National Laboratory, a Long Island facility 
jointly funded and administered by the AEC and nine large eastern uni­
versities. Much of the AEC's limited nonmilitary research was centered 
at Brookhaven, and members of its staff frequently spoke to public gath­
erings and the press. Brookhaven's public relations office assembled two 
traveling exhibits featuring movies, audiovisual displays, and live demon­
strations. Exhibitions were mounted in a number of cities and at the 
American Museum of Natural History in New York. The campaign to 
counteract the public's atomic phobia crested in the summer of 1948 
with "Man and the Atom," a month-long multimedia exhibition in New 
York's Central Park. This show was jointly sponsored by the AEC, its 
major corporate contractors for nuclear power development (General 
Electric and Westinghouse), and the New York Committee on Atomic 
Information—an umbrella group of various service organizations. 
Following the lead of Truman, Lilienthal, and the AEC, the Ameri­
can media in these years heavily promoted the vision of an imminent 
atomic Utopia. Although the "Atoms for Peace" program as a formal U.S. 
policy initiative dates from President Dwight Eisenhowers United Na­
tions speech of December 1953, the theme was omnipresent in the Tru­
man years as well. In one of its more dramatic expressions, CBS radio in 
June 1947 broadcast an hour-long documentary, "The Sunny Side of the 
Atom," designed to publicize the vast promise of radioactive isotopes 
and, according to a publicist, counteract "the 'scare' approach to atomic 
education." 
Numerous magazine feature articles struck the same note, portraying 
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the enormous promise of the atomic age. The applications of atomic en­
ergy to the treatment of cancer and other ills, reported Collier's in May 
1947, opened the door to a "golden age of atomic medicine." This fea­
ture was illustrated with a composite photograph of a former paraplegic, 
healed by atomic energy, emerging smiling from a mushroom-shaped 
cloud, his empty wheelchair in the background. Foreseeing cures for can­
cer, heart disease, and other ailments thanks to atomic energy, Operation 
Atomic Vision, a 1948 high school study unit prepared by the National 
Education Association, declared: "Many of our generation will reach the 
century mark. . . . No one will need to work long hours. There will be 
much leisure, and a network of large recreational areas will cover the 
country, if not the world." 
This government and media blitz had its effect. In a 1948 Gallup 
poll, 61 percent of college-educated Americans answered yes to the ques­
tion: "Do you think that, in the long run, atomic energy will do more 
good than harm?" Other surveys produced similar results. This emphasis 
on a thrilling—if somewhat amorphous—atomic Utopia ahead, tenta­
tively advanced in President Truman's initial atomic-bomb announce­
ment and then massively reinforced by official and media sources in the 
succeeding months and years, had a profound influence in molding 
Americans' initial responses to the nuclear reality. 
The positive view of science that pervades Truman's August 6 an­
nouncement also mirrored and helped shape the broader public re­
sponse. In the early post-Hiroshima period, newspapers, magazines, and 
radio were full of glowing accounts of the Manhattan Project as a crown­
ing triumph of the age of science. Photographs of J. Robert Oppenhei­
mer and other leading physicists stared from every page, and the 
pronouncements of scientists, from Albert Einstein down to the lowliest 
physics graduate students caught up in the Manhattan Project, received 
almost reverent attention. In post-Hiroshima editorial cartoons, scien­
tists typically appear as awesome, larger-than-life figures. In one, a scien­
tist, represented as a person so gigantic that only his lower legs are visible, 
passes the knowledge of atomic energy to a dwarflike figure labeled "The 
Statesman." Another cartoon portraying a somber scientist offering an 
atom to the human race (represented as a crawling, diaper-clad infant) 
was captioned, "Baby Play With Nice Ball?" 
But as the mixed messages of such cartoons suggest, the post­
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Hiroshima view of science had a darker side, and Truman anticipated 
this, too. Characteristically, however, he did not reveal his bleaker reflec­
tions publicly. On July 16, the day he first learned of the successful test 
at Alamogordo, he wrote in his diary: "I hope for some sort of peace— 
but I fear that machines are ahead of morals by some centuries and when 
morals catch up perhaps there'll be no reason for any of it. I hope not. 
But we are only termites on a planet and maybe when we bore too deeply 
into the planet there'll [be] a reckoning—who knows?" On July 25, after 
Stimson had flown to Potsdam with a detailed account of the Alamo­
gordo blast by eyewitnesses, Truman characterized the report as "star-
tling—to put it mildly." Brooding on this "most terrible bomb in the 
history of the world . . . , the most terrible thing ever discovered," he 
expressed his fear of apocalypse in biblical imagery: "It may be the fire 
destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his 
fabulous Ark." 
In these sober reflections on Alamogordo, Truman uncannily re­
flected a spontaneous popular response to the Hiroshima news that came 
a few days later—a response of profound apprehension and even terror, 
often expressed in nightmarish images of universal destruction. Radio 
newscasters and newspaper articles and editorials compared Hiroshima 
with U.S. cities of similar size. Photographs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
were transmuted into images of American cities in smoldering ruin. 
This fear pervaded all levels of society, from Nobel laureates and gov­
ernment leaders to those who scarcely grasped what had happened but 
still sensed it as deeply menacing. The "strange disquiet" and "very great 
apprehension" the atomic bomb had aroused, wrote the theologian Rein-
hold Niebuhr, were particularly intense among "the more sober and 
thoughtful sections of our nation." "The 36-Hour War," a November 
1945 Life magazine article describing the nuclear annihilation of Ameri-
ca's cities, featured realistic drawings of a mushroom cloud rising over 
Washington and of the marble lions of the New York Public Library gaz­
ing sightlessly over the rubble of a demolished city. 
Truman's diary jottings of July 1945 also reveal a far more ambivalent 
view of science than he conveyed in his public proclamations—a view 
not of brilliant researchers unlocking the atom's secrets for the ultimate 
benefit of mankind but of voracious termites burrowing into the planet 
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with unpredictable but possibly catastrophic consequences. Here again, 
Truman's response anticipated an important thread in the larger cultural 
reaction to the atomic bomb. Accompanying the post-Hiroshima praise 
for the scientific miracle workers who had accomplished this marvel was 
a strain of nagging apprehension about where science and its hand­
maiden technology were leading humankind. If, as Truman was boast­
ing, the atomic bomb was "the greatest achievement of organized science 
in history," wrote Dwight Macdonald in his journal politics a few days 
after Hiroshima, then "so much the worse for organized science." It was 
grotesque, he suggested, to present this city-destroying machine as a gi­
ant leap forward in the march of science. Macdonald s view of the Man­
hattan Project was closer to Truman's private apprehensions than to the 
presidents expansive public pronouncements. For Macdonald, the hor­
ror of the atomic bomb was immeasurably deepened by the fact that it 
represented the end product of an elaborately bureaucratized project in­
volving the uncoerced labor of 125,000 people, few of whom had the 
slightest idea what they were doing. 
Macdonald expressed with particular vehemence one extreme of a 
deeply ambivalent set of public attitudes toward science in the early post­
war period. Along with the idea of scientists as technological wonder­
workers that Truman (publicly) insisted was the true meaning of Hiro­
shima, one also finds strong currents of fear, mistrust, and disillusion­
ment. "Grave doubts are in many minds, and science is being regarded 
both with greater respect and with greater apprehension than ever be­
fore," observed Scientific Monthly in September 1945. 
Much evidence supports such assessments of the public mood. 
Newspaper editorials and letters to the editor, for example, reflected 
praise and fear of science in about equal proportions. "Science a Menace" 
and "Science Moving Too Fast" were the headlines of typical letters. A 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorial could simultaneously praise the scientific 
triumph and worry that it might end in human extinction. The very 
search for truth that was science's "noblest attribute," observed Raymond 
B. Fosdick, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, in a November 
1945 radio address, "has brought our civilization to the brink of destruc­
tion." Should scientific research be curbed, Fosdick asked, or given free 
rein, with all the attendant social risks? That dilemma remains with us 
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still, and Harry Truman, in the privacy of his diary, was already strug­
gling with it before the rest of the world had even heard of the atomic 
bomb. 
THE CONTEMPLATED USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS 
What postwar diplomatic and military uses, if any, were envisaged for 
what Bernard Baruch in 1946 called Americas "winning weapon"? On 
this critical question, too, Truman vacillated in ways that reflected the 
larger uncertainty of the American people. In his post-Hiroshima public 
pronouncements, Truman always insisted that a fundamental objective 
of U.S. policy was to devise a system of international control that would 
end U.S. atomic supremacy, forestall a dangerous nuclear arms race, 
and ensure that the bomb would never again be used. The Acheson-
Lilienthal plan of March 1946, to which historians have given much 
attention, was presented to the world as an expression of this high-
minded objective. 
At the same time, Truman was clearly prepared to gain whatever stra­
tegic advantage he could from the American atomic monopoly, which 
continued until September 1949, and the country's overwhelming 
atomic superiority, which lasted considerably longer. As he wrote jauntily 
to Bess from Potsdam on July 31, 1945, using a metaphor drawn from 
his favorite game: "I rather think Mr. Stalin is stallin because he is not so 
happy over the English elections. [Clement Attlee had replaced Winston 
Churchill as prime minister.] He doesn't know it but I have an ace in the 
hole and another one showing—so unless he has threes or two pair (and 
I know he has not) we are sitting all right." As numerous studies have 
now demonstrated, all Truman's thinking and decision-making about 
nuclear weapons, from July 1945 through the end of his presidency, in­
variably reflected his preoccupation with the U.S.-Soviet power nexus. 
As the Cold War worsened, did Truman ever envisage the atomic 
bomb not only as a diplomatic asset in his maneuverings with the Soviets 
but as something that actually might be used again? In various public 
pronouncements, as well as in occasional private communications within 
the government, Truman firmly rejected such an option. When army 
secretary Kenneth Royall urged a preemptive nuclear strike against the 
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Soviets during the 1948 Berlin blockade crisis, Truman made plain that 
he considered such an action not only unthinkable morally but appalling 
in its strategic and diplomatic shortsightedness: "You have got to under­
stand that this isn't a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women and 
children and unarmed people, and not for military uses. You have got to 
understand that I have got to think about the effect of such a thing on 
international relations. This is no time to be juggling an atom bomb 
around." 
When the Cold War turned hot in Korea, however, Truman himself 
toyed with the nuclear option. At a news conference on November 30, 
1950, after the Chinese had crossed the Yalu River, Truman was asked 
about the possible use of the atomic bomb. He replied: "There has always 
been active consideration of its use. I don't want to see it used. It is a 
terrible weapon and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and 
children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression." 
When the respected Merriman Smith of the United Press asked the presi­
dent explicitly to confirm whether dropping the atomic bomb was, in­
deed, under "active consideration," he answered tersely: "Always has 
been. It is one of our weapons." When asked whether the targets being 
considered were civilian or military, he responded that this was a "matter 
that the military people have to decide. I'm not a military authority that 
passes on those things. . . . The military commander in the field will have 
charge of the use of weapons, as he always has." 
The newspapers reported the story in banner headlines. A United 
Press bulletin proclaimed: "PRESIDENT TRUMAN SAID TODAY 
THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDER­
ATION USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE WAR IN KOREA." An alarmed Prime Minister Attlee flew to 
Washington to dissuade the president from precipitate action. 
In her biography of her father, Margaret Truman describes this epi­
sode as "all ridiculous, and very disheartening." It was, she writes, a clas­
sic example of journalistic distortion and sensationalism. Indeed, she 
implicitly blames the press's handling of this story for the fatal heart at­
tack suffered a few days later by Truman's old friend and press secretary 
Charlie Ross. Yet when one reads Truman's clear answers to a series of 
clear questions, it is difficult to see how the reporters distorted or 
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misrepresented his views. Truman's comments, while perhaps merely 
propaganda bluster, did clearly indicate that use of the atomic bomb in 
the Korean War, while deeply deplorable, was indeed under "active con­
sideration" and that targeting decisions would be left to "the military 
commander in the field"—General Douglas MacArthur, who publicly 
advocated turning the Korean conflict into a war of destruction against 
Communist China. 
In 1952, with his popularity sagging at home and the armistice talks 
bogged down at Panmunjom, Truman again considered the nuclear op­
tion, this time in the form of two memoranda that came to light years 
later {New York Times, August 3, 1980, p. 20). Evidently written to for­
mulate hypothetical options as a way of clarifying his own thinking, they 
spell out in specific detail a nuclear ultimatum to the Soviets. The first, 
dated January 27, 1952, says: 
It seems to me that the proper approach now would be 
an ultimatum with a 10-day expiration limit, informing 
Moscow that we intend to blockade the China coast 
from the Korean border to Indochina by means now in 
our control—and if there is further interference we shall 
eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish 
our purposes. 
This means all-out war. It means that Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, 
Port Arthur, Darien, Odessa, Stalingrad, and every man­
ufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be 
eliminated. 
In the second of these two remarkable memos, written in May 1952, 
Truman actually drafted his ultimatum to "the Commies": "Now do you 
want an end to hostilities in Korea or do you want China and Siberia 
destroyed? You may have one or the other; whichever you want, these 
lies of yours at this conference have gone far enough. You either accept 
our fair and just proposal or you will be completely destroyed." 
It is important to place these documents in context. Apart from the 
1950 news conference mentioned above, Truman in his public pro­
nouncements dismissed all talk of employing atomic weapons in the 
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Korean War. He had even recalled General MacArthur in April 1951 in 
part over MacArthur s insistent calls for a wider war. And the Truman 
administration had firmly rejected NSC 100, the 1951 proposal by Stu­
art Symington (chairman of the National Security Resources Board) to 
the National Security Council calling for a nuclear attack on China and 
possibly the Soviet Union. In this context, historian Gregg Herken is 
probably correct in suggesting that Truman's Rambo-like private mus­
ings are best seen as "more an expression of pique than of policy." Yet in 
a nuclear age, even pique by a U.S. president cannot be dismissed lightly. 
Clearly, Truman's feelings about the military and diplomatic utility 
of the atomic bomb were ambivalent. He could readily state the compel­
ling arguments against using the bomb (except when looking back on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and he recognized the terrible dangers of 
nuclear threats and bluster. Yet when his frustration level rose high 
enough—whether against Stalin at Potsdam or the Communists in Ko-
rea—his thinking invariably circled back to the alluring option of resolv­
ing his frustrations once and for all with his ace in the hole. 
In this respect, too, Truman's ambivalence mirrored the attitudes of 
the American public: fearful of the bomb, aware of the horror of nuclear 
war, yet longing to translate the nation s atomic supremacy into a decisive 
stroke against the new postwar enemy. Here it is important to note that, 
at least for some Americans, Truman's ringing defense of the use of the 
atomic bomb against Japan had larger implications. If the bomb was jus­
tified against one enemy, they asked, why not against another? As one 
reader wrote the New Yorker after the publication of John Hersey s Hiro­
shima in August 1946, "I read Hersey's report. It was marvelous. Now 
let us drop a handful on Moscow." 
During the Korean War, a strong current of opinion emerged in fa­
vor of using the atomic bomb. In August 1950, a few weeks after the war 
began, 28 percent of Americans endorsed this option. When the Chinese 
entered the war in November, U.S. News & World Report noted a "wave 
of demand" for a nuclear response. A year later, as the conflict dragged 
on inconclusively, slightly more than half those polled by the Gallup or­
ganization supported dropping atomic bombs on "military targets." 
Although periodicals like the Saturday Evening Post warned that use 
of the atomic bomb in Korea would surely trigger World War III, others 
38 CHAPTER THREE 
discussed the matter quite coolly, as a viable option to be carefully 
weighed. US. News & World Report, for example, after a narrow tactical 
discussion that ignored any larger strategic (not to mention ethical) con­
siderations, concluded in December 1950 that U.S. use of the bomb in 
Korea would probably be "sparing." In "Advice to Joe" (1951), country-
music star Roy Acuff warned the Russians that when Moscow lay in ashes 
they would regret their aggressions. "When the atomic bombs start fall­
ing," the song rhetorically asked Stalin, "do you have a place to hide?" 
Truman and the American people s parallel patterns of response in 
their risky flirtation with the atomic bomb during the Korean War were 
only another manifestation of a congruence of outlook that had been 
evident for years. From the time he learned of the Alamogordo test in 
July 1945, Truman's attitude toward the atomic bomb was a bundle of 
contradictions. He could express awe, fear, caution, bluster, or bravado, 
depending on his mood, his audience, and the circumstances of the mo­
ment. The very diversity and unpredictability of these reactions accu­
rately mirrored the mood of the nation as a whole. Reacting to their 
political leaders, to the media, and to their own terrors and hopes, the 
American people displayed wide-ranging and sometimes quite contra­
dictory responses as they struggled to come to terms with the endlessly 
ramifying implications of the news they had first heard from President 
Truman on August 6, 1945. 
JANUARY 1953 
Truman's final and most complete comment on the atomic dilemma as 
president came in his State of the Union message delivered on January 
7, 1953, nine weeks after the United States exploded the world's first 
hydrogen bomb at Eniwetok atoll in the South Pacific. It was an excep­
tionally depressing appraisal: 
Now we have entered the atomic age, and war has un­
dergone a technological change which makes it a very 
different thing from what it used to be. War today be­
tween the Soviet Empire and the free nations might dig 
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the grave not only of our Stalinist opponents but of our 
own society, our world as well as theirs. 
War's new meaning may not yet be grasped by all 
the peoples who would be its victims; nor, perhaps by 
all the rulers of the Kremlin. . . . The war of the future 
would be one in which man could extinguish millions 
of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the 
world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past— 
and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has 
been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds 
of generations. 
Such a war is not a possible policy for rational man. 
We know this, but we dare not assume that others would 
not yield to the temptation science is now placing in 
their hands. 
Truman went on to insist that the United States had done everything 
in its power to avoid a nuclear arms race; the fault lay entirely with the 
Soviet Union. But beneath the Cold War rhetoric lay another theme: the 
inevitability of an upward spiral of nuclear menace rooted in the nature 
of science itself. "Science and technology have worked so fast" that mere 
presidents and premiers were helpless in the face of its inexorable 
advance: 
The progress of scientific experiment has outrun our ex­
pectations. Atomic science is in the full tide of develop­
ment; the unfolding of the innermost secrets of matter 
is uninterrupted and irresistible. Since Alamogordo we 
have developed atomic weapons with many times the 
explosive force of the early models, and we have pro­
duced them in substantial quantities. And recently in 
the thermonuclear test at Eniwetok, we have entered an­
other stage in the world-shaking development of atomic 
energy. From now on, man moves in a new era of de­
structive power, capable of creating explosions of an or­
der of magnitude dwarfing the mushroom clouds of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
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We have no reason to think that the stage we have 
now reached in the release of atomic energy will be the 
last. Indeed, the speed of our scientific and technical 
progress over the last 7 years shows no sign of abating. 
We are being hurried forward in our mastery of the 
atom, from one discovery to another, toward yet unfore­
seeable peaks of destructive energy. . .  . It is no wonder 
that some people wish that we had never succeeded in 
splitting the atom. 
Truman attempted to summon once more the soothing vision of the 
peaceful atom as "an instrumentality for human betterment," but his 
words rang hollow when compared to the bleak panorama of nuclear 
menace he had conjured up. 
Absent from these valedictory passages is the aura of confidence and 
mastery usually so characteristic of the public Truman; muted is the reas­
suring image of a beneficent science. Other than stoic fortitude, Truman 
offered no advice or hints in his farewell message about how the nation 
might avoid the fate toward which an inexorable science was propelling 
it. The message was not only bleak but deeply passive and acquiescent 
in tone, as it described a fearful nuclear future that seemed destined to 
play itself out beyond human control. Harry Truman—and the Amer­
ican people—had come a long way since that exciting August afternoon 
aboard the USS Augusta, a little more than seven years before. 
DIPLOMATS AND STRATEGISTS 
CONFRONT THE BOMB 
The atomic bomb profoundly affected all realms of American life, including postwar U.S. diplomacy and military strategizing. While my own research focused 
on the bombs cultural impact, I also quite naturally fol­
lowed and periodically commented on the scholarly lit­
erature relating to these other areas. Beginning in the 
mid-1960s, a number of diplomatic historians, including 
Gar Alperovitz, Barton J. Bernstein, and Martin J. Sherwin, 
had probed the larger diplomatic context of President 
Truman's A-bomb decision and the bombs influence on 
U.S. foreign relations during and after the war. Another his­
torian working in this vein was Fraser J. Harbutt of Emory 
University, who published his findings in a fascinating 1986 
book, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins 
of the Cold War. My review of HarbuttJs work (considerably 
expanded here) appeared in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scien­
tistsin May 1987. 
Following the review, the second part of this chapter dis­
cusses how Defense Department brass and Pentagon strate­
gists incorporated the atomic bomb into their early postwar 
thinking. As I explored the bomb's cultural effects, and as 
others studied early atomic-age diplomacy, still other schol­
ars were probing post-Hiroshima developments in military 
strategy—and reporting scary findings. One who did so, 
drawing on a rich and largely untapped body of official 
archival material, was Gregg Herken, whose 1980 book 
The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 
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1945—19501 discuss in the concluding pages of this chapter. 
Adapted from an essay written in 1981 and published in the 
September 1982 issue of Reviews in American History, this 
represents my earliest published work on the nuclear theme. 
I wrote it as my own research in this area was just beginning, 
and as the early-1980s wave of nuclear fear and activism was 
taking shape. 
While the American people of the early postwar years 
had responded to the nuclear reality in the various ways de­
scribed in chapters 1 through 3, and as President Truman, 
David Lilienthal, and others had offered their upbeat pro­
nouncements about the peacetime uses of atomic energy, 
military strategists deep in the Pentagon had been devis­
ing secret nuclear-war plans. Though "hypothetical," these 
apocalyptic scenarios, unearthed by Herken and others, 
make clear that the threat of nuclear holocaust was no 
mere bugaboo invented by antinuclear alarmists. It was real, 
and even (or perhaps especially) when clothed in the imper­
sonal, technostrategic language of the war planners, it was 
nightmarish. 
THE BOMB IN POSTWAR DIPLOMACY 
How did the Cold War begin? As though trapped in a dull, reiterative 
dream, we play the tape over and over, straining to decipher the garbled 
cacophony of voices. If one could only discern precisely when things be­
gan to go wrong, we seem to hope, perhaps the tangled skein of U.S.-
Soviet relations could be unraveled, and we could start afresh. 
Diplomatic historians, sharing this interest not only as citizens but 
as scholars, have long sought to pinpoint the exact moment at which the 
Cold War started. In terms of U.S. policy, some have focused on the 
Truman Doctrine of March 1947, committing U.S. resources to shoring 
up anti-Communist forces in Greece and Turkey. Others designate 
George Kennans famous "long cable" of February 22, 1946, outlining 
the doctrine of containment. 
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In The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold 
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), Fraser J. Harbutt, a 
diplomatic historian at Emory University, argues for a still earlier date, 
which he cites with great exactitude: the evening of February 10, 1946, 
when President Truman and former Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
met at the White House to discuss a speech Churchill would soon deliver 
at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. The origins of the speech 
had seemed innocuous enough. In August 1945, Westminster's president 
had written a letter inviting Britain's heroic but recently defeated war­
time prime minister to deliver a speech. To the letter, President Truman 
had added a friendly note that said: "This is a fine old college out in my 
state. If you'll come out and make them a speech I'll take you out and 
introduce you." Churchill accepted, and the planning that would pro­
duce a key Cold War pronouncement proceeded apace. The symbolic 
importance of Churchill's celebrated "Iron Curtain" speech on March 5, 
1946, at Westminster College has, of course, long been recognized. But 
Harbutt argues for its immediate tactical importance as well, focusing on 
that fateful February meeting at the White House. 
Stated thus baldly, his thesis may suggest sensationalism, but The 
Iron Curtain builds its case painstakingly and, in my view, compellingly. 
Indeed, the author does not actually get to the Fulton speech until chap­
ter 7. After two introductory chapters tracing Churchill's long-standing 
visceral hatred of the Soviet Union—"Bolshevism is not a policy, it is a 
disease"—and his equally long interest in forging a "special relationship" 
between Britain and the United States, Harbutt devotes the next 230­
odd pages to a detailed account of the shifting relations between the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, from the Tehran 
Conference of late 1943 through the Iran crisis of early 1946, brought 
on by Soviet moves in that arena. This account is based on an awesome 
array of published work and archival material, including the papers of 
the British cabinet, foreign office, and prime minister. 
Building on this solid evidentiary base, Harbutt constructs his care­
ful version of the evolving relationship of the wartime Big Three. If the 
general contours of the story are familiar, the work's richness of detail and 
tripartite perspective should assure it a respectful reception as a valuable 
contribution to historical scholarship. 
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Toward the end of World War II and in the immediate postwar era, 
Harbutt argues, Washington distanced itself from imperialist England 
and sought a bilateral accommodation with Moscow over such matters 
as the United Nations, sometimes at the expense of British interests. This 
policy seemed plausible, he notes, since U.S. and Soviet strategic interests 
did not conflict in any obvious way. British and Soviet interests, by con­
trast, clashed directly in Poland and in the so-called northern tier of Brit-
ain's sphere of influence: Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Between 1943 and 
1946, Harbutt contends, prior to the familiar Cold War between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, came an earlier "Cold War" in 
which the British and the Soviets struggled to define their postwar 
spheres, while the United States remained a bystander. Unlike historians 
who see a consistent anti-Soviet thrust to U.S. policy from Hiroshima 
onward, Harbutt finds a general pattern of passivity and detachment 
through the end of 1945. 
The heart of Harbutt's book deals with the transformation of this 
Anglo-Soviet "Cold War" into the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. In this process, 
Harbutt ascribes a central but complex role to Churchill. By February 
1946, he argues, Truman was increasingly uncomfortable with the Roo­
sevelt policy of accommodating the Soviets. Yet reversing that policy 
posed delicate problems. U.S. public opinion, reflecting the mood of the 
wartime alliance, remained vaguely pro-Soviet, while those who had 
been close to Roosevelt, for example, Henry Wallace and Eleanor Roose­
velt, staunchly upheld the conciliatory approach. Furthermore, among 
those urging a harsher policy were some of Truman's bitterest congres­
sional opponents, including Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. 
Whatever his personal inclinations, Truman did not wish to be perceived 
as adopting a get-tough policy merely in response to Republican 
pressure. 
At this point, Truman's and Churchill's interests neatly converged. 
Churchill had long believed that close Anglo-American ties were essen­
tial, not only to fight Bolshevism but also to shore up British geopolitical 
interests as Great Britain's power waned. Dismayed by the two countries' 
postwar divergence on Soviet policy (and chafing to resume his accus­
tomed place in the limelight), Churchill early in 1946 undertook a U.S. 
tour. Disappointed in his hope of addressing Congress, he quickly ac­
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cepted the invitation to speak at Westminster College on March 5. Tru­
man, recognizing the advantages of having the British leader serve as 
point man for the policy shift he had already decided to implement, 
quickly announced plans to attend the speech and introduce Churchill, 
assuring maximum publicity for the event. 
Harbutt presents a careful and illuminating analysis of this seminal 
address, which Churchill explicitly compared to his speeches of the 
1930s warning a complacent England of the Nazi threat. Not only did 
Churchill invoke (without attribution) the Nazi propagandist Joseph 
Goebbels's memorable image of an "iron curtain" descending over Eu­
rope; he also described a Manichean world divided between the forces of 
good—variously described as "Christian civilization" and "the English-
speaking peoples"—and the forces of evil: the Communist empire cen­
tered in Moscow and bent on world domination. Only a closely linked 
United States and Great Britain, Churchill proclaimed, could resist the 
menace. Harbutt also notes a key omission: Not once did the British 
leader invoke the name of Roosevelt, architect of the accommodationist 
policy Churchill was intent on discrediting. 
With persuasive evidence, Harbutt dismisses Truman's subsequent 
claim that he had not anticipated the impact of the speech and had at­
tended only as a matter of courtesy. Not only did Truman ostentatiously 
applaud the most militant anti-Soviet passages, but strong circumstantial 
evidence suggests a high degree of covert advance coordination. 
Churchill discussed the speech in detail with Truman on February 10, 
with Secretary of State James E Byrnes and Bernard Baruch on February 
17, and with Byrnes and Admiral William Leahy, Truman's chief of staff, 
on March 3. 
Harbutt also offers strong evidence for a "sudden reorientation" in 
Washington's Soviet policy immediately after Fulton as accommoda­
tionism gave way to "firmness"—the diplomatic buzzword of 1946. This 
shift included an officially orchestrated anti-Soviet media campaign. Un­
like the earlier Anglo-Soviet "Cold War," with its sources in tangible 
geopolitical rivalries, he argues, the Americanized Cold War was rooted 
much more in ideological abstractions and generalized conceptions of a 
global struggle for supremacy. 
The new policy was sealed, Harbutt concludes, by a serious Soviet 
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miscalculation that produced the Iranian crisis of February to May 1946, 
mentioned above. Failing to grasp the rapidity with which an Anglo-
American and anti-Soviet front was forming, Stalin sought to extend 
the Soviet role in Iran, a traditional cockpit of Anglo-Soviet rivalry. He 
kept Soviet troops in northern Iran beyond the date set by a wartime 
agreement and fostered separatist movements in the Iranian provinces of 
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. In collaboration with London and a some­
times reluctant Tehran, Washington utilized the U.N. Security Coun­
cil as the forum for a highly public display of the new get-tough policy 
toward the Soviets, triggering the first of Andrei Gromykos famous 
walkouts. 
The Iron Curtain is traditional diplomatic history. The focus is over­
whelmingly on the maneuvering of statesmen and diplomats, with little 
attention to the broader political, economic, military, or cultural factors 
that influence foreign policy. In stressing the aura of cooperation that 
briefly characterized Washington's Soviet policy during the war, Harbutt 
underplays the deep strand of anti-Soviet feeling in the United States 
going back to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, expressed in such 
outbursts of official hysteria as the "Red Raids" of January 1920. As Tru­
man knew it would, Churchill's rhetoric at Fulton aroused a powerful 
answering echo from deep in the American psyche. But if this is tradi­
tional history, it is traditional history of a very high order. Harbutt s judi­
cious and well-written account of the fateful international realignment 
of 1946 will surely influence profoundly our understanding of this criti­
cal period. 
Confirming the conclusions reached by other diplomatic historians, 
The Iron Curtain also underscores the centrality of the atomic bomb in 
shaping the early postwar relations of erstwhile wartime allies. Allusions 
to the bomb recur like a Wagnerian leitmotiv throughout Harbutt's ac­
count. During the war, the United States had concealed the Manhattan 
Project from one ally—the Soviet Union—while fully sharing atomic 
information with another: Great Britain. (Soviet espionage, of course, 
had circumvented this attempt at secrecy, giving Moscow's leaders at least 
some knowledge of the bomb project.) In talks with Churchill at Hyde 
Park, New York, in September 1944, President Franklin Roosevelt had 
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pledged that this full and exclusive sharing of atomic information with 
the British would continue after the war. One of London's key postwar 
objectives, then, was to preserve this aspect of a special bilateral relation­
ship with the Americans. 
For a time, however, this goal seemed in jeopardy. For a few brief 
months in late 1945 and early 1946, in a fleeting interlude of interna­
tionalist enthusiasm, the Truman administration embraced the so-called 
Acheson-Lilienthal plan for international control of atomic energy under 
the monitoring of the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee (UN­
AEC). A joint U.S.-British-Canadian declaration of November 1945 
officially endorsed the international control principle, and Soviet Pre­
mier Joseph Stalin embraced this objective at a conference in Moscow 
in December. 
In reality, however, the Truman administration, encouraged by the 
British, was rapidly backing away from its commitment to international 
control as 1945 ended. A key signal came in late February 1946, when 
Truman appointed Bernard Baruch, a vain and pompous anti-Commu-
nist hard-liner, as the U.S. delegate to UNAEC, with responsibility 
to conduct negotiations with the Soviets on the international-control 
plan. As partisans of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan wrung their hands, the 
British rejoiced. The Baruch appointment, Churchill wrote his successor, 
Clement Attlee, "is of the utmost importance to us and . .  . in my opin­
ion an effective assurance that these matters will be handled in a way 
friendly to us." (President Truman's authorization of the 1946 Bikini 
atomic tests in the midst of negotiations with the Soviets over interna­
tional control provided further evidence of the new exclusivity and mili­
tarization of U.S. atomic policy.) 
Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, with its multiple goals, must be 
seen against the backdrop of these rapidly evolving atomic realities. On 
the one hand, of course, Churchill crafted the speech with an eye to pos­
terity, articulating an overarching spiritual and strategic rationale for a 
long-term Anglo-American struggle against a godless, anti-Christian 
Communist power. In Churchill's view, as he would later write in Tri­
umph and Tragedy, the final volume of his magisterial history of World 
War II, postwar America "stood on the scene of victory, master of world 
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fortunes, but without a true and coherent design." Never inhibited by 
excessive modesty, Churchill saw himself as the person who would pro­
vide that design. 
But beyond these cosmic objectives, the Fulton speech's immediate 
goal was to shore up the Anglo-American wartime alliance, and specifi­
cally to assure the continuation of a bilateral approach to atomic energy 
that would freeze out the Soviet Union. As we have seen, Churchill's 
objective was not so much to change U.S. policy as to provide a cover for 
Truman to signal publicly an already-decided-upon shift from interna­
tional control to Western exclusiveness in the atomic sphere. 
Indeed, from the moment Truman had received news of the success­
ful Alamogordo test while sparring with Stalin at the Potsdam confer­
ence, the idealistic vision of international control had clashed with the 
conviction that the atomic bomb would be Americas winning weapon 
not only in the war with Japan but in the postwar era as well. As Harbutt 
shrewdly observes, the success of the Manhattan Project had, "perhaps 
inevitably, created in Truman and [Secretary of State James E] Byrnes a 
sense of enhanced confidence if not omnipotence." In this spirit, and 
despite Washington's official endorsement of international control, 
Byrnes came to the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in Septem­
ber 1945 with the goal of using America's atomic monopoly to promote 
U.S. diplomatic objectives. The effort failed, however, as Soviet Foreign 
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov brazenly joked about the atomic bomb and 
ridiculed Byrnes's efforts to turn the bomb to Washington's diplomatic 
advantage. 
In this context of a profoundly ambivalent and rapidly shifting U.S. 
atomic policy, Churchill in his Iron Curtain speech launched a slashing 
attack on international control of atomic energy as "wrong and impru­
dent." It would be "criminal madness," he went on, to "cast [the secret 
of the atom] adrift in this still agitated and ununited world." Truman 
(who, as we have seen, had carefully reviewed the text of the speech with 
Churchill) heartily applauded this passage—a fact duly noted by jour­
nalists, who were observing his reactions carefully. Although interna­
tional control ostensibly remained U.S. policy, the shift toward Western 
exclusiveness had been clearly signaled. 
The Soviets, of course, were hardly innocent bystanders as the 
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Anglo-American hard line on nuclear issues unfolded. Not only did they 
miscalculate badly in Iran; on February 9, 1946, Joseph Stalin (preparing 
his people for a harsh new Five-Year Plan) had declared communism and 
capitalism incompatible. A few days before, on February 3, Washington 
columnist Drew Pearson had broken the news of a Soviet atomic spy 
ring in Canada. All this, combined with the earlier failure of the London 
Conference, fatally weakened the hand of the internationalist group in 
Washington who sought postwar cooperation with the Soviets on 
atomic-energy control and other issues, and vastly strengthened the hand 
of the advocates of firmness. 
In late April 1946, with U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorating almost 
by the day, Truman met with Gromyko in Washington and gave him 
such a tongue-lashing that (according to Truman) the Soviet diplomat 
sputtered: "I have never been talked to like that in my life." (To which 
Truman allegedly replied: "Carry out your agreements and you won't get 
talked to like that.") The Cold War's temperature quickly plummeted to 
subzero levels. 
By early spring 1946, in short, whatever opportunities might have 
existed to shape a different postwar atomic history had evaporated, and 
the stage was set for a decades-long nuclear arms race with the Soviets. 
Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech—certainly one of the most im­
portant public utterances of the twentieth century—both marked the 
moment of transition and helped bring it about. 
THE BOMB IN POSTWAR MILITARY STRATEGY 
Pincher, Broiler, Grabber, Sizzle. If, like most Americans with a general 
knowledge of U.S. history, you find these words less familiar than, say, 
Loco Foco, Mugwump, or Flapper, this fact in itself is a revealing com­
ment on the gingerly way historians have approached the central global 
reality of our age: the nuclear arms race. For these are the names of a 
succession of U.S. war plans drawn up between 1945 and 1950. There 
were others, with equally catchy tags: Fleetwood, Offtackle, Dropshot, 
Trojan, Charioteer. Each plan assumed that in the event of war the Soviet 
Union would be obliterated in a massive atomic blitz lasting only a few 
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days. In this ultimate holocaust, death from the skies would rain down 
on a substantial portion of the earth's population. 
In The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold Wan 1945— 
1950 (New York: Knopf, 1980), Gregg Herken sets out to fill in some of 
the gaps in our knowledge of these matters. The book explores how the 
United States in the early postwar years handled what statesmen liked to 
call the nations "solemn trust"—the burden of being the creators and, 
as yet, sole possessors of instruments of unprecedented mass destruction. 
The book begins with the diplomacy of the immediate post-
Hiroshima period. At the London and Moscow conferences of late 1945, 
Herken suggests, Secretary of State James E Byrnes tried two diametri­
cally opposed strategies for gaining diplomatic advantage from Americas 
nuclear monopoly, but to no avail; "They don t scare," Byrnes concluded. 
"We shall have atomic energy and many other things too," declared 
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov that November, warning the United 
States against pushing its temporary strategic advantage. At Moscow, 
Byrnes substituted the carrot for the stick, holding out the prospect of 
nuclear cooperation with the Soviets. For a time it seemed possible, but 
back in Washington, Byrnes s position was eroding. Led by Admiral Wil­
liam Leahy, President Truman's palace guard denounced Byrnes and his 
"communistically inclined" State Department advisers. The Moscow 
agreement, charged Senator Arthur Vandenberg, was "one more typical 
American 'give-away.'" Preoccupied by political problems at home and 
abroad, Truman turned on his secretary of state; "I'm tired of babying 
the Soviets," he declared in January 1946. From then until his retirement 
in 1947, the pliant Byrnes faithfully followed the new "get tough with 
Russia" policy The effort to develop atomic policy in collaboration with 
the Soviets was abandoned, and monopoly and exclusion became the 
hallmarks of U.S. nuclear strategy. 
Turning to the struggle over civilian versus military control of the 
atom, Herken shows that the 1946 defeat of the May-Johnson bill (pro­
viding for military control) and the passage of the McMahon Act (creat­
ing the Atomic Energy Commission under a civilian head) was hardly a 
clear-cut victory for civilian control. In fact, he argues, the military got 
much of what it wanted in the McMahon Act. Here, as throughout the 
book, Herken stresses the central role of General Leslie R. Groves, war­
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time director of the Manhattan Project and a linchpin in postwar nuclear 
affairs. The national furor over the Soviet spy ring uncovered in Canada 
in 1946, he suggests, was largely orchestrated by Groves to discredit the 
supporters of civilian control and international cooperation in managing 
the atom. 
This same period saw the rise and collapse of the move for U.N. 
control of the atom—a move rooted in Byrnes's desire to clip Groves's 
wings and bring nuclear policy within the purview of the State Depart­
ment. In January 1946, Byrnes named a committee under Dean Acheson 
to draft a plan for international control of the atom. Aided by a board of 
scientific advisers, chaired by David Lilienthal and including J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, Achesons committee drew up its proposals. But then 
Truman appointed Bernard Baruch to the U.N.'s Atomic Energy Com­
mission and—in the view of the Acheson-Lilienthal-Oppenheimer 
group—all was lost. Working closely with Groves, Baruch and his coterie 
of advisers (mainly businessmen and right-wing ideologues obsessed 
with the Soviet menace) scuttled the Acheson-Lilienthal plan. Abandon­
ing any serious effort for international control, Baruch concentrated on 
scoring propaganda points against the Soviets and laying the ground­
work for a perpetuation of America's nuclear monopoly. Despite the 
grandiloquence of Baruch's famous June 1946 U.N. speech ("We are 
here to make a choice between the quick and the dead"), the "Baruch 
Plan' was from the first, Herken persuasively argues, more propaganda 
than substance, more a nuclear ultimatum than a genuine bargaining 
proposal. The collapse of the U.N. negotiations in late 1946 despite last-
minute Soviet efforts to keep them going merely confirmed the Truman 
administration's de facto policy of nuclear monopoly. 
The long final section of The Winning Weapon, tracing the evolution 
of American military planning from Hiroshima to about 1950, offers a 
chilling insight into what passed for strategic thinking a generation ago. 
Under the various code names mentioned earlier, these plans consisted 
of little but doomsday scenarios for the obliteration of Russia in a mas­
sive nuclear spasm. Some explicitly envisioned the mass killing of civil­
ians as an instrument of psychological warfare; in others, civilian deaths 
on a scale of millions was simply implicit. (As Herken notes, this was a 
natural outgrowth of the terror bombing of civilians introduced by the 
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Germans—and perfected by the British and Americans—in World War 
II.) Fleetwood (1948) projected eight atomic bombs for Moscow, seven 
for Leningrad, and so forth. Such an assault, the authors judiciously 
speculated, "could well lead to Soviet capitulation/' In Dropshot (1949), 
the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad was held off until the begin­
ning of the war's second week, the planners having evidently grasped that 
if Moscow were wiped out in the first wave of attack, there would be no 
one around to surrender. 
Herken is especially good on the way interservice rivalries, especially 
the air force's frustrations over its second-class status, shaped nuclear 
strategy. The annual interservice budget squabbles, he shows, were a cru­
cial propellant of the strategic planning process. The same rivalries also 
contributed to what little criticism of underlying strategic assumptions 
was voiced in these years. Increasingly disgruntled over growing air force 
dominance, the navy began to question the morality of the air-atomic 
strategy. With some justice, the air force sarcastically retorted that, to the 
admirals, an immoral weapon was one they couldn't use. 
The occasional glimpses of the nuclear-war planner as moral philos­
opher are diverting. In 1949, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
brushed aside all ethical objections to the H-bomb. Since, "in the larger 
sense, it is war itself which is immoral," they reasoned, it is "folly to argue 
whether one weapon is more immoral than another." With casual non­
chalance, the generals dismissed many centuries of Christian doctrine 
about the just war that drew precisely such distinctions. 
Strategists consistently refused to rule out the unrestrained use of 
nuclear weapons, the possibility of an American first strike, or even "pre­
ventive" nuclear war. The Russians, insisted the authors of NSC 30 
(1948), should "never be given the slightest reason to believe the U.S. 
would even consider not to use atomic weapons against them i£ neces­
sary." (Along with their readiness to blow up the world, another count 
against these planners is their atrocious prose style.) 
What emerges starkly in these pages is the degradation of the strate­
gic planning process in the years of America's nuclear monopoly. Herken 
fully documents the Joint Chiefs' "habit of demanding all the traffic 
would bear from the AEC s bomb factories." As the nuclear arsenal grew, 
war plans were revised accordingly. In 1946, for example, Pincher pro­
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jected the obliteration of twenty Soviet cities; by 1948, Fleetwood had 
upped the ante to seventy-seven cities. In 1950 a demoralized David Lili­
enthal, retiring as head of AEC, confessed that his agency had become 
"nothing more than a major contractor to the Department of Defense." 
The Soviet nuclear test of September 1949 abruptly ended this first 
cycle of U.S. nuclear-war planning. But rather than reassessing underly­
ing premises, the administration set off in quest of yet another "winning 
weapon" that would reestablish U.S. nuclear supremacy: the hydrogen 
bomb, or "hell bomb," as journalists dubbed it. Herken reviews the 
H-bomb decision process, including the deeply apprehensive eighty-
page memo drafted by George Kennan—a memo Dean Acheson with­
held from Truman. With NSC 68 (1950) providing its underlying strate­
gic framework (and with Czechoslovakia and Korea as part of its 
background), the nuclear arms race entered a new and even more lethal 
stage. James B. Conant wrote Lilienthal that he had the feeling of watch­
ing the same rotten movie a second time. 
Herkens most original contribution is clearly the section on military 
strategy. No other historian has covered this subject so thoroughly or so 
well. But throughout, Herken deepens our understanding of the inner 
diplomatic and strategic history of these years, drawing as he does not 
only on memoirs and the published record, but on interviews and a rich 
lode of recently declassified government documents, especially in the 
Modern Military Branch of the National Archives. 
The Winning Weapon s compelling power lies in its portrayal of an 
entire government in the grip of incredible hubris. With rare exceptions, 
Herkens large cast of characters clings firmly to the delusion that Ameri-
ca's nuclear monopoly will continue into the indefinite future. Their 
confidence on this score reminds one of Herbert Hoover s glowing de­
scriptions of the nations economic prospects early in 1929. To the mo­
ment of his retirement in 1948, General Groves never stopped insisting 
that a Soviet bomb was fifteen or twenty years in the future. At his last 
press conference he told reporters he was "not a bit worried" about a 
Russian bomb. This massive miscalculation in high places did not rest 
on the vulgar notion that there was a single "atomic secret" locked in 
a safe somewhere. Rather it reflected the grossly exaggerated belief in 
the general superiority of American know-how and ability to organize 
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large-scale technical projects—a belief that was rudely shattered in 1949 
(and then again in 1957, with Sputnik). 
It is tempting to read The Winning Weapon as a morality play pitting 
the farsighted and virtuous against the myopic and malevolent. In the 
rush to exploit the bomb, a few men, like Lilienthal, Kennan, Stimson, 
and Marshall, do stand out for their moral concern and more reflective 
cast of mind. For others, like Groves, Leahy, Forrestal, air force secretary 
Stuart Symington, and army secretary Kenneth Royall, the old propa­
ganda tag "warmonger" seems nothing but the simple truth. The nuclear 
saber-rattling of these real-life Dr. Strangeloves can still chill the blood, 
although some of these pronouncements, dating as they do from the era 
before nuclear-war planners discovered computers and game theory, are 
almost quaint in their bluster. As for the fatuous Bernard Baruch— 
FDR's "Great Poohbah"—the less said the better. 
But ultimately this is a story less of obtuse or evil individuals than of 
an entire generation unable to grasp a dramatically changed reality. With 
few exceptions, these statesmen and strategists tried to force that new 
reality into comfortably familiar conceptual categories. The atomic 
bomb was a "weapon"; it could be used to "wage war"; it could help us 
achieve our "national objectives." Few grasped that the bomb had created 
its own categories, and that new metaphors were required to compre­
hend its meaning: a spreading plague, perhaps, or a metastasizing cancer. 
What The Winning Weapon really portrays is a monumental failure 
of the imagination. As the seeds of potential world holocaust germinated 
and took root, it was business as usual in Washington—and no doubt in 
Moscow as well. The old ideological rivalries among the various military 
services and government departments all went on as before, with the 
atomic bomb simply another piece on the chessboard. Most power hold­
ers did not notice as we took our first slow, lazy turns around the far 
outer edges of the maelstrom, simply because their minds were on 
other matters. 
As in so many other ways, President Truman stands as a kind of Ev­
eryman for his generation, straining to bend his mind around awesome 
new realities, yet continually slipping back into old ways of thinking. 
When Royall blustered that it "doesn't make any sense" not to use the 
bomb against Russia, Truman (as we saw in chap. 3) shot back: "You 
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have got to understand that this isn't a military weapon." Yet, in other 
moods, the same man could cockily assure a senator that no one should 
doubt his readiness to drop the bomb again "if necessary," and—in pri­
vate notes written for his own purposes—toy with the idea of issuing a 
nuclear ultimatum to Russia during the frustrating days of the Korean 
War. 
The underlying source of Truman's confused groping is suggested in 
a terse and anguished entry David Lilienthal made in his diary in 1947: 
"The fences are gone. And it was we, the civilized, who have pushed 
standardless conduct to its ultimate." 

NUCLEAR CULTURE IN THE 
COLD WAR'S HIGH TIDE 

A the 1940s ended, the raw shock of atomic menace that had burst on the 
scene in 1945 was wearing off. By 
the early 1950s, Americas preoccu­
pation with the bomb was less bla­
tant, more subterranean. At the 
same time, however, nuclear weap­
ons production and planning were 
burgeoning as the Cold War con­
flict between the United States and 
the Soviet Union moved into high 
gear. The Soviet A-bomb test in 
1949; the superpowers' race to de­
velop the H-bomb and an arsenal of 
nuclear weaponry; and the move 
toward new, highly sophisticated 
delivery systems—nuclear subma­
rines, high-tech bombers, and in­
tercontinental ballistic missiles— 
added new levels of complexity and 
menace to the arms race. Govern­
ment civil-defense programs pro­
liferated, drawing in educators, 
urban planners, media specialists, 
psychologists, physicians, medical 
researchers, and other profession­
als. Washington continued to hype 
the atoms peacetime uses, partly as 
a means of funding more weapons 
research and partly as a way of culti­
vating more positive public atti­
tudes toward atomic energy. Much 
of the popular culture reflected the 
Cold War outlook. Such magazines 
as Time, Life, and U.S. News & 
World Report usually echoed offi­
cial Washington's position on nu­
clear issues, as did radio commenta­
tors and patriotic movies like the 
stirring Strategic Air Command 
(1955), starring Jimmy Stewart. 
But undercurrents of uneasi­
ness persisted, especially as the haz­
ards of radioactive fallout from 
nuclear testing gripped the public's 
awareness, and activist organiza­
tions campaigned for a test ban— 
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an idea supported by Democratic writer Tom Lehrer, and the satirical 
presidential candidate Adlai Ste- Mad Magazine all in their various 
venson in 1956. In the cultural ways warned of possible cataclysm 
realm, novels, poems, science- ahead, 
fiction stories, the parodies of song­
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL PROFESSION AND 
THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WA R 
Iike chapters 1 and 2, this essay was written in 1985, as the fortieth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Japan I focused the nations renewed attention on the nuclear 
threat. In the spring of that year, the editor ofthe Journal of 
the American Medical Association (JAMA) asked me to pre­
pare an article dealing historically with U.S. physicians' en­
gagement with nuclear issues. In researching By the Bomb's 
Early Light, I had already observed the way many profes­
sional groups, from sociologists to city planners to high 
school social-studies teachers, had concluded that their par­
ticular expertise had become absolutely vital in the new 
atomic era. (In February 1947, the University of Maine's 
College of Agriculture published a pamphlet arguing elo­
quently that the college's agricultural extension workers 
could play a key role in the quest for peace in the atomic 
age.) The JAMA invitation led me to several weeks of inten­
sive research on a specific professional group whose mem­
bers became especially involved with the nuclear issue—as 
radiation specialists, civil-defense advisers, and ultimately as 
antinuclear activists. Chapter 5 is adapted from the article 
that resulted. It appeared in the August 1, 1985, issue of 
JAMA. Reprint requests flowed in from many countries, 
suggesting broad interest in the issues that arise when profes­
sional expertise, political involvement, and activist engage­
ment intersect. 
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IN THE RESURGENCE of nuclear-weapons activism that swept the United 
States in the early 1980s, physicians figured prominently. The pediatri­
cian Helen Caldicott gained national visibility as president of the thirty-
thousand-member organization Physicians for Social Responsibility. 
Dean Howard Hiatt of the Harvard School of Public Health, psychiatrist 
John Mack of Harvard Medical School, H. Jack Geiger of the City Col­
lege of New York School of Biomedical Education, and Yale University 
psychiatrist Robert Lifton were prominent in the antinuclear cause. In 
The Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War (1981) and 
Last Aid: The Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War (1982), medical leaders 
spoke out on this issue. Th.t Journal of the American Medical Association 
published articles on aspects of the subject, including the role of the 
medical profession in preventing nuclear holocaust. This, however, was 
only the latest chapter in a long and decidedly checkered history. 
RADIATION STUDIES AND ISOTOPES: THE INITIAL 
MEDICAL RESPONSE TO THE BOMB 
American medicine s involvement with nuclear weapons began with the 
establishment of the Manhattan Project in 1942. The projects medical-
research division, based at the University of Rochester and directed by 
Stafford L. Warren, M.D., a professor of radiology, studied means of pro­
tecting workers from radiation, tried to establish radiation tolerance lev­
els, and conducted blood studies of more than 100,000 irradiated 
laboratory animals and genetic studies involving 277,000 mice and 50 
million fruit flies. 
But this wartime research was secret, and for most physicians, as for 
other Americans, President Truman's atomic bomb announcement of 
August 6, 1945, came as a stunning surprise. The Journal of the American 
MedicalAssociation first mentioned the bomb in a brief note on Septem­
ber 22, dismissing "JaP propaganda claims" that people were still dying 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki from "delayed radioactivity." Quickly, how­
ever, awareness dawned that this new weapon had profound medical im­
plications, not only because it produced blast and burn casualties on an 
unprecedented scale, but also because of its unique additional prop-
erty—radioactivity. The biological and physiological hazards of radio­
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active substances had long been recognized, thanks to the turn-of-the-
century studies of the Leipzig clinician Hermann Heineke, but until Au­
gust 1945, this arcane byway of medical research had received relatively 
little attention. 
All this soon changed. Within days of Japan's surrender, two Ameri­
can medical teams, one representing the military and the other the Man­
hattan Project, were in Hiroshima and Nagasaki studying the bomb's 
effects. For the military team, radiological studies were conducted by Dr. 
Shields Warren, professor of pathology at Harvard Medical School; the 
Manhattan Project team was led by Stafford Warren of Rochester. In 
March 1946, Shields Warren reported to the American Association for 
Cancer Research (of which he was president) on the delayed effects of 
radiation exposure on some fourteen thousand people in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, including hemorrhage, leukocyte destruction, bone marrow 
damage, anemia, sterility, and the suppression of menstruation. As for 
long-range somatic and genetic effects, he cautioned, "It will be necessary 
to follow the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for many years." 
In June 1946, JAMA published a study of twenty-one Japanese radiation 
victims admitted to the Osaka University hospital. At the American 
Medical Association (AMA) convention that July, Dr. George V. LeRoy 
of Northwestern University Medical School read a detailed report, "The 
Medical Sequelae of the Atomic Bomb Explosion," which included ex­
tensive data on radiation disease. This report, copiously illustrated with 
clinical photographs, was later published in JAMA. The American Jour­
nal ofSurgery published a report on "Trauma Resulting from Atomic Ex­
plosions" by the leader of the navy medical team that studied survivors 
in Nagasaki. (The author described prisoners of war in the city whose 
"names had been burned onto their chests or backs because the names 
had been stenciled in black on their white undershirts.") 
In November 1946, the National Research Council of the National 
Academy of Sciences sent five radiologists to Japan to survey possibilities 
for a long-term research project. In 1947, authorized by a formal direc­
tive from President Truman, the council set up the Atomic Bomb Casu­
alty Commission (ABCC) to be funded by and operated under contract 
with the AEC. Work began in Japan in 1948, with blood surveys and 
collection of pregnancy data. In the years that followed, the ABCC and 
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its successor, the Radiation Effects Research Foundation, proved an 
invaluable source of knowledge about the long-term effects of atomic 
bomb exposure. 
In contrast to the medical professions considerable interest in the 
clinical aspects of radiation disease in the immediate post-1945 period, 
one finds little initial attention to the larger medical implications of an 
atomic bomb attack or to the professions capacity to cope with such an 
event. Shields Warrens 1946 report to his fellow cancer researchers noted 
the "total disorganization" of the Japanese medical service after the 
bombings, and George LeRoys address to the 1946 AMA convention 
mentioned that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had presented 
"the surviving members of the medical profession . . . with an extremely 
large relief and rescue problem." "From medical and surgical points of 
view," wrote one early postwar American medical visitor to Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki in th.t American Journal ofSurgery in 1948, "the confusion 
immediately after the bombing is difficult to imagine." But these passing 
observations were not elaborated or pursued. LeRoy ended on a cau­
tiously hopeful note, stating, "In the hospitals of the western world 
where plasma, electrolyte solutions, whole blood and penicillin are avail­
able in adequate amounts, a much lower mortality rate could be achieved 
than was observed in Japan." 
The profession's capacity for political activism and engagement with 
broader social issues in these years seems to have been totally exhausted 
by its single-minded preoccupation with the evils of "socialized medi­
cine." After the Truman administration proposed a national health insur­
ance plan in 1948, medical attention focused obsessively on this issue. 
In resisting "the creeping paralysis that is socialism," said New York Medi-
cine'in 1950, "the medical profession has found it necessary to undertake 
civic and political action, which a few years ago was remote from the 
thoughts of most physicians." Even in dealing with the clinical aspects 
of radiation disease, the AMAs position was sometimes colored by its 
ideology. In 1947, for example, reporting that British atomic-energy 
workers were complaining of lassitude, skin eruptions, impotence, and 
other symptoms, JAMA observed: "It has to be remembered that, with a 
Labour government in control of the country, workers have every oppor­
tunity to exploit real or alleged grievances." 
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It was not the medical profession but a journalist who first brought 
home to the American public the way an atomic bomb could devastate 
a city's medical facilities. Two of the six atomic bomb survivors whose 
stories are told in John Hersey's 1946 best-seller Hiroshima are physi­
cians. The first, Masakazu Fujii, regains consciousness after the bombing 
to find his small private clinic "all around him in a mad assortment of 
splintered lumber." The other, Terufumi Sasaki, was a surgeon at Hiro-
shima's large, modern Red Cross hospital. After the blast, glasses lost and 
vision blurred, he wanders among the maimed and dying who have in­
undated the partially demolished hospital, "moving aimlessly and dully 
up and down the stinking corridors with wads of bandage and bottles of 
mercurochrome, . . . binding up the worst cuts as he came to them. . . . 
Ceilings and partitions had fallen; plaster, dust, blood and vomit were 
everywhere. Patients were dying by the hundreds, but there was nobody 
to carry away the corpses." 
There are a few exceptions in these early post-Hiroshima years to 
the medical profession's general lack of attention to all but the narrowest 
clinical aspects of the atomic bomb's medical implications. In 1946, 
JAMA published a letter from Dr. Edwin J. Grace, a specialist on radium 
poisoning, urging the medical profession to launch an educational pro­
gram "to awaken the public to full realization that they cannot view in­
differently this colossal missile of destruction." And after the 1946 Bikini 
tests, Stafford Warren, the project's radiological safety chief, wrote an ar­
ticle for Life Magazine (August 11, 1947), later condensed in Readers 
Digest, offering in laymen's language a somber and frightening assess­
ment of the test's implications. The radioactive spray of Test Baker (the 
underwater explosion), he wrote, posed "an entirely new danger of 
atomic war." It had so penetrated the target ships that scientists and mili­
tary personnel could visit them only on hurried forays, to avoid radiation 
sickness. Radioactive algae had been eaten by larger fish, which had died, 
their decaying bodies then passing the radioactivity back to the algae. 
Algae-encrusted hulls on the task-force ships had become so radioactive 
that crew members' bunks had to be shifted. If, under favorable meteoro­
logical conditions, a Bikini-type bomb were dropped in the harbor of a 
great city, he said, the radiological casualties would be ghastly. Warren 
concluded with a categorical political assertion of a kind exceedingly rare 
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among medical leaders in this period: "The only defense against atomic 
bombs still lies outside the scope of science. It is the prevention of 
atomic war." 
The physician dealing with the nuclear theme who reached the 
largest audience in these years was David Bradley, a 1944 graduate of 
the University of Wisconsin Medical School. A junior member of the 
radiological team at Bikini, Bradley was much impressed by Stafford 
Warren's efforts to awaken the public to the hazard of radiation. Having 
some journalistic experience and an undergraduate degree in English 
from Dartmouth College, he readily agreed when a friend at Atlantic 
Monthly suggested an article about his experiences. The article turned 
into the best-selling book No Place to Hide (1948), which, condensed in 
Readers Digest and offered by the Book~of-the-Month Club, sold 
250,000 copies by 1950. Reviewers were enthusiastic. E. B. White, in 
the New Yorker, praised Bradley's "casual, personal" tone and added: "His 
laboratory was a paradise, and the experiment in which he was involved 
was an experiment in befouling the laboratory itself." Christopher Mor­
ley heard in the book "the clock-tick of warning" {Reader's Digest, Febru­
ary 1949). Bradley lectured widely, wrote numerous magazine articles, 
and appeared on the network radio program Town Meeting of the Air. 
Written in the form of a journal, No Place to Hide is structured 
around the contrast between the edenic setting and Bradley's awakening 
to the magnitude of the test's radiological aftereffects. This awakening 
is conveyed through a series of impressions: the coral reefs gradually 
bleaching white as the algae that gave them color died off, the radioactive 
fish that took their own pictures when placed on photographic plates, 
the navy's futile efforts to decontaminate the surviving ships, the pariah 
fleet of contaminated vessels anchored off Kwajalein atoll, physically un­
scathed but nevertheless "dying of a malignant disease for which there is 
no help." 
Bradley also reports a September 1946 visit to Rongerik Island, 
where some 160 Bikini natives had been "temporarily" relocated. (Nu­
clear testing continued at Bikini until 1958, and in 1985, the atoll was 
still unsafe for human habitation. In March 1985, confronted by a law­
suit, the Reagan administration agreed to a $42-million cleanup, includ­
ing the removal and replacement of radioactive topsoil, which would 
 67 The American Medical Profession
enable the people of Bikini to return.) Emphasizing the lack of any satis­
factory protection against atomic radiation or of any effective means of 
decontamination, and warning of the devastating radiological effect of 
an atomic bombing attack not only on the immediate victims but on the 
land itself for centuries afterwards, Bradley insistently called attention to 
his book's larger implications: "Bikini is not some faraway little atoll pin­
pointed on an out-of-the-way chart. Bikini is San Francisco Bay, Puget 
Sound, the East River. It is the Thames, the Adriatic, Hellespont, and 
misty Baikal." 
Despite the impact of No Place to Hide, one must emphasize that 
David Bradley, a young physician not in the top tier of radiological spe­
cialists, stood nearly alone among physicians in this period in his efforts 
to place the medical and environmental hazards of the atomic bomb in 
a larger social and political context. No medical groups invited him to 
lecture, he told me in a 1984 interview, and in medical and scientific 
journals his book was either ignored or dismissed. Austin M. Brues, 
M.D. (Harvard, 1930), a University of Chicago radiologist with ties to 
the AEC, responded with an essay in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
designed to "dispel some of the fear of radiation that is engendered by 
an unfamiliar natural phenomenon." The genetic risk of radiation expo­
sure, he said, was "overrated," and the whole subject needed a "partial 
debunking." Certainly radiation could increase the likelihood of can-
cer—but so could sunlight and tobacco smoking. Radiation sickness was 
already treatable, and "further means of alleviation" would soon be 
found. Disposal of radioactive waste was "no cause for anxiety," since "we 
still have years in which we can settle upon one of a number of feasible 
methods." "Above all," he concluded, "we should develop a civilian de­
fense organization to the point where we may rely on it to protect the 
population." 
As one might anticipate, given the narrow clinical focus of its re­
sponse to the advent of the atomic bomb, the medical profession did not 
play an active role in promoting the Acheson-Lilienthal plan for inter­
national control of atomic energy, which won wide public support 
in 1945-47 (even as the Truman administration distanced itself from 
the international control principle). Among the most articulate and 
effective proponents of international control were many scientists of the 
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Manhattan Project, who became intensely active politically just after the 
war through their lobbying organization, the Federation of American 
Scientists. Many religious and professional groups threw their support 
behind the atomic scientists' cause. For example, the American Psycho­
logical Association formed a Society for the Psychological Study of Social 
Issues, which in June 1946 issued a six-point manifesto that essentially 
endorsed the political program of the atomic scientists. The interna­
tional control movement found little answering echo, however, in the 
leadership of the American medical profession. 
PROMOTING THE "PEACEFUL ATOM": THE MEDICAL 
PROMISE OF RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES 
In somewhat deliberate counterpoint to grim reports about the atomic 
bomb's clinical effects, the American medical profession in the late 1940s 
focused much attention on the atom's potential medical benefits, espe­
cially the diagnostic and treatment value of radioactive isotopes. In the 
1930s, Ernest O. Lawrence had predicted vast therapeutic applications 
for the isotopes he produced in his cyclotron at the University of Califor­
nia, but not until August 1945 did medicines interest in isotopes really 
blossom. As even a casual perusal of the Index Medicus for these years 
makes abundantly clear, the medical journals were full of reports on the 
use of isotopes of phosphorus, iodine, and cobalt in the diagnosis and 
treatment of goiter, bone cancer, and other diseases. 
These applications were indeed important. In the present context, 
however, it is noteworthy as well that the widespread publicity given to 
the medical promise of atomic energy was also culturally significant in 
shaping public perceptions of the new age that had dawned. Discussions 
of atomic energy in the early post-Hiroshima period often reflected a 
stark either-or approach: Either the atomic bomb would destroy civiliza­
tion, or atomic energy would be harnessed to produce a Utopia of un­
imaginable wonder. If a nuclear holocaust could be avoided, the atom 
would provide electricity too cheap to meter; fuel automobiles, airplanes, 
and ships for a lifetime; give mankind mastery of the environment and 
the weather—and banish disease from the earth. An editorial cartoon 
published in the Dallas Morning News within days of Hiroshima pictured 
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a skeleton labeled "CANCER" fleeing lightning bolts of "Atomic En­
ergy," and this theme loomed large in the early popular writings about 
atomic energy in such magazines as Life, Colliers, and the Saturday Eve­
ning Post 
The more euphoric of the post-Hiroshima Utopian fantasies soon 
faded, but predictions of the atom's vast medical promise became, if any­
thing, rosier as the decade wore on. Radioactive isotopes were wonder­
workers that would transform human existence! Isotope research, pro­
claimed Colliers in May 1947, promised "cures for hitherto incurable 
diseases" and opened the door to "a golden age of atomic medicine." As 
soon as hospitals were equipped "to offer atomic medicine to all who 
need it," this article concluded, "much of the pain and premature death 
which now face so many of us may prove to be avoidable." Writing in the 
American Magazine in December 1947, Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins 
of the University of Chicago predicted, "The atomic city will have a cen­
tral diagnostic laboratory but only a small hospital, if any at all, for most 
human ailments will be cured as rapidly as they are diagnosed." "The 
Sunny Side of the Atom," a 1947 CBS radio special, credited isotopes 
with almost magical powers, artfully blurring the distinction between 
diagnosis and cure and implying that isotopes had actual healing 
properties. 
Research on the medical applications of atomic energy was strongly 
encouraged by the U.S. government in these years. Thanks in part to the 
efforts of Shields Warren, first director of the AECs division of biology 
and medicine, the AEC funneled substantial funds to cancer research 
in medical schools and research institutes, financed construction of the 
Argonne Cancer Research Hospital at the University of Chicago, and 
underwrote some 175 pre- and postdoctoral fellowships in the life sci­
ences. With this infusion of federal dollars, research in the field bur­
geoned. In the six months from January to June 1950, the Index Medicus 
recorded some 250 reports on medical research involving atomic energy. 
While the AECs funding of medical research was legitimate and 
doubtless praiseworthy, it also had significant public relations value in 
shaping perceptions of atomic energy—a side benefit the government 
fully recognized. AEC chairman David E. Lilienthal tirelessly promoted 
the image of "the peaceful atom," even as the AEC s energies focused 
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heavily on bomb production. As the AEC celebrated the positive side of 
the atomic story through exhibits, radio programs, magazine articles, and 
speeches by Lilienthal and others, the atoms medical promise high­
lighted the propaganda campaign. 
The American medical profession willingly lent itself to this cam­
paign. In December 1946, the District of Columbia medical journal 
published a lengthy article in which a government radiologist deplored 
the "wild fantastic talk" by "irresponsible" people that was exacerbating 
public fears of atomic war. Urging a more "common-sense viewpoint," 
he described the therapeutic possibilities of radiation in cancer treatment 
and concluded, "The romance which undoubtedly lies ahead for these 
fortunate investigators who enter this field has probably never been 
equalled in the past, certainly not in the field of biologic research." In 
1947, after glowingly describing the vast medical promise of radioactive 
isotopes, Hygeia, an AMA-sponsored popular health magazine, noted 
that this dimension of atomic energy development was "not so de­
pressing as the thought of an atomic war," and that while the develop­
ment of atomic weapons was unquestionably "an unhappy event, . . . the 
power to learn about better health far outweighs other considerations." 
At the 1948 AMA convention, a special session on atomic energy 
featured a report by Shields Warren on the AEC's medical research pro­
gram, a lecture by an AEC scientist on the medical value of isotopes, 
and a more general discussion of "The Medical Profession and Atomic 
Energy" by AEC commissioner Lewis L. Strauss. While some peacetime 
applications of atomic energy were as yet "hidden in the mists of the 
future," said Warren, its immediate implications for medical research 
were "as overwhelming as a streamliner rushing down on a grade cross­
ing" (an image that may have been less reassuring than he intended). 
Strauss urged physicians to help in overcoming the unreasoning "preju­
dice against work on atomic energy, based on lack of detailed informa­
tion" and the "widespread impression that atomic energy is a health 
hazard of monumental and enduring proportions." "Certainly persons 
can be injured by loose and restless atomic particles, and chromosomes 
can be damaged, with resultant mutations," acknowledged Strauss. "But 
we should remember that these changes can be produced also by any 
number of agents from sunlight down to the garden crocus. In other 
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words, they are neither very new, nor very startling. It is simply that our 
attention is focused on them at the moment." 
The implicit (and often explicit) message underlying much of this 
medical discussion of atomic energy—that the therapeutic promise far 
outweighed and even canceled out the atom's menace—penetrated the 
profession very deeply. "The effects of the atomic bomb may seem ap­
palling to many persons," Dr. Harold C. Lueth told the West Virginia 
Medical Association in August 1949, but when the medical benefits of 
atomic energy were considered, he went on, "a much more hopeful as­
pect . .  . is gained." "Out of the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," he 
concluded, "there will come a beneficial atomic energy that will rise 
phoenix-like to benefit the health and welfare of our nation." 
THE FEDERAL MEDICAL BUREAUCRACY AND CIVIL DEFENSE 
By the late 1940s, American attitudes toward the atomic bomb were 
changing rapidly. Hopes for international control had evaporated, the 
Cold War was under way, and fear of Russia was intensifying. Encour­
aged by the government and influential voices in the media, many who 
had earlier viewed the abolition or strict control of atomic weapons as 
the nations top priority now concluded that atomic superiority was 
Americas best hope. The Russian atomic-bomb test of September 1949, 
the arrest of atomic spy Klaus Fuchs in England in January 1950, and 
President Truman's decision that same month to authorize development 
of the hydrogen bomb sharply accelerated this profound shift in cultural 
attitudes. Public-opinion polls overwhelmingly supported the H-bomb 
decision. 
With these developments came a heavy official emphasis on civil de­
fense. In 1948, Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal created an office of 
civil-defense planning in the Pentagon, and in 1950 President Truman 
established the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Under its director, 
Millard Caldwell, the administration moved quickly to draw the medical 
profession deeply into the process of civil-defense planning and propa­
ganda. A director for health services was appointed, with assistant 
directors responsible for medical care planning, public health, and the 
stockpiling of medical and mortuary supplies against the day of atomic 
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attack. State and county medical societies were designated as advisers to 
local civil-defense offices. Dr. Howard A. Rusk, a professor at the New 
York University School of Medicine and a national leader in the profes­
sion, chaired the medical advisory committee. 
Physicians in many branches and agencies of government rallied be­
hind the emerging civil-defense campaign. The Public Health Service 
established a radiological health division. The Naval Medical Center at 
Bethesda, Maryland, organized a course on civil defense in atomic war 
for its reserve medical officers. The director of this program reported in 
1950, "At the conclusion of these lectures our Reserve Medical Officers 
have told me repeatedly, 'Many of us came disheartened and with a help­
less attitude on the atomic bomb. The casualties were just too staggering. 
The course has dispelled this defeatist attitude.5" In "What You Should 
Know about the Atomic Bomb," the surgeon general of the army, R. W. 
Bliss, offered an equally optimistic message: Survival was possible; 
experts had the problem in hand. "Our population need not be defense­
less," he declared, "The trained combination of nuclear physicists, engi­
neers, and medical men can operate to protect our Nation if it is ever 
attacked." 
Another government physician to put his expertise at the service of 
civil-defense planning was the psychiatrist Dale C. Cameron, M.D., as­
sistant director of the National Institute of Mental Health from 1945 
to 1950. In "Psychiatric Implications of Civil Defense," read before the 
American Psychiatric Association in May 1949 and later published in 
the American Journal of Psychiatry, Cameron warned that an atomic at­
tack could have serious psychological effects, ranging from "apathy" to 
"purposeless hyperactivity." But such undesirable postattack behavior 
could be minimized, Cameron went on, if citizens were authoritatively 
assured that atomic attack was survivable, that alarmists were vastly over­
stating radiation hazards, and that civil-defense planning would protect 
the nation if atomic war came. 
Cameron called for the organization of the population into small 
groups under psychiatrically trained leaders who would assist groups in 
"working through . . . fears and apprehensions" and "overcoming atti­
tudes of futility . . . which would be disastrous in the event war should 
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occur." After the bomb fell, these small neighborhood groups could then 
reassemble and provide mutual support. 
Central to the government s civil-defense program was the effort to 
downplay the danger of radiation in an atomic attack and to emphasize 
protective measures citizens could take against radiation injury. Radia­
tion was like taxes, wrote one government civil-defense staff member in 
1949, not pleasant, perhaps, but you could learn to live with it. This is 
the central theme, too, of How to Survive an Atomic Bomb, a government 
handbook by Richard Gerstell, holder of a Ph.D. in radiology from the 
University of Michigan. Don't.be taken in by "foolish stories" about radi­
ation causing cancer, sterility, or genetic damage, Gerstell urged, "Learn 
not to be afraid of those words 'radiation' and 'radioactivity.'" A re­
curring theme in David Lilienthal's speeches of the late 1940s was that 
fearmongers were exaggerating the radiation hazard; radiation was like 
sunlight, Lilienthal insisted—to be treated with respect, but certainly 
not feared. 
Physicians in the government's employ lent their authority to this 
campaign. In April 1948, clearly seeking to counteract the impact of Da­
vid Bradley's No Place to Hide, the U.S. surgeon general issued a news 
release deriding the "sensational prophecies" of dire radiological conse­
quences in an atomic war. In 1948, James P. Cooney, M.D., an official 
of the army medical corps attached to the AEC, told the American Public 
Health Association that while atomic radiation could indeed cause death 
and injury, it should be approached with a "practical attitude," not un­
reasoning fear. Cooney's central concern was not radiation itself, but "the 
fear reaction of the uninitiated." The potential victims of atomic radia­
tion, he insisted, must be conditioned to think of it as simply another of 
the many acceptable risks of war. Americans must learn "to live with this 
piece of ordnance" and if necessary "use it again in the defense of our 
way of living." Cooney further disseminated his ideas in numerous medi­
cal articles of this period, of which "The Physicians Problem in Atomic 
Warfare" in JAMA (March 3, 1951) is representative. 
Several physicians with links to the AEC, including Shields Warren 
and James P. Cooney, contributed to The Effects of Atomic Weapons, a 
technical report issued by the AEC in 1950. The chapter on the bomb's 
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radiological effects offered a detailed summary of current knowledge and 
cautioned that "the exact magnitude of the risk" of long-term genetic 
damage was not yet known. But this AEC report was intended as a hand­
book for civil-defense officials, and its overall theme is the value of in­
formed advance planning in diminishing the bomb's destructive effects. 
Typical of this action-oriented emphasis is the claim (not in the medical 
chapter, it should be noted) that lingering radiological contamination 
from an atomic bomb exploded low in the atmosphere "might be an in­
convenience, but it would not, in general, represent a real danger." A 
simplified AEC booklet based on the longer technical study went much 
further in downplaying the danger of radiation and stressing the value of 
preventive measures. 
At a news conference introducing this booklet, an AEC spokesman 
insisted that the radiation danger had been much exaggerated, and con­
cluded: "If an individual can stand up after the bomb goes off and look 
around and comment cthis place is really beat up' . . . , he has a pretty 
good chance of surviving." While acknowledging that there was "no spe­
cific therapeutic treatment right now" for radiation disease, he insisted 
vaguely but emphatically, "There is much that we can do about it. We 
don't have to sit back and say that 60,000 people are going to die because 
a bomb goes off, because that is not the way to look at it." 
THE MEDICAL PROFESSION AS A WHOLE AND CIVIL DEFENSE 
The medical professions role in the early civil-defense campaign was not 
by any means limited to government physicians. With rare exceptions, 
all levels of organized medicine actively supported and lent credibility to 
the government effort to persuade the American people of the urgency 
and efficacy of civil-defense preparation for atomic war. At a time when 
American medicine was so vigorously fighting government proposals 
for national health insurance, enthusiastic support of Washington on the 
civil-defense issue may have appealed to the medical leadership as a 
means of demonstrating the professions patriotism, social consciousness, 
and civic responsibility. 
In these years JAMA published frequent and approving reports about 
the profession's civil-defense role, and it also promoted the expansion of 
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that role. In a 1949 issue of JAMA, for example, three veterans of the 
Manhattan Project's medical-research program, discussing the general 
question "Physicians in an Atomic War," conceded "the enormity of the 
medical problem" and even admitted that at the moment American med­
icine was little better prepared "to cope with an atomic bomb attack on 
one of our major cities than the Japanese were at Nagasaki." They in­
sisted, however, that with more planning all this could change, and the 
profession could handle the medical challenge of atomic war, including 
blood transfusions, intravenous feeding, and pain sedation on a monu­
mental scale. They recommended the construction of backup hospitals 
in suburban areas and insisted that "an essential part of a physician's 
training" should be instruction in postattack medical practice, including 
the principles of triage (the tripartite division of casualties on the basis 
of survival probability). "The physician must play a role in the investiga­
tion of these problems during this period of peace," they concluded 
bluntly. "That he will play a role in handling casualties in the event of 
an atomic war is inevitable." 
Organizationally, too, the American medical profession cooperated 
fully with the federal civil-defense program in these years. In 1947, the 
AMA set up a Committee on National Emergency Medical Service, 
which met periodically to discuss a variety of post—nuclear attack prob­
lems. The AMA also cooperated with a Red Cross program to stockpile 
blood plasma for use in an atomic attack. At an AMA conference on 
medical education in 1948, Dr. George E. Armstrong, deputy surgeon 
general of the U.S. Army, urged medical schools to organize minicourses 
on radiation disease to "alleviate the worry which pervades the profes­
sion." Such courses need take only a few days, he said, since "what every 
physician should know. . . can be mimeographed on one sheet of paper." 
Armstrong cautioned, however, that in an atomic attack certain medical 
procedures customary in disaster situations would have to be delayed, for 
example, "until trained technicians consider it safe to enter the radio-
contaminated areas." Further, vast numbers of victims would be so heav­
ily irradiated that no treatment or transfusions could help them, and "the 
profession must steel itself to make those persons comfortable and to 
concentrate every effort to save those who have some chance of survival." 
Armstrong asked the AMAs "assistance in 'selling' [these] two concepts 
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to the profession—concepts which are contrary to all previous teachings, 
yet which are vital to the proper handling of casualties in the event of an 
atomic catastrophe." 
Accepting its assigned mission, the AMA cooperated fully in an ex­
tensive medical training program that was soon launched by the AEC 
and the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Under this program, 
physicians were brought to regional training centers at Rochester, Johns 
Hopkins, UCLA, and other universities for a brief but intensive course 
in the medical aspects of an atomic attack, including "the biological, 
pathologic and genetic effects of radiation" and "psychological factors 
such as mass hysteria." These trainees were then expected to cooperate 
with local civil-defense officials in their respective areas in the training of 
physicians, nurses, and other medical professionals. At a November 1951 
conference in Chicago sponsored by the AMAs Council on National 
Emergency Medical Service, the American Hospital Association, and the 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officers, 250 delegates from 
all over the country heard lectures by federal civil-defense officials and 
discussed all aspects of medical and public-health planning for an atomic 
attack, from the stockpiling of blood and plasma to latrine policing, the 
control of hysteria, and the mass burial of radioactive corpses. 
Local and state medical societies, too, responded with alacrity to 
Washington's call for cooperation in civil-defense planning. The Massa­
chusetts Medical Society's "Suggestions for First-Aid Treatment of Casu­
alties from Atomic Bombing," published in the New England Journal of 
Medicine in 1950, was subsequently offered in pamphlet form to the gen­
eral public. That same year, the Maine medical journal published a three-
part series, "What Every Maine Doctor Should Know about the Medical 
Aspects of Atomic Weapons and Atomic Warfare," which began with 
a hopeful exhortation by the army's surgeon general, R. W. Bliss, and 
concluded with a call to every Maine physician to "measure his obliga­
tion toward the future," "accept his responsibility for the safety and . . . 
survival of the great masses of the population if a new conflict should 
come," and "cooperate wholeheartedly" with civil-defense planning de­
signed to reduce casualties, "should these new atomic or hydrogen 
bombs ever be dropped . . . over our densely populated civilian centers." 
In Colorado, Dr. Thad P. Sears, professor at the University of Colorado 
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Medical School and a member of the state medical society's Disaster 
Commission, became almost obsessed, according to a colleague, with a 
"deep-seated conviction . . . that the community in which he lived 
should be prepared for atomic warfare." Sears gave hundreds of lectures 
in the Rocky Mountain area, trying to "arouse civilians and his profes­
sional colleagues from their unrealistic complacency," and in The Physi­
cian in Atomic Defense (1953), he reiterated his belief in the medical 
professions vital civil-defense role. 
Perhaps the most elaborate planning at the state level was by the 
Pennsylvania medical society's Atomic Energy Medical Steering Com­
mittee, set up in 1948 to design a program "to protect the public in event 
of disaster." Six subcommittees addressed such matters as radiation mea­
surement, postattack epidemic control, and "strengthening public mo­
rale." Reviewing these plans at the society's annual meeting in 1949, a 
speaker reminded his colleagues that the prospect of atomic war "im­
posed grave responsibilities on the medical profession." 
The annual gatherings of the nation's medical associations provided 
an important forum for government medical officials preaching the civil-
defense message. Physicians must "be in a continual state of prepared­
ness," the District of Columbia medical society was told in 1948 by Clar­
ence J. Brown of the navy medical service, since in an atomic attack, 
responsibility would "rest squarely upon the shoulders of the civilian 
medical profession, whether or not they are in uniform." The Atlanta 
medical society was told in 1950 by another navy medical officer that 
a "sustained and orderly program of education and wise leadership" by 
physicians was essential to encourage civil-defense preparation and coun­
teract the exaggerated radiation fears that had "captured the popular in­
terest and beclouded the thinking of many imaginative minds." 
In the same vein, an alumni-day audience at the Indiana University 
medical school in May 1950 heard Morton D. Willcutts of the Naval 
Medical Center denounce exaggerated and misleading reports that had 
"excited too much respect and fear of the radiation hazards in the wake 
of an atomic explosion." Willcutts acknowledged that, without advance 
planning, the casualties in an atomic attack would "swamp normally 
available facilities," but he insisted that civil-defense preparation could 
improve the picture dramatically: "There is a defense. We do not need 
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to hide or to become frightened out of our wits into hysteria. Forewarned 
is to be forearmed." Quoting a navy public-relations officer of his ac­
quaintance, Willcutts ended on a note of aggressive optimism, "We will 
survive. Our country is young and very, very strong when angered or 
attacked. . . . 'Through the generations of our existence as a peace-loving 
democracy, we have formed one excellent habit—we win wars.'" 
A number of state medical societies heard the civil-defense message 
from William W Wilson, M.D., of the army medical corps. Physicians 
were understandably feeling "temporary pessimism" as they contem­
plated the medical consequences of a nuclear war, Wilson told the Flor­
ida Medical Association in 1950, but with planning they could enhance 
their "capabilities for overcoming the hazards attributable to atomic 
bombing." Such preparation could be relatively simple, he insisted. Pre­
1945 civil-defense plans need only be updated to take into account the 
"vastly increased numbers" of casualties and "the new problems of radia­
tion." Like Willcutts, Wilson ended on an inspirational note: "It has 
been characteristic of our medical profession . .  . to accept no defeats, to 
know no fears, to withhold no service to victims of disaster." With plan­
ning and cooperation, "there could be nothing but triumph if we should 
ultimately be put to a critical test." 
Hospital administrators, too, participated in the officially inspired 
preoccupation with civil defense. Discussing "Hospitals versus the Atom 
Bomb" in the December 1950 issue of Modern Hospital, an army hospital 
administrator urged his civilian colleagues to prepare at once for atomic 
war. "We are not likely to have enough hospital beds for even a limited 
atomic attack," he warned, "unless we think now in terms of maximum 
potentials." Administrators, he insisted, should give thought to such mat­
ters as tattooing blood type on patients' arms, "emergency morgue facili­
ties," postattack "police and traffic control" at their hospitals, and means 
of handling hysterical patients. Should beds run short, he noted, "an or­
dinary house door on a saw horse will suffice in dire need." In an atomic 
war, he suggested: "Improvisation will be the greatest asset the adminis­
trator can have." In the same issue, an architect discussed the need for 
more blast-resistant hospital design. 
The leading civil-defense advocate among hospital administrators 
was New York City hospital commissioner Marcus D. Kogel, M.D. "The 
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mounting tension in our population makes it imperative that we have a 
workable plan . .  . as quickly as possible/' Kogel wrote in Hospital Man­
agement in 1950, "so that we can get rolling and do something construc­
tive towards its implementation." Recognizing that most urban hospitals 
would be wiped out in an atomic attack, Kogel advocated the training 
of mobile paramedical squads, modeled on the army's battalion aid sta­
tions, to set up emergency medical centers around the perimeter of the 
bombed-out area "at intervals as close as a block or two." KogeFs staff 
even drew up a list of supplies for each emergency medical center, includ­
ing a lantern, six sheets and pillowcases, a pint of whiskey, and a bottle 
of sodium bicarbonate. With atomic war looming, he wrote, it was "a 
matter of plain common sense" to develop "an entirely new concept of a 
civilian emergency medical service . . . capable of going into high gear 
the moment the disaster strikes." 
Pervading these discussions was the conviction that to sustain civil­
ian morale, the medical profession must cultivate an aura of mastery and 
total assurance regarding its ability to cope with atomic war. As William 
Wilson told the Florida Medical Association, it would be "impossible to 
exaggerate the benefits guaranteed by public confidence that prompt and 
skilled medical services" would be available in the postattack period. 
"What the public will believe, as soon as their physicians and health de­
partments tell them at every opportunity," he insisted, was that, with 
sufficient advance planning, "most of those resisting attack" would sur­
vive. Professionally acculturated always to appear hopeful and optimistic 
in dealing with patients, physicians tried to sustain this manner in their 
discussion of atomic war. "The task of the medical profession," Dr. Har­
old C. Lueth told the West Virginia Medical Association, was to "reassure 
the population that steps can be taken to minimize the effect of the 
atomic bomb." He acknowledged, however, that this task would become 
increasingly difficult as atomic war drew closer: "Those persons who 
have heard only the gruesome results of the bomb will be definitely de­
pressed by the possibility of the threat of immediate death. Anxiety and 
fear will be kindled in the minds of those who do not understand the 
bomb. . . . The possibility of lingering illness with no prospect of recov­
ery constitutes a real anxiety." 
In this spirit of reassurance, Dr. George R Lull, secretary of the 
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AMA, brought a message of both hope and challenge to the public in a 
1950 article in Todays Health, Physicians were shouldering "the leading 
role in national preparedness for an atomic war," he wrote, but they 
needed "the help of every American." To provide that help, he went on, 
citizens must "treat the problem of possible attack with skill and fore­
sight, and control fear with reason instead of exaggerating it into hyste­
ria." The challenge of preparedness for atomic attack was formidable, 
said the aptly named Lull, but "the answer lies in a smooth-operating 
civil-defense setup within every community.*' 
Only, in muted, half-acknowledged ways did a few physicians— 
while ostensibly endorsing civil-defense ideology—hint that the entire 
approach might be misconceived. In some discussions, for example, the 
most nightmarish visions of total chaos were followed by the ritualistic 
insistence that "planning" and "preparation" were nevertheless essential. 
In The Physician in Atomic Defense, for example, Thad P. Sears, estimat­
ing (very conservatively) that an atomic attack on a city of half a million 
would produce 120,000 casualties, of whom 40,000 would die in the 
first twenty-four hours, wrote: "The remaining case load will therefore 
be 80,000. . . . Injured persons must be rescued and given first aid. They 
are then to be passed through a hospital chain and evacuated either to 
their homes or to off-target convalescent institutions. This service must 
be rendered in the presence of physical destruction, fire, confusion, 
rubble-filled streets, poor ambulance transport, disrupted communica­
tions, insufficient technical assistance and possibly lingering radioactiv­
ity." The disposal of corpses, too, would pose problems "almost bizarre 
in type and magnitude": "Refrigeration and embalming facilities are en­
tirely inadequate for the care of numbers so great as these. . . . This may 
mean mass burial in a common grave." Despite these horrifying pros­
pects, Sears insisted that the medical profession must be prepared to 
cope: "Such a prospect calls for a well-organized plan with careful atten­
tion given to every detail, including adequate rehearsal." 
Despite its effort at optimism, the Maine medical journal launched 
its civil-defense series with extensive quotations from Hersey's graphic 
description of the utter destruction of Hiroshima's medical system—by 
a single bomb that was already puny by 1950. Every physician should 
read Hiroshima, it said, to learn "what the medical man wil l .  . . face in 
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the event an atomic bomb is detonated over a large industrial area in his 
vicinity." A number of medical writers recalled how the several hundred 
burn victims of the 1942 Coconut Grove nightclub fire had swamped 
the medical resources of Boston. In a 1949 report on AEC-fiinded re­
search on the effects of flash burns on pigs, two medical researchers at 
Rochester digressed to reflect on the "staggering" resources necessary to 
treat the burn victims in an actual atomic attack on a medium-sized city: 
170,000 medical professionals; 8,000 tons of oxygen, plasma, drugs, 
gauze; and so forth. 
But such cautionary notes were rare. In the later 1940s, the orga­
nized medical profession wholeheartedly lent its prestige and organiza­
tional strength to the government's civil-defense program, including the 
systematic effort to downplay the radiation hazards of atomic war and 
persuade the public that with sufficient preparation, American society 
could absorb a large-scale atomic attack with a minimum of disruption. 
The demands on the medical profession would be enormous, so the lit­
any went, but it would rise to the challenge. As Everett Evans, a professor 
of surgery at the Medical College of Virginia and consultant to the 
ABCC, put it in a JAMA article, the very fact that the medical situation 
in an atomic war could easily degenerate into "complete chaos and 
panic" made it all the more urgent that physicians gird themselves for 
the eventuality. "Only free men with strong hearts and wills can accom­
plish the gigantic task of providing by training and discipline the neces­
sary workers." Civil-defense planning must, begin at once, said Evans, 
"lest contemplation of the magnitude of the task only encourage de­
spair." Atomic war would be the ultimate challenge for the American 
physician, and he must steel himself for it, whatever the odds. Any other 
response would be unworthy and unpatriotic. Such was the message of 
Americas medical leadership as the 1950s began. 
THE ROOTS OF ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
ACTIVISM IN AMERICAN MEDICINE 
Beginning in the mid-1950s and increasing through the early 1960s, 
a few influential medical voices broke the pattern of uncritical support 
for official government positions on nuclear issues. This development 
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reflected a larger cultural shift in these years—a shift triggered primarily 
by fear of fallout from the atmospheric testing of thermonuclear weap­
ons. Although the first thermonuclear test was conducted by the United 
States in 1952, it was the U.S. Bravo test series at Bikini atoll in March 
1954, which spread deadly radioactive ash over nearly eight thousand 
square miles of the Pacific and brought illness and death to the crew of a 
Japanese fishing vessel, that first alerted the world to the fallout danger. 
As American, Russian, and British thermonuclear tests continued, 
fear of global atmospheric fallout and its possible link to cancer and long-
term genetic damage increased, focusing especially on strontium 90, 
a deadly radioactive isotope with a half-life of twenty-eight years and 
calcium-like properties. Pumped into the atmosphere by thermonuclear 
explosions, strontium 90 returned to earth in rain, entered the food 
chain, and concentrated especially in the bone marrow of infants and 
children. Geneticists took the lead in sounding the alarm. The Nobel 
laureate Hermann J. Muller of Indiana University somberly warned of 
threats to the human gene pool, man's "most valuable irretrievable pos­
session." In a 1956 National Academy of Sciences report, a committee 
of prominent geneticists concluded that in terms of long-term genetic 
damage, "the concept of a safe rate of radiation simply does not make 
sense." The University of Wisconsin geneticist James E Crow declared 
unequivocally in 1957: "There is no such thing as a safe dose of radiation 
to the population." Radiologists (including some physicians with AEC 
ties, such as Shields Warren and Austin Brues) tended to disagree, sug­
gesting that a safe threshold did exist. Warren called the genetic risk from 
radioactive fallout "so slight in relation to other risks as to be disre­
garded" and dismissed the entire controversy as "more important as a 
symbol than it is as an actual health hazard." A 1958 study of irradiated 
mice at the AEC s Argonne Laboratory in Illinois seemed to confirm the 
"safe threshold" conclusion, although geneticists sharply challenged its 
relevance to human beings. 
While scientists debated, public alarm mounted. Under growing 
pressure, the Public Health Service began monitoring the nation's milk 
supply in 1958. A full-blown fallout scare gripped the nation early in 
1959, when tests showed a sharp rise of strontium 90 in St. Louis and 
other cities. A study of strontium 90 in the bones of children under the 
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age of four, conducted at Columbia University and published in Science 
in May 1959, showed that the level doubled in 1957. The Saturday Eve­
ning Post in 1959 ran a feature entitled "Fallout: The Silent Killer." 
Across the cultural spectrum—from sermons, symposia, poems, and 
novels to movies, television series, and mass magazines—the fallout scare 
led to the articulation of more general nuclear fears submerged since the 
1945-47 period. Politically, it spawned a campaign to stop nuclear test­
ing. The idea of a test ban, advanced by the Democratic presidential can­
didate Adlai Stevenson in the 1956 presidential campaign, was broached 
again by Minnesota senator Hubert Humphrey in the 1960 Democratic 
primaries. Nearly two thousand scientists signed Linus Pauling's 1957 
petition calling for an international test ban agreement. Of the many test 
ban organizations, the best known, founded in 1957, was SANE, the 
National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. 
Within this sharply altered cultural and political climate, some in­
fluential American physicians became politically active on the nuclear 
issue. Psychiatrist Jerome Frank of Johns Hopkins University, for ex­
ample, in a November 1958 Atlantic Monthly article, drew parallels be­
tween society's responses to the nuclear threat and the behavior of mental 
patients: denial, compulsive repetition, paranoid suspicion, and so on. 
Frank became a SANE director in 1963 and in 1967 published Sanity 
and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace. 
In St. Louis, meanwhile, Dr. Walter Bauer, a pathologist at the 
Washington University School of Medicine, joined with physiologist 
Barry Commoner and others in 1958 to found the Committee for Nu­
clear Information (CNI) to publicize the fallout danger. The committee's 
best-known publication, a fictionalized but scientifically accurate ac­
count of the effects of a nuclear attack on St. Louis, appeared in the CNI 
newsletter in 1959 and was reprinted in Saturday Review and elsewhere. 
Another CNI project was the "Baby Tooth Survey" to measure strontium 
90 levels. The brainchild of Dr. Alfred Schwartz, a St. Louis pediatrician 
and CNI vice president, the study accumulated more than eighty thou­
sand teeth by 1962. (Each contributor received a button proclaiming "I 
Gave My Tooth to Science.") The deans of the Washington University 
and St. Louis University dental schools sat on the project's scientific advi­
sory board. The results, released in 1962, showed a fourteenfold increase 
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in the level of strontium 90 in the teeth of children born in 1957 com­
pared with those born in 1949. 
This first wave of medical involvement in the nuclear issue crested 
in 1962-63. In 1962, SANEs executive director, Homer Jack, recruited 
Benjamin Spock to the cause. In a full-page advertisement in the New 
York Times, the famed baby doctor gazed with furrowed brow at a little 
girl under the headline "Dr Spock Is Worried." In 1963, Spock became 
SANEs cochairman. 
In 1962, an important series of articles in the New England Journal 
of Medicine (which in 1950 had published "Suggestions for First Aid 
Treatment of Casualties from Atomic Bombing") explored "The Medical 
Consequences of Thermonuclear War" and "The Physicians Role in the 
Post-Attack Period." Supplemented by essays by Gerard Piel, publisher 
of Scientific American, and Bentley Glass, professor of biology at Johns 
Hopkins University, these articles were published in 1963 in a work ar­
restingly entitled The Fallen Sky. In sharp contrast to the earlier exhorta­
tions to physicians to prepare for atomic war, these articles insisted that 
a thermonuclear attack would be a medical catastrophe so enormous and 
so devastating in its effects on the structure of medical service that physi­
cians should focus their energies on preventing such an event, not pre­
paring for it. "No modern society can survive a full-scale thermonuclear 
attack," the authors asserted unequivocally, and any civil-defense 
program that suggested otherwise was "a vast and scientifically unsup­
portable gamble with human life." A "limited" nuclear attack on metro­
politan Boston, the authors concluded, would kill one million of the 
three million inhabitants outright and another million from injuries and 
delayed effects. Of the city's 6,560 physicians, 4,850 would die at once, 
and only 640 would escape unscathed. If each of these 640 worked a 
sixteen-hour day and spent only fifteen minutes with each casualty, they 
calculated, it would take about three weeks for all the victims to receive 
minimal attention. 
This influential series, published in one of the nation's most presti­
gious medical journals, was one of the early projects of a new organiza­
tion, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR). Founded in 1961 by Dr. 
Bernard Lown, professor of cardiology at the Harvard School of Public 
Health, PSR served as a rallying point for the growing number of physi­
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cians becoming active in the antinuclear cause. "There are situations in 
which prevention is the only effective therapy," declared PSR's statement 
of purpose. "The physician . . . must begin to explore a new area of pre­
ventive medicine, the prevention of thermonuclear war." Membership 
increased steadily in the succeeding months, drawing physicians from 
around the country. 
In these years Jerome Frank was not the only psychiatrist to probe 
the psychological underpinnings of the nuclear arms race and the impli­
cations of the civil-defense movement. In the aforementioned 1962 spe­
cial issue of the New England Journal of Medicine, two Harvard Medical 
School psychiatrists argued that "the psychological and social problems 
raised in planning a defense-shelter program are of a magnitude and 
complexity that make it advisable to concentrate massive efforts on elimi­
nating the need£01 such a program." An article reporting the destructive 
psychological effects of prolonged fallout-shelter confinement appeared 
in the Archives of General Psychiatry in 1963. The following year, the 
Committee on Social Issues of the Group for the Advancement of Psy­
chiatry (an association of socially engaged psychiatrists founded in 1946) 
published Psychiatric Aspects of the Prevention of Nuclear War. 
In these years, too, Robert Jay Lifton discovered his subject—the 
psychological effects of living with nuclear weapons. Active in the test 
ban movement at Harvard in the late 1950s, Lifton in 1962, having con­
ducted a two-year study of Japanese youth, spent six months in Hiro­
shima interviewing atomic-bomb survivors. The first product of this 
study, a 1963 Daedalus article entitled "Psychological Effects of the 
Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima—The Theme of Death," contained the 
germ of the ideas Lifton elaborated in numerous books and articles, most 
memorably in Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima (1967). 
REORIENTATION 
The American medical profession s surge of involvement with the issue 
of nuclear war was not sustained. In common with the rest of the culture, 
medicine's engagement with this issue diminished sharply after the rati­
fication of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in November 1963. This 
treaty did not stop all nuclear testing, but it did halt atmospheric testing, 
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the source of the dreaded radioactive fallout. This development, plus a 
series of arms-control agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty of 1972 (SALT I) > an apparent easing of Cold War tensions during 
the period of detente), and the emergence of the Vietnam War as an issue 
of compelling urgency all combined to diminish anti—nuclear weapons 
activism. Groups like SANE and the St. Louis Committee on Nuclear 
Information, in which physicians had played a prominent role, faded 
away or turned to other issues. PSR went into eclipse. 
Nevertheless, a profound shift had occurred. The narrow clinical fo­
cus and uncritical identification with official policy that had character­
ized American medicine's initial response to the atomic bomb was 
fundamentally undermined during the period of fallout worry and test 
ban activism (1954—63). When the cultural and political climate shifted 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, bringing the nuclear issue once more 
to the fore, men and women of the medical profession played a leading 
role. PSR revived with phoenixlike vitality; old themes were rediscov­
ered; and leaders from the earlier period of activism, reinforced by articu­
late newcomers, again conveyed the grim tidings to a newly attentive 
public: If nuclear war comes, organized medicine will be of scant help, 
for it, too, will be sucked into the all-consuming maelstrom. 
EDWARD TELLER AND PROJECT CHARIOT 
Years after the Cold War ended, Americans continued to learn more about bizarre byways of the era when American life was shaped in profound ways not only 
by the nuclear arms race itself, but also by the exposure of 
military personnel to radioactive fallout from nuclear-
weapons tests, medical experiments that involved giving ra­
dioactive substances to the unsuspecting and uninformed 
inmates of public institutions, and the erratic if not meretri­
cious official policy toward the release of information about 
the hazards of radioactivity from nuclear tests. Only in 
1997, for example, forty years or more after the fact, did we 
learn that throughout the years of atmospheric nuclear test­
ing, the Atomic Energy Commission had regularly informed 
the Kodak Corporation of Rochester, New York, when 
atomic tests were scheduled, since as early as the Alamo­
gordo test of 1945, Kodak had experienced problems with 
the fogging of X-ray film because of elevated levels of radio­
activity in the packaging material in which the film was 
shipped. Corporate America thus had privileged access to in­
formation about product hazards related to nuclear testing 
at a time when the government routinely downplayed or 
flatly denied possible human health risks resulting from the 
tests. Washington's determined campaign to promote "the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy" must be understood in this 
climate of deception, misrepresentation, and propaganda 
manipulation. 
In 1995, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists invited me 
to review a fascinating book by Daniel T. O'Neill, The Fire­
cracker Boys (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994). O'Neill 
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told of an amazing engineering project conceived by Edward 
Teller s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the late 
1950s, in part as a strategy for circumventing the movement 
to ban nuclear-weapons testing. This chapter is adapted 
from that review, published in the May/June 1995 issue of 
the Bulletin. 
AS THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE RECEDES, or at least mutates into new forms, 
we learn more and more about how it polluted and poisoned the streams 
of our national life—both literally and figuratively. Dan O'Neill's ab­
sorbing book The Firecracker Boys is a major contribution to this ongoing 
process of historical excavation. O'Neill, a research associate in the oral 
history program at the University of Alaska—Fairbanks, re-creates in care­
ful detail the story of Project Chariot, a bizarre plan gestated in the late 
1950s at the University of California's Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory. The plan called for the detonation of up to six thermo­
nuclear bombs at a remote point near Cape Thompson on Alaska's coast, 
where the Ogotoruk Creek flows into the Chukchi Sea. 
The initial public rationale offered for the plan was that the explo­
sions could transform the mouth of this small stream into a major inter­
national harbor that would stimulate fabulous economic development, 
dramatically illustrate the peacetime uses of atomic energy, and provide 
a showpiece for the Eisenhower administrations Project Plowshare, de­
signed to promote the "Atoms for Peace" idea. 
But the absurdity of the idea soon became apparent: The region, 
more than a hundred miles north of the Arctic Circle, is icebound for 
months at a time, and access to the coalfields of the interior would have 
required the construction of prohibitively expensive rail facilities. When 
the hoped-for private investment that was a crucial component of the 
plan failed to materialize, a more general rationale for Project Chariot 
emerged: that the "experiment" would advance nuclear knowledge and 
thus in some vague way promote human happiness and well-being. 
O'Neill, an engaging writer as well as a careful researcher, begins his 
account with a description of Cape Thompson's history and ecology, and 
of the local Eskimo economy based on fishing and hunting. He then 
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establishes the larger context of Project Chariots origins. It was the 
brainchild of the Hungarian emigre physicist Edward Teller, whose 
fingerprints mark so much of our nuclear history. 
A Manhattan Project veteran and "Father of the H-bomb," Teller 
in 1952 had become head of the Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons 
laboratory. In the late 1950s, as the hazards of radioactive fallout became 
increasingly apparent, and a moratorium on nuclear tests began, Teller 
avidly embraced Atoms for Peace. If nuclear detonations ostensibly de­
signed to explore the peaceful uses of atomic energy could be exempted 
from a possible future test ban agreement, covert weapons research could 
proceed as well. 
Teller and his Livermore associates began a quest for monumental 
engineering projects that could theoretically be undertaken only with the 
aid of nuclear explosions. Touting the wonders of what he called "geo­
graphic engineering," Teller joked at one news conference: "If your 
mountain is not in the right place, drop us a postcard." 
One high-visibility project that quickly surfaced was the idea of re­
arranging the Panama Canal by a series of blasts to eliminate the many 
locks, transforming the canal into a sea-level waterway. Another was to 
bypass the Suez Canal by constructing an alternate canal from the Gulf 
of Aqaba through the Negev Desert to the Mediterranean. Such a canal 
would be wholly Israeli territory. Project Chariot initially entered the pic­
ture as a preliminary step to lay the groundwork for these visionary un­
dertakings. Despite tensions between the freewheeling Teller and Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) officials in Washington, the AEC under 
Lewis Strauss generally backed the plans. 
The heavily publicized campaign to explore the "peacetime uses" of 
atomic energy served a broader purpose as well. As the Livermore scien­
tist (and future defense secretary) Harold Brown wrote in a classified 
1957 report, dramatic demonstrations of the engineering applications of 
nuclear explosions would help Americans "gain a more rational view­
point" about nuclear issues by countering the "phobic public reactions 
[that] have been built around nuclear bombs." 
Thus it was that Edward Teller, the quintessential nuclear-age snake-
oil salesman, arrived in Alaska on July 14, 1958, to promote Project 
Chariot. Initially, he enjoyed remarkable success. O'Neill documents the 
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convergence of interests between Teller and other proponents of nuclear-
weapons development on the one hand, and local groups in Alaska on 
the other. The regions politicians, major newspapers, business groups, 
and would-be developers quickly fell into line. So, too, did the University 
of Alaska at Fairbanks and its entrepreneurial president, William Ran­
som Wood. 
When university biologists called for studies of the environmental 
implications of turning Alaska into a nuclear test site, and the AEC com­
pliantly agreed to fund those studies, dollar signs began to dance in the 
eyes of university officials. Soon AEC research grants, eventually totaling 
more than $100,000, were flowing to Fairbanks. 
Cementing its profitable link with the AEC, the University of Alaska 
in 1959 awarded Teller an honorary degree. In his commencement ad­
dress, Teller spoke enthusiastically of the "industry and progress" that 
Project Chariot would bring to Alaska, and added grandly (if ungram­
matically): "Please God, that by making harbors here in Alaska, perhaps 
near coal deposits, by exporting this coal cheaper to Japan, the Japanese 
might become the first beneficiaries of atomic explosions as they have 
been the first victims." 
But tensions quickly arose within the university. On one side were 
Wood and other administrators eager to maintain a lucrative relationship 
with the AEC. On the other were the field researchers intent on docu­
menting and publicizing the potentially devastating impact of the pro­
posed detonations on the Cape Thompson ecosystem and on the 
livelihood of the local Eskimos. O'Neill records in fascinating detail the 
academic infighting that ensued as university officials first pressured re­
searchers to modify their findings, then censored and rewrote reports, 
and finally forced out two university staff members who refused to kow­
tow, William O. Pruitt and Leslie Viereck. 
Shabby as it is, the story will hardly shock anyone familiar with aca­
demic politics and the ways of university administrators. But unlike 
many such tales, The Firecracker Boyshas a qualified happy ending. Pruitt 
and Viereck, the troublesome researchers who lost their jobs, not only 
pursued productive careers elsewhere despite attempted blacklisting 
by the AEC, but in 1993 both returned to the University of Alaska­
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Fairbanks to receive honorary degrees. Faculty members with long mem­
ories initiated this belated effort to right an old wrong—and they 
overrode efforts by administrators to substitute bland generalities in the 
degree citations for an explicit acknowledgment of the events that oc­
curred nearly thirty years before. 
On a larger canvas, the happy ending also includes the fact that Proj­
ect Chariot quietly expired, done in by its own inherent absurdity, by 
shifting political winds in Washington, and by an increasingly articulate 
and confident local opposition. Slowly, but with growing effectiveness, 
some Alaskans began to protest and to mobilize. The Eskimos of Point 
Hope, a settlement some thirty miles north of the proposed detonation 
site, displayed a sophistication, worldly knowledge, and media savvy 
that repeatedly flummoxed patronizing AEC officials. (At one meeting, 
an AEC spokesman, facing questions far beyond his expertise, made a 
series of patently false assertions—all captured on tape by Point Hope 
residents.) 
As the environmental researchers, working under rigorous condi­
tions in a frigid arctic setting, painstakingly compiled and publicized 
their data despite the efforts of University of Alaska administrators to 
muzzle them, the national media eventually began to pay attention. Sto­
ries appeared in the New York Times, Outdoor Life, Harper's, the Christian 
Science Monitor, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (December 1961), 
and many other publications. 
Advocacy groups from the Sierra Club to the Association on Ameri­
can Indian Affairs also became involved. In St. Louis, Barry Commoner's 
Committee for Nuclear Information spread word of the danger. And 
with the election of John F. Kennedy in November I960, the political 
climate in Washington became distinctly chilly for Teller and his allies. 
Interior secretary Stewart Udall forcefully intervened, making clear that, 
in his view, Project Chariot would violate long-standing Eskimo land 
rights. 
By 1962, the AEC and Livermore officials were looking for ways qui­
etly to scuttle the four-million-dollar project that had become a public-
relations albatross. That August, Livermore lamely announced that since 
other tests had provided the information they had hoped to glean from 
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the Alaska blasts, Project Chariot would be "held in abeyance." Despite 
the qualified nature of the statement, opponents rightly celebrated: The 
scheme was dead. 
O'Neill's exemplary case study of the politics of nuclear-weapons 
testing in the late 1950s and early 1960s illustrates some central features 
of this bleak era in America's Cold War history. He amply documents 
the duplicity of the AEC and of Livermore officials. In public statements 
they insisted that every effort would be made to keep radioactive fallout 
from Project Chariot to a minimum, timing detonations so that radioac­
tive debris would drift seaward rather than onto the land. But internal 
documents O'Neill uncovered make it clear that one purpose of the test 
was to study radiation's effects on the ecosystem of the tundra—implic-
itly including its human population. When a Livermore study group in 
1961 explored the possibility of reducing the yield of the detonations, for 
example, one disadvantage they listed was that smaller explosions would 
reduce radioactive fallout, diminishing the usefulness of the experiment. 
O'Neill also documents the way the AEC manipulated research 
grants to achieve the results it wanted. When AEC-funded biologists, 
botanists, and geographers working on the site produced draft reports 
that underscored the environmental dangers and uncertainties of Project 
Chariot, the AEC threatened to withhold payments to the University of 
Alaska until more "satisfactory" results were forthcoming, rousing con­
sternation in President Wood's office. 
Behind the pose of supporting unbiased scientific research on the 
project's ecological impact, AEC and Livermore officials from the start 
focused mainly on public relations, as they subtly—and not so subtly— 
pressured scientists to produce reassuring studies that would allay public 
fears and clear the way for the test. O'Neill makes clear how readily uni­
versity administrators, concerned primarily with maintaining the flow of 
research dollars to their campus, collaborated in this process. 
TheFirecracker Boysalso reveals that attempts at public-relations ma­
nipulation and cover-up continued long after Project Chariot was all but 
forgotten. Edward Teller, the Energizer Bunny of America's nuclear-
weapons program, became so enraged by O'Neill's questions while being 
interviewed for the book that, according to O'Neill, he halted the ses­
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sion, treated O'Neill to a stream of vituperation, and melodramatically 
tore up the release form he had earlier signed. 
The CIA also stonewalled O'Neill, refusing his Freedom of Informa­
tion Act request for its file on one of the young scientists who had been 
most critical of Project Chariot, geographer Don Foote, even though 
Foote died in 1969 following an automobile accident. (Apparently, as in 
the Karen Silkwood case, some of Foote's friends found his death sus­
picious, but O'Neill;—invariably balanced and judicious—does not en­
dorse conspiracy theories in the case.) 
And his story has a disturbing coda. O'Neill's research in the Liv­
ermore records turned up the fact that in August 1962, even as Project 
Chariot was expiring, government scientists working under contract to 
the AEC secretly brought to the proposed test site on Ogotoruk Creek 
43.5 pounds of highly radioactive sand from a nuclear test conducted in 
Nevada earlier that summer. They placed this material at various sites 
along the creek, "to determine the extent to which water passing through 
irradiated soil would dissolve the fallout radionuclides and transport 
them to aquifers, streams and ponds." 
After the experiment, the scientists gathered some fifteen thousand 
pounds of contaminated soil into a low mound, bulldozed uncontami­
nated soil over it, and quietly departed without posting a warning or 
informing local officials of what they had done. O'Neill's 1992 revelation 
of this long-suppressed episode led to a wave of fear and anger among 
the long-suffering Eskimos of Point Hope, some of whom drew a link 
between the experiment and the high rate of cancer deaths in their com­
munity. (Public-health experts believe that diet, cigarette smoking, and 
other nonradiological factors are the more likely causes—but the people 
of Point Hope have a well-developed skepticism toward experts.) 
Apart from problems with the CIA and Teller, O'Neill faced other 
roadblocks in getting his story out. He initially planned to produce a 
program about Project Chariot for Alaska public television, which is 
based at the University of Alaska-Fairbanks. Although he secured fund­
ing from the Alaska Humanities Forum, Alaska public television officials 
got cold feet and canceled the project. It might jeopardize their funding, 
they feared, by alienating university bureaucrats, especially ex-president 
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Wood, still a formidable figure on the local scene. Like the environ­
mental researchers he writes about, O'Neill has shown considerable per­
sistence, ingenuity, and courage in telling a story that influential 
individuals and institutions would rather keep quiet. 
O'Neill documents in illuminating detail the process by which that 
elusive phenomenon "grassroots protest" actually arises and is mobilized. 
He re-creates the texture and the feel of tense meetings in the crowded 
Point Hope town hall, of biologists and geographers slowly coming to­
gether to oppose the juggernaut of powerful interests behind Project 
Chariot, and of the process by which the issue was picked up and publi­
cized by the national media. (An Episcopal priest in Point Hope with 
good contacts among the East Coast elite played an important role.) 
The book also shows how this seemingly isolated episode contrib­
uted significantly to the emergence of a larger environmental conscious­
ness in Alaska and beyond, and to a broader awareness among Alaska's 
Native American population of their legal rights—and the need to stand 
up for them. When the Alaskan press proved supine and uncritical in its 
enthusiasm for Project Chariot, for example, the Eskimos of Point Hope 
took steps to launch their own newspaper, the Tundra Times. 
The Firecracker Boys is, in short, an important addition to a growing 
shelf of case studies that present a disturbing picture of the way govern­
ment authorities, under the justification of defending the nation against 
"the Soviet threat," seriously damaged the fabric of American democracy. 
Books like this remind us of the manifold dangers that arise when scien­
tific hubris, ideological compulsions, governmental power, and public-
relations manipulation converge behind misconceived "projects" that are 
profoundly dangerous to the public weal. 
Of course, one must guard against the populist fallacy of assuming 
that "the people" are invariably wiser than those in positions of power 
and influence. But surveying the half-century history of U.S. nuclear-
weapons research and testing, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that 
time and again it was "the people," or at least local groups of politically 
attentive citizens, who proved wiser and more responsible than the 
experts. 
DR. STRANGELOVE 
Stanley Kubrick Presents the Apocalypse 
For more than forty years, the nuclear reality penetrated every stratum of American life, including mass culture. This was especially true during three cycles of sharp­
ened public anxiety about the hazards of the nuclear age: 
(1) the immediate postwar years; (2) the period from 1954 
to 1963, when the dangers of radioactive fallout loomed 
large; and (3) the surge of nuclear fear and activism that 
erupted during President Ronald Reagan's first term. Stanley 
Kubrick's celebrated film Dr. Strangelove was a product of 
the second of these periods. When the Society of American 
Historians in 1994 planned a collection of essays on the way 
the movies have handled historical events, the opportunity 
arose for me to take a closer look at Kubrick's masterpiece. 
This chapter is adapted from my essay in the resulting vol­
ume, Past Imperfect: History according to the Movies (New 
York: Henry Holt, 1995). 
AMERICANS TOP MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS gather for an urgentsecretsession in 
the nations capital An unexpected Cold War crisis threatens to lead to a 
world-destroying thermonuclear war. A long, rambling message arrives from 
Moscow, with the Soviet leader alternately blustering indignantly and stam­
mering with fear of what may lie ahead. American strategists solemnly ponder 
the message: Has the Soviet premier cracked? Is he intoxicated? With human-
ity's fate hanging in the balance, the hours tick by, and the world edges ever 
closer to nuclear Armageddon. 
95 
96 CHAPTER SEVEN 
This may seem like a scene from Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove, 
but it really happened. During the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 
the White House received a long, almost incoherent message from Nikita 
Khrushchev, prompting President John F. Kennedys top decision makers 
to wonder whether the Soviet leader was drunk. To a greater extent than 
many might believe, Dr. Strangelove faithfully mirrors this historic epoch, 
in which the world s fate often seemed hostage to accident, miscalcula­
tion, and human fallibility. 
Of course, Dr. Strangelove is not a historical movie in the conven­
tional sense. The precise events it portrays never actually occurred. But 
this black comedy does have historical resonances. It captures a specific 
moment and offers a satiric but recognizable portrait of the eras strategic 
thinking and cultural climate. Its director, Stanley Kubrick, and his co-
writers convey all too accurately the weird logic of deterrence theory, the 
paranoia of the Cold War, and the nuclear jitters of the early 1960s. 
Atomic fear, having diminished somewhat from the immediate post-
Hiroshima level, increased dramatically after 1954 as hydrogen-bomb 
tests in the Pacific spread deadly radioactive fallout across parts of North 
America. While activists demanded a test ban, novelists, magazine edi­
tors, science-fiction writers, and moviemakers publicized the threat. 
Neville Shutes On the Beach (1957), made into a bleak 1959 movie by 
Stanley Kramer, was one product of this apprehension. 
Fear intensified during the early 1960s, as President John F. Ken­
nedy, having charged in his 1960 campaign that America faced a "missile 
gap," approved a nuclear buildup to close it. After sparring with Khrush­
chev over Berlin in July 1961, Kennedy warned Americans of the dangers 
of nuclear war and called for an urgent program of fallout-shelter con­
struction. Schoolchildren hid under desks during nuclear drills and, in 
an animated civil-defense film, learned from Bert the Turtle to "duck and 
cover." The Cuban Missile Crisis was only the most frightening of a long 
series of events that made the nuclear threat terrifyingly real. Dr. Strange-
love, released in January 1964, grew out of this accumulation of nuclear 
alarms. 
Dr. Strangelove, however, does more than just reflect the general nu­
clear anxiety of the time; it also offers insight into the strategic debates 
of the day. During the 1950s, U.S. policymakers developed deterrence 
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theory as the surest means of avoiding a nuclear war. The fear of massive 
retaliation, they argued, offered the most credible deterrent to nuclear 
attack. But how could such a retaliatory threat remain credible if an at­
tacker could destroy the command-and-control centers responsible for 
launching the counterattack? This dilemma led to studies of automated 
response systems requiring no human intervention. In On Thermo­
nuclear War (1960) and Thinking about the Unthinkable'(1962), RAND 
Corporation strategist Herman Kahn coolly discussed (though ulti­
mately rejected) such a strategy. This arcane debate fascinated Kubrick— 
in 1963, he wrote that he owned "70 or 80 books" on nuclear strategy— 
and in Dr. Strangelove he translated that fascination into black comedy. 
Dr. Strangelove was actually one of two 1964 movies that explored 
the theme of accidental nuclear devastation. The other, Fail-Safe, was 
based on a best-selling 1962 novel by Harvey Wheeler and Eugene Bur-
dick. While Dr. Strangelove presented nuclear holocaust as black comedy, 
Fail-Safe played the story straight. Although directed by Sidney Lumet 
and starring Henry Fonda as the president of the United States, Fail-Safe 
did not capture the public imagination. Instead, it was Kubricks sar­
donic version of Armageddon, not Lumet's earnest treatment, that be­
came a classic. 
Kubrick, too, based his movie on a recently published novel of Cold 
War nuclear crisis, Peter Georges Two Hours to Doom (1958), issued in 
the United States as Red Alert. Up to a point, Dr. Strangelove closely fol­
lows the plot of George's novel, in which a demented SAC commander 
orders the 843rd Bomber Wing to launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet 
Union, unaware that the Russians have deployed an automated retalia­
tion system. But Kubrick made a crucial change in the ending: In Two 
Hours to Doom, the nuclear bomber crashes, and humankind is spared. 
In the novels final paragraph, the U.S. president, shaken by the close 
brush with disaster, pledges to devote the remainder of his term to the 
search for peace. Kubrick offered no such pat ending or heavy-handed 
didactic message. Faithful to his darkly comic vision, he grimly followed 
the ultimate logic of deterrence theory to its horrifying conclusion. 
Kubrick portrays a nuclear holocaust arising from the intersection of 
contemporary nuclear strategy and human fallibility. The action begins 
as General Jack D. Ripper (Sterling Hayden), in charge of a Strategic Air 
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Command unit at Burpelson Air Force Base, launches an unauthorized 
nuclear attack on Russia. Under the provisions of Wing Attack Plan R, 
designed as a retaliatory safeguard should Washington be destroyed, only 
General Ripper has the code necessary to recall the planes. When Presi­
dent Merkin Muffley contacts an inebriated Soviet premier Kissov to 
warn him of the danger, we learn that the Soviets have built a "doomsday 
machine." In the event of a U.S. attack, this huge bomb will automati­
cally explode, creating a vast shroud of radioactive fallout that will en­
circle the earth and kill all life on the planet. 
In a brilliant tour de force, the actor Peter Sellers plays a triumvirate 
of characters: the phlegmatic President Muffley, General Ripper s terri­
fied British aide, Group Captain Lionel Mandrake, and the titular Dr. 
Strangelove, a former Nazi who changed his name from Unwertigliebe 
after the war. President Muffley often calls on Strangelove, as the Penta-
gon's top weapons guru, to explain the intricacies of nuclear strategy. In 
creating this horribly disabled but ever-smiling character, Kubrick com­
bined parodic elements of Henry Kissinger, the physicist Edward Teller, 
and the former Nazi rocket scientist Wernher von Braun, each of whom 
played a central role in U.S. Cold War nuclear policy-making and scien­
tific technology. 
Long before he became President Richard Nixon's top foreign-policy 
adviser, Henry Kissinger had made a reputation for himself as a dip­
lomatic historian and then as a nuclear strategist. His book A World 
Restored (1957) was a scholarly study of Viscount Castlereagh, the con­
servative statesman who reordered Europe after Napoleon, and it won 
him a professorship at Harvard. Turning from history to contemporary 
strategic issues in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957), Kissinger 
urged the United States to deploy a variety of tactical nuclear weapons 
to provide additional deterrence in the face of the Soviet threat. In The 
Necessity for Choice (1961), picking up on John Kennedy's I960 cam­
paign theme, he warned darkly of a growing "missile gap" that invited 
Soviet expansionism and even nuclear blackmail of the United States. 
Edward Teller, a Hungarian Jew who, like Kissinger, fled Europe 
after Hitlers rise to power, was a brilliant physicist who worked during 
the war on the Manhattan Project. While at Los Alamos, Teller became 
convinced of the feasibility of a far more powerful thermonuclear 
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weapon. At California's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, he oversaw the 
development and 1952 testing of the first hydrogen bomb. An avid Cold 
Warrior, he used his considerable influence to push for expansion of 
America's nuclear arsenal, fiercely opposing the 1963 limited test ban 
treaty. He also promoted such visionary and controversial schemes to use 
atomic energy for peacetime purposes as the ill-fated marine engineering 
scheme, Project Chariot (see chapter 6). Teller—whose piercing, deep-
set eyes and beetling eyebrows gave him something of the sinister appear­
ance of a stage villain—epitomized the politicized scientists who helped 
drive the nuclear arms race forward. Antiwar critics recognized his power 
and in 1970 sardonically presented him with the Dr. Strangelove Award. 
Wernher von Braun, blond, blue-eyed, and handsome, was a twenty-
one-year-old member of the minor Prussian nobility when Adolf Hitler 
came to power in 1933. An early rocket enthusiast, the "boy wonder" 
von Braun became a key technician in the Nazi rocketry program at 
Peenemiinde on the Baltic Sea. Joining the Nazi Party in 1940, he helped 
persuade Hitler to give the program top priority. In September 1944, the 
Peenemiinde team launched the first V-2 rocket against London. At the 
war's end, von Braun fled to Bavaria so he could surrender to the Ameri­
cans rather than to the Russians. Late in 1945 he signed a contract with 
the U.S. Army. "The next time, I wanted to be on the winning side," he 
later recalled. By 1950 he was stationed at the army's Redstone Arsenal 
in Huntsville, Alabama, directing more than a hundred of the German 
scientists and engineers with whom he had worked in Hitler's day. Von 
Brauns political flexibility and technocratic approach to missile science 
inspired a parody by songwriter Tom Lehrer, in which von Braun, in a 
thick German accent, insists that his job is to launch the missiles, not to 
worry about where they land: "Dot's not my department, says Wernher 
von Braun." 
Is Dr. Strangelove historically accurate? In some respects, yes. The 
information on the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the capability of B-52 
bombers is factual. The billboard at Burpelson AFB that proclaims 
"Peace Is Our Profession" actually adorned some SAC bases. The rant­
ings of General Buck Turgidson (George C. Scott) about "doomsday 
gaps" and "mine-shaft gaps" directly echo Kennedy's 1960s "missile gap" 
rhetoric, and Turgidsons description of U.S. casualties in a nuclear war 
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as "get [ting] our hair mussed" caught the lingo of such military men as 
former SAC commander General Curtis LeMay. 
As the near-legendary head of the SAC during the 1950s, the cigar-
chomping LeMay provided an easily recognizable archetype for both the 
grimly fanatical General Ripper and (especially) the bombastic and hy­
peractive General Turgidson. LeMay never met a bombing plan he didn't 
like. In 1957 he told two members of the Gaither Commission, which 
had been formed to assess U.S. military policy, that if a Soviet attack ever 
seemed likely, he planned to "knock the shit out of them before they got 
off the ground." Reminded that a preemptive first strike was not U.S. 
policy, LeMay retorted, "No, its not national policy, but it's my policy." 
In 1962, as a member of EXCOM, the top-level team that advised Presi­
dent Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, LeMay urged a preemp­
tive air strike on missile sites in Cuba, to be followed by an invasion of 
the island. Retiring from the air force, he ran for vice president in 1968 
on a ticket headed by the racist, demagogic governor of Alabama, George 
Q Wallace. Asked what he would do about the war in Vietnam, LeMay 
said he would "bomb North Vietnam back into the Stone Age." 
Yet the air force angrily challenged the movies basic premise—an 
attack order that could not be countermanded. Air force crews in such a 
situation, insisted the Pentagon, would attack only if they received ex­
plicit additional instructions confirming the original order. To forestall 
this official criticism, Kubrick included a notice at the beginning of the 
film that reads: "IT IS THE STATED POSITION OF THE U.S. AIR 
FORCE THAT THEIR SAFEGUARDS WOULD PREVENT THE 
OCCURRENCE OF SUCH EVENTS AS ARE DEPICTED IN THIS 
FILM." (No doubt surmising that filmgoers' thoughts would quickly 
turn to the likes of Kissinger, Teller, von Braun, and LeMay, Kubricks 
deadpan disclaimer continued: "FURTHERMORE IT SHOULD BE 
NOTED THAT NONE OF THE CHARACTERS PORTRAYED IN 
THIS FILM ARE MEANT TO REPRESENT ANY REAL PERSONS 
LIVING OR DEAD.") But even if Dr. Strangelove misrepresented U.S. 
nuclear command policy for dramatic effect, it accurately captured deep­
ening popular uneasiness about science and technology, as well as grow­
ing fears of an arms race escalating out of control. As nuclear stockpiles 
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mounted and intercontinental ballistic missies (ICBMs) cut attack times 
from hours to minutes, the potential for catastrophe soared. 
Though an expatriate living in England, Kubrick brilliantly limned 
U.S. Cold War paranoia. General Ripper, brooding in his claustrophobic 
office, is a walking embodiment of free-floating cultural fears. Linking 
his anti-Communist obsessions to his anxieties about the fluoridation of 
drinking water, Ripper concludes that only a preemptive strike can save 
America and assure the continued purity of its citizens' "precious bodily 
fluids." The scenes in which the world's fate hangs on the availability of 
a dime for a pay phone and President Muffley's ability to reach Omsk 
Information epitomize both the horror and the absurdity of the nuclear 
arms race. 
Kubrick was also among the first to explore the macho nature of nu­
clear strategy, a topic much discussed later by psychiatrists and feminists. 
(See, for example, Helen Caldicotts Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nu­
clear War [1984] and Carol Cohn's "Sex and Death in the Rational 
World of Defense Intellectuals" in the Summer 1987 issue of the femi­
nist journal Signs.) The movie's title and most of the characters' names 
suggest a perverse eroticism, and beginning with the celebrated B-52 re­
fueling sequence behind the opening credits (to the tune of "Try a Little 
Tenderness"), the movie is saturated with sex. General Ripper grips a 
phallic cigar while pondering his sexual problems. As the holocaust 
looms, the ever-resourceful Dr. Strangelove describes how the war room 
elite might survive in deep mine shafts, where it could replenish the hu­
man race by copulating nonstop with voluptuous women chosen for 
their sexual appeal. And in the movie's finale, the B-52 captain played by 
Slim Pickens-mounts a hydrogen bomb as it plummets earthward, wav­
ing his cowboy hat in orgiastic ecstasy. 
Dr. Strangelove went a long way toward demolishing the traditional 
war-movie genre. The attack on Burpelson AFB by army troops trying 
to capture General Ripper is filmed as a grainy newsreel (the entire movie 
is black-and-white) and staged as a hackneyed combat set piece. Aboard 
one of the B-52s winging toward Russia, muted drum rolls and the 
strains of "When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again" echo in the 
background as Slim Pickens inspires his crew with a cornball homily on 
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the importance of their mission. When the mushroom clouds erupt at 
last, Vera Lynn croons "We'll Meet Again"—a 1939 song indelibly asso­
ciated with England's heroic stand during World War II. All of this, of 
course, is weirdly out of place in the context of global annihilation. It is 
not only war, suggests Kubrick, but also war movies that will never be 
the same. 
Dr. Strangelove appeared at a transitional moment in America's nu­
clear history. Nuclear terror, eased by the limited 1963 test ban treaty, 
diminished still further during the later 1960s and 1970s as arms-control 
negotiations produced periodic agreements, and as other, temporarily 
more urgent issues intervened. But as fears revived in the early 1980s, 
pervasive nuclear anxiety once again produced a cultural fallout of nov­
els, poetry, movies, rock songs, and (something new) television specials 
that often owed a considerable imaginative debt to Kubricks pioneering 
effort. A younger generation rediscovered Dr. Strangelove itself. 
In the early 1990s, as the nuclear threat eased, the dangers the world 
had faced in earlier decades loomed even larger in retrospect. Reports 
of past nuclear accidents and miscalculations surfaced for the first time. 
Russian and U.S. participants in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis gathered 
to compare notes on their brush with disaster. Simultaneously, revela­
tions from within the former Soviet Union suggested that at one time the 
Soviets may, in fact, have deployed (or at least developed) an automated 
retaliatory system—the dreaded "doomsday machine" that is the ulti­
mate deus ex machina of Dr. Strangelove. Stanley Kubrick, it now ap­
pears, may have cut closer to the truth than even he realized at the time. 
GOING UNDERGROUND 
Nuclear America, 1963-1980 

I[hefirst of many lectures I gave in the 1980s discussing the impact of nuclear weapons on 
American culture took place on 
a warm summer evening in July 
1982 before a small audience at the 
Madison, Wisconsin, public li­
brary. It was sponsored by a new or­
ganization, Wisconsin Educators 
for Social Responsibility, founded 
to support the nuclear-weapons 
freeze campaign. Titling the lecture 
"The Big Sleep," I focused on the 
years from 1963 through the late 
1970s, when the Limited Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty that had pushed 
nuclear testing underground also 
seemed to have buried Americans' 
awareness of their nuclear history 
and of the continuing nuclear 
threat. It is this period to which we 
now turn. 
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FROM THE TEST BAN TREATY TO 
THREE MILE ISLAND 
N[y 1982 talk at the Madison Public Library laid the groundwork for many other lectures in the months and years that followed, as the "Reagan Round" of 
antinuclear activism and cultural attention to the bomb 
gained momentum. Much revised and expanded, this talk 
also provided the framework of an essay published in the 
May 1984 Journal of American History (with full footnote 
citations) and then condensed in the August/September 
1984 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The version 
reprinted here, adapted from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scien­
tists piece, offers an interpretive overview of the years when 
the nations level of nuclear awareness appeared—superfi-
cially—to be at a low ebb. The essay focuses especially on 
the complex and troubled relationship between the test ban 
and nuclear disarmament movements of the 1950s and early 
1960s and the New Left leaders and Vietnam War protesters 
who moved center stage in the later 1960s. 
WRITING IN 1981, George E Kennan described Americans7 response to the 
threat of nuclear war: "We have gone on piling weapon upon weapon, 
missile upon missile, new levels of destructiveness upon old ones. We 
have done this helplessly, almost involuntarily, like the victims of some 
sort of hypnotism, like men in a dream, like lemmings headed for the 
sea." 
Kennan's generalization is not wholly accurate. Americans have not 
always behaved like lemmings in confronting the nuclear danger. Their 
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engagement with this threat has gone through several distinct cycles of 
activism and apparent passivity. When applied to the years from 1963 to 
the later 1970s, however, his observations seem chillingly accurate. In 
these years, public concern with the nuclear-weapons issue sank to a very 
low level indeed. 
In exploring this interval, our starting point is September 24, 1963, 
when the Senate overwhelmingly approved the Limited Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty agreed on earlier in Moscow. The treaty won enthusiastic 
public and journalistic support. David Lawrence of the conservative U.S. 
News & World Report wrote, "There's a new word in the vocabulary of 
the day—or at least a more noticeable use of an old word—euphoria" 
Even I. E Stone, a skeptical, left-wing Washington journalist not given 
to flights of easy enthusiasm, wrote, "Peace has broken out, and hope 
leaps up again." The agreement did not halt all tests; underground nu­
clear explosions were still permitted. Nevertheless, it was welcomed as 
the beginning of a process that would ultimately free the world of the 
nuclear menace. Summing up the prevailing view, the New York Times 
hailed the agreement in a front-page banner headline as a "Major Step 
toward Easing Tension." 
Underlying this collective sigh of relief was the fact that for more 
than a decade the nation had been gripped by profound nuclear fears. 
Americas atomic monopoly ended in 1949, and in the 1950s the United 
States and the Soviet Union developed the hydrogen bomb, ICBMs, and 
sophisticated control systems that raised the specter of a push-button war 
that could snuff out millions of lives in the blink of an eye. 
Feeding the nuclear anxieties of these years was a heavy official em­
phasis on civil defense. Under the "Operation Alert" program of the Fed­
eral Civil Defense Administration, evacuation plans, radio alert systems, 
warning sirens, school air-raid drills, and films on how to survive a nu­
clear attack became familiar features of American life. 
In May 1961, shortly before the Vienna summit conference, Presi­
dent Kennedy went on television to urge a national shelter program. A 
few weeks later, during a period of East-West confrontation over Berlin, 
he delivered an even more alarmist speech on the danger of nuclear war 
and the urgent necessity for civil-defense preparation. Responding to a 
deluge of panicky requests, the administration hastily prepared a civil­
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defense booklet and distributed 35 million copies through schools, post 
offices, and newspaper supplements. The Cuban Missile Crisis added a 
grim immediacy to these fears. For a few days in October 1962, Ken­
nedys warnings seemed about to become reality. 
Further, as we saw in chapter 5, these were years shadowed by fears 
of radioactive fallout, as U.S. and Soviet atmospheric tests of thermonu­
clear weapons contaminated the atmosphere. Despite soothing words 
from Washington, the disturbing facts could not be denied. As in the 
immediate post-Hiroshima period, the mass media once again both ar­
ticulated and amplified the publics escalating anxieties. 
These fears gave rise to a campaign against nuclear testing led by 
such groups as Leo Szilards Council for a Livable World, Dr. Bernard 
Lowns Physicians for Social Responsibility, and the Student Peace 
Union. Formed in Chicago in 1959, the Student Peace Unions national 
conventions attracted hundreds of delegates over the next few years. 
Above all, there was SANE, the National Committee for a Sane Nu­
clear Policy, conceived in 1957 by several veteran peace activists who re­
cruited Norman Cousins of the Saturday Review 2x16. Clarence Pickett of 
the American Friends Service Committee as cochairmen. With an im­
posing list of public figures and celebrities as sponsors, SANE announced 
itself in November 1957 with a large New York Times advertisement pro­
claiming, " We Are Facing a Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever 
Existed." 
A high point of this round of activism came in May 1960, when 
thousands attended a SANE-sponsored rally in New York's Madison 
Square Garden to hear speakers ranging from the Republican Alfred M. 
Landon to the socialist Norman Thomas call for an end to the nuclear 
arms race. After the rally, five thousand people accompanied Thomas 
on a march to the United Nations. The organized test ban campaign 
unquestionably intensified public opposition to testing, though the level 
of opposition was also influenced by shifting U.S.-Soviet relations. By 
late 1959, 77 percent of Americans favored a continuation of the tempo­
rary moratorium on nuclear testing then in effect. 
Nuclear fear became a shaping cultural force. Books, essays, sympo­
sia, and conferences explored the medical, psychological, and ethical im­
plications of atomic weapons. Novels like On the Beach, Fail-Safe, Dexter 
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Masterss The Accident, and Walter Miller Jr.'s A Canticle for Leibowitz 
offered visions of nuclear holocaust. The film versions of On the Beach 
and Fail-Safe, as well as Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove (discussed in 
chapter 7), attracted large audiences. 
The Eisenhower administration was especially concerned about On 
the Beach. In December 1959, civil-defense director Leo Hoegh criticized 
it at a Cabinet meeting as "very harmful because it produced a feeling of 
utter hopelessness, thus undermining OCDM's [Office of Civil Defense 
Management] efforts to encourage preparedness." An analysis of the film 
by the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency warned that 
its "strong emotional appeal for banning nuclear weapons could conceiv­
ably lead audiences to think in terms of radical solutions . . . rather than 
. . . practical safeguarded disarmament measures." Insisting that the 
film's ending, in which many doomed Australians choose suicide over 
death from radiation poisoning, "grossly misconstrues the basic nature 
of man," this analysis declared, "It is inconceivable that even in the event 
of a nuclear war, mankind would not have the strength and ingenuity to 
take all possible steps toward self-preservation." 
The nuclear preoccupation of the years from 1954 through 1963 
manifested itself at all cultural levels. Television series like The Outer 
Limits and Rod Serling's The Twilight Zone, when not dealing explicitly 
with radioactivity, genetic mutation, and atomic war, conjured up tales 
of vague, unseen menaces. A spate of mutant movies— The H-Man, The 
Incredible Shrinking Man, Attack of the Crab Monsters, The Blob, It, 
Them!—had clear psychological roots in fears of genetic damage from 
radioactive fallout. In The Incredible Shrinking Man, the luckless hero 
begins to shrink soon after his pleasure boat passes through a glistening 
radioactive cloud generated by a distant nuclear test. In Them! twelve-
foot killer ants crawl from the New Mexico A-bomb test site and leave 
horrifying carnage in their wake as they head unerringly for the storm 
sewers of Los Angeles. (The producer ran out of money and had to stop 
filming on location in New Mexico and return to Hollywood.) Small 
wonder that the 1963 test ban aroused such euphoria. 
It is what happened next that is surprising. The sudden fading of 
the nuclear-weapons issue after September 1963, whether as an activist 
cause, a cultural motif, or a topic of public discourse, is astonishing. Test 
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ban and nuclear disarmament organizations either collapsed or vanished 
from public view. When only twenty-five delegates showed up for the 
convention of the Student Peace Union in spring 1964, the organiza­
tion disbanded. 
One of the first to notice the shift was Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of 
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and a leader of the postwar "scientists' 
movement" that had campaigned for international atomic control. Writ­
ing in the January 1964 Bulletin, Rabinowitch observed: 
As the year 1963 drew to its end, it found Americans 
in a changed mood. A year ago . . . peace movements 
flourished and disarmament studies proliferated. It 
looked as if Americans were trying to come to grips with 
the critical problem of our age. 
The acute concern and frantic search for solutions 
did not last long. . . . The abatement of the Cuban con­
flict, the test-ban treaty, and vague signs of rapproche­
ment between the Soviet Union and the United States 
encouraged the public attention to turn in other 
directions. 
Echoing Rabinowitch, the Catholic journal of opinion Commonweal in 
1965 deplored the lethargy that had enveloped the nuclear-weapons is­
sue. In succeeding years, this lethargy remained a matter of frustrated 
comment by a few peace activists and social observers. 
Of course, the bomb did not totally vanish from the American con­
sciousness. In 1965, a Pacem in Terris conference in New York sponsored 
by Robert M. Hutchins s Center for the Study of Democratic Institu­
tions attracted more than two thousand people, who heard addresses by 
Linus Pauling and other veterans of the test ban movement. In the later 
1960s, considerable journalistic and public attention focused on the Pen­
tagons proposal to construct an antiballistic missile system in North 
Dakota—a proposal narrowly approved by the Senate in August 1969. 
And scattered evidence suggests that the nuclear threat still remained 
vividly alive, especially among the young, at the subconscious level of 
nightmares, fantasies, and inarticulate forebodings. Popularizers of Bible 
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prophecy continued through the 1960s and 1970s to search the Scrip­
tures for intimations of atomic war. 
What one does see, however, is a sharp decline in activism, public 
discussion, mainstream media attention, and cultural expression focused 
on the nuclear-weapons issue. Even the ABM debate was confined 
mainly to strategists, a few columnists, and a small band of arms-control 
specialists. Jerome Wiesner, provost of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), noted in the June 1967 Bulletin of the Atomic Scien­
tists, "There seems to be little public concern about the ABM issue, either 
pro or con." 
This climate of apparent obliviousness and unconcern continued 
well into the 1970s. In 1975, Samuel H. Day Jr., successor to Eugene 
Rabinowitch as editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, wrote, "Pub­
lic apathy . . . constitutes perhaps the most ominous of the various forces 
pulling the world toward a nuclear holocaust." The chorus of lament is 
striking in its unanimity. "Unless momentarily roused by crisis or threat­
ening alert," asked Richard Rhodes in the November 1975 Atlantic, 
"who among us think of nuclear war anymore?" Reflected Norman 
Cousins in the Saturday Review (April 17, 1976), "Hardly anyone talks 
anymore about nuclear stockpiles as the world's No. 1 problem. . . . The 
anti-testing clamor of the Sixties now seems far off and almost unreal." 
Political journalist Peter Ognibene, in the same issue of the Saturday Re­
view, agreed. "Any politician who would now speak, as President Ken­
nedy once did, about cthe nuclear sword of Damocles' poised above our 
collective head would be dismissed out of hand as an anachronism. The 
fear of nuclear war, once so great, has steadily receded." 
Why did the era from 1963 through the 1970s see such quiescence 
on issues related to nuclear war and the nuclear arms race? The most 
reassuring answer would be that the complacency was justified—that the 
nuclear threat did diminish in these years. And, indeed, by 1975, 106 
nations had signed the test ban treaty; 99 had signed the 1968 Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty; and the nuclear powers had agreed not to place 
atomic weapons in space, on the moon, or on the ocean floor. In 1967 a 
number of Latin American states pledged by treaty to forswear nuclear 
weapons. In 1972 the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, begun in 1969, 
produced the SALT I and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaties, re­
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stricting the United States and the Soviet Union to two ABM systems 
each and pledging each nation to limit for five years its missile capability 
to launchers already operational or under construction. 
But when one turns from the realm of treaty making to the real 
world of nuclear weaponry, a different and bleaker picture emerges. In 
both the United States and the Soviet Union, nuclear-weapons research, 
construction, and deployment went forward rapidly after 1963. Taking 
advantage of the test ban treaty's gaping loophole, both sides developed 
sophisticated techniques of underground testing. The United States con­
ducted more tests in thefive years after 1963 than in thefive years before, 
some involving weapons fifty times the size of the Hiroshima bomb. The 
physicist Bernard Feld of MIT concluded in the January 1975 Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists that the test ban treaty, while perhaps an "ecological 
blessing," was "an arms-control disaster." For one thing, the treaty's sig­
natories did not include the nations most likely to develop nuclear weap­
ons. Moreover, as Milton Leitenberg noted in the January 1972 Bulletin, 
"No one believes it will long remain as a viable treaty unless the two 
major powers begin substantial disarmament." 
As for the SALT I agreement, it sidestepped what had by 1972 
emerged as the most volatile feature of the nuclear arms race: missiles' 
growing destructive power and technical sophistication. While the Soviet 
Union opted for larger ICBMs and warheads, America moved toward 
diversification and technical refinements such as MIRV (Multiple Inde­
pendently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles), by which each missile could 
carry up to sixteen highly accurate and separately targeted warheads. 
What Robert McNamara in 1967 called the "mad momentum" of 
the nuclear arms race steadily accelerated in these years. The SALT pro­
cess had "institutionalized" the competition, observed Swedish arms-
control specialist Alva Myrdal in 1976, but "by no stretch of the imagina­
tion can this be called arms limitation." In the December 1967 Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, Milton Leitenberg noted that in the flurry of nu­
clear treaty making, not a single weapons system had been reduced or 
dismantled—except to be replaced by a more modern one. 
With so little objective basis for this decade and a half of comparative 
nuclear complacency, why did it occur? Many have attributed it to 
the influence of the Department of Defense and the major military 
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contractors. Writing in 1970, one arms-control advocate blamed nuclear 
passivity on the Pentagons "in-house steam roller" that "forges ahead 
over all objections i" Few would deny the existence of the military-
industrial complex. For the principal military contractors and their hun­
dreds of subsidiaries, as indeed for entire regions of the country, nuclear-
weapons research, development, and construction represented economic 
interests of vast proportions. But simply because the military-industrial 
complex has powerful economic incentives for shaping public attitudes 
in certain ways, does this mean it has the power to do so? 
Certainly the military services and corporate interests engaged in 
planning and producing nuclear weapons have their media outlets, and 
their influence on public perceptions is formidable. But this does not 
seem a sufficient explanation for the public's unconcern. For one thing, 
this explanation is not time specific; it cannot account for variations in 
public responses to the nuclear threat. Nuclear-weapons research and de­
velopment have constantly loomed large since the early 1950s. Yet there 
have been dramatic shifts in the level of activism and cultural expression 
directed to the nuclear issue. The question, then, remains: Why did nu­
clear awareness and activism decline so precipitously in the period we are 
examining? Several reasons suggest themselves. 
The perception of reduced danger. Although the various treaties 
of these years failed to slow the nuclear arms race, they did convey the 
appearance of progress. For those already inclining toward psychic denial, 
this appearance provided a plausible rationalization. To nuclear activists, 
this situation was intensely frustrating: "The elaborate staging of arms 
control negotiations," wrote Samuel H. Day Jr. in the September 1975 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "doubtless persuaded many that the 
threat is diminishing." 
Nor, perhaps, was this perception entirely illusory. The intensity of 
nuclear fear at any given moment is presumably influenced by two dis­
tinct though connected realities: the quantity and nature of the world s 
nuclear arsenals, and judgments about the likelihood of their use. In the 
1950s and continuing through the Cuban Missile Crisis, the fear that 
nuclear war might actually break out received periodic reenforcement 
from political pronouncements and international crises. With the Cold 
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War thaw that began in 1963 and continued episodically through the 
detente of the early 1970s, the diminution of nuclear-war fear had a cer­
tain rational basis, despite the superpowers' growing nuclear arsenals. 
The growing remoteness of the nuclear reality. Memories of Hiro­
shima and Nagasaki were dimming. Civil defense was played down. And 
with atomic tests and radioactive fallout no longer dominating the me­
dia, the world's nuclear stockpile seemed increasingly unreal. 
"Familiarity takes the sting out of practically anything, even Arma­
geddon," noted the journalist P. E. Schneider in the New York Times 
Magazine (August 14, 1966). "Nuclear weapons constitute a danger so 
theoretical, so remote, as to be almost non-existent." The psychiatrist 
Jerome Frank made this point in 1967: "Nuclear missiles poised to kill 
cannot be seen, felt, tested, or smelled, and so we scarcely think of them." 
With the end of aboveground testing, observed the New York Times in 
1969, nuclear fear had become "diffuse and inchoate." "Our capacity 
for . . . response is dulled," agreed the MIT physicist and arms-control 
advocate Kosta Tsipis in 1972, "because the danger is not present to our 
daily experience; it is a mental image . . . inconceivable to the large 
majority." 
The muting of the sense of urgency was furthered by the abstract 
vocabulary of nuclear strategies and weapons technicians. These years 
brought an array of acronyms confusing enough to make even a New 
Dealer blush: ABM, AWACS, ELF, FOBS, MIRV, MARV, SLBM, 
GLCM, MX, TNW, and so on. Even the names given the various missile 
systems evoked not their actual doomsday potential but reassuring asso­
ciations with the heavens, classical mythology, American history, and 
even popular slang: Polaris, Nike-Zeus, Poseidon, Tomahawk, Minute­
man, Pershing, Davy Crockett, Hound Dog. 
The sense of the issue's remoteness was self-reenforcing. As nuclear 
weapons literally went underground after 1963, the torrent of novels, 
movies, and television programs that had both fed and reflected nuclear 
fears slowed to a trickle. This in turn facilitated the numbing process. 
Remote and largely invisible, nuclear weapons proved particularly ill-
suited to the insatiable visual demands of television. 
Some tried to restore the lost sense of immediacy. In the 1970s, the 
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Catholic activists Daniel and Philip Berrigan took hammers to missiles 
on the production line, as in 1968 they had poured blood on draft rec­
ords. In 1970, two University of Missouri sociologists showed their stu­
dents the documentary film Hiroshima/Nagasaki, which portrays the 
victims' sufferings in horrifying detail. Predictably, when tested immedi­
ately afterward, students showed a heightened resistance to the idea of 
nuclear war. But for how long? Was it like the well-known phenomenon 
of drivers creeping along for a few miles after passing a terrible highway 
accident—only to speed up again as the memory fades? 
The tranquilizing effect of the "peaceful atom/3'President Eisen­
hower launched the international "Atoms for Peace" program as early as 
1953, and the first domestic nuclear power plant opened in 1957, but in 
the mid-1960s the program really gained momentum. By 1973, thirty-
seven plants were in operation in the United States, with many more 
planned. Concurrently, the atom's peacetime potential was given enor­
mous publicity. 
The most indefatigable cheerleader after David Lilienthal's retire­
ment from public life was the chemist and Nobel laureate Glenn T. Sea­
borg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1961 to 1970. 
In speeches, articles, and interviews, Seaborg described the nuclear uto­
pia ahead: cheap power, medical wonders, agricultural abundance, a 
"junkless society" through the nuclear processing of waste materials, "in­
ternational understanding and peace" thanks to nuclear-powered com­
munications satellites. "Designed to blend into the natural landscape, 
low in profile . . . with all the distribution lines underground," and 
nestled in "park-like settings," Seaborg declared, future nuclear power 
plants would be "as close to an extension of nature as any human enter­
prise." The expansive Texan in the White House echoed Seaborg s enthu­
siasm. In 1967, Lyndon Johnson delivered a speech entitled "Nuclear 
Power: Key to a Golden Age of Mankind." 
In the nations collective unconscious (to use that Jungian term 
loosely), a kind of psychological trade-off seems to have occurred, with 
glowing images of the benevolent atom obscuring and to a degree neu­
tralizing dark images of the destroying atom. Support nuclear power and 
other peacetime uses of the atom, the tacit argument went, and the threat 
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of nuclear war will diminish correspondingly. As U.S. News & World Re­
port put it in December 1967, the world had wandered far down the 
nuclear-weapons path, but was now at least crossing "the threshold into 
the era of the peaceful atom, with its promise of better things for all 
mankind." In reality, of course, there were not two separate worlds of 
atomic energy but only one, whose various aspects were deeply inter­
twined. Still, for a time, the allure of the peaceful atom played its part in 
muting fears of nuclear weapons. 
The arcane reassurance of nuclear strategy. From 1945 to 1950, 
and continuing into John Foster Dulless term as secretary of state, 
atomic strategy as practiced in Washington was a fairly simple (if often 
unnerving) matter. By the 1960s, however, it had become a highly spe­
cialized pursuit dominated by a small group of civilian experts under 
contract to the military and based at semiautonomous research insti­
tutes at larger universities or at such "think tanks" as the Institute for De­
fense Analysis, the System Development Corporation, the Center for 
Naval Analysis, the Research Analysis Corporation, and the RAND 
Corporation. 
Using computer simulations, John von Neumann's game theory, and 
other analytical tools, these "defense intellectuals" transformed nuclear 
strategy into a rarefied, quasi-scientific discipline. Conveying "the im­
pression of holding membership in a closed club" (as the New Yorker put 
it in 1971), they increasingly moved in their own intellectual and even 
social orbit. 
The physicist Ralph Lapp, in a 1965 book, called them "the new 
priesthood," noting that even in academia, with its tradition of scholarly 
openness, "they enjoy a privileged area of argument and can always re­
treat to a sanctuary of secret dataland." Of the key strategists—Herman 
Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Henry Kissinger, Donald Brennan, Bernard 
Brodie, William Kintner, Fred Ikle, Oskar Morgenstern, Robert Strausz-
Hupe, William Kaufmann, Albert Wohlstetter, Glenn Snyder—the 
names of only one or two would have been recognizable even to politi­
cally attentive citizens. 
As for the strategic theories they debated, only the dimmest aware-
ness—analogous, perhaps, to a medieval peasant's grasp of the theologi­
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cal concepts with which monastic scholars like St. Thomas Aquinas 
wrestled—filtered beyond the walls of the institutes and think tanks. 
This had a profoundly discouraging effect not only on potential activists, 
but also on those seeking to remain informed on nuclear issues. As early 
as 1959, Robert M. Hutchins questioned whether democratic theory re­
tained much relevance in the new era of strategic planning, and similar 
questions gained force in succeeding years. In the mid-1960s, the politi­
cal scientist Hans Morgenthau stated: "The great issues of nuclear strat­
egy . . . cannot even be the object of meaningful debate . . . because there 
can be no competent judgments without meaningful knowledge. Thus 
the great national decisions of life or death are rendered by technological 
elites, and both the Congress and the people retain little more than the 
illusion of making the decisions which the theory of democracy supposes 
them to make." 
The substance as well as the process of nuclear strategy changed in 
these years. As the Soviets moved toward parity with the United States 
in nuclear warheads and ICBMs, American atomic saber-rattling gave 
way to a new strategic emphasis: deterrence. The essential elements of 
deterrence theory had been developed by the Yale political scientist Ber­
nard Brodie in a seminal 1946 work The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power 
and World Order and elaborated by Albert Wohlstetter in a 1954 RAND 
study published as "The Delicate Balance of Terror" in the January 1959 
issue of Foreign Affairs. 
It was in the 1960s, however, particularly toward the end of Rob­
ert McNamaras tenure as secretary of defense, that deterrence theory 
was officially endorsed and given extensive public visibility as the corner­
stone of U.S. nuclear strategy. As elaborated by McNamara in 1967, deter­
rence theory held that the point of stockpiling nuclear weapons was 
not the anticipation of ever usingthem, but ofpreventingtheir use by the 
other side. 
Specifically, the Soviets had to be convinced that a nuclear first strike 
by them would trigger a retaliatory "second strike" that would devastate 
their country. In McNamaras memorable phrase (which of course soon 
gave rise to the acronym MAD), nuclear security lay in "mutual assured 
destruction," that is, "the certainty of suicide to the aggressor—not 
merely to his military forces, but to his society as a whole." By challeng­
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ing the common-sense assumption that the vast buildup of nuclear 
weapons increased the likelihood of their eventual use, deterrence theory-
helped dull nuclear fears and activist impulses. To march and demon­
strate for nuclear disarmament, deterrence theorists suggested, was to 
advocate a destabilization of the "balance of terror" that could in fact 
increase the risk of nuclear war. 
Not all Americans found deterrence theory and its seemingly-
perverse corollaries persuasive. To traditional pacifists, disarmament 
advocates, and others who believed that the reduction and eventual elim­
ination of nuclear weapons must be a fundamental objective of U.S. pol­
icy, the abandonment of this goal, implicit in deterrence theory, was 
dismaying. In the 1950s and early 1960s, deterrence came under heavy 
criticism on these grounds. Criticism diminished after 1963, reflecting 
the larger cultural shift we have been examining, but it never disap­
peared entirely. 
Many who approached the nuclear dilemma from a religious or ethi­
cal perspective were appalled by the moral implications of a strategy 
predicated on threatening to wipe out an entire society. The elaborate 
edifice of deterrence theory rested on the threat of retaliation, and that 
threat had to be credible for the theory to make any sense at all. McNa­
mara insisted on the government's "unwavering will" should the awful 
moment of decision ever come. In the New York Times Magazine of June 
7, 1964, Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Departments policy 
planning council, assented: "The heart of a credible deterrent in a 
nuclear age lies in being prepared to face the consequences, should de­
terrence fail." American security, Rostow went on, demanded an un­
flinching readiness to match any Soviet escalation "up to and including 
all-out nuclear war." 
The moral dilemma lay precisely here, giving rise to considerable 
soul-searching in religious circles, not only in the historically pacifist de-
nominations—Quaker, Mennonite, Church of the Brethren—but also 
in the mainstream Protestant denominations and even in the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy, traditionally a bastion of support for a policy of mili­
tary strength. In 1965, drawing on the church's traditional just-war 
doctrine, Vatican Council II declared: "Any act of war aimed indiscrimi­
nately at the destruction of entire cities and of extensive areas along with 
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their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits un­
equivocal and unhesitating condemnation." 
What, then, was the church to say of a strategy whose avowed aim 
was to avoid nuclear war, but which depended on an "unwavering will" 
to destroy an entire people? "Surely there is something obscene," said the 
Catholic journal Commonweal in 1971, about a policy predicated on 
such a threat. What if human error, technological malfunction, or some 
unforeseeable combination of circumstances triggered an attack, or led 
to the mistaken impression that one was under way (the Dr. Strangelove 
scenario)? The consequences if deterrence failed through mischance did 
not bear contemplating. 
At the other end of the spectrum, many strategists, Pentagon plan­
ners, and weapons researchers never fully accepted the operational im­
plications of deterrence theory. New weapons proposals continued to 
proliferate, beyond any rational function. And even after McNamara 
publicly endorsed deterrence theory, the Pentagons computerized war 
plan, SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan), continued to give tar­
geting preference to Soviet military sites and missile bases, reflecting not 
only the deterrence principle but also the desire to maintain an actual 
nuclear war fighting capability. 
Despite these qualifications, deterrence theory, as publicized in the 
later 1960s, clearly helped calm the nuclear anxieties of many Americans. 
It offered hope that ultimately the nuclear arms race would reach a point 
of equilibrium. Once each side had achieved a credible second-strike ca­
pability (McNamaras "mutual assured destruction"), the "race" would 
end in a tie. Nuclear warheads would remain, but they would simply rest 
in their silos and submarine bays forever, endlessly deterring. Thanks in 
part to this theory, editorialized Business Week on July 13, 1968, "living 
with the atomic bomb has turned out to be less frightening than it 
once seemed." 
Other issues and concerns. The nuclear-weapons issue did not exist 
in a vacuum in these years; it was but one element of a complex cultural 
and political reality. Even as Americans hailed the test ban treaty, the war 
in Vietnam was becoming more threatening. With Lyndon Johnsons 
postelection escalation offerees in February 1965, the Vietnam conflict 
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began to rule the media, dominating public discourse and drawing ever 
greater waves of protest. From the first tentative campus protests in 
March 1965 to the final outburst on campuses and in Washington in the 
spring of 1970, the war in Southeast Asia absorbed nearly all the available 
protest energy of peace activists, religious leaders, and college students 
facing the draft. 
Always present on the nation's television screens, the war and the 
domestic turmoil it engendered had an immediacy that the more abstract 
nuclear-weapons issue could not begin to approximate. Missile tests were 
out of sight, deep underground, and the missiles themselves were simi­
larly hidden in subterranean silos, in B-52 bomb bays on remote, heavily 
guarded air force bases, or in nuclear submarines patrolling the world's 
seas. The war and the protest demonstrations, by contrast, conveyed in 
urgent, often shocking visual images, appeared constantly on television 
news programs, in radio bulletins, and on the pages of newspapers and 
news magazines. In this situation, there was little question which would 
dominate public debate and the outlets of cultural expression. A new 
cycle of arms-control talks had begun, the Wall Street journal reported 
on January 11, 1973- But, it predicted, few would notice "amid the dis­
tractions of Vietnam hopes and fears." 
When a 1969 Gallup poll asked subjects to list the "two or three 
most important problems" facing the nation, 63 percent mentioned 
Vietnam and only 2 percent the danger of nuclear war. The shift of atten­
tion to Vietnam, according to Roy E. Licklider in his 1971 book, Private 
Nuclear Strategists, removed "much of the public pressure on the Ameri­
can government to alter its nuclear policies." 
The impact of Vietnam on the nuclear disarmament movement is 
vividly illustrated in the history of SANE. While Benjamin Spock and 
other SANE leaders turned completely to the Vietnam issue, still others 
urged continued attention to nuclear weapons. At a 1966 SANE board 
meeting, issues related to the nuclear arms race were relegated to near the 
bottom of a long agenda dominated by the Vietnam War. 
When Spock and other leaders of SANE increasingly linked the 
organization to the most militant wing of the antiwar movement, par­
ticularly at the National Conference for a New Politics held in Chicago 
in September 1967, these deepening differences in the organization 
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exploded openly. The executive director, Donald Keys, and Norman 
Cousins resigned; Spock himself soon departed. A shadow of its former 
self, SANE in 1969 eliminated the word nuclear horn its name. 
Similar seismic shifts were occurring throughout the nuclear dis­
armament movement. At the University of Wisconsin, Students for 
Peace and Disarmament, founded in 1962 to oppose nuclear testing and 
the arms race, dropped the nuclear issue abruptly in the fall of 1963 to 
organize a rally protesting America's deepening involvement in Vietnam. 
Understandable and even inevitable as it seems in retrospect, this process 
was distressing to the dwindling band of older activists who continued 
to focus on the nuclear threat. "From the long-range . . . point of view," 
wrote the physicist and Manhattan Project veteran David Inglis in the 
May 1967 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "the most tragic feature of the 
war in Vietnam . .  . is that preoccupation with this struggle is being al­
lowed to stand in the way of the urgent business of making a far more 
devastating nuclear war less likely." 
A closely related influence on post-1963 American nuclear attitudes 
was the emergence of the New Left, particularly the campus-based radi­
cal organization Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Founded in 
I960 as an offshoot of the socialist League for Industrial Democracy, 
SDS at its peak in 1968 had some seven thousand members, with up­
wards of forty thousand more affiliated with local campus branches. It 
would be foolhardy to treat SDS, or even a more loosely defined "New 
Left," as synonymous with the large and diverse 1960s antiwar move­
ment. Even the New Left itself was notoriously amorphous; John Dig-
gins, in The American Left in the Twentieth Century (1973), called it "a 
mood in search of a movement." Nevertheless, New Left ideology was 
one important force shaping 1960s activism. At the rhetorical level, the 
New Left talked a lot about nuclear weapons. In their 1962 Port Huron 
statement, SDS founders proclaimed themselves seared by atomic fears 
"when we were kids" and "guided by the sense that we may be the last 
generation in the experiment with living." "Our hopes for the future 
have been corroded by the Bomb," added the 1963 SDS manifesto 
America and the New Era. 
Adult sympathizers helped spread the idea that the activists' lifelong 
association with nuclear weapons was crucial to their political orienta­
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tion and gave them a unique moral sensitivity. "The bomb has had a 
wide, corrosive, and depressing effect upon the young," wrote the novel­
ist Fletcher Knebel in the December 1968 issue of Popular Science. "They 
sing their sad laments over guitars while the girls' long hair weeps for the 
coming suicide of humanity." 
But when one moves beyond the rhetoric, it is striking both how 
little serious attention the New Left gave to the nuclear issue and how 
little effort it made to sustain the momentum of the pre-1963 nuclear 
disarmament movement. "It's just a cliche," was the succinct comment 
of one Harvard activist on the claim that the New Left's outlook was 
profoundly shaped by the bomb. 
Nuclear disarmament was doubtless implicit in the New Left's vi­
sion, but one finds few specifics in the literature. When nuclear weapons 
are mentioned, it is usually as part of an expose of the universities' role 
in military research, or a more general indictment of capitalist society. In 
his 1969 book The Making of a Counter Culture, Theodore Roszak ar­
gued that the central issue was not nuclear weapons but "the total ethos 
of the bomb"—an ethos that also pervaded "our culture, our public mo­
rality, our economic life, our intellectual endeavors." The central signifi­
cance of "the shadow of thermonuclear annihilation beneath which we 
cower," said Roszak, was as "the prime symptom" of morbidity in a soci­
ety that was "fatally and contagiously diseased." 
The vague and general talk about "the Bomb" in New Left circles 
sometimes suggests an effort to establish at least a rhetorical link with 
the earlier anti—nuclear weapons campaign. What in fact emerges, how­
ever, is the sharp discontinuity between the two movements. The ex­
planation suggested above—that the Vietnam War in all its urgent 
emotional intensity preempted all other concerns—certainly has valid­
ity; but the discontinuity is rooted as well in the inner history of the test 
ban movement in the early 1960s and in the effect of this history on the 
New Left in its formative stages. 
From the first, relations between the test ban and nuclear disarma­
ment organizations, on the one hand, and student activists, on the other, 
had been strained at best. Organizations like SANE sought to shape pub­
lic policy through speeches, sober pronouncements and advertisements 
featuring famous names, and access to sympathetic politicians. SANE's 
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1960 Madison Square Garden rally notwithstanding, its members were 
not oriented toward demonstrations, marches, and mass action. SANE's 
campus branch, Students for a Sane Nuclear Policy, enjoyed little auton­
omy. "On arms control, we weren't looking for help from the youthful 
polloi? one SANE leader has candidly acknowledged. The campus-based 
Student Peace Union emerged in 1959 partially out of frustration with 
SANE's rigidity, exclusivity, and general stodginess. 
These latent stresses were vastly exacerbated early in 1960 when Sen­
ator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut charged that SANE was infiltrated 
by Communists. An alarmed Norman Cousins privately assured Dodd 
that SANE was determined to rid itself of any taint of disloyalty. SANE's 
national board excluded Communists from membership, revoked the 
charter of the Greater New York Committee (a major target of Dodd s 
charges), and pointedly announced that SANE was a "deliberately auto­
cratic organization" whose membership could be closely monitored. 
All this caused an upheaval in SANE and in the peace movement. 
Several directors resigned, and SANE's student branch broke away from 
the parent organization. Campus groups committed to a test ban and 
nuclear disarmament, but independent of SANE, proliferated: Tocsin at 
Harvard, Students for Peace and Disarmament at Wisconsin, and so on. 
The pace of activism—marches, demonstrations, petitions—quickened 
markedly: A San Francisco peace march in October I960 drew two thou­
sand participants. Women's Strike for Peace, a grassroots movement 
started in the Washington area in 1961, quickly organized demonstra­
tions in sixty cities, involving fifty thousand women. Discontent with 
SANE and similar narrowly based, top-down groups intensified. The 
Nation, in its March 3, 1962, issue, saw in the ferment of I960—62 not 
just a new phase of the peace movement, but "the birth of a new" 
movement. 
The volatility of the situation emerged clearly in February 1962 
when a coalition of campus peace groups led by Todd Gitlin and Peter 
Goldmark of Tocsin organized the Washington Project, which drew 
five thousand students to the nation's capital. Some, attired in suits and 
ties, met with senators, congressmen, and State Department officials. But 
others—the wave of the future—organized a mass meeting and took 
to the streets, marching, chanting, and waving placards for nuclear 
disarmament. 
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By 1962, then, thousands of students had abandoned SANE's ap­
proach in favor of direct-action strategies aimed at fomenting a mass 
movement against nuclear testing and the nuclear arms race. With the 
test ban treaty of 1963, the urgency drained from the nuclear issue, but 
the activist zeal and spirit of tactical innovation remained. Waiting in 
the wings was SDS. For many students, the "new" peace movement of 
1960—62 provided a bridge to the New Left. 
The early New Left was determined to avoid what it saw as the fail­
ings of SANE and the 1950s peace movement. Unlike SANE, SDS 
adopted a "non-exclusionist" membership policy, prized face-to-face re­
lations and the spirit of community, and was casually organized and de­
centralized to the point of chaos. 
Tactical differences were no less pronounced than were those of 
structure and style. SANE relied on its access to Washington powerbro­
kers and its ability to influence the educated middle class through the 
prestige of its sponsors and the impact of its psychologically manipula­
tive (if factually sound) advertisements. The early SDS, by contrast, fo-
cused-on the poor, prided itself on its nonmanipulative, nonexploitative 
approach, and adopted an ideological stance of radical opposition to the 
"Establishment." 
With a grant from the United Auto Workers, the SDS Economic 
Research and Action Project in 1963-64 sent organizers into ghettos and 
slums to discuss the residents' grievances, help them plan protest actions, 
and (so it was hoped) gradually lead them to an awareness of the larger 
realities and class inequities that shaped their lives. In gradual stages, the 
poor would be radicalized and become a part of the force contributing 
to the emergence of a new social order. "Only in this way," wrote SDS 
president Tom Hayden in Dissent (January/February 1966), "can a 
movement be built which the Establishment can neither buy off nor 
manage." The groups Port Huron statement gave a name to this strategy: 
participatory democracy. An article of faith for the early New Left, this 
concept was both its most significant contribution to the radical tradi­
tion and its most explicit repudiation of SANE and much of the 1950s 
peace movement. 
SDS community organizers quickly found that the nuclear arms race 
ranked well below such matters as garbage collection on the list of slum 
dwellers' concerns. As one activist later wrote, the poor were often openly 
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hostile to "large, organization-funded, top-down peace propaganda pro­
grams." This realization made the New Left retreat still further from the 
issue of nuclear disarmament. 
If SANE was the negative role model for the early New Left, the 
civil-rights movement was the positive one. The tactics of black activist 
groups like SNCC (Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee), 
with its sit-ins and marches, seemed eminently more promising—and 
exciting—than the staid, desk-bound approach of organizations like 
SANE. Black activists understandably gave other issues priority over the 
nuclear arms race, reenforcing the inclination of their white emulators 
in the New Left to do the same. 
Ideological as well as tactical considerations underlay the early New 
Left's downgrading of the nuclear-weapons issue. Assuming that the 
Washington technocrats understood the irrationality of nuclear war and 
an out-of-control nuclear arms race, SDS further believed that they 
would devise ways to avoid nuclear catastrophe. This assumption 
emerges most clearly in the 1963 manifesto America and the New Era, 
written soon after the test ban treaty was announced. Citing this 
agreement as well as "other first-step efforts at curtailing the arms race," 
this analysis concluded, "A deep desire to avoid general nuclear war is 
fundamental to the Administrations 'rational military policies.'. . . The 
Administration recognizes that some forms of agreement with the Soviet 
Union are necessary if nuclear war is to be prevented." But while the 
technocratic managers in Washington could be counted on to avoid nu­
clear war and a spiraling nuclear arms race, SDS went on, they would 
not hesitate to engage in subversion, counterinsurgency wars, and other 
nonnuclear power tactics to protect corporate Americas global political 
and economic interests. 
The radicals' assumption that the technocrats' rational calculations 
and managerial skills would prevent nuclear war despite the continued 
existence of vast nuclear arsenals (a belief they shared with the deterrence 
theorists) was a remarkable gesture of faith in human reason and techno­
cratic expertise. As such, it represented a sharp break with the activist 
perspective and cultural ethos of the 1950s and early 1960s, which 
viewed the nuclear arms race as a fundamentally irrational, unstable, and 
highly dangerous process that might at any time escape from control 
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through accident, technical breakdown, or some sudden escalation of lo­
cal conflict. The early New Left, for all its talk of "the looming shadow 
of the bomb," did not share such fears—or at least did not systematically 
explore them in its theoretical work or embody them in its operational 
planning. 
The relationship between the radical movement of the 1960s and 
the nuclear-weapons issue, then, was a complex and subtle one. After 
1965, anti—Vietnam War activism played a paramount role in pushing 
the nuclear issue to the background. But even earlier, the ideological and 
tactical thrust of the New Left had led it to break decisively with the 
organized test ban and nuclear disarmament activism of the 1950s. Con­
vinced of the superiority of its tactics and the greater sophistication of its 
political analysis, the New Left downplayed its roots in the antinuclear 
and test ban movements. The earlier campaign was significant, New Left 
ideologues suggested, primarily because its limitations had propelled 
some of its youthful adherents beyond liberal reformism to a larger radi­
cal consciousness. 
Even qualified efforts at rapprochement soon faded. In The Making 
of a Counter Culture, Theodore Roszak, himself a veteran of the earlier 
peace movement, wrote: "Precisely what do groups like SANE . . . tell us 
about adult America even when we are dealing with politically conscious 
elements? Looking back, one is struck by their absurd shallowness and 
conformism, their total unwillingness to raise fundamental issues about 
the quality of American life, their fastidious anti-communism, and above 
all their incapacity to sustain any significant initiative on the political 
landscape." Roszak s analysis is insightful, but its dismissive, contemptu­
ous tone also indicates the depth of the chasm between the radicals of 
the New Left and the earlier nuclear-weapons protest movement. 
The New Left's hostility toward the older generation of nuclear ac­
tivists was in many instances fully reciprocated. Eugene Rabinowitch, 
editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, was deeply critical of the 
1960s activists, expressing his dismay in editorials with titles like "Stu­
dent Rebellion: The Aimless Revolution?" (September 1968) and "The 
Stoning of America" (November 1971), a bitter attack on Charles Reich's 
The Greening of America (1970), a paean to the political potential of the 
counterculture. 
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One of the bitterest denunciations came from Donald Keys, SANE's 
executive director. The differences between the New Left and older or­
ganizations like SANE, he said, were fundamental. SANE believed in 
democracy and in the "common sense and goodwill" of the American 
people, and placed "communication and dialogue with the public and 
the power structure at the center of its approach." SANE believed in 
working through the system for its broad-rangirig, though limited, goals. 
New Left radicals, by contrast, "reject the democratic process, encourage 
violence, and offer only protest and opposition." Young people, "becom­
ing conscious of social issues for the first time," Keys went on, had 
reacted "in a total way against the hypocrisy, gross materialism, and de­
humanization of their society." They seemed unable or unwilling to 
"compartmentalize or fragment their response." Two such dissimilar ap­
proaches, concluded Keys, shared no common ground. As he put it in a 
November 13, 1967, memorandum to SANE, "The two major trends 
in the peace movement are by their nature incompatible and mutually 
divergent." The breakdown of communication and even civility between 
the New Left and the activists who for years had worked against the men­
ace of nuclear war could hardly have been more complete. 
As the 1970s ended, with the Vietnam War over at last and the Wa­
tergate crisis resolved, the combination of circumstances that for more 
than a decade had mired the American public in nuclear apathy was rap­
idly breaking up, giving way to the early stirrings of renewed political 
activism and cultural attention. The issue of nuclear proliferation, high­
lighted by India's test of a nuclear device in 1974, demonstrations in 
Europe against NATO s deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles, and 
a grassroots campaign against nuclear power plants all helped revive ac­
tivist energies. 
But much time had been lost. From the early 1960s to the late 
1970s, most Americans had seemed oblivious to a danger that many in 
earlier years, and many others in the years to follow, considered the most 
urgent ever to confront the nation, and indeed the entire human race. 
NUCLEAR WA R IN THE WRITINGS OF 
BIBLE-PROPHECY POPULARIZERS 
In the early 1980s, as I researched the cultural impact of the atomic bomb, I encountered a vast and neglected lode of source material: scores of popular paperbacks 
that purported to interpret Revelation and other apocalyptic 
portions of the Bible. After August 1945, these pious popu­
larizers, long accustomed to finding current events foretold 
in the Bible, lost no time in incorporating images of atomic 
destruction into their scenarios, where they remained firmly 
implanted for half a century. 
I was able to include only a few brief references to this 
material in By the Bomb's Early Light, but in 1987, after the 
publication of that book, I decided to explore this specific 
part of the nuclear culture more fully. My research quickly 
expanded, however, to include not only the nuclear-war-in-
prophecy theme, but the much larger panorama of apoca­
lyptic belief in contemporary America. My 1992 book* 
When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern 
American Culture, was the result. This chapter is based on a 
fully documented chapter in that book that explores proph­
ecy popularizers' view of the atomic bomb and the nuclear 
threat. 
Bible popularizers seem to have been immune to the 
cycle of America's nuclear awareness discussed in chapter 8. 
Even during the "Big Sleep"—the period of diminished 
attention to nuclear issues that extended from 1963 to 
the later 1970s—the topic of nuclear war remained vividly 
alive for the nations millions of Bible-prophecy believers. 
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Instructed by television evangelists and by paperback popu­
larizers, these millions remained convinced, despite arms-
control treaties, diminished antinuclear activism, and the 
secular media's neglect of the topic, not only that the Bible 
foretells a world-destroying thermonuclear holocaust, but 
that the holocaust would probably erupt in their lifetimes. 
Despite the end of the Cold War, many still believe this 
today. 
FROM CHRISTIANITY'S EARLIEST DAYS, biblical images of the earth's convulsive 
final cataclysm both awed and challenged prophetic interpreters. "This 
our city will be burned with fire from heaven," Christian warns his 
family in John Bunyaris Pilgrims Progress (1678). A nineteenth-century 
American prophecy work, D. T. Taylors The Coming Earthquake (1870), 
vividly pictured a planet trembling on the brink of disintegration: 
Modern science . . . teaches that this globe is an enor­
mous "terrestrial bombshell" . . . , its hidden interior.. . 
an intensely heated mass in a condition of molten fluid­
ity, agitated, restless, and rolling its fiery waves hither 
and thither age after age, incessantly seeking with a ter­
rible expressive power an outlet to diffuse its igneous ele­
ments over the surface and into the atmosphere. On this 
thin, rocky film, or outer surface, dwells a fallen, sinful, 
and dying race of mortals. . .  . Is it any wonder that 
thinking, sober people have from the earliest ages looked 
for a final, awful convulsion and burning day? 
Down to 1945, interpreters of prophecy typically envisioned this 
"burning day" in naturalistic terms—earthquakes, comets, volcanic 
eruptions—or as an eschatological event beyond human understanding. 
One writer, for example, simply attributed the destruction at Arma­
geddon to "the all-consuming 'breath of God'" and did not speculate 
further. 
With the coming of the atomic bomb, all this changed. Man himself, 
it now seemed, had in the throes of war stumbled on the very means 
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of his own prophesied doom. Beginning in autumn 1945, a chorus of 
preachers, Bible scholars, and paperback writers insisted that the Scrip­
tures not only foretold atomic weapons, but also their eventual cataclys­
mic use. 
FIRST ASSESSMENTS 
President Truman's August 1945 announcements of the atomic destruc­
tion of Hiroshima and Nagasaki triggered a torrent of apocalyptic pro­
nouncements, many of them explicitly biblical. "Atomic Energy for War: 
New Beast of Apocalypse," headlined the Philadelphia Inquirer. William 
Laurence of the New York Times titled the final section of his history of 
the Manhattan Project "Armageddon." Countless commentators quoted 
2 Peter 3:10: "The heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the 
elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that 
are therein shall be burned up." 
A popular culture steeped in prophecy quickly enveloped the bomb 
in an aura of biblical imagery. Fred Kirby's 1945 country-music hit 
"Atomic Power," which imagined brimstone fire raining down from 
heaven and described atomic energy as "given by the mighty hand of 
God," tapped directly into this reservoir of grassroots end-time belief. In 
the privacy of his diary, even President Truman, as we have seen, re­
sponded in biblical terms to the first A-bomb test in New Mexico as 
possibly the means of "the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates 
Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark." Truman, who knew his 
Bible, doubtless had in mind such Old Testament passages as Deuter­
onomy 32:22: "For a fire is kindled in mine anger, and shall burn unto 
the lowest hell, and shall consume the earth with her increase, and set on 
fire the foundations of the mountains." 
At the level of popular religious belief, the bomb's impact was imme­
diate and dramatic. In contrast to the secular press, where relief at its 
apparent role in ending the war counterbalanced fears about the future, 
prophecy writers from the first adopted an unrelievedly somber tone. "It 
is the devil who caused man to devote his highest and most successful 
potencies to the discovery of those things by which man destroys his fel­
lows," commented E. Schuyler English, associate editor of Our Hope, a 
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magazine of prophecy exposition, late in 1945, "and no greater weapon 
has ever been devised than this one, the A-bomb." The ultimate cata­
clysm foretold in the Bible, English went on, sounded "singularly similar 
in its effects to those of the atom bomb." Moody Monthly, the publication 
of Chicago's Moody Bible Institute, agreed: "The Bible is ahead of sci­
ence again," it said; an atomic blast offered an "exact picture" of the 
burning and melting of 2 Peter 3:10. 
Philadelphia's Donald Grey Barnhouse, prophecy writer and radio 
preacher, explored the bomb's prophetic significance in his Eternity mag­
azine in December 1945. Commenting on those who were expressing 
hope that global holocaust might yet be avoided, Barnhouse declared 
somberly: "It is already too late. The threads of inevitability have been 
caught in the mesh of the hidden gears of history and the divine plan 
moves toward the inexorable fulfillment." Weighing the prospects of 
atomic war, Barnhouse diverged sharply from the self-congratulatory 
mood of a nation flushed with victory. The bomb, he said, had given 
fresh plausibility to a speculation he had long entertained: that New York 
City was the Babylon whose obliteration in one hour is foretold in Reve­
lation. With atomic power, not only New York but all the nation's great 
cities could be instantly wiped out. "The destruction of the United States 
. .  . is certainly consistent with the nature of God," Barnhouse declared 
implacably: The nation had sinned and faced "terrible judgment." Barn-
house's calm in contemplating mass slaughter reflected his conviction 
that believers faced a happier destiny. "If atomic bombs fall upon our 
cities," he wrote a few weeks into the nuclear age, "we shall be in heaven 
the next second." 
Of postwar prophecy writers who combed not only the Bible but 
also the interpretive literature of the past for anticipations of the atomic 
bomb, the most indefatigable was surely Wilbur M. Smith (1894-1976). 
The son of a prosperous Midwest apple grower, Smith in 1913 enrolled 
at Moody Bible Institute, where his father served on the board. A 1914 
prophecy conference awakened Smith's lifelong interest in this subject. 
In 1938, after service as a Presbyterian minister, Smith returned to 
Moody to teach. In 1947, he joined the newly founded Fuller Theologi­
cal Seminary in Pasadena. A prolific writer and conference speaker, 
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Smith was Americas best-known and most erudite prophecy expounder 
of the early postwar era. 
The atomic bomb immediately riveted Smith's attention. Like many 
others, he preached on 2 Peter 3:10—"the passage that was in everyone's 
mind"—after Hiroshima, and in November 1945 produced a booklet, 
"This Atomic Age and the Word of God," that sold fifty thousand copies 
and was condensed in the January 1946 Reader's Digest. His much ex­
panded book of the same title appeared in 1948. 
God may have destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah with nuclear power, 
Smith speculated, foreshadowing the judgment now confronting all hu­
manity. Smith scoured the press for doomsday pronouncements by sci­
entists. "The very phrases [foretelling the earths destruction] that were 
formerly. . . laughed at by the world," he observed, "are now being used 
by our outstanding thinkers without any reference to the Scriptures and 
without any knowledge of prophetic truth." He cited the clock of the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, poised a few minutes before midnight, 
and Harold Urey's Collier's article, "I'm a Frightened Man." Never in 
history, asserted Smith, had Jesus' prophecy of men's hearts failing them 
for fear been more clearly fulfilled. 
While activist scientists evoked the horrors of atomic war to rally 
support for world government or the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, prophecy 
writers like Smith marshaled the rhetoric of terror to underscore the 
hopelessness of humanity's situation as the end approached. The bomb, 
said Smith, forced unbelievers to consider the truth claims of Bible 
prophecy seriously. The fear aroused by the prospect of atomic annihila­
tion, he asserted, had focused attention on teachings about the Second 
Coming and end-time events. Like Barnhouse, Smith rejected the idea 
of world government as a solution. Without God's blessing, he warned, 
world government would lead only to global tyranny under the Anti­
christ. The international atomic-energy control agency envisioned by the 
Acheson-Lilienthal plan would be the perfect vehicle for the rise of the 
demonic end-time ruler. 
Smith gleefully quoted numerous fatuous comments by pre-1914 
liberal theologians hailing the imminent advent of the Kingdom of God 
through human effort. The atomic bomb, he said, should finally quash 
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all such "foolish dreams." Far more on target, he suggested, was Bishop 
John Ryle, the Anglican evangelical, who as early as 1883 had written: 
"The last days of the earth shall be its worst days. The last war shall be 
the most fearful and terrible war that ever desolated the earth." Smith 
reflected on the contrast between the world of 1948 and the "bright, 
warm, unclouded days" of his youth, when "a sort of general conviction 
[prevailed] that we were on the verge of a millennium," and "the idea of 
atoms was only a theory in our textbook of physics." The bomb, he in­
sisted, radically challenged not only the notion of inevitable progress, 
but also the cyclical theories of history in which renewal follows degener­
ation and collapse. History's "great, awful climax" was at hand, he pro­
claimed, "and every act and plan and invention of godless men can only 
hasten that day." 
One of the more interesting early efforts to link the atomic bomb to 
the tradition of prophetic interpretation came not from the evangelical 
ranks, but from Harvard's Perry Miller, the intellectual historian of 
American Puritanism. In his 1950 essay "The End of the World," Miller 
noted the similarities between post-Hiroshima doomsday rhetoric and 
the work of late seventeenth-century prophecy writers whose end-time 
scenarios had incorporated current scientific thinking. But the intima­
tions of doom in contemporary secular discourse, Miller suggested, 
differed radically from those of earlier writers, for whom the coming cat­
aclysm had profound eschatological meaning. The nuclear end that 
seemed all too possible after 1945 lacked such a framework. In an era 
when "the very concept of a future becomes meaningless," Miller sug­
gested, the sense that history had meaning—and that America had a spe­
cial role in history-—might finally atrophy and die. 
Miller's distinction between a theologically rooted apocalypticism 
and a merely rhetorical one grafted on an essentially secular worldview 
was important, but for many evangelical ministers, revivalists, and 
prophecy popularizers, not to mention millions of believers, the intellec­
tual distance between 1650 and 1950 was narrower than Miller might 
have imagined. Numerous early postwar prophecy writers viewed atomic 
war as apocalyptic not in a metaphorical but in a literal sense. For them, 
the bomb and the global holocaust it portended brought infinitely closer 
the fulfillment of a divine plan formulated before the dawn of time. 
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Many writers echoed Smith in dismissing proposals for the interna­
tional control of atomic energy, and indeed all efforts to reduce the risk 
of atomic war, as further manifestations of the vain hope that humanity 
could avoid catastrophe through its own efforts. All plans for controlling 
the atom would fail, one proclaimed in November 1945, "and the na­
tions will be destroyed, because God's word declares it." The United Na­
tions was "doomed to failure," asserted Barnhouse in 1951. The stark 
marble monolith rising in New York might well serve as the smoldering 
city's tombstone. 
Even those who deplored the post-Hiroshima surge of interest in 
prophecy could not ignore its intensity. In 1949, Henry Sloan Coffin 
of Union Theological Seminary (a bastion of liberalism) lamented that 
mainstream Protestantism's neglect of eschatology had left the field to 
"sensational propagandists" and "mushrooming cultists" who found blue­
prints of the future in Daniel and Revelation and promised their follow­
ers easy escape from the coming cataclysm. The liberal Baptist Courier 
lashed out at "cults that preach the doom of the present evil order by a 
sudden intervention of God." Like Communism, the Courier said, "This 
doctrine thrives on darkness and distress." 
In response, the Fundamentalist Sunday School Times pointed out 
that the heightened receptivity of the "plain people" to an eschatology 
that taught a convulsive end to human history ought not be surprising, 
since the experience of recent decades had so utterly discredited "the 
dream of a better world" long preached by theological liberals. In a world 
shadowed by nuclear fear, premillennialism (belief in the Christ's immi­
nent return to earth after a terrible interval of wickedness, violence, and 
war) had taken a vigorous new lease on life. 
THE 1950S AND 1960S: PROPHECY WRITING 
AND THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE 
Reflecting a broader trend in U.S. culture, prophecy writers devoted 
somewhat less attention to the bomb in these years. But this lull was 
relative. Wilbur Smith commented in 1953 on the prophecy books 
"pouring from the presses," and many of them dealt with the atomic 
bomb. Despite Washington's efforts to allay nuclear fear, prophecy 
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writers could find no silver lining to the mushroom cloud. "Today the 
whole world lives in fear of annihilation," declared the manifesto of a 
1952 prophecy conference in New York City, and several speakers elabo­
rated the point. Implicitly dismissing government propaganda touting 
the atoms peacetime uses, one speaker insisted on "the dreadful impli­
cations of modern atomic science." Another cited the environmental 
damage inflicted by U.S. atomic tests in the Pacific, described in David 
Bradley s No Place to Hide, as a sign of the approaching end. 
From the mid-1950s to 1963, as we have seen, fears of radioactive 
fallout triggered a second wave of nuclear fear and political activism. 
Mirroring this trend, prophecy writers5 attention to the bomb picked up 
sharply. "At no time in past history has the universal situation of the 
human race been so desperate as it is today," wrote the author of a 1955 
prophecy work. "Dread of a third world war hangs heavily on the hearts 
of men." A I960 Moody Monthly article cited "the piling up of nuclear 
weapons" as a major contributor to a climate of terror comparable to 
the biblical accounts of the last days. Given the world situation, wrote 
J. Dwight Pentecost of Dallas Theological Seminary in 1961, the cata­
clysmic war prophesied in Ezekiel could break out at any time. 
These authors interlaced their discussions of the nuclear threat with 
a stock set of proof texts: the vision of a melting earth in 2 Peter; the 
crescendo of catastrophes in John's Apocalypse; the all-consuming con­
flagration and terrifying astronomical events woven through the Book of 
Joels three short chapters ("O Lord, to thee will I cry; for the fire hath 
devoured the pastures of the wilderness, and the flame hath burned all 
the trees of the field" [1:19]. "The sun shall be turned into darkness, and 
the moon into blood, before the great and the terrible day of the Lord 
comes" [2:31]); and the prophet Zechariah's terrifying description of Je-
hovah's judgment on Israel's enemies—a description strikingly similar to 
John Hersey's account of Japanese atomic-bomb victims in Hiroshima: 
"And this shall be the plague wherewith the Lord will smite all the people 
that have fought against Jerusalem; their flesh shall consume away while 
they stand upon their feet, and their eyes shall consume away in their 
holes, and their tongue shall consume away in their mouth" (14:12). 
One of the most influential prophecy interpreters of this period was 
M. R. DeHaan of Grand Rapids, whose "Radio Bible Class" aired on five 
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hundred stations, including the Mutual and ABC networks. In broad­
casts and books of the early 1960s, DeHaan often discussed the nuclear 
threat. "Hanging over the heads of the nations," he wrote in 1962, "is 
the dire, horrible fear that at any moment some trigger-happy despot 
will. . . drop a missile that would set the world on fire." Demonstrating 
the skill of prophecy writers at incorporating new developments into 
their scenarios, DeHaan discussed the neutron bomb, "technology's 
deadliest weapon," designed to destroy life without harming physical 
structures. Elaborating a passage from Jesus' "Little Apocalypse," re­
corded in the Gospel of Mark, DeHaan proclaimed: "This present age 
will close with a time of peril and war and destruction so great, what 
with our atomic weapons and supersonic missiles, that God must halt 
the holocaust, or man would utterly destroy himself." 
Prophecy conferences helped believers place the deepening nuclear 
threat in biblical context. A speaker at a 1956 gathering in New York 
City quoted Zechariah's account of human flesh "consuming] away," 
and asked: "Did you ever wonder how it could be fulfilled? Well, the 
atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and the cobalt bomb have made real 
this passage of Scripture." The arms race, he went on, was "the training 
ground for Armageddon." Added John Walvoord, a prophecy writer 
based at the Dallas Theological Seminary, at a 1961 Los Angeles proph­
ecy conference: "The Bible plainly forecasts the coming of yet another 
great war . . . eclips[ing] anything that the world has ever seen before." 
Given this conviction, prophecy writers dismissed Washington's 
message of peace through strength, survival through civil defense, and 
Utopia through peacetime uses of atomic energy. Whatever the soothing 
rhetoric, they insisted, the nuclear arms race obviously represented a 
giant step toward Armageddon. "No shelter . . . can protect us from the 
bombs being perfected today," declared DeHaan in 1962. "The only way 
out is up." The rosy talk of "converting atomic energy into useful indus­
trial purposes," he went on, "is completely overshadowed . .  . by the 
threat of wholesale annihilation." 
As they updated the premillennial scenario with images of nuclear 
war, prophecy writers maintained a tone of calm assurance. All is fore­
told; if the prophetic plan is understood, one need feel no alarm. As one 
interpreter wrote in 1957, amid deepening anxiety about radioactive 
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fallout: "Wars and disasters may come and go; atom bombs may pose 
their threat of universal annihilation. . . . But these things are recognized 
as part of the great design of the God of Israel." 
The narratives of horror ended formulaically: The Christian would 
escape it all. One writer, after a particularly gruesome recital of the disas­
ters facing humankind, went on, "But let us turn our face from that 
dreadful scene, and be reminded that the redeemed of God . . . shall not 
be on the earth at that time." Despite the ubiquitous fear of nuclear war, 
observed Dwight Pentecost in 1961, "the child of God who is acquainted 
with the prophetic Scriptures rests in assurance because he has before 
him God's own blueprint." And what did this blueprint tell the believer? 
Before the final crisis, "You and I . .  . will have been translated into the 
presence of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ." DeHaan agreed: "One of 
these days [the Rapture] is really, actually going to happen. . . . The 
darker the days become, the more glorious this blessed hope shines in 
our lives." 
The world's doom was sealed, but individuals might still be snatched 
as brands from the burning. After describing the grim nuclear prospect 
and the Christian's blessed hope, the prophecy writers always concluded 
with the ancient, yet ever urgent theme: Accept Christ today, and escape 
the horror that could engulf the earth at any moment. As one reminded 
his readers, updating Jonathan Edwards's spider dangling over a flame: 
"Only the touch of a button stands between you and eternity at every 
moment of every day." 
THE 1970S AND BEYOND: HAL LlNDSEY AND HIS SUCCESSORS 
In 1970, a newcomer among Bible-prophecy popularizers, a young cam­
pus evangelist named Hal Lindsey Jr., published what became a multi-
million-copy best-seller: The Late Great Planet Earth. The phenomenal 
success of this book (it sold more copies than any other nonfiction work 
of the 1970s) makes plain that despite reduced attention in the mass 
media and the reassurance offered by the test ban treaty and the ongoing 
arms-control process, nuclear fear lurked just below the surface of the 
American consciousness. In this paperback and a stream of sequels, all of 
which offered a colloquial and highly accessible version of the premillen­
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nialist prophetic system, Lindsey skillfully wove the biblical apocalypses 
into a narrative of the coming holocaust, which he labeled "World War 
III" and explicitly portrayed as a global thermonuclear war. 
Assuming that all scriptural allusions to fiery destruction and mass 
suffering foreshadowed nuclear war, Lindsey (usually with qualifying 
phrases like "quite possibly" or "may very well be") relentlessly turned 
the Bible into a manual of atomic-age combat. Zechariah's image of hu­
man flesh consuming away portrays "exactly what happens to those who 
are in a thermonuclear blast"; "fire and brimstone" means tactical nuclear 
weapons; the falling stars and stinging locusts of Revelation are warheads 
fired from space platforms and Cobra helicopters spraying nerve gas; the 
scorching heat and awful sores mentioned in Revelation describe the 
effects of radiation as observed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For page 
after mind-numbing page, Lindsey systematically enumerated the apoca­
lyptic scriptures, mechanically transcribing every phrase and image into 
the vocabulary of Pentagon strategists. 
Biblical writers, said Lindsey patronizingly, had been unable to deci­
pher their own visions. "After all," he wrote, "how could God transmit 
the thought of a nuclear catastrophe to someone living in the year A.D. 
90!" The "hail and fire mingled with blood" of Revelation 8, he says, are 
clearly missiles as they appeared "to John's eyes, unsophisticated as to 
ICBMs." Similarly, John's image of horses with lionlike heads and fire 
pouring from their mouths was his feeble effort to describe "some kind 
of mobilized ballistic missile launcher." 
Lindsey paraded his insider's knowledge of current events and scien­
tific developments. "Recently as I was studying about nuclear weapons," 
begins a typical passage, "I discovered that science has perfected a cobalt 
bomb—one of the most lethal weapons known to man. . .  . By placing 
a shield of cobalt 59 metal around a hydrogen bomb . . . the destruc­
tive capacity... is doubled. More significantly, however, the radioactive 
contamination . .  . is tremendous. Scientists have dubbed it "the dirty 
bomb" because of its fallout. This is what I believe may be pictured in 
Revelation 6:12." 
Lindsey described the end-time holocaust with unholy zest, hypnoti­
cally piling catastrophe on catastrophe: "Multiplied millions" of soldiers 
are incinerated; civilian casualties mount into the billions amid nuclear 
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horrors including a "quadrillion megaton explosion"; mass poisoning re­
sults as water turns to blood ("There's going to be a big run on Coca-
Cola, but even this will give out after a while!")- Reflecting on all this, 
the political scientist Michael Barkun has perceptively observed: "As the 
exclamation points march forward, it becomes clear that Lindsey finds 
these prospects enormously attractive. His prose pants on with scarcely 
a word of sympathy for the hundreds of millions killed or maimed. For 
him, the tribulation is grand, cosmic theatre, the ultimate Hollywood 
spectacle." 
Not only secular critics, but many from the religious world, even 
evangelicals, dealt harshly with Lindseys imaginative flights. One dis­
missed his "science fiction fantasy" as "a farrago of nonsense." A seminary 
student called him "the Geraldo Rivera of the Christian world." Never­
theless, in embedding nuclear war in a framework of foreordained mean­
ing, Lindsey struck a note that resonated with millions of Americans. 
A torrent of prophecy books in the 1970s and 1980s imitated Lind­
sey in making nuclear war a centerpiece of their scenarios. "Billions will 
perish in the coming cataclysm," wrote Merrill Unger of Dallas Theolog­
ical Seminary in Beyond the Crystal Ball (1973), adding that while the 
approaching judgment would ultimately be God's doing, "on the natural 
plane, H-bombs and the latest thermonuclear weapons will play a large 
part." John Phillips, in Only the Bible Can Foretell the Future (197r5), after 
describing the effects of a thermonuclear attack on the eastern United 
States ("The entire East Coast, from Portland, Maine, to Norfolk, Vir­
ginia, and up to 150 miles inland, would become a lake of fire"), con­
cluded somberly: "Truly, the dawning of the atomic age is of great 
prophetic significance." 
Among the post-1970 prophecy popularizers who proclaimed a 
coming nuclear war, few reached a larger audience than evangelist Jack 
Van Impe of Royal Oak, Michigan, whose weekly broadcasts appeared 
on more than ninety television channels, the Trinity Broadcasting reli­
gious network, forty-three U.S. radio stations, and internationally on 
Trans-World Radio. Van Impe also promulgated his end-time interpreta­
tions in short, easy-to-read paperbacks with titles like The Signs of the 
Times, The Coming War with Russia, and 11:59 and Counting Describing 
a visit to Hiroshima, he foresaw much worse in "the near future" as "a 
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holocaust of fire" unleashed "atomic devastation beyond comprehen­
sion." Biblical quotations studded Van Impe's apocalyptic predictions, 
including not only the familiar ones from Revelation, Zechariah, and 
2 Peter ("as clear a definition of atomic warfare as is contained in any 
library"), but also more obscure selections from Joel, Zephaniah, Ma­
lachi, and this from Ezekiel: "The flaming flame shall not be quenched, 
and all faces from the south to the north shall be burned therein. And all 
flesh shall see that I the Lord have kindled it: it shall not be quenched" 
(20:47-48). 
Striving to outdo one another, the post-Lindsey popularizers pro­
duced ever more sensational prose and tortuous interpretations. Jeremi-
ah's phrase "make bright the arrows" (51:11), suggested one, described 
the launching of a nuclear missile. Another triumphantly unearthed a 
cryptic phrase from Habakkuk—"for they shall heap dust and take it" 
(1:10)—as an obvious prophecy of radioactive fallout. Expounding 
Ezekiel 39, in which the armies of a northern kingdom called Gog are 
wiped out after invading the land of Israel, another popularizer hypothe­
sized that the seven-months' delay in burying the dead would be a "cool­
ing off period" because of the corpses' radioactive contamination. 
To keep their apocalyptic scenarios timely (and perhaps gain an edge 
in a highly competitive field), these writers also followed Lindsey in cit­
ing the latest developments in nuclear technology. "An entire country's 
targets could be hit simultaneously by releasing a SWARM of . .  . cruise 
missiles," wrote a breathless Leon Bates; "This is a major development 
in modern warfare, just in time for the TRIBULATION?" A writer of the 
1980s, discussing Antichrist's feat of calling down fire from the skies 
(Rev. 13:13), described a satellite device allegedly under development by 
the Soviets that could "at any given moment. . . trigger the release of a 
laser beam flame which could descend in an apocalyptic flash on a prede­
termined target." 
This decades-long effort to find prophetic intimations of mankind's 
nuclear fate helps one understand the excitement set off by Edgar 
Whisenant's two-million-copy best-seller, Eighty-Eight Reasons Why the 
Rapture Will Be in 1988. Marshaling elaborate and highly ingenious pro­
phetic evidence, Whisenant foresaw a final global cataclysm that would 
begin with Russia's invasion of Israel at sunset on October 3, 1988, and 
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end one hour later with Russia's annihilation. This divinely ordained ho­
locaust, he predicted, echoing many other prophecy writers, would pro­
duce nuclear winter, mass starvation, radioactive water, and mountains 
of unburied bodies. 
Few prophecy writers followed Whisenant s venture into precise 
date-setting, but many did go beyond general predictions of global ther­
monuclear war to speculate about the form it would take and the nations 
that would be involved in it. 
SCENARIOS OF NUCLEAR WAR 
As prophecy writers reflected on the end-time cataclysm foretold in the 
Scriptures, some tried to work out the precise details. Although, as two 
1974 authors admitted in a rare confession of uncertainty, it is often "not 
quite clear who fights with whom about what," innumerable writers' at­
tempts at interpretation, while puzzling to the uninitiated, illuminate 
the complex ways in which prophetic belief influenced perceptions of 
humankind's nuclear future. 
One troublesome issue was whether the cataclysm prophesied in the 
Bible would in fact be a nuclear war as conventionally understood, or a 
divine intervention in which God punishes mankind, possibly by nuclear 
means. In contrast to Lindsey's detailed nuclear scenarios for World War 
III, other writers stressed the transcendence of eschatological fulfillment. 
Merrill Unger, for example, while not excluding nuclear conflict from 
his end-time scheme, emphasized that the devastation portrayed in Reve­
lation might well be a direct "outpouring of God's wrath" on humanity. 
Even Jack Van Impe, ever ready to find atomic war foretold in biblical 
prophecy, conceded that "God does not need man's modern inventions" 
to achieve His purposes. 
Some resolved the dilemma by positing two nuclear-related end-time 
events: first World War III, and then God's destruction of the earth. In 
11:59 and Counting (1983), for example, Van Impe hypothesized a ther­
monuclear conflict during the seven-year interval known as the Great 
Tribulation, followed, after the Millennium, by God's nuclear annihila­
tion of the world in preparation for the new heaven and the new earth 
foretold in the Book of Revelation. Proponents stressed this theory's 
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hopeful aspect: Although World War III will be devastating, many will 
survive. Even if a billion people die, one writer pointed out, "there would 
be a couple billion others left." 
Those who sought nuclear allusions in the prophecies faced another 
problem. Biblical writers' visions involved weapons of their own day— 
spears, bows and arrows, mounted warriors, and the like. Some prophecy 
writers, faithful in their literalism, argued that precisely these weapons 
would be used in the final batde. But most, for all their insistence on 
scriptural inerrancy, freely followed Hal Lindsey in transmuting swords 
and chariots into modern-day nuclear weaponry. As S. Maxwell Coder 
explained in The Final Chapter (1984), elucidating a passage from 
Ezekiel: 
Hebrew is a language of word pictures. . . . The word for 
"arrow" means a piercing missile, and the word for 
"bow" means a launching device for such a missile. . . . 
If we use the word pictures instead of what was meant 
in ancient times, the verse [Ezek. 39:3] translates, "And 
I will smite thy launcher out of thy left hand, and will 
cause thy missiles to fall out of thy right hand." . . . The 
word pictures can describe modern weapons just as ac­
curately as they described those in use twenty-five hun­
dred years ago. 
What nations would be involved in the coming holocaust? While 
many Cold War prophecy writers, drawing on the allusions to a mysteri­
ous northern foe in Ezekiel 38-39, tied their nuclear-war predictions to 
forecasts of Russia's destruction following an invasion of Israel, most pro­
ceeded cautiously in discussing the precise nature and source of that de­
struction. Writing of the Ezekiel passage in What's This World Coming 
To? (1970), Ray Stedman said: "It is apparent from this description that 
God himself will assume the prerogative in dealing with the Russian 
threat. Whether it will involve nuclear warfare, or be purely a natural 
disaster, is difficult to determine." Doug Clark, in Shockwaves of Arma­
geddon (1982), perhaps came closest to identifying the fire that inciner­
ates the invading nation in Ezekiel: "Could this . .  . be European and 
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American nuclear power destroying the Soviet Union? Certainly it could. 
God uses earthly as well as heavenly powers to do his will." 
But nuclear war did not figure in these prophecy popularizations 
solely in an anti-Soviet context. Whatever its specific cause, the final con­
flict would soon engulf the globe. As a speaker at a 1970 prophecy con­
ference put it, "The very idea of a coming cataclysmic judgment that will 
destroy the nations seems preposterous; yet for those. . . acquainted with 
the prophetic word, there resides the conviction that the dissolution of 
the present world order must be near." James Boice, a Philadelphia Pres­
byterian minister and leader of a popular religious radio program called 
the Bible Study Hour, explicating Ezekiel 38-39 in 1984, foresaw "a gen­
eral exchange of nuclear missiles" in a "horribly destructive war" over­
coming every nation, including "the United States, Great Britain, Japan, 
China, and other world powers." 
The most precise list of the nations facing nuclear destruction ap­
peared in Jack Van Impe s Signs of the Times (1979). Noting the prophecy 
in Revelation that a third of the world would be consumed by fire, Van 
Impe, citing Life's Pictorial Atlas of the World, calculated one-third of the 
earth's land mass as 18,963,194 square miles. He next listed the area of 
the nations he believed destined for annihilation: Israel, the "Persian Em­
pire (including West Pakistan)," Ethiopia, Libya, the Soviet Union, the 
Warsaw Pact nations, the ten nations of Western Europe ruled by Anti­
christ, and the United States. The total? Precisely 18,963,194 square 
miles! "How much more proof is needed . . . that Christ's return is very 
near?" he concluded triumphantly. 
As Van Impe's calculations suggest, the United States fared poorly in 
most narratives of nuclear destruction. Late twentieth-century prophecy 
writers, after chronicling America's decline into wickedness and apostasy, 
usually concluded that it would share the judgment foretold for the na­
tions as a whole. For many, this meant nuclear destruction. The United 
States will either ally with Antichrist, declared Thomas S. McCall and 
Zola Levitt in The Coming Russian Invasion of Israel (197r4), and face di­
rect annihilation, or be a "helpless casualty of global thermonuclear 
effects." A 1985 author expressed the prevailing view with particu­
lar starkness. America, the latter-day Babylon whose doom is foretold 
in Revelation, "is going to be destroyed by fire! Sudden destruction is 
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coming and few will escape. . .  . [A] hydrogen holocaust will engulf 
America—and this nation will be no more." Some popularizers foresaw 
Americas nuclear judgment coming directly from God, others from 
human intermediaries—usually the Soviet Union. "Russia possesses 
enough hydrogen bombs . .  . to devastate America," wrote Roy Hicks, a 
Pentecostal prophecy writer and speaker, in 1982. "Of course, this must 
be in the knowledge and timing of the Lord, but her threats to bury us 
cannot be ignored." 
These prophetic visions of nuclear war share certain common 
themes. First is the pervasive sense of inevitability. God's plan for man­
kind, established before the world began, is unalterable. As a chapter title 
in one book put it, the drift toward nuclear Armageddon is "A TREND 
THAT CANNOT BE REVERSED." These works abound with fatalis­
tic pronouncements: "It is only a matter of time. . . [a] nuclear holocaust 
is coming"; "Our world is in a death-dive. We have peaked and now 
we're plunging rapidly to the end"; and so on and on. 
Second, nuclear war, while horrendous, will also be the means to a 
beneficent and even glorious outcome. "If God permits men to use 
atomic warfare," Merrill Unger wrote, "it will be to accomplish His pur­
pose and to glorify His name." Robert Gromacki, an Idaho Baptist 
minister and church-college professor, observed in 1970: "Although Ar­
mageddon will be an awesome and terrifying experience for the world, it 
should be welcomed by the child of God as the day of vindication of our 
holy and sovereign Creator. Many beneficial results will be produced by 
this great battle. . . . What then should be the believers attitude to the 
destruction of the world by fire? First of all, he should welcome it and 
pray for its nearness." 
David Wilkerson, an Assemblies of God minister and Pentecostal 
leader, elaborated the point in Set the Trumpet to Thy Mouth (1985): 
Are we so blind, so earthbound, that we want God to 
keep.us alive physically, only to live in a contaminated, 
hostile environment? Why can't we see that a holocaust 
can only dissolve this earthly body; but that very dissolv­
ing brings us into a celestial one. It will be instant glory. 
How can we who are already dead to the world be 
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adversely affected by a holocaust? As for me, I died to 
the world—its pleasures, its pains, its destruction—so 
that a meltdown simply brings me into the fullness of 
an inheritance I already possess in measure. . .  . To me, 
going home to Jesus in a sudden fiery holocaust is an 
escape from God's wrath. How can it be wrath when He 
takes me by the hand and leads me to paradise? God's 
chosen can look at every disaster right in its fury and 
declare: "Nothing can move me; I am safe in the palm 
of his hand." 
Finally, as we have seen, this hopefulness found further grounding 
in the assurance that Christians will escape earth's ultimate crisis by way 
of the Rapture. (Citing a passage in 2 Thessalonians, Rapture believers 
hold that before the Great Tribulation, all true believers will be bodily 
taken from the earth to join Jesus Christ in the air, whence they will 
return at the Battle of Armageddon to share in Christ's millennial reign.) 
As the Fundamentalist leader Carl Mclntire put it exuberantly in 1965: 
"Thank God, I will get a view of the Battle of Armageddon from the 
grandstand seats of the heavens. All who are born again will see the Battle 
of Armageddon, but it will be from the skies." Added the California 
prophecy expositor Chuck Smith in What the World Is Coming To (1977): 
"The world has one great war yet to endure. . . . The slaughter that will 
take place is too frightening to imagine. Just be thankful that you're not 
going to be around!" 
Clearly, then, prophecy writers viewed nuclear holocaust from a 
unique vantage point. They described its horror as graphically as any 
antinuclear activist, but did not see it as a possible historical outcome to 
be avoided at all costs, but as the probable form of earth's divinely or­
dained end. For these authors, escape had an individual meaning, not 
a corporate, social meaning. Hope lay only in accepting Christ and 
holding oneself in readiness for the Rapture. In the secular world, the 
possibility of thermonuclear war tended to be either psychologically 
numbing or politically energizing, as people transformed anxiety into 
action. For prophecy writers, it served different functions: spurring 
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missionary effort, promising future judgment, and validating the premil­
lennial belief system and the Bible itself. 
FALWELL, ROBERTSON, GRAHAM: THREE NUCLEAR-AGE 
PROPHECY INTERPRETERS 
Politics penetrated even the hermetically sealed world of prophecy popu­
larizers, causing subtle shifts in the treatment of nuclear war. Such shifts 
occurred in particularly interesting ways in the pronouncements of three 
politically active late twentieth-century evangelical leaders: Jerry Falwell, 
Pat Robertson, and Billy Graham. 
Falwell, prince of the electronic church, New Right leader, and con­
fidant of President Reagan, offered a succession of prophetic pronounce­
ments on nuclear war in the 1970s and 1980s. Most of these echoed the 
familiar post-1945 premillennialist theme: Nuclear destruction is proph­
esied and inevitable. In a 1980 pamphlet, "Armageddon and the Coming 
War with Russia," complete with mushroom-cloud cover, Falwell de­
scribed the "final holocaust" to follow Russia's invasion of Israel. "All hell 
will break out" at this time, he told an interviewer in 1981, paraphrasing 
Ezekiel 39; "blood shall flow in the streets up to the bridles of the 
horses." "The Tribulation will result in such bloodshed and destruction 
that any war up to that time will seem insignificant," he told his Old-
Time Gospel Houraudience in 1983. FalwelFs grim descriptions of Arma­
geddon took on special resonance when, on tours of Israel, he preached 
from the actual prophesied site of the battle at Megiddo, near Haifa. 
"God only knows how many human beings will be wiped out in that 
battle," he reiterated in his Fundamentalist Journal in 1988, "but they 
willht wiped out." Believers, however, will escape the approaching hor­
ror: "If you are saved, you will never go through one hour, not one mo­
ment of the Tribulation." 
But with FalwelPs growing political involvement, he periodically 
qualified the view that nuclear war was inevitable and (for most human 
beings) inescapable. In 1983, for example, he endorsed the position that 
the final holocaust will come only after the Millennium, as God uses 
nuclear power "to destroy the present universe" and make way for the 
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new heaven and the new earth. Therefore, he said reassuringly, "We don't 
need to go to bed at night wondering if someone's going to push the 
button and destroy the planet between now and sunrise." The 1983 Fal­
well even suggested that Americans could influence their nuclear destiny, 
not only individually through conversion, but collectively through diplo­
macy. Washington had a duty "to negotiate for peace with the Soviet 
Union and other nations." "We have a human responsibility to do all we 
can to seek sensible arms controls." In finding earth's nuclear annihila­
tion foretold in the Bible while simultaneously hinting that the end 
might be long delayed—and even that politics could make a differ-
ence—Falwell hewed to a central post-Hiroshima premillennial theme 
while at the same time preserving the role in Reagan-era conservative 
politics that he so clearly valued. 
The words of Pat Robertson, a U.S. senators son who experienced a 
religious conversion in 1956 and went on to found the Christian Broad­
casting Network, reveal a similar tension between the stark premillennial 
view of nuclear war and the lure of politics. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s he, like Falwell, often foretold a nuclear war triggered by Russia's 
invasion of Israel. Israel's 1967 capture of Jerusalem's Old City, he wrote 
in 1980, had set the stage for Antichrist's reign and Armageddon. Ven­
turing into date-setting, he predicted the ultimate holocaust by 1982 and 
became increasingly apocalyptic as that year wore on. "The onrush of 
events toward the end of the year may see the world in flames," he wrote 
in February. "I guarantee you by the fall of 1982 there is going to be a 
judgment on the world," he added in a May broadcast. 
But when 1982 passed—and as presidential hopes beckoned—Rob-
ertson backpedaled from his doomsday predictions. In 1985 he told the 
Wall Street Journal that he no longer anticipated nuclear war or history's 
end in the near future. "There is no way I feel I'm going to help the Lord 
bring the world to an end," he added elsewhere; "God doesn't want to 
incinerate the world. . .  . [Armageddon] is an act of God Almighty that 
has nothing to do with human abilities whatsoever." In fact, already in 
his book The Secret Kingdom (1982), deep fissures had emerged in,Rob-
ertson's eschatology, as he both embraced the standard premillennial 
position and espoused a breathtakingly optimistic postmillennialism, 
which holds that conditions on earth will grow progressively better 
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through human effort. Through Christ, he proclaimed, we can enjoy the 
Millennium here and now: "There can be peace; there can be plenty; 
there can be freedom." Citing God's grant of dominion to his human 
creations in Genesis, Robertson urged Christians to "assume the author­
ity, power, and dominion that God intends for men to exercise over the 
rest of creation." Although this "dominion theology" eased Robertsons 
transition to a more politically viable stance, his 1988 presidential cam­
paign collapsed, as voters remained leery. He returned for a time to the 
more comfortable precincts of television evangelism only to re-emerge 
on the national scene as founder of the Christian Coalition, a conserva­
tive force in Republican Party politics in the 1990s. 
Even more interesting, because less obviously motivated by political 
ambition, was the eschatological evolution of Billy Graham, who burst 
on the revivalist scene in 1949 and remained influential into the 1990s. 
While his sermons and books did not heavily emphasize prophecy, Gra­
ham clearly embraced premillennialism. Christ's kingdom would arise 
from the ruins of earthly institutions, he proclaimed in World Aflame 
(1965): "Secular history..  . is doomed. . . . The whole world is hurtling 
toward a war greater than anything known before." Acknowledging his 
debt to Wilbur Smith, Graham speculated that the melting elements and 
"fervent heat" of 2 Peter referred to atomic fission, as God used nuclear 
means for earth's "purification." 
In the early 1980s, however, social issues loomed larger in Graham's 
sermons. In Moscow in 1982, he called the nuclear arms race "a moral 
and spiritual issue that must concern us all" and offered a five-point dis­
armament program culminating in a ban on all nuclear, biochemical, 
and laser weapons. To evangelicals unsettled by this new activist empha­
sis, he described himself as a man "in process" still exploring "the deeper 
. . . implications of [his] faith." Graham's Approaching Hoofbeats (1983) 
offers a fascinating picture of this evolution, as it alternates between so­
cial meliorism and classic premillennial fatalism. The hoofbeats of the 
title were those of the four horses of the Apocalypse, conventionally 
taken to represent famine, pestilence, war, and death. Discussing each 
horse in the allegorical fashion favored by theological liberals, Graham 
addressed such issues as Third World poverty, public-health problems, 
and overpopulation; drought and famine; environmental hazards; and 
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the arms race. Vividly evoking the horrors of modern war, he insisted 
that one cannot "sit silently by" in the face of the threat; the red horse 
symbolizing war "rides in warning to effect positive change." Jesus 
blessed the peacemakers, and Christians must work to slow the arms race 
and avoid nuclear holocaust. Graham even confessed that he should have 
done more over the years to promote peace and social justice. 
Yet the classic premillennial outlook shaped Approaching Hoofbeats 
as well. History's final moments ("perhaps just ahead"), Graham wrote, 
will see "nuclear conflagrations, biological holocausts and chemical apoc­
alypses rolling over the earth, bringing man to the edge of the precipice. 
History will £bottom out' in the battle of Armageddon." Struggling to 
resolve the book's eschatological schizophrenia, he argued that while 
prophecy is sure, God may delay foreordained events in response to hu­
man effort. Therefore, we must never lapse into passivity in the face of 
such issues as the nuclear threat. Still, whatever we do, "ultimate peace" 
will come only when Christ reigns on earth. 
In a nationally televised sermon in 1990, Graham, now in his early 
seventies, still vacillated between a premillennial orthodoxy and his 
newly awakened social conscience. Addressing the question "Are the Last 
Days Almost Here?" Graham insisted that they were: "We've become so 
technological and so wicked at the same time, that we have been on the 
verge of destroying our world. But. . . God is going to step in and not 
allow us to have an atomic war." How will God accomplish this purpose? 
He will "cleanse the earth byfire," just as he cleansed it by flood in Noah's 
day. The implication was not reassuring: Like the American troops who 
burned the Vietnam village in order to save it, God will destroy the earth 
to prevent wicked mankind from blowing it up. (Or, as one critic put it: 
"God so loved the world that he sent it World War III.*) 
At the same time, echoes of Graham's early-1980s' flirtation with so­
cial activism survived, at least vestigially, in this 1990 sermon. The arms 
race was "a spiritual and moral problem," he declared, and whatever hu-
manity's ultimate destiny, Christians must speak out against it. The con­
fusing message reflected the ambivalence of a man of conscience deeply 
rooted in one intellectual and theological tradition seeking to accommo­
date himself to another, very different one. Graham went perhaps as far 
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as one could in adapting premillennialism to an ethic of social engage­
ment with the nuclear threat and other issues of global import. 
PROPHETIC BELIEF AND NUCLEAR POLICY 
What influence, if any, did all these pronouncements by preachers and 
prophecy writers actually have on U.S. nuclear policy? The question 
is difficult, the evidence sketchy. Hal Lindsey insisted that the impact 
was direct and dramatic. He described earnest prophecy discussions 
with newspaper publishers, government officials, and military strategists. 
When he spoke at the American Air War College, "virtually the entire 
school turned out, including many officers accompanied by their wives." 
At the Pentagon, "hundreds . . . jamm[ed] the room" with more crowd­
ing outside. If we move beyond such self-serving anecdotal evidence, two 
lines of analysis suggest themselves: (1) the direct influence of premillen­
nialist dogma on policymakers and (2) the more amorphous role of end-
time belief in shaping public attitudes on issues of war and peace. 
The direct influence of prophecy belief on nuclear decision-making 
surfaced as an issue in the 1980s, when the eschatological interests of 
several Reagan-administration officials became known. Secretary of De­
fense Caspar Weinberger, asked about the subject in 1982, replied: "I 
have read the Book of Revelation and yes, I believe the world is going to 
end—by an act of God, I hope—but every day I think that time is run­
ning out." Secretary of the Interior-designate James Watt, questioned at 
his confirmation hearing about preserving the environment for future 
generations, forthrightly replied: "I do not know how many future gen­
erations we can count on before the Lord returns." Reagan's surgeon gen­
eral, C. Everett Koop, attended a 1971 prophecy conference in Jerusalem 
and reported on it for a leading premillennial journal. 
The most sensational scenario, of course, was the election of a presi­
dent who believed nuclear war inevitable and set out to help God bring 
it about. In Kingdoms in Conflict (1987), the former Nixon adviser 
turned born-again Christian Charles Colson offered a fictional account 
of just such a situation. Colson's "President Hopkins," an amalgam of 
Robertson and Falwell, spends his spare moments in the Oval Office 
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reading Ezekiel and phoning premillennialist faculty members at "Mid-
South Seminary." "I ran my campaign on the Bible, and I intend to run 
this nation on the Bible," he defiantly tells critics. Hopkins arranges the 
clandestine demolition of the Dome of the Rock, a Muslim sacred shrine 
on Jerusalem's Temple Mount, to make way for the prophesied rebuild­
ing of the Jewish Temple, despite (or because of) his theological advisers' 
warnings that this will set the stage for Armageddon. As Colson's account 
ends, the Christian Broadcasting Network is playing "The Battle Hymn 
of the Republic," while the Dome of the Rock crumbles into ruin. 
For a time in the 1980s, such a scenario seemed eerily plausible. 
Ronald Reagan's abiding interest in prophecy, dating from his youthful 
immersion in the theology of the Christian (Campbellite) Church, deep­
ened in the 1960s and 1970s through contacts with Billy Graham, the 
Hollywood minister Donn Moomaw, the born-again entertainer Pat 
Boone, and other prophecy believers. "Apparently never in history," 
then-governor Reagan told Christian Life magazine in 1968, "have so 
many of the prophecies come true in such a relatively short time." The 
Late Great Planet Earth strengthened Reagan's beliefs, and at a 1971 po­
litical dinner in Sacramento shortly after a leftist coup in Libya (a nation 
mentioned in Ezekiel as one of Israel's invaders), he observed somberly: 
"That's a sign that the day of Armageddon isn't far off. . . . Everything is 
falling into place. It can't be long now. Ezekiel says that fire and brim­
stone will be rained upon the enemies of God's people. That must mean 
that they'll be destroyed by nuclear weapons." 
During his White House years, while his wife, Nancy, communed 
with a San Francisco astrologer, Reagan's interests in prophecy contin­
ued. In 1983 he told a lobbyist for Israel: "You know, I turn back to your 
ancient prophets in the Old Testament and the signs foretelling Arma­
geddon, and I find myself wondering if we're the generation that's going 
to see that come about. I don't know if you ve noted any of those prophe­
cies lately, but believe me, they certainly describe the times we're going 
through." 
Asked about the subject by newsman Marvin Kalb in one of the 
1984 presidential debates with Walter Mondale (as Nancy groaned "Oh, 
no" off camera), Reagan acknowledged a "philosophical" interest in 
Armageddon and noted that "a number of theologians" believed "the 
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prophecies are coming together that portend that." But no one knew, he 
insisted (echoing Falwell and others), whether "Armageddon is 1000 
years away or the day after tomorrow/' In any event, Reagan concluded, 
he had "never seriously warned and said we must plan according to Ar­
mageddon." The issue faded in the late 1980s, as improved East-West 
relations eased fears of nuclear war. Reagan's successor, George Bush, 
while proclaiming himself a born-again Christian ("I'm a clear-cut 
affirmative to that"), did not, so far as one could tell, interest himself 
deeply in the arcana of Bible prophecy. 
But for a time in the mid-1980s, the politics of prophecy elicited 
intense public discussion. The New York Times worried that "Armaged­
donist" advisers might subtly influence nuclear policy, and one hundred 
prominent religious leaders urged Reagan to disavow the dogma that nu­
clear holocaust is foreordained in the Bible. Such beliefs could lead to 
"historical fatalism," they cautioned, and prove self-fulfilling. People for 
the American Way, a liberal lobbying group, warned of the "disdain for 
peace" implicit in a belief in Armageddon. The columnist Hunter S. 
Thompson wrote in 1987, "The president is very keen on the Book of 
Revelation. I love it for the sharp and terrible power of the language, but 
[Reagan] really believes it." After quoting a particularly lurid passage 
from Revelation, Hunter went on: "A lot of acid freaks have been taken 
away in white jackets with extremely long sleeves for seeing things like 
that, but the visions normally don't last for more than 72 hours. Reagan, 
though, has believed in the coming of these hideous Tour beasts with six 
wings and full of eyes within' for something like 72 years." 
Even some evangelicals expressed uneasiness about having a premil­
lennialist in the Oval Office. An editor of Sojourners, the voice of a small 
but articulate band of evangelicals espousing the liberal-activist social 
agenda, warned of the politicization of prophecy: "The popular link be­
tween nuclear weapons and portions of apocalyptic scripture began as an 
innocent, if biblically shaky, attempt by simple people of faith to make 
some sense out of a new and horrifying evil. . . . But the linking of £our' 
weapons and 'GodV plan became a part of presidential rhetoric, and 
frighteningly it has provided the one thing our military planners have 
always lacked—a religious justification for nuclear weapons." 
On the other hand, evangelicals active in New Right .politics denied 
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that prernillennial belief implied advocacy of nuclear war. Only a "small 
minority" of evangelicals, contended Harold Lindsell, a former editor of 
the evangelical journal Christianity Today, in 1984, opposed efforts to 
prevent nuclear holocaust as contrary to God's prophetic plan. Two of 
Falwell's associates, Ed Dobson and Ed Hindson, writing in the conser­
vative journal Policy Review in 1986, insisted on God's sole responsibility 
for prophetic fulfillment. "A lot of talk about speeding up the apocalypse 
would be stopped," they complained, "if more people understood that 
prophecy cannot be altered." But despite such reassurances, nagging 
worries persisted that apocalyptic belief might inspire some future presi­
dent or military leader to try, in Michael Barkuns fine phrase, "to make 
the inevitable, paradoxically, even more certain." 
And how did nearly half a century's worth of books, articles, cas­
settes, films, and sermons (on national television and in local churches) 
that found nuclear war foreshadowed in prophecy shape the larger cli­
mate of public opinion within which politicians and policymakers oper­
ated? Few studies of nuclear attitudes include religious belief as a 
variable, but the limited data available do pinpoint prophetic belief as an 
important, and neglected, factor. In a 1984 Yankelovich poll, for ex­
ample, 39 percent of the respondents said that biblical prophecies of 
earth's destruction by fire referred to nuclear war, with 25 percent con­
vinced that God would spare them personally from the coming holo­
caust. Danny Collum, the Sojourners editor mentioned above, recalled 
the large urban Southern Baptist church he attended as a youth in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s as full of "lay, self-taught 'prophecy experts' 
who regularly turned Sunday School classes into seminars on the 'signs' 
of our apocalyptic nuclear times." The pastor of a Dallas-area Baptist 
church observed in 1989 that many of his parishioners professed little 
concern about the nuclear threat, either because they believed that God 
would never permit it, or that if it did come, it would be as "part of God s 
sovereign plan which cannot be altered." 
Although Falwell's spokesmen Dobson and Hindson, writing in Pol­
icy Review, found no nuclear policy significance in premillennialism, the 
insistence of countless postwar prophecy writers on the futility of efforts 
to limit the arms race or to ease Cold War tensions had obvious policy 
implications. As Robert Glenn Gromacki declared flatly in Are These the 
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Last Days? (1970), disarmament "will never be achieved this side of the 
millennium.55 Charles R. Taylor in The Destiny of America (1972) found 
some antinuclear campaigners "very subversive55 and under Communist 
influence. "Arms Control Agreements Always Fail,55 proclaimed Clifford 
Wilson and John Weldon in 1980s: Decade of Shock (1978), as negotia­
tions on the ill-fated SALT II treaty crept forward. In The Late Great 
Planet Earth, Lindsey warned that Antichrist would delude the world 
with promises of peace. The prophetic scriptures, he told Eternity maga­
zine in 1977, underscored the need for "a strong [U.S.] military posture55 
and the readiness to use its military might. 
With the politicization of Fundamentalism in the 1980s, such pro­
nouncements increased. Through television and mass-market paper­
backs, prophecy writers commented on nuclear policy issues from a 
conservative, promilitary perspective. Earlier writers had rejected official 
propaganda portraying the nations growing nuclear arsenal as a guaran­
tor of peace and had stressed that America would not escape the end-
time holocaust. These themes did not wholly disappear in the 1980s, but 
many writers, increasingly mobilized into the ranks of the New Right, 
now treated Gods prophetic plan and Reagan's military buildup as indis­
tinguishable. Lindsey's 1981 best-seller, The 1980s: Countdown to Arma­
geddon, was even more blatantly political than his earlier works. Rabidly 
nationalistic and virulently anti-Soviet (with charts showing the Rus­
sians5 alleged nuclear superiority), Countdown insisted that the Bible 
"supports building a powerful military force,55 including more nuclear 
missiles, and urged readers to make themselves heard politically. A book 
more in tune with the beefed-up military spending and anti-Soviet rhet­
oric of the early Reagan presidency would be hard to imagine. 
A strident chorus of 1980s writers—characterized by one critic as 
"the court prophets55—supported the weapons buildup and dismissed 
peace activism as at best "superficial window dressing55 masking history's 
inexorable march to Armageddon. Falwell in 1983 lashed out at the 
nuclear-weapons freeze campaign movement as a "suicidal effort to force 
our country into . . . unilateral disarmament55 and assure Communism's 
triumph. James Robison, the premillennialist television preacher who 
delivered an invocation at the 1984 Republican National Conven­
tion, proclaimed: "Any teaching of peace prior to [Christ's] return is 
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heresy. . . . It's against the Word of God; its Antichrist." In a 1985 novel 
about the end times, Antichrist wins a world following by espousing nu­
clear disarmament. 
Even prophecy writer Harold Lindsell, the former editor of Chris­
tianity Today, while denying in his 1984 book that prophecy believers 
pined for nuclear war and further insisting that all "reasonable men, in­
cluding Christians, should try to prevent any use of nuclear bombs . . . 
and wars of any kind," undercut this apparently forthright statement by 
insisting on the inevitability of end-time wars as "part of God's plan." 
Belying his conciliatory tone, Lindsell denounced peace activists for 
"helping the enemy," attacked the freeze campaign as KGB-inspired, im­
plicitly endorsed Reagan's "Star Wars" proposal, and approvingly cited 
Edward Teller's debunking of the "myths" about the devastating effects 
of nuclear war. 
Unquestionably this wave of blatantly political commentary on nu­
clear issues by prophecy popularizers helped shape the political culture, 
as millions of Americans absorbed supposedly Bible-based teachings pro­
claiming history's imminent and catastrophic end. As Robert Jewett of 
Garrett Theological Seminary observed in 1984, Reagan's musings on 
prophecy, like his reflections on other matters, were "uncannily close to 
the public pulse." Despite some interpreters' efforts to distinguish nu­
clear war from the end-time events foretold in Revelation, such subtleties 
escaped many believers, who, as the 1984 Yankelovich survey revealed, 
found "Armageddon" and "World War III" essentially indistinguishable. 
Many cultural observers outside the premillennial camp expressed fears 
that Armageddon theology would hasten the holocaust its proponents 
saw as preordained. As a British churchman put it, "One rather frighten­
ing by-product of this process of [prophetic] interpretation is that it is 
so easy to create the very situation which is being described, so that the 
interpretation . . . brings about its own fulfillment." 
My own sense is that the connection between grassroots prophecy 
belief and nuclear-weapons policy, while real, was subterranean and indi­
rect. Few post-1945 believers in prophecy consciously sought to bring 
on Armageddon as quickly as possible. Rather, convinced that the Bible 
foretells the end, and secure in the knowledge that believers will be 
spared, they tended toward passive acquiescence in the nuclear arms race 
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and the Cold War. As Stephen O'Leary, a specialist in apocalyptic rheto­
ric at the University of Southern California, has argued, "The real issue 
is not. . . whether some born-again believer is going to get his hands on 
the button that could destroy all of us, but on the way this interpretation 
of end-time prophecy conditions all our expectations . . . , [making nu­
clear war seem] a perverse fulfillment of divine destiny." The assimilation 
of nuclear holocaust into the comfortably familiar premillennial sce­
nario, agreed Eddie F. Carder, a young Southern Baptist minister critical 
of the prophetic views prevalent in his denomination, "encourage [s] so­
cial and political complacency." It "may lead to exciting preaching, 
attract a large following, and even pad the prophets pocketbook," 
he concluded in 1989, but it "falls far short of responsible biblical 
interpretation." 
One might argue that the prophecy popularizers, in compelling 
some readers who were not overtly political to confront the reality of 
nuclear war, unwittingly served the antinuclear cause. But this effect 
seems to have been at best minor and peripheral. Indeed, not only pre­
millennialisms theology, but also its vocabulary, was more anesthetizing 
than energizing. In contrast to the rhetorical strategies of antinuclear ac­
tivists, who translated the abstract calculus of nuclear war into gripping 
accounts of emotional trauma, radiation's medical effects, and the devas­
tation a missile attack would bring to specific cities, the "nuclear war" of 
the prophecy writers had, with rare exceptions, little tangible reality or 
affective power. Although such writers spoke of billions killed, of cities 
obliterated, of oceans poisoned, of "a bloodbath of astounding propor­
tions," their prose remained curiously inert. One reacts to it much as one 
responds to King Saul's smiting of the Amalekites recorded in 1 Samuel. 
Did the Amalekites bleed and moan? Did Amalekite children cry for 
their mothers? 
The seventeenth-century biblical language retained by many proph­
ecy writers—armies "perish"; God "slays" or "chastises" his enemies— 
further emasculated the prose. The distancing from reality built into the 
language of nuclear strategists, noted by Robert Jay Lifton and others, 
has its counterpart in the prophetic literature. The writers' theology may 
insist on the terrible literalness of these "inerrant" prophecies, but the 
rhetoric is mythic, a fairy tale domesticated through many tellings. The 
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"billions of dead" are not flesh-and-blood human beings with families, 
hopes, and aspirations; they are eschatological zombies, signposts mark­
ing another stage in a sequence of familiar events. 
Premillennialism's conceptual structure, as well as its rhetoric, en­
couraged skepticism toward efforts to reduce U.S.-Soviet nuclear compe­
tition. Nationsare central to biblical prophecy. Of the Bible's more than 
480 references to "nation" and "nations," some 70 occur in the books of 
Daniel, Ezekiel, and Revelation. During the Tribulation, Antichrist rules 
"all. . . nations." At Armageddon, where "the kings of the earth and of 
the whole world" gather, Jesus Christ returns "to smite the nations; and 
. . . rule them with a rod of iron." In the Millennium, Christ governs 
"all people, nations, and languages." In the prophecies, in short, nations 
remain intact to the end of history—and beyond. 
Discussion of "the nations" pervaded the writings of John Darby, the 
nineteenth-century English evangelist and biblical scholar who formu­
lated the scheme of prophetic interpretation embraced by many contem­
porary American prophecy believers. The fate of the nations also looms 
large in the work of the American Cyrus Scofield, who popularized Dar-
by's scheme in his preaching and writings, including the popular Scofield 
Reference Bible, first published in 1909. 
Post-1945 prophecy popularizers followed the nationalistic lead of 
Darby and Scofield. Doug Clark, in Shockwaves of Armageddon, citing 
such scriptures as Romans 13:1 ("the powers that be are ordained of 
God"), argued that nations—and the wars between them—are destined 
to survive to the end of history. And in the grammar of prernillennialism, 
all forms of political organization beyond the national level are associated 
with Antichrist, and thus are deeply suspect. The evangelist Hilton 
Sutton drew laughter and applause in a 1988 appearance in Madison, 
Wisconsin, when he jeered at "the United Nothing in New York." Pre­
millennial belief emphasizes the centrality of national power calculations 
in discussions of nuclear policy; encourages the view that nuclear-
weapons competition among nations is a natural expression of the divine 
order of things; and deepens suspicions of any individual, organization, 
or movement seeking to address the issue from a supranational or 
global perspective. 
How many U.S. premillennialists accepted the long series of govern­
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mental decisions that pushed the nuclear arms race to new levels of men­
ace, in the belief that the entire process was inevitable? How many did 
not become involved in the late-1940s effort for international atomic-
energy control, the test ban movement of the 1950s, or the nuclear-
weapons freeze campaign of the early 1980s, in the conviction that such 
efforts were doomed to failure and even ran counter to God's plan for 
mankind? If national conflicts must go on to the end of time, and if 
nuclear cataclysm awaits us at the last turning of history's long path, then 
are not efforts to deviate from that course pointless and perhaps even 
impious? Believers' energies, the logic of premillennialism makes clear, 
are better spent in winning souls for Christ than in trying to shape 
world events. 
Certainly it would be unwise to offer sweeping generalizations about 
all premillennialists, or to posit a simple cause-and-effect relationship be­
tween this belief system and an automatic acceptance of the inevitability 
of "wars and rumors of wars"—up to and including nuclear holocaust. 
Explaining premillennialism to Policy Review readers in 1986, FalwelPs 
aides argued that only a "relatively small group" of "extreme fundamen­
talists" had "given up on the world" because of their eschatology and 
become "complacent about evils such as nuclear proliferation." How 
could Falwell support Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, they asked, 
if he thought no human effort could influence our nuclear fate? Yet the 
implications of premillennial doctrine, as well as the empirical evidence 
of public-opinion data and a mass of popular writing, suggests that the 
links between premillennialism and nuclear attitudes were stronger, and 
more unsettling, than these polemicists wished to concede. 
Gordon Kaufman of Harvard Divinity School spoke to this issue in 
his 1982 presidential address to the American Academy of Religion. 
To find in prophecy the message that nuclear holocaust represents "the 
ultimate expression of God's sovereignty over history," he said, "is not 
only an ultimate evasion of our responsibility as human beings; it is de­
monically to invoke the divine will as a justification for that very eva­
sion." To teach that nuclear cataclysm is inevitable (or, conversely, 
impossible because God would not permit it), he went on, means "cut­
ting the nerve of human responsibility." In an age of a nuclear menace 
and of environmental hazards that almost defy comprehension, he 
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concluded, "traditional images of divine providential care have become 
not only outmoded, they have become misleading and dangerous, and 
must be thoroughly reworked." 
A similar perspective informed Blessed Assurance, A. G. Mojtabai's 
1986 report on nuclear attitudes in Amarillo, home of the Pantex Corpo­
ration, a hydrogen-bomb assembly plant. Mojtabai quickly discovered 
that the worldview of Pantex workers and Amarillans generally was in­
separable from their Fundamentalist religious beliefs—an interpenetra­
tion of the mundane and the sacred summed up in an Amarillo sign: 
JESUS CHRIST IS KING OF KINGS 
ALTERNATORS STARTED 
Time and again in her interviews she found variations on a single 
core belief: God controls history; nuclear war, if it occurs, will not result 
from human action or inaction, but from God's prophetic plan. And, of 
course, whatever terrors lie ahead, believers will be spared. As one resi­
dent put it, "There's a possibility of nuclear war, but if it comes, its be­
cause God allowed it. I believe as a Christian I'm ready to go home at 
any time—the world stinks." The Rev. Charles Jones, pastor of Ama­
rillos 2,600-member Second Baptist Church, echoed the point: "Some 
day we may blow ourselves up with all the bombs. . . . But I still believe 
God's going to be in control. . .  . If He chooses to use nuclear war, then 
who am I to argue with that?" In complex and subtle ways, Mojtabai 
came to realize, premillennial doctrine enabled men and women abetting 
the nuclear arms race in the most direct way imaginable to distance 
themselves emotionally from the implications of their work. In this re­
spect, Amarillo represented in microcosm vast stretches of the American 
religious and cultural landscape. As Mojtabai concluded: "The danger is 
not limited to possible actions by individuals in government or foreign 
policy positions, or working in nuclear weapons plants and launch sites, 
who might consider themselves instruments of Providence and decide to 
help the millennium along. It lurks everywhere, and deeply, in the habits 
of mind and heart of innumerable ordinary citizens who vote for those 
who help make policy." 
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Passivity, whatever its theological underpinnings, is also a political 
stance. Insofar as prophecy belief influenced citizens to avoid confront­
ing nuclear issues in the Cold War era, it had direct political impli-
cations—implications that became explicit in the 1980s. "As the Fun­
damentalists moved into the partisan political arena," Danny Collum of 
Sojourners magazine noted in 1986, "they brought their theories about 
nuclear war and the endtime along with them"—theories that saw a cer­
tain inevitability to the military buildup and heightening of Cold War 
tension in the early Reagan era. In these years the premillennial eschatol­
ogy that had saturated American religious culture for decades converged 
with a larger rightward thrust in the national political life in a synergistic 
process that, for a time at least, transformed the political landscape. 
But has not Armageddon become passe? With the apparent end of 
the Cold War as the 1990s began, global nuclear conflict seemed a night­
mare from which the world had blessedly awakened. Certainly the con­
vulsive changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in these years 
had profound implications for prophecy belief. But given its durability 
and its exponents' resourcefulness in adapting their dramas to shifting 
events—not to mention the continued risk of nuclear confrontations, 
particularly in the volatile (and prophetically significant) Middle East— 
this theme seemed likely to continue to figure prominently among those 
invoked by prophecy writers in documenting humankind's bleak pros­
pects. Like frugal homemakers, they had learned over the centuries to 
recycle their basic themes. The genre grows by accretion, rarely abandon­
ing a theme, but simply adding new ones as world conditions change. 
Certainly a motif as powerful as the melting of the earth with fervent 
heat is unlikely to vanish entirely from the repertoire of prophetic 
themes. Should history take a more menacing turn (and who would con­
fidently predict that it will not?), premillennialist images of a prophesied 
cataclysm will be available to make sense of events and offer reassurance 
to the redeemed, as men and women peer into the mists of an opaque 
and frightening future. 

I  V

THE REAGAN ERA 
The Freeze Campaign and After 

Athe time, the wave of nu­clear fear that swept Amer­ica in the early 1980s 
seemed far from unreasonable. 
The nuclear arms control process 
(never especially reassuring) had 
bogged down during the Carter 
years, and the Reagan White 
House showed no haste to resume 
them. Instead, a series of belliger­
ent pronouncements emanated 
from Reagan and top administra­
tion officials, and Washington 
once again warned citizens to pre­
pare for nuclear war by cooperat­
ing in an elaborate plan of "crisis 
relocation" from urban centers to 
small towns, to be implemented in 
times of international crisis. 
In a now familiar pattern, 
this fear led to a surge of antinuclear 
activism. Beginning in wintry 
New England town meetings, the 
nuclear-weapons freeze campaign 
peaked in 1982—83. Once again, 
nuclear themes and images per­
vaded the media and the culture, 
from poetry to pop music to tele­
vision specials. By mid-decade, 
however, thanks in part to Rea-
gan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" 
speech and in part to the general 
easing of Cold War tensions re­
lated to political changes in Russia, 
nuclear fear was in sharp decline. 
As I noted earlier, these devel­
opments coincided with my own 
research on the atomic bomb's ini­
tial cultural impact and with the 
publication of By the Bomb's Early 
Light I followed the nuclear-freeze 
campaign closely, participated in 
it, and commented on it. The brief 
entries in part 4 include reviews 
and journalistic pieces from this pe­
riod that offer historical perspective 
on the freeze campaign, Reagan's 
"Star Wars" campaign, and the cam­
pus mood as activism faded. 
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THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION IN 
THE 1940S AND THE 1980S 
In a curious way, America's nuclear history in the early 1980s recapitulated early postwar patterns of opinion manipulation. While the Truman administration and 
the media had downplayed the bombs' deadly aftereffects, 
alarmed atomic scientists and their supporters had cam­
paigned for the Acheson-Lilienthal international-control 
plan by portraying the horrors of atomic war in the most 
graphic terms conceivable. 
In both cases, the manipulative techniques failed. De­
spite official censorship, the reality of radiation poisoning 
quickly became known. As for the fear campaign of the 
international-control activists, its principal effect, ironically, 
was probably to stimulate support for the Truman adminis­
trations frantic stockpiling of nuclear weapons in a desperate 
drive to "keep ahead of the Russians." 
These parallels struck me as worth noting, and I did so 
in the two pieces reprinted below. The first, adapted from a 
brief review in the Fall 1985 issue ofPacificAffairs, compares 
Washington's efforts to manipulate public opinion in 1945 
with similar deceptions by the Reagan administration. 
The second, adapted from an article in the January 1986 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, recounts the ironic early 
history of activists' scare tactics as a way of critiquing the 
nuclear-freeze advocates who were terrifying audiences with 
blood-chilling images of global thermonuclear war. The im­
mediate impetus for this essay was a talk given by the Austra­
lian pediatrician and nuclear-freeze activist Helen Caldicott 
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to a large audience at the University of Wisconsin Medical 
School. Describing how she had cradled dying children in 
her arms, she mourned in advance the boys and girls who 
would die horribly in a nuclear war. Representing the nu­
clear arms race metaphorically as a deadly global epidemic, 
she showed slides of the inexorable spread of the "epidemic" 
that strongly suggested that the "patient" (humanity itself) 
had sc3.nt hope of survival. Though powerful, Caldicott's 
presentation left me skeptical, wondering about the utility 
of terror as a motivator for social action. 
My ambivalent reaction to Caldicott's talk probably also 
reflected boyhood memories of lurid sermons on the tor­
ments of hell. These pious harangues had usually achieved 
their desired immediate result as tearful sinners rushed for­
ward to seek salvation, but they had also left an aftertaste of 
cynicism and resentment. The manipulation of nuclear ter­
ror, I suspected, could prove similarly counterproductive. 
A HISTORICAL VIEW OF OFFICIAL DECEPTION 
From August 6, 1945, onward, the Truman administration sought to 
soothe the stomach-churning fear of the atomic future that the presi­
dent s announcement had unleashed. In a calculated effort to shape the 
climate of public opinion, journalists close to the administration, like 
William L. Laurence of the New York Times, produced stories that dram­
atized the inspiring story of the Manhattan Project, pictured the shim­
mering peacetime promise of atomic energy, and portrayed the atomic 
bomb as the only alternative to a costly land invasion of Japan. 
Washington also sought, with initial success, to control and sanitize 
the information that reached the American people about the effects of 
the bomb on the men, women, and children of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
This effort is illuminated by Wilfred Burchett's Shadows of Hiroshima 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1983), the final book of a prolific left-wing 
Australian journalist who died in 1983. Though heavily propagandistic 
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in places, Shadows of Hiroshima has an important story to tell. Covering 
the Pacific war in 1945 for the London Daily Express, Burchett arrived 
in Tokyo shortly after the Japanese surrender and at once made his way 
to Hiroshima, which he reached on September 3, 1945. His arrival co­
incided with that of the first American reporters, a hand-picked group 
flown directly from Washington and carefully chaperoned by U.S. Occu­
pation officials. Their leader was William L. Laurence, the Manhattan 
Project's official reporter—and unofficial public-relations mouthpiece. 
In Hiroshima, Burchett observed the widespread incidence of radia­
tion disease, though he did not know what it was. In a long dispatch 
published in the Daily Express on September 5, he described an "atomic 
plague" from which thousands of people uninjured in the blast itself were 
falling sick and dying. Returning to Tokyo on September 7, Burchett 
discovered that a news briefing had been called by Occupation officials 
to deny his story. When he reported his direct observations, the briefing 
officer told him: "I'm afraid you've fallen victim to Japanese propa­
ganda." Whisked off to a hospital for "observation," he found on his 
release that his press credentials had been revoked and that his camera— 
containing a full roll of film from Hiroshima—and the original draft of 
his Daily Express story were missing. On September 12 and 13, under 
Laurence's prestigious byline, the New York Times carried two long stories 
reporting the official U.S. government position. The stories of radiation 
sickness coming out of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Laurence insisted, were 
nothing but "Jap propaganda." 
The early chapters of Shadows of Hiroshima, in which Burchett re­
counts these events of 1945, should be required reading for anyone seek­
ing to understand the long history of deception and misinformation in 
Washington's treatment of the issues of radiation disease and radioactive 
fallout. The official effort to discredit Burchett s Hiroshima report in 
September 1945 in fact prefigured a pattern that would continue 
through the Bikini tests of 1946, the Eniwetok tests of 1954, a whole 
series of tests in the American Southwest, and decades of blandly opti­
mistic civil-defense pronouncements ranging from Richard GerstelPs 
grotesquely upbeat How to Survive an Atomic Bomb of 1950 to the assur­
ances of the Reagan-era Pentagon official T K. Jones that, "with enough 
shovels we'll all make it" through a nuclear war. 
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A HISTORICAL VIEW OF SCARE TACTICS 
To those conversant with the history of Americas nuclear culture in the 
early postwar years, the role of fear in the contemporary antinuclear 
movement induces a strong sense of deja vu. In fact, tactics very similar 
to those of Helen Caldicott and other present-day activists figured prom­
inently in the strategy of their counterparts of forty years ago. These 
techniques gave rise to the same kinds of doubts and discussions about 
their efficacy four decades ago that we are witnessing again in the 1980s. 
From the earliest moments of the atomic age, a spontaneous and 
well-justified surge of fear swept over the United States. The atomic sci­
entists and other activists who rallied around the 1946 Acheson-
Lilienthal plan for the international control of atomic energy quickly 
concluded that this gut reaction, rooted in the primal instinct of self-
preservation, could be a potent instrument of political action. In 1946 
and 1947, the politicization of terror became a major shaping force in 
American culture. In lectures, radio programs, and articles in such mass 
magazines as Life and Collier's, the American people were told of the hor­
rors of atomic war in the most vivid imaginable terms. 
"Mist of Death over New York," a 1947 Reader's Digest article, 
graphically portrayed an atomic explosion that spews poisonous radioac­
tivity over New York City and its environs. "Within six weeks," noted 
the article, "389,101 New Yorkers were dead or missing," including loot­
ers shot by the National Guard, persons who drowned when they threw 
themselves into the river, and thousands crushed as they fled the city "in 
the worst panic known in all human history." In May 1947, seeking the 
assistance of J. Robert Oppenheimer on a similar article, a Reader's Digest 
editor wrote: "I think that we are both agreed that a sense of fear is prob­
ably necessary to break public apathy. I would therefore like to keep the 
Radioactive Warfare sequence as dramatic or sensational as I possibly 
can, to the utmost limit of underlying facts which are true or which could 
be true." 
As we have seen, another of these fear-inducing imaginings of atomic 
war, "The 36-Hour War," was published in Life in November 1945, il­
lustrated with forbiddingly realistic drawings, including one of Manhat­
tan Island as a rubble-strewn wasteland. 
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The public appeals of the organized scientists5 movement initially 
rested almost wholly on fear. In any future international crisis, wrote 
W. A. Higinbotham of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in 
a 1946 New York Times Magazine article, "you will be haunted by the 
overpowering knowledge that if war is declared, you, your house, or your 
business may disappear in the next second." A January 1946 Collier's ar­
ticle by the chemist Harold C. Urey, a Nobel Prize winner from the Uni­
versity of Chicago, began candidly: "I write this to frighten you. I'm a 
frightened man, myself. All the scientists I know are frightened—fright-
ened for their lives—and frightened for your life." 
In this pre-television era many radio programs, often scripted with 
the cooperation of such activist groups as the FAS or the Atomic Scien­
tists of Chicago (ASC), presented harrowing accounts of the aftermath 
of atomic war. One such program aired by a Chicago station early in 
1946 described in vivid detail the effects of an atomic attack on Chicago 
and concluded: "No attempt at identification of bodies or burial ever 
took place. Chicago was simply closed, and the troops did not allow any­
one to return." 
This effort to intensify and prolong the spontaneous post-Hiroshima 
wave of atomic fear did not occur by chance. It arose from a deliberate 
calculation by advocates of the international control of atomic energy: 
From mass fear would spring a mass demand for the abolition of atomic 
weapons. As the Catholic journal Commonweal put it, "Fear may do 
what sheer morality could never do." If mankind survived, this editorial 
continued, "not conscience but the most basic of instincts will probably 
get the credit." 
Acting on this belief, activists candidly discussed the practicalities of 
their fear campaign. As one Manhattan Project veteran commented in 
November 1945, only "the preaching of doom" could rally public opin­
ion behind the outlawing of atomic weapons. The office manager for the 
Atomic Scientists of Chicago underscored this message in her correspon­
dence with the ASC's public speakers. "Scare them a little, and inciden­
tally give them some scientific background," she told one. 
Although the atomic scientists consciously manipulated the public's 
fears, they—like the activists of the 1980s—did so from the highest mo­
tives. The frightening speeches, articles, and radio broadcasts invariably 
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ended with a call for support for what the activists saw as the sole alterna­
tive to ultimate human extinction—the international control of atomic 
energy. Certain that the remedies they proposed offered the only hope, 
these activists readily concluded that any measures necessary to rouse 
public support for those remedies were justified. 
Not everyone agreed that terrifying people was the best way to stir 
them to action. The Danish physicist Niels Bohr criticized the fear cam­
paign and urged a more upbeat emphasis on the potential of human 
cooperation in the atomic age. The atomic prospect did indeed look 
dark, observed the New York minister Harry Emerson Fosdick in a post-
Hiroshima radio sermon, "but no man or nation was ever yet frightened 
into real brotherhood or peace." 
Others warned that the ironic ultimate effect of the politically or­
chestrated campaign of fear might be deadened sensibility and apathy. 
"The louder they shout to us, the more inaudible their voices become," 
observed the historian and cultural critic Lewis Mumford in 1946. 
While the Atomic Energy Commission chairman David E. Lilien­
thal had tactical reasons to dwell on the upbeat side of the atomic pros­
pect, he did offer a telling critique of the fearmongers. For two years, 
Lilienthal observed in the summer of 1947, U.S. citizens had been "fed 
a publicity diet of almost nothing else but horror stories." He went on 
to caution: "Scaring the daylights out of everyone so no one can think, 
inducing hysteria and unreasoning fear . .  . is not going to get us any­
where. . . . Fear is an unreliable ally; it can never be depended upon to 
produce good." 
Such apprehensions were abundantly borne out. In January 1950, a 
few months after the first Russian A-bomb test, President Truman gave 
a green light to Edward Teller's hydrogen-bomb project, and the pub­
lic overwhelmingly rallied behind that decision. As the terrible simplifi­
cations of Cold War thinking took hold, most Americans concluded 
that safety lay in possessing more and bigger nuclear weapons than any­
one else. 
The rush to embrace the hydrogen bomb was closely linked to the 
earlier fear campaign of the atomic scientists and the international-
control activists. Eugene Rabinowitch recognized this point in a bleak 
editorial in the January 1951 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. From the 
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ominous perspective offered by the H-bomb project, "the clamor for the 
use of atomic weapons in Korea," and mounting evidence that a full-
scale nuclear arms race was under way, Rabinowitch looked back on the 
scientists' movement and its important role in shaping public attitudes 
in the immediate postwar period. He concluded that the fear-based 
international-control campaign, in which he himself had figured promi­
nently, had been worse than a failure: It had inadvertently encouraged 
the very reliance on atomic weapons the scientists had hoped to avoid. 
The scientists' insistence on the horrifying destructiveness of the atomic 
bomb had left the American people "half-educated." They had learned 
the lesson of the bomb's terrifying power but not the lesson that diplo­
macy and negotiations offered the best means of escaping the terror. The 
net effect was "despair and confusion." "While trying to frighten men 
into rationality," Rabinowitch concluded, "scientists have frightened 
many into abject fear or blind hatred." 
As early as 1947, exhausted by their endless rounds of speaking and 
writing and demoralized by the failure of the international-control effort, 
many activist scientists began drifting away from political engagement. 
Although the scientists' movements varied institutional expressions— 
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the FAS, and so forth—remained 
important, the movement's influence over public opinion and the media 
was largely gone by 1950. 
This loss of influence had external causes, of course, including the 
policies pursued by the Soviet Union and the anti-Communist hysteria 
that engulfed the United States in the early Cold War years. But it was 
also linked to the scientists' somewhat naive political program and fear-
based tactics. The collapse of the scientists' movement as a political force 
adds a dimension of irony to the skill and effectiveness with which, for a 
time, scientists had wielded their most potent and reliable instrument of 
persuasion: fear. 
For years prior to 1945, fear had been a potent rhetorical theme 
in American political life. Franklin Roosevelt told Americans in 1933 
that they had nothing to fear but fear itself, and in January 1941 he 
listed "freedom from fear" as one of the Four Freedoms for which 
America stood. Yet within a few years, a new and terrible fear of unfath­
omable magnitude had insinuated itself into American culture and 
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consciousness. Activist scientists deliberately intensified this fear in pur­
suit of goals they wholeheartedly believed in. If only the reality of atomic 
destruction could be made vivid enough, they reasoned, surely America 
would rise up and demand that the nation's leaders act to eliminate the 
danger! 
Many thousands of Americans responded in good faith to the scien­
tists' challenge. They debated atomic issues, studied the Acheson-
Lilienthal report, and wrote their congressmen and their newspaper edi­
tors. What was the result? Except for the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 
which created the appearance of civilian control of atomic-energy mat­
ters on the domestic front, practically nothing. The international-control 
movement disintegrated, and the nuclear arms race began. 
Looking back, it seems clear that scientists' reliance on rousing the 
public's fears of atomic war to an ever higher pitch, not the specific poli­
cies they advocated, comprises the major long-term significance of their 
movement. In one of the great ironies of the early atomic age, the spiral­
ing arms race and the hysterical anti-Soviet mood of the early Cold 
War era—developments that most activist scientists bitterly deplored— 
were rooted in the very terror that they had themselves so assiduously 
cultivated. 
The fear strategy of early postwar activists, despite its failure, set a 
precedent for all later antinuclear crusades. As a new generation of activ­
ists once again debated these troubling issues, one lesson of the 1945-50 
experience seemed clear: Those who deliberately set out to exacerbate 
nuclear fear should be aware not only of the power but also of the volatil­
ity of the emotions they are arousing. Once fear is unleashed, the direc­
tion it will take is wholly unpredictable. Certainly the early activists 
learned—to their regret—that it is easier to terrify the public than it is 
to channel that terror into sustained, constructive political action. 
II

STAR WARS 
The Cultural Implications of Reagan's 
Strategic Defense Initiative 
n March 23, 1983, amid mounting public fears of nu­
clear war and a nuclear-freeze campaign that seemed 
• to be gathering momentum, President Ronald Reagan 
offered a brilliantly crafted response. In a dramatic television 
address that caught even top Pentagon strategists off guard, 
Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a 
multibillion-dollar military project to develop and deploy 
an impenetrable shield against nuclear missiles. Quickly 
dubbed "Star Wars" by the media and the public, Reagan's 
plan envisioned the use of incredibly complex computer 
technology to pinpoint incoming missiles, and futuristic la­
ser weaponry to destroy them. 
SDI eventually collapsed, or at least mutated into some­
thing considerably less grandiose, a victim of reduced Cold 
War tensions and of its own science-fiction aspects. For 
several years in the mid-1980s, however, it loomed large in 
public discourse—and in the military budget. As this fasci­
nating episode unfolded, I was again struck (as I had been 
during the nuclear-freeze campaign) by parallels to earlier 
periods of America's nuclear history. In this essay, first pub­
lished in the Nation magazine on January 10, 1987, I re­
flected on the cultural sources and ramifications of Star 
Wars, moving in a fairly freewheeling way from antebellum 
Transcendentalism to contemporary children's games. 
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SINCE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S memorable Star Wars address of March 1983, 
the technological feasibility of the Strategic Defense Initiative has been 
debated exhaustively. By contrast, its cultural and psychological implica­
tions have been largely ignored. This is particularly surprising because it 
is government-sponsored efforts to defend the civilian population against 
nuclear attack, rather than the buildup of offensive weapons, that have 
historically proved most unsettling to Americans and have left: the deep­
est mark on our culture. 
Ask any audience of Americans over thirty years of age about their 
nuclear memories, and what invariably come tumbling out—apart, 
perhaps, from the primal event, Hiroshima, and the frightening Cuban 
Missile Crisis—are recollections of civil defense: sirens, fallout shelters, 
CONELRAD radio alerts, crouching under schoolroom desks. These are 
the experiences evoked in the documentary film Atomic Cafe and in par­
tially autobiographical novels like Tim O'Briens The Nuclear Age. Now 
the government has embarked on the ultimate civil-defense project: Star 
Wars. The sky itself is to be converted into one vast schoolroom desk 
under which we will collectively huddle while Teacher hurls erasers at 
the marauding invaders. 
What may be the cultural and psychological effects of this latest 
strategy? It is always risky to identify a single causal factor—even one as 
protean as SDI—in explaining or predicting cultural change. Neverthe­
less, a number of cultural developments may reasonably be anticipated 
if SDI research proceeds along its multibillion-dollar course and if some 
form of missile defense shield is eventually deployed. My speculation is 
somewhat disciplined by my research on the cultural impact of the 
atomic bomb in the first few years after World War II. 
In the post-Hiroshima era, the atomic-bomb motif saturated Ameri­
can mass culture, from country music and cereal giveaways (Kix cereals 
"Atomic 'Bomb' Ring" was especially popular) to jewelry design and 
skimpy bathing suits (the bikini). We may now expect all manner of 
SDI-derived images, concepts, and artifacts to show up in movies, televi­
sion shows, and advertisements, and on the shelves of the neighborhood 
Toys "R" Us and Kmart. 
One toy manufacturer has already introduced "Lazer Tag: The Game 
Star Wars 111 
That Moves with the Speed of Light." Along with alluring drawings of 
kids in Buck Rogers—style protective gear, the ads offer an enticing pros­
pect:. "Welcome to the age of Lazer Tag. Discover the exhilaration of one-
on-one competition at the speed of light. Or a galactic free-for-all, where 
it's every man, woman and child for himself." A complete Lazer Tag set 
for two players, with all accessories, costs $316. 
Such evidence can be accumulated with ease; the challenge is to as­
sess its significance. The relationship between mass-culture ephemera 
and the shaping of popular attitudes toward public policy issues is highly 
complex. In the case of SDI, President Reagan's 1983 speech was pre­
ceded by a vogue for Star Wars-type video arcade games and, of course, 
by George Lucas's 1977 hit movie, Star Wars, which featured laser weap­
ons and other futuristic forms of intergalactic ordnance. Many cultural 
observers have plausibly suggested that the video games and movies 
helped condition the public, especially the young, to imagine nuclear 
war as a high-tech game played on computers, with minimal human risk 
and involvement. 
But the video games and the movies did not emerge from a void. 
Before the signing of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, there was 
extensive research on exotic antimissile technologies, and at least some 
of that research filtered into popular awareness. As early as 1962, General 
Curtis LeMay spoke publicly of "directed energy weapons" that would 
"strike with the speed of light" to destroy incoming missiles. 
Rummaging even further back in our collective cultural memory, we 
find not only the Ur-hero Buck Rogers but the 1940 Warner Brothers' 
movie Murder in the Air, to which historian Stephen L. Vaughn has called 
our attention. This features a proto-SDI secret weapon called the Inertia 
Projector, whose mysterious rays can strike down incoming enemy air­
craft from miles away. {Murder in the Air, by the way, starred a twenty-
nine-year-old actor who had been signed by Warner Brothers a few years 
earlier—Ronald Reagan.) 
Mass-culture fantasies and government weapons programs appear to 
be interwoven in complex ways. The fantasies lay the psychic ground­
work for the weapons programs; the weapons programs in turn stimulate 
new fantasies. As SDI progresses, we should have ample opportunity to 
observe this phenomenon at work. 
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A striking feature of the post-1945 cultural climate has been the per­
vasive fear of nuclear attack. Before supersonic bombers, intercontinental 
ballistic missiles or missile-launching nuclear submarines, the character­
istic nightmare was of nuclear blackmail: The components of an atomic 
bomb would be smuggled into the country, secretly assembled, and the 
product employed to force an American surrender. Give up, or say good­
bye to New York! In a 1946 article, the physicist Edward Condon 
painted a terrifying picture of urban life in which every building, room, 
and filing cabinet potentially concealed an atomic bomb. 
Within days of the presidents March 1983 address, pundits and edi­
torial writers were warning that SDI would still leave the nation vulner­
able to other forms of nuclear attack, including the smuggled bombs that 
aroused such terrors in the late 1940s. In a country "protected" by SDI, 
nuclear fear would surely not diminish. It might even be more socially 
destructive, because the potential source of attack would now be so ubiq­
uitous and innocuous—a fishing trawler, a diplomatic pouch, a shipping 
container of Stolichnaya vodka. 
Under these circumstances a bunker mentality would probably de­
velop rapidly, together with an accompanying obsession with secrecy and 
cultural conformity. In a remarkable 1947 essay on the social effects of 
the atomic bomb, Lewis Mumford imagined a society propelled by nu­
clear fear into a grim preoccupation with defense. In Mumford's sce­
nario, the degraded, terrorized populace ekes out a miserable existence in 
a vast underground warren, dominated by an authoritarian government 
whose power rests on its control of the instruments of atomic war and 
by an elite of "scientists and technicians responsible for atomic produc­
tion and anti-atomic defense." 
The preoccupation with atomic secrecy that gripped the nation after 
Hiroshima would be more than matched by fears for the security of the 
exotic technologies being developed by SDI researchers. Already four 
million Americans hold security-rated jobs that are shielded from pub­
lic scrutiny. The deployment of a Star Wars defensive network, with its 
vast infrastructure of supporting systems, would increase that number 
enormously. 
SDI rests on a fundamentally nationalistic premise. In a world of 
nuclear menace and "evil empires," we must take our fate into our own 
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hands. Its subtle and insidious subtext appeals to a dark and deeply 
rooted theme in U.S. culture, from the essays of Emerson to the mythol­
ogy of the Old West. Self-reliance is best; draw the wagons into a tight 
circle. The upsurge of nationalism would be accompanied by an intensi­
fication of the myth of American innocence, one of the more tenacious 
themes in this country's cultural history. The conviction that our actions 
are by definition high-minded and pure crops up incessantly: in Andrew 
Jackson's sanctimonious justifications for removing Indians from Geor­
gia in the 1830s; in the lofty rhetoric in which Woodrow Wilson enve­
loped his decision to enter the war in 1917 and his peacemaking efforts 
in 1919; and in President Truman's repeated postwar assurances that the 
United States viewed its atomic monopoly as a "sacred trust," never to 
be used for merely nationalistic ends. 
Once Ronald Reagan shared his Star Wars dream with the world, 
both the Soviet Union and the system's domestic critics quickly pointed 
out that what appeared from the Oval Office as a benign defensive 
system could be viewed in a far more sinister light. In the Alice-in-
Wonderland world of nuclear strategy, "defensive" systems turn into 
"offensive" ones with the slightest twist of the looking-glass. As former 
secretary of defense Robert McNamara notes in Blundering into Disaster, 
even a partial strategic defense system comports nicely with a first-strike 
strategy. Advocates of SDI respond to such criticism with self-righteous 
variations on the myth of national innocence. How could anyone suspect 
the virtuous United States of plotting anything so wicked and immoral? 
We are just not that kind of people. 
Although the myth of national innocence is as strong as ever, public 
attitudes toward scientists and technicians remain profoundly ambiva­
lent. These mixed feelings intensified with the explosion of the atomic 
bomb in August 1945. The same scientific discovery that had apparently 
brought an end to one terrible war simultaneously raised the specter of 
future wars of inconceivable destructiveness. An almost schizophrenic 
view of the scientist as public benefactor and as sinister impresario of 
death pervaded American culture. 
In a time of highly visible, heavily publicized Star Wars research, this 
ambivalence would likely reach a new plane of intensity. On the one 
hand, the eager young Star Warriors pursuing their high-frontier experi­
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ments at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and elsewhere will be 
the Oppenheimers, Comptons, and Fermis of our age. The cultural pres­
tige of science might be enormously enhanced, bringing further hefty 
federal endowments for scientific research—at least for SDL On the 
other hand, that very process could also bring its antithesis—a powerful 
reaction against science and its imperial pretensions—as the rest of us 
increasingly realize our irrelevance in a world ruled by technology. As 
Lord Zuckerman, former chief science adviser to the British government, 
and others have pointed out, the split-second nature of SDI leaves no 
alternative to total automation. Preprogrammed computers will com­
mand the entire apparatus; there will be no human intervention, no time 
for human judgment. 
"Washington, of course, aided by the media, will do everything in 
its power to allay these fears. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, as the 
government stockpiled atomic bombs, developed advanced delivery sys­
tems, and organized research on the hydrogen bomb, a stream of eu­
phoric propaganda poured forth from Washington, the radio networks, 
and the popular press, portraying an exciting future of atomic transporta­
tion, cancer cures through nuclear medicine, atomic weather control, 
and a brave new world of genetic manipulation. As we have seen, David 
E. Lilienthal, the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and 
an enthusiastic cheerleader for the peaceful atom, made the circuit of 
civic gatherings, religious conventions, and high school graduations, tell­
ing audiences to forget their atomic anxieties and focus instead on the 
bright promise of atomic energy. That propaganda served an important 
political function. It muted dissent and diverted public attention from 
the buildup of atomic weapons. 
We are witnessing the beginnings of a similar campaign today. As 
SDFs critics challenge it on technological, strategic, and foreign-policy 
grounds, proponents paint an increasingly rosy picture of the project's 
beneficence for the civilian sector. Echoing LilienthaTs earlier pro­
nouncements, Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, head of the Pen­
tagons SDI research project, vowed to "capitalize on the results of SDI 
research and apply it across all facets of our economy and society." In 
rhetoric eerily evocative of 1946, two leading Star Wars researchers at 
Livermore have predicted that SDI laser technologies could also propel 
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giant solar reflectors into orbit to create a system of global meteorological 
control. They declared, "We can thereby demonstrate our racial compe­
tence for terraforming other planets for human use by first bringing our 
own one to its full potential." 
The full, ripe flavor of this genre of SDI hype is well conveyed in 
"The Star Wars Spinoff," an article in the New York Times Magazine (Au­
gust 24, 1986) by the science writer Malcolm W Browne. In breathless 
prose, Browne offers a tantalizing sampler of the goodies that await us in 
the SDI cornucopia: Powerful new computer-modeling programs will 
enhance long-term weather forecasting and make possible detailed maps 
of the ocean floor; advances in computer pattern-recognition will at last 
enable us to develop robots to serve as "surrogate servants, laborers and 
bodyguards"; electron beams capable of penetrating human tissue at pre­
cise depths will be able to "hit a malignant tumor with pinpoint accu­
racy"; optic signaling and the substitution of such new synthetic crystals 
as gallium arsenide for the silicon chip will increase computer speed a 
thousandfold. To anyone who has pored over hundreds of late-1940s de­
scriptions of the technological Utopia to be expected from the invention 
of the atomic bomb, such rhetoric produces a profound sense of deja 
vu—and a profound sense of depression. 
The recently adopted Latin motto of the Army Strategic Defense 
Command is Munimentum in Aethere Novis: "Defense in Space." In a 
more innocent era, observers disturbed by the impact of technology 
found solace in the thought that whatever the machine's toll on earth, 
the starry skies above were immune to human folly. In his 1836 essay 
"Nature," Emerson offered the sky as a symbol of the possibilities of 
spiritual transcendence. In Walden, Thoreau describes how the clouds 
of steam from the intrusive Fitchburg railroad—his primary symbol of 
industrialization—escape to heaven while the noisy cars rumble on to­
ward Boston. 
This imaginative embrace of the heavens as a pristine alternative to 
the chaos of life on earth, long since undermined by the Wright brothers, 
has collapsed totally in the era of Star Wars. Space retains its symbolic 
power, but now as a vast stage set on which the deadly drama of Cold 
War military competition can be enacted on a literally cosmic scale. 
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ANOTHER CYCLE OF NUCLEAR 
ACTIVISM ENDS 
Throughout Americas nuclear history, as we have seen, cycles of heightened fear, activism, and cultural atten­tion to the bomb gave way with surprising suddenness 
to intervals when the nuclear reality seemed to sink out of 
sight. Another such dramatic shift came in the later 1980s, 
as Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, who came to power 
in 1985, moved to liberalize Soviet politics and end the Cold 
War. The long-stalled arms-control process resumed, and by 
1988, President Reagan was strolling in Red Square with the 
head of a state he had earlier denounced as an "evil empire." 
Certainly, grave dangers remained. Thousands of nu­
clear missiles still existed; the prospect of nuclear exchanges 
in regional conflicts or nuclear blackmail by rogue states like 
Iraq or North Korea loomed on the horizon; and the world 
faced the massive challenge of dealing with tons of radioac­
tive materials generated over a period of half a century— 
materials that would remain deadly for millennia. Neverthe­
less, the terrifying possibility of global thermonuclear war 
had clearly diminished radically, at least in the near term. 
The collective sigh of relief was almost audible. 
Chapters 12 and 13, both written and first published in 
1989, are products of this moment of transition. The brief 
book review that constitutes chapter 12, slightly modified 
from the version that appeared in the October 1989 Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, comments on an upbeat and rather 
polemical study by a political scientist arguing that not only 
was the nuclear threat over, but that it had never been as 
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serious as many had believed, and that the activists who had 
campaigned against it had been misled and deluded from 
the first. 
I have included this review because the book in question 
captures the mood of relief—like a collective exhalation of 
breath after an extended period of tension—triggered by the 
mid-1980s improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations and the 
consequent decline of nuclear fear. It also serves as a useful 
reminder that successive antinuclear campaigns had not only 
won enthusiastic recruits, but had stirred skepticism and 
even hostility among those who considered challenges to the 
U.S. policy of deterrence through retaliatory readiness to be 
naive, if not profoundly threatening, to Americas national-
security interests. 
SHOULD ANYONE still remain unaware of the precipitous decline of Cold 
War tensions since 1985 and the change in perceptions of the nuclear 
threat, a useful benchmark is John Mueller's Retreat from Armageddon: 
The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Muellers 
work, a freewheeling speculative essay embedded in a history of the Cold 
War, epitomizes the current U.S. mood of passivity, conservatism, and 
glasnost-'mductd optimism. The theme of the essay is easily stated: Just 
as the world outgrew slavery and dueling, so it is outgrowing war. In this 
model, World War II is an aberration brought on by one man, Adolph 
Hitler. In recent centuries, and especially since 1918, the West has been 
undergoing a profound ideological transformation in its view of war. No 
longer seen as romantic, manly, or purifying, war has come to be seen as 
"repulsive, immoral, and uncivilized." While noting that seventeen mil­
lion people have died in war since 1945, Mueller, a University of Roches­
ter political scientist, suggests that war will gradually fade from those 
regions where it vestigially survives, eventually to vanish entirely as a hu­
man social activity. 
Regrettably, this appealing vision is based on selective and inade­
quately examined historical data. To blame World War II on one man, 
for example, is to neglect both the historical rootedness of Hitler s obses­
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sions and the way the German masses rallied behind him. In general, 
Mueller emphasizes the power of ideology while paying little attention 
to economic interests and other material factors. 
Humanity's shifting perception of war is a significant topic, but 
Muellers treatment is disappointing. He considers only a few writers, 
none deeply, and almost wholly neglects the realms of fiction, music, the 
visual arts, and the mass media. At a time when intellectual historians 
are seeking to grasp more fully the relationship of ideas to their social 
milieus, and to understand more deeply the complex process of ideologi­
cal transformation, Retreat from Armageddon seems facile. The changed 
view of war so central to Mueller's argument is only casually sketched, 
with somewhat random quotes that emerge from a social vacuum. The 
actual process of ideological change remains opaque. Similarly, the end 
of slavery, which Mueller stresses heavily for his analogy, is ascribed to 
inexplicable shifts in moral sensibility, while the rise of industrial capital­
ism, with its profound implications for the organization of labor, is 
largely ignored. 
No utopianist, Mueller distinguishes his future scenario from the 
millennial vision of global cooperation and harmony. He foresees no 
changes in the present structure of nation-states, or in the struggles 
among them. Given this Hobbesian view, is it plausible that war, over 
the long haul, will lose its appeal as an option of last resort? 
Mueller emphasizes rational decision-making, downplaying the way 
the line between "rational" and "irrational" can blur as leaders act under 
stressful, emotionally charged conditions. His rationalistic, schematic 
approach allows relatively little scope to unforeseen concatenations of 
events or to the infinite human capacity for novelty—a capacity with 
negative as well as positive implications. For all its speculative boldness, 
Retreat from Armageddon betrays a deficiency of historical imagination. 
Despite its occasional caveats, this is in general a hopeful book. War 
is not endemic to the human condition; it is a learned social activity 
that can be unlearned. This perspective (so different from Reinhold 
Niebuhr's, for example) echoes in secular form the Victorian belief in 
inexorable progress through a divinely guided evolution, or the pre-1914 
social gospel vision of the Kingdom of God pressing in on human his­
tory. Such an approach invites passivity on issues of war and peace. 
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Thanks to a sweeping change of consciousness, war is fading through a 
kind of historical inevitability, independent of further human effort, at 
least according to Mueller. As the more backward or more ideologically 
driven societies absorb the new consciousness from the West, war will be 
no more. 
Like all such metahistorical theorizing, Mueller's conjectures are ulti­
mately unprovable. As he himself cheerfully concedes, his book will be 
read in the future either as remarkably prescient, or as one more sorry 
example of wishful thinking about the human prospect. 
But what of the other part of Retreat from Armageddon, its account of 
the Cold War? Here the work's historical thinness becomes particularly 
evident. In Muellers drama, "international communism" dominates the 
stage. The role of the United States was entirely reactive, as it responded 
to the Communists' lingering ideological infatuation with war. The role 
of liberal capitalist ideology, or indeed of any ideology, in shaping U.S. 
policy is ignored. The Vietnam War is presented as a "sober and realistic" 
U.S. response to Chinas fomenting of wars of national liberation. 
Mueller argues that Washington's Vietnam policies were correct strategi­
cally (at least up to the collapse of Chinese influence in Indonesia), and 
flawed tactically only in underrating North Vietnam's will to resist. This 
version of recent history ignores a vast body of historical scholarship that 
over the past quarter century has offered a considerably more complex 
and nuanced understanding of the Cold War. 
Mueller contends that nuclear weapons have played little role in 
postwar international relations. He presents President Truman's 1945 
atomic-bomb decision as motivated solely by the desire to defeat Japan 
(again ignoring many studies suggesting a more complex interpretation); 
gives extended and uncritical attention to Alexander de Seversky s notori­
ous 1946 argument that the atomic bomb's destructive power was much 
overrated; and downplays the significance of what he dismissively calls 
"the nuclear arms 'race."' While treating rhetoric with great seriousness 
elsewhere in the book, he sees the history of nuclear threats and count­
erthreats during the worst of the Cold War as irrelevant "bluster," of no 
significance. Nuclear proliferation receives some attention, but it does 
not loom large in Mueller's optimistic scheme of things. 
Since nuclear weapons are of little import, it follows that antinuclear 
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activists must be deluded and misguided. Mueller pokes fun at the sym­
bolic warning clock printed on the cover of each issue of the Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, its hands positioned ominously at a few minutes 
before midnight. He dismisses the "antinuclear frenzy" of the early 1980s 
and flippantly caricatures the Catholic bishops' long and careful state­
ment on nuclear war, The Challenge ofPeace (1983), as "an airy pastoral 
letter declaring that it may be okay to threaten mass destruction but only 
if you didn't plan to do it." 
Mueller's contempt for the antinuclear movement is understandable 
in view of his larger theories about the origins of the revulsion against 
war and his one-sided interpretation of the Cold War. Still, it is curious 
that he ascribes such importance to antiwar sentiment at one point in 
history and so little at another. Those who spoke out against conven­
tional war early in the century were shaping a new human consciousness, 
but those who raised the alarm against nuclear war in recent years were 
irrelevant, misguided, and foolish. As Vice President George Bush said 
to his Democratic challenger, Michael Dukakis, in one of their televised 
debates during the 1988 presidential campaign, it must be wonderful to 
be so sure of oneself 
"You MUST KEEP REMINDING US" 
Post-Cold War College Students Contemplate Nuclear Issues 
A a visiting professor at Northwestern University in 1988-89, I taught an American Studies seminar entitled "Nuclear Weapons in American Culture" 
and with Carl Smith, director of the American Studies pro­
gram, organized a conference on that subject. Coming at 
a moment when Cold War alarms and nuclear fears were 
rapidly diminishing, these experiences sharply reminded me 
how quickly the cultural barometer can change, and, more 
specifically, how rapidly nuclear awareness could fade, espe­
cially for the young. This essay, adapted from an article in 
the June 1989 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, reflects my 
experiences and impressions of that year. Rereading it in 
1997,1 am again struck by how much 1988—89 was a mo­
ment of transition—in the world situation, in domestic pol­
itics, and in the culture. While I and others of my generation 
vividly recalled the emotional intensity of the freeze cam­
paign and continued to view the nuclear threat (however de­
fined) as a matter of urgent and continuing concern, college 
students, already on the other side of an invisible fissure in 
the culture, were looking forward to the 1990s, a decade of 
different concerns and different issues, in which warnings of 
nuclear dangers would seem anachronistic and irrelevant. In 
some respects, this essay seems the most dated of any in the 
book. Yet it captures the moment of transition from one era 
to the next. 
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WHERE HAVE ALL the nuclear activists gone? The contrast between 
1981—83 and 1988—89, in terms of nuclear awareness in the United 
States, could not be more striking. Then, massive Pentagon budget in­
creases, "crisis relocation" plans, musings by a gung-ho secretary of state, 
Alexander Haig, about "nuclear warning shots," and belligerent presi­
dential speeches lambasting the Soviet "evil empire" raised public atten­
tion to the nuclear threat to feverish levels. Nuclear-freeze activists rang 
doorbells, television programs like The Day After (1984) captured na­
tional attention, church groups issued manifestos and pronouncements, 
and thousands of protesters rallied in Central Park and across the coun­
try. Time featured a mushroom cloud on its cover for the first time in 
years. Since I was then working on a book on nuclear weapons in Ameri­
can thought and culture, invitations to speak or to participate in confer­
ences and symposia on the subject poured in. 
Six years later, public attention has faded. The restless media spot­
light has moved on. The rallies and the referenda seem far in the past. 
Conferences and speaking invitations—somewhat to my relief—are less 
frequent. While a few books, films, and television productions conceived 
during the earlier period of nuclear awareness continue to appear, they 
seem misplaced in time, and stir little public response. 
When public television announced a program in May 1988 in which 
a number of experts would discuss issues of nuclear strategy and nuclear 
disarmament, the Los Angeles Times television critic began his preview, 
"It sounds like an hour in PBS hell." When the strategists of Governor 
Michael Dukakis's presidential bid fought off efforts to add a no-first-use 
pledge to the 1988 Democratic platform (that is, a pledge that the 
United States would never again initiate use of nuclear weapons), and 
Dukakis refused to embrace the pledge himself, few protests were heard. 
W. Joseph Campbell of the Hartford Courant wrote in the summer of 
1987: "The dramatic moments of the early 1980s, when arguments over 
freezing production and deployment of nuclear weapons could propel 
people into the streets by the thousands, nowadays are taunting memo­
ries. .  . . Instead of gathering momentum .  . . popular anti-nuclear ac­
tivism has faltered, and the promise borne by the grassroots freeze 
movement has dissipated." 
The reasons are not hard to find. Chief among them are President 
 189 "You Must Keep Reminding Us"
Reagan's "Star Wars" proposal, with its technological quick-fix response 
to the nations nuclear fears; the easing of U.S.-Soviet relations after Mik­
hail Gorbachev's rise to power in Moscow; and the 1989 INF Treaty, 
eliminating intermediate-range nuclear weapons from Europe. Amid all 
these developments, the nuclear-freeze movement in the United States 
went into hibernation, and an entire congeries of issues related to nuclear 
weaponry, nuclear power, and the nation's nuclear history seemed to van­
ish from the national consciousness. 
This is strikingly reminiscent of the period after 1963, when a simi­
lar bout of nuclear amnesia gripped the American people following the 
signing of the test ban treaty. The columnist Stewart Alsop, describing 
the political climate in 1967—four years after the treaty—used phrases 
that seem strikingly apropos in 1989: "Writers rarely write about this 
subject anymore, and people hardly ever talk about it. In recent years 
there has been something like a conspiracy of silence about the threat of 
nuclear holocaust." 
Despite jitters and protests over the prospect of "antimissile missiles" 
ringing America's cities that preceded the signing of the 1972 ABM 
(antiballistic missile) treaty, activists' energies did not fully revive until 
the late 1970s. During Jimmy Carter's presidency, a combination of 
events—including a campus-based campaign against nuclear power 
plants that culminated in 1979 with the Jane Fonda film China Syndrome 
and the near-disaster at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island nuclear power 
plant—reawakened the public to the broader nuclear threat, leading to 
a wave of antinuclear protest in the early Reagan years. 
The current decline in nuclear activism and cultural attention, and 
the parallels to earlier periods of apathy, have been sharply underscored 
for me while teaching at Northwestern University this year. My under­
graduate students are bright, articulate, socially engaged, and concerned 
about public issues. They are a joy to teach. They are also very young. I 
am constantly made aware of the chasm that exists between us in terms 
of our nuclear memories and perspective. The college juniors of 1989 
were most likely born in 1968 or 1969. Hiroshima, Bikini, civil defense, 
fallout shelters, the Cuban missile crisis, the test ban treaty, the ABM 
controversy—all this is ancient history to them, something known only 
secondhand. Even more recent events are part of the half-remembered 
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world of childhood and adolescence. My students were about ten years 
old at the time of Three Mile Island, twelve when Ronald Reagan took 
office. Some remember seeing The Day After as teenagers. When I asked 
the undergraduates in my "Nuclear Weapons in American Culture" sem­
inar about their earliest nuclear memory, a surprising number mentioned 
an episode on the early-1980s television series Happy Days, set in the 
1950s, in which the central character (nicknamed "the Fonz") and his 
teenaged friends decide whether or not to build a family fallout shelter. 
(Producer Garry Marshall graciously supplied a video cassette of this epi­
sode, enabling the class to share a collective moment of nostalgia for its 
lost youth.) 
My students' recollections of the freeze movement are hazy at best. 
One young woman remembers going to the 1982 antinuclear rally in 
Central Park with her mother. She recalls that the rally attracted "50,000 
participants" (in fact, the total was over 500,000). My students' most 
vivid political memories are extremely recent: Reagan's Moscow trip, 
Soviet-American good fellowship, the INF Treaty, and the 1988 presi­
dential campaign, in which nuclear issues barely surfaced. 
With the activism of the early 1980s a thing of the past, today's col­
lege students typically encounter the nuclear reality in indirect ways, of­
ten through mass-culture channels. Rock lyrics occasionally have nuclear 
themes. Examples are "Guns in the Sky" (1987) an anti-Star Wars song 
by INXS; "Put Down That Weapon," by Midnight Oil; Sting's "Walking 
in Your Footsteps" (1983) and "Russians" (1984)—"How can I save my 
little boy, from Oppenheimers deadly toy?"; and U2 s "Seconds" (1981) 
and "Bullet the Blue Sky" (1987), in which droning guitars frighteningly 
simulate the sound of incoming missiles. One should note, however (as 
my students are quick to point out) that such songs represent only a tiny 
fraction of the total rock output. Their lyrics are often difficult to follow, 
and with rare exceptions they are not the most popular or frequently 
aired album tracks. 
Movies like Dr. Strangelove keep nuclear memories alive, as do more 
recent films like The Road Warriors (1982), set in a brutal post—nuclear 
war future. Such role-playing games as Gamma World znd Twilight 2000 
simply posit a world after nuclear war as a device for getting the action 
under way. As for coverage of the theme in lectures and textbooks, I sus­
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pect that the medium is the message: Americas nuclear history tends to 
exist for most students at about the same affective level as Valley Forge, 
the Reconstruction era, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the 
New Deal. 
As in the late 1970s, recent controversies about nuclear power 
plants—the battle over the Shoreham plant on Long Island, problems at 
the Department of Energy's Savannah River nuclear weapons plant in 
South Carolina, and the issue of nuclear waste disposal—seem more 
vivid in students' consciousness than the world's largely invisible nuclear-
weapons arsenals, the seemingly remote and abstract threat of nuclear 
war, or the complex issue of nuclear proliferation among smaller nations. 
For my students, the nuclear issue is subsumed into a larger set of 
environmental and ecological preoccupations. They are deeply and often 
passionately concerned about the fragile global habitat. Insofar as nuclear 
power or nuclear weapons contribute to this problem, they become the 
foci of attention. For example, in the current debate over the proposed 
nuclear waste dump site in Nevada (a state appropriately accustomed to 
high-stakes gambling), experts readily concede that the containment sys­
tems will probably not survive for more than a thousand years. From 
then on, our distant descendants will have to depend on the vagaries of 
a changing natural environment to protect them from the still lethal 
poisons we are burying today. This may speak to today's environmental 
consciousness more vividly than issues of missile deployment or details 
of arms-control proposals. As was true after 1963, most students readily 
confess that nuclear war per se does not loom large in their conscious­
ness, and they express confidence that the easing of Cold War tensions 
has made a global nuclear conflict far less likely. 
Ironically, the treatment of the nuclear issue by activists and the mass 
media in the early 1980s may be partially responsible for the decline of 
nuclear awareness in the current college generation. For understandable 
reasons, freeze activists and the media focused almost exclusively on the 
most terrifying of nuclear possibilities: global thermonuclear war and the 
related ecological horror of a worldwide "nuclear winter." Much less at­
tention was devoted to the long-range and technically complex issue of 
radioactive waste disposal or to the possible use of nuclear weapons in 
regional conflicts. Amid widespread and legitimate terror over the pros­
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pect of worldwide nuclear holocaust, other lesser but still gravely impor­
tant nuclear dangers tended to be left on the sidelines. As fears of a full-
scale nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union 
faded, other urgent and menacing nuclear issues slipped down the mem­
ory hole as well. 
Robert Jay Lifton recounts, in his 1982 book Indefensible Weapons, 
Michael Carey's mid-1970s interviews with some forty men and women 
who as schoolchildren had experienced the school drills and fallout-
shelter controversies of the 1950s. Lifton comments on "the ubiquitous 
presence of the bomb" in the subjects' memories and consciousness. The 
same cannot, I think, be said of college students today. When my stu­
dents recently read Tim O'Briens novel The Nuclear Age, they found it 
largely unsatisfactory and expressed little but impatience for its nuclear 
war-obsessed hero. John Hersey's Hiroshima retains its power, but as an 
account of a remote, almost mythic event. Even such a major document 
as the 1983 pastoral letter of the American Catholic bishops, The Chal­
lenge of Peace, with its devastating ethical critique of the nuclear arms 
race and its profound skepticism about deterrence theory, stimulated 
little detailed discussion. It did, however, provoke considerable hostility 
for its theological framework—a framework hardly surprising consider­
ing the source. 
In the spring of 1989, as part of the conference related to the semi­
nar, Jonathan Schell visited the Northwestern campus. SchelPs 1983 
book The Fate of the Earth (which, like Hersey's Hiroshima, began as a 
New Yorker series) had become a best-seller for its reflections on the con­
sequences of a global thermonuclear war that could not only extinguish 
all human life but even all memory that human beings had ever inhab­
ited the planet. Schell received a respectful hearing from the large audi­
ence, but when he asked the students to articulate their own thoughts 
about such a prospect, he was greeted by a long and embarrassing silence. 
Nuclear war and its consequences, it seemed, simply did not figure very 
prominently, if at all, in their thoughts. 
Since colleges and universities have historically functioned as seed­
beds of political and social movements, my reading of the current cam­
pus mood not only suggests something about our situation at the 
moment, but also implies a discouraging prognosis for the renewal of 
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antinuclear activism, at least in the short run. The collapse of the activist 
surge of the early 1980s reveals once again how susceptible the antinu­
clear movement is to shifts in the political winds, and how it collapses 
each time there is a small step toward ameliorating the threat. 
Each generation must define its causes on the basis of its experience. 
On college and university campuses, where successive waves of students 
seem to come and go like fruit flies, a "generation" is not twenty or 
twenty-five years, but more like four. Just as the young scorn the styles, 
tastes, and slang not only of their parents but of their older siblings, as a 
way of asserting their own distinctive identity, they often cast a jaundiced 
eye on the issues deemed important by their elders. Even a cause as po­
tent and seemingly timeless as preventing nuclear war, which loomed so 
large only yesterday, does not automatically speak with the same force to 
those who are products of a different cultural and political moment. 
Todays students recognize intellectually how vulnerable we continue 
to be in the face of long-term nuclear menace, and how overwhelming is 
the work that remains if we are ever to be truly free of that menace. We 
need a comprehensive test ban, movement on the currently stalled nego­
tiations for strategic arms reductions, progress on a wide range of 
confidence-building measures, and a serious global effort to grapple with 
the terrible risks inherent in nuclear proliferation. Students at the end of 
the 1980s understand all this in a cerebral way, but for most it is not 
emotionally vivid. As one woman student recently told me rather plain­
tively: "Those of you who lived through all those scary events have to 
keep reminding us that nuclear weapons really exist." 

THE VIEW FROM THE NINETIES


Fast-forward a full decade. By the mid-1990s, the Cold War was fading into memory, and 
the "nuclear threat" had mutated 
from its classic form—a nightmar­
ish, world-destroying holocaust— 
into a series of still-menacing but 
less cosmic regional dangers and 
technical issues. 
But these developments, wel­
come as they were, did not mean 
that the historical realities ad­
dressed in this book had suddenly 
vanished. For one thing, nuclear 
menace in forms both fanciful and 
serious remained very much alive 
in the mass culture, from popular 
fiction to movies, video games, 
and television programs. Further, 
Americans continued to wrestle 
with the meaning of the primal 
event that had started it all, the 
atomic destruction of two cities by 
the order of a U.S. president in Au­
gust 1945- The fiftieth anniversary 
of the end of World War II, and of 
the nearly simultaneous Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki bombings, raised 
this still contentious issue in a par­
ticularly urgent form, inviting re­
flections on America's half-century 
effort to accommodate nuclear 
weapons into its strategic thinking, 
its ethics, and its culture. 
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NUCLEAR MENACE IN THE MASS CULTURE 
OF THE LATE COLD WA R ERA 
AN D BEYOND 
Paul Boyer and Eric Idsvoog 
Dv espite the end of the Cold War, the waning of the nu­clear arms race, and the disappearance of "global thermonuclear war" from pollsters' lists of Ameri­
cans' greatest worries, U.S. mass culture of the late 1980s 
and the 1990s was saturated by nuclear themes. Images of 
nuclear menace continued to pervade the movies, video 
games, and mass-market fiction. This essay explores these 
continuities and reflects on what they tell us about American 
cultural anxieties as the nation moved into the uncharted 
terrain of the post-Cold War era. 
This chapter is the product of a collaboration with Eric 
Idsvoog, an undergraduate at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison who in the summer of 1996, funded by a profes-
sor/student research fellowship, investigated nuclear themes 
in the fiction and movies of the 1990s. This essay represents 
a shared process of research, discussion, analysis, and 
writing. 
ON AUGUST 8, 1945, Anne O'Hare McCormick, writing in the New York 
Times, insisted that the atomic bomb had caused "an explosion in 
men's minds as shattering as the obliteration of Hiroshima." Whatever 
the appropriateness of McCormick's equation of mass death and mass 
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psychology, an upsurge of "atomic" jokes, "atomic" drinks, and "atomic" 
sales, not to mention the many businesses that quickly incorporated the 
potent new word into their names, seemed to confirm her claim. From 
the beginning, advertisers, marketers, and mass-culture producers found 
the atomic bomb a potent and versatile image. 
Within weeks of Hiroshima, movie marquees heralded The House on 
92ndStreet, a spy thriller hastily revised to incorporate in its plot "Process 
97, the secret ingredient of the atomic bomb." By year's end, radio sta­
tions were airing the Slim Gaillard Quartet's "Atomic Cafe" and "When 
the Atomic Bomb Fell," a country song celebrating victory over the 
"cruel Jap." 
The idea of nuclear weapons—and the terror they spawned—re-
mained embedded in U.S. mass culture for the next forty years and be­
yond. This cultural output came in waves, however, paralleling cycles of 
activism and apathy. The fallout fears so pervasive from the mid-1950s 
to 1963, for example, produced a rich trove of cultural effluvia, including 
"mutant" movies featuring such radiation-spawned creatures as The Beast 
from 2000 Fathoms (1953), the giant ants of Them! (1954), The Blob 
(1958), and The Incredible Shrinking Man (1957). Nuclear anxiety often 
surfaced in the science-fiction television shows The Outer Limits and Rod 
Serling's Twilight Zone, and radioactive mishaps spawned a new genera­
tion of comic-book superheroes, including Spider-Man, the Fantastic 
Four, and the Incredible Hulk. As we have seen, this wave of atomic fear 
also gave rise to films adapted from nuclear-war novels, including On the 
Beach and Dr. Strangelove. 
Similarly, the upsurge of nuclear fear and activism in the early 
Reagan years resonated in a variety of cultural forms, from poetry, novels, 
and science fiction to rock music, movies, and novels. The movies War 
Games, in which a high school hacker taps into the Pentagon's supercom­
puter and nearly triggers World War III, and Testament, which chronicles 
a California family's final days as radiation from a nuclear attack on San 
Francisco creeps northward, both debuted in 1983. In the 1983 made-
for-TV movie Special Bulletin, terrorists threaten to destroy Charleston, 
South Carolina, with a nuclear weapon. The terrorist theme soon 
loomed large in post—Cold War mass culture. 
The Day After (1984), a heavily publicized ABC-TV special, por­
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trayed the effects of a Soviet nuclear attack on a Kansas town. With at­
tention shifting from the nuclear-freeze campaign to President Reagan's 
Strategic Defense Initiative, The Day After missed the crest of the early-
eighties' wave of nuclear fear and activism. Nevertheless, it unsettled 
many Americans—including children forbidden to watch it because of 
a parental-advisory message warning of its frightening content. 
Nuclear jitters aided sales of at least three novels of the early 1980s: 
William Prochnaus Trinity's Child (1983), Frederick Forsyth's Fourth 
Protocol (1984), and Tom Clancy's best-selling Hunt for Red October 
(1984). In Trinity's Child, an unidentified nuclear missile explodes over a 
Russian city. The Soviets retaliate with a limited nuclear attack on the 
United States, forcing on American officials the agonizing choice of 
backing down or launching a full-scale nuclear counterattack that could 
jeopardize human survival. 
In The Fourth Protocol the British intelligence service narrowly fore­
stalls a Soviet plot to detonate a nuclear device near a U.S. base in En­
gland and then pin the blame on the United States. The aim is to turn 
European public opinion against the United States, break up the NATO 
alliance, and open the way for a Soviet takeover of western Europe. 
The Hunt for Red October, the first of Clancy's popular "Jack Ryan" 
novels of espionage, high-level intrigue, and military derring-do, told of 
a rogue Soviet submarine captain, Marko Ramius, who realizes that his 
sub has been selected to launch a nuclear first strike against the United 
States. As he desperately tries to defect to the West, the KGB falsely 
warns Washington that Ramius himself is the threat. As both Soviet and 
U.S. vessels close in, and as a nuclear showdown seems inevitable, only 
the CIA analyst Ryan grasps the truth, and by amazing heroics prevents 
World War III. 
Even the novels and films in which nuclear themes seem incidental, 
or hover in the background, demonstrate the unease of these years. In 
Stephen King's 1979 thriller The Dead Zone, the clairvoyant protagonist 
attempts to assassinate the man he realizes will someday plunge the world 
into nuclear war. One of the many subplots of the 1983 James Bond film 
Octopussy involves a scheme by Kamal Khan (Louis Jourdain), a smuggler 
with ties to the Soviet Union, to plant a nuclear device on a U.S. Air 
Force base. In the 1985 movie Back to the Future, the eccentric scientist 
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Doc Brown, played by Christopher Lloyd, deploys a time-traveling ve­
hicle powered by plutonium stolen from a nuclear-research facility by 
Libyan terrorists—another anticipation of a major post—Cold War nu­
clear theme. When the brain-eating zombies ofReturn ofthe Living Dead 
(1985) overrun a small town, the government fights back with (what 
else?) a nuclear bomb. In the potboiler movie Weird Science (1985), a 
nuclear missile disrupts a teenagers house party. 
Some mass-culture output of the late 1970s and early 1980s inter­
wove images of nuclear holocaust with fears of social breakdown and 
urban collapse. The anarchic society of the 1979 Australian film Mad 
Max and its sequels, Mad Max 2 (1981; released in the United States in 
1982 as The Road Warriors) and Mad Max: Beyond Thunderdome (1985), 
is presented as the aftermath of nuclear holocaust. As The Road Warriors 
opens, a scrolling text explains in mythic language how this debased, 
dog-eat-dog society came to be: "Two mighty tribes went to war, and 
touched off a blaze that engulfed them all." Terminator (1984) and Ter­
minator II: Judgment Day (1991), both starring Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
offer nightmarish images of a post-holocaust Los Angeles of half-
demolished buildings and wrecked playgrounds, where survivors desper­
ately battle their own machines. Joining nuclear terror to fear of a com-
puter-dominated world, the Terminator movies featured an omnipotent 
computer, Skynet, that has detonated all the world s nuclear weapons, 
destroying civilization. In Terminator, Schwarzenegger is a cyborg (the 
eponymous "Terminator") who arrives from the future, programmed to 
kill the person (still in utero) who is destined to lead a rebellion against 
Skynet. In Terminator II, Schwarzenegger has morphed into a robotic 
defender of the future rebel, now a young boy, against the powers that 
wish him dead. 
William Gibsons 1984 science-fiction novel Neuromancer (which in­
troduced the term "cyberspace") gives expression to a host of anxieties, 
including the existential terrors of a world dominated by powerful corpo­
rations possessing the technology to buy, sell, destroy, and even create 
human beings at will. The horror of nuclear weapons, while only one of 
Gibsons many themes, is powerfully invoked. One character, Peter Ri­
vera, who can project his thoughts as holograms, generates this image of 
a city devastated by nuclear attack: 
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A dark wave of rubble rose against a colorless sky, be­
yond its crest the bleached, half-melted skeletons of city 
towers. The rubble wave was textured like a net, rusting 
steel rods twisted gracefully as fine string, vast slabs of 
concrete still clinging there. The foreground might once 
have been a city square; there was a sort of stump, some­
thing that suggested a fountain. At its base, the children 
and the soldier were frozen. . . . Children. Feral, in rags. 
Teeth glittering like knives. Sores on their contorted 
faces. The soldier on his back, mouth and throat open 
to the sky. They were feeding. 
Even as these novels and films appeared, however, the Cold War and 
the nuclear arms race—realities woven tightly into the fabric of Ameri­
can life and culture—were ending. The sequence of now familiar events 
needs no elaboration: Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985; his 
meetings with President Reagan; the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; Ger-
many's reunification; the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. 
Simultaneously, a series of nuclear-arms treaties, spawning a new set 
of acronyms—INF (1987), START I (1991), START II (1993)—re-
versed years of nuclear escalation. Negotiators also addressed complex 
issues related to dismantling nuclear weapons, the disposal of plutonium 
and other nuclear by-products, and the security of remaining missiles. 
President Bill Clinton, in his 1997 State of the Union address, called 
for renewed efforts toward nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation 
agreements. Clinton and Russian president Boris Yeltsin later that year 
agreed in principle on START III, aimed at cutting stockpiles to between 
2,000 and 2,500 warheads by 2007. 
THE MASS CULTURE RESPONDS 
Given the historically cyclical pattern of Americans' cultural engagement 
with nuclear issues, which intensifies in times of heightened fear and ac­
tivism and diminishes when fear and activism fade, one might have ex­
pected these events to have ushered in another cycle of cultural neglect. 
Don DeLillo's 1997 novel Underworld, exploring the cultural and 
psychological ramifications of America's half-century encounter with 
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nuclear weapons, implicitly placed those ramifications in the past. The 
nuclear arms race and all its by-products had profoundly shaped, and 
warped, American life for decades after 1945, DeLillo suggested—but 
they were now history and could be grasped imaginatively and summed 
up novelistically. 
In fact, however, the process of "cultural fallout" goes on—changed, 
certainly, but in some respects barely diminished. A decade after the 
Cold War s end, cultural concern with the nuclear menace was still per­
vasive. What the emotional and psychological effects of this outpouring 
of cultural material would be remained an interesting unanswered 
question. 
Why this persistence? In contrast to the early 1950s, the federal gov­
ernment in the late 1980s and early 1990s did not downplay nuclear 
dangers with soothing propaganda about civil defense or the atoms 
peacetime uses. And in contrast to the post-1963 years, the late 1980s 
and 1990s did not see the emergence of such all-consuming issues as 
the Vietnam War, urban riots, or Watergate, which had earlier diverted 
attention from nuclear issues. On the contrary, the fiftieth anniversary of 
the atomic bombing of Japan and the controversy over the Smithsonian 
Institution's Enola Gay exhibit (see chapter 16) actually heightened nu­
clear awareness. 
The language and imagery of the mass media and of everyday life in 
the later 1990s underscored the cultural persistence of the nuclear theme. 
We "nuke" foods in our microwaves. A PBS news commentator, speak­
ing of a volatile political issue, says: "I don't want to get too close to this; 
it could be radioactive." A legislator criticizing a proposed bill observes 
on CNN: "It's like using a nuclear weapon to try to kill a fly." An anti­
smoking activist admits in the New York Times that he "goes thermonu­
clear" when people ignore No Smoking signs. A Kentucky flood victim 
tells a reporter: "The only worse thing would be a nuclear disaster." 
Though the songs on the 1996 compact disk Dr. Dre Presents . . . the 
Aftermath did not deal with nuclear war, the cover featured a mushroom 
cloud, that generic, instantly recognizable symbol of menace. The third 
edition of the American Heritage Dictionary (1992) defined "apocalypse" 
as: "Great or total devastation: the apocalypse of nuclear war' (emphasis 
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added). After half a century, in short, the language and the imagery of 
nuclear war so permeated U.S. culture that one hardly noticed them. 
The mass media's imitative nature doubtless played a part as well. A 
theme that had inspired so many movies, novels, and television programs 
from the 1950s to the early 1980s clearly invited further exploitation, 
whatever the shifts in world realities. Just as Hollywood continued to 
churn out World War II movies long after the war was over, an occasional 
"nuclear" film or novel is hardly surprising. 
Beyond all this, however, lay an additional and obvious causal factor: 
the persistence of nuclear hazards. The 1986 Chernobyl disaster revived 
fears of nuclear power. The cleanup of contaminated nuclear sites and 
the long-term storage of deadly radioactive waste (estimated by the De­
partment of Energy to cost $230 billion or more for the United States 
alone) posed massive problems. By the mid-1990s, the United States 
possessed nearly one hundred tons of weapons-grade plutonium and al­
most one thousand tons of enriched uranium; Russia's stockpiles were 
even larger. 
Further, despite significant moves toward nuclear disarmament, 
START II remained unratified by the Russian parliament, and Russian 
conservatives and military leaders ominously denounced Boris Yeltsin as 
a traitor for agreeing to START III in 1997. Even if fully implemented, 
these treaties would still leave Russia and the United States with several 
thousand nuclear warheads each—a stockpile that would have horrified 
the Americans of 1945, who had just seen what two atomic bombs, puny 
by 1990s standards, could accomplish. 
Further, the continued presence of nuclear missiles, missile-grade 
materials, and atomic scientists in highly unstable regions of the former 
Soviet sphere (including Russia itself) spawned fears of nuclear black­
mail or the clandestine transfer of nuclear materials or know-how to as­
piring nuclear powers like North Korea, Iraq, or Libya—or even to small 
terrorist groups desperate to achieve their goals. In October 1997, a Rus­
sian nuclear scientist told a congressional committee that in the 1970s 
the Soviet KGB had had in its possession more than eighty suitcase-sized 
nuclear bombs; he added the alarming charge that this cache of micro-
weapons had vanished in the breakdown of the chain of command after 
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the Soviet Unions collapse. Commenting on this testimony, Senator 
Richard Lugar of Indiana warned of the danger of nuclear weapons fall­
ing into the wrong hands. (The FBI issued a statement denying that the 
eighty-four bombs were unaccounted for). 
The uncertainties of the post—Cold War era, exacerbated by stories 
such as this, kept nuclear-related issues at the forefront of Americans' 
awareness and provided a rich lode of material for the mass culture of 
the late 1980s and 1990s. While nuclear fear may ultimately fade from 
American imagination and culture, it seems destined to have a very long 
half-life indeed. 
THE LATE 1980S: YEARS OF TRANSITION 
By a kind of cultural inertia, the nuclear preoccupations of the early 
1980s persisted in U.S. mass culture as the decade wore on, despite 
the changing international climate, as projects already in the pipeline 
reached fruition. Tom Clancy, for example, followed The Hunt for Red 
October With Red Storm Rising (1986) and The Cardinal of the Kremlin 
(1988). In The Cardinal of the Kremlin, U.S. spies in the Kremlin seek 
information about Russia's missile-defense system. In Red Storm Rising, 
an interesting transitional novel, Clancy again takes the world to the 
brink of nuclear war, setting up a classic Cold War superpower confron­
tation while also introducing ambiguities and complexities that antici­
pated the post—Cold War era ahead. The action begins when Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorists destroy a major Soviet oil facility, crippling the 
nation's energy flow. Deciding on a desperate strategy, the KGB stages a 
coup and launches an invasion of western Europe as a prelude to seizing 
the oil-rich Persian Gulf. 
The resulting war repeatedly threatens to go nuclear. When Moscow 
launches a surveillance satellite, U.S. authorities mistake it for an ICBM 
and nearly retaliate. As the Red Army faces defeat in conventional com­
bat, pressures to play the nuclear card increase. In a showdown with the 
Soviet Defense Council, a Russian field commander, General Alekseyev, 
warns against this fateful step. Ridiculing the Defense Council chairman 
for urging the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons, Alekseyev fumes: "He's 
talking like one of those NATO idiots! There is no wall between a tactical 
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and a strategic nuclear exchange, just a fuzzy line in the imagination of 
the amateurs and academics who advise their political leaders." Should 
the Defense Council proceed with its mad plan, he goes on, Russia's very 
survival "would be at the mercy of whichever NATO leader is the least 
stable." Seizing power, Alekseyev arranges a cease-fire with NATO and 
prevents nuclear war—by the narrowest of margins. In this scene, 
Clancy in fact powerfully critiqued NATO strategy, which included a 
nuclear first-use option if the Soviets invaded. 
Cold War themes of nuclear menace pervade several movies of the 
late 1980s, in some cases reflecting the time lag in bringing novels to the 
screen. Frederick Forsyth's 1984 novel, The Fourth Protocol, for example, 
appeared as a movie (starring Michael Caine) in 1987. The Hunt for Red 
October reached movie screens in 1990, with Sean Connery and Alec 
Baldwin in the starring roles, although the international climate had 
changed radically since 1984. The made-for-TV movie By Dawns Early 
Light (1990), the last of the "traditional" Cold War nuclear thrillers, was 
based on William Prochnau's novel Trinitys Child, published seven years 
earlier, when nuclear fear and activism had dominated U.S. life. In Super­
man TV: The Quest for Peace (1987), the Man of Steel belatedly emerges 
as a nuclear-freeze advocate, hurling the world's thermonuclear arsenals 
into the sun. 
Other late-1980s novels and movies, however, moved beyond the 
familiar superpower showdown to explore more ambiguous post—Cold 
War forms of nuclear menace. In Stephen Hunter's 1989 novel, Day be­
fore Midnight, Russian commandos angered by Gorbachev s concessions 
seize a U.S. missile silo, intent on launching a nuclear war they can win 
through a decisive first strike. In the 1986 movie The Manhattan Project, 
a teenager eager to impress his girlfriend steals plutonium from a nuclear-
weapons facility and constructs his own reactor. 
In Roman Polanski's Frantic (1988), starring Harrison Ford, a young 
American couple, Richard and Sondra Walker, arrive in Paris to find that 
an airport mixup has left them with the wrong suitcase—one containing 
a nuclear triggering mechanism that a beautiful young French woman, 
Michelle, has smuggled into France for an Arab terrorist organization. 
Sondra is kidnapped, the detonator is nearly lost on a Paris rooftop, 
Richard is erotically attracted to Michelle, and many other plot twists 
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ensue before the terrorists murder Michelle, the Walkers are reunited, 
and a disgusted Richard Walker throws the nuclear device into the Seine. 
Mass-culture producers continued to exploit the nuclear theme as 
the 1990s dawned. But as the full implications of the Soviet collapse 
became apparent, this protean theme assumed a variety of forms fascinat­
ing and revealing in their diversity. 
COLD WAR NOSTALGIA 
For Americans accustomed to "the Soviet threat" and the icy reassurance 
of a superpower balance of terror, the abrupt transformation of world 
realities proved disorienting. As Harry Angstrom complains in John Up-
dike's 1990 novel, Rabbit at Rest: "It's like nobody's in charge of the other 
side any more. I miss it, the cold war. It gave you a reason to get up in 
the morning." In the same vein, a character in the 1995 movie Crimson 
Tide pines for "the good of days of the Cold War, [when] the Russians 
could . .  . be depended upon to do what was in their own best interest." 
Reflecting this almost nostalgic mood, some mass-culture products 
emulated the Tom Clancy novels of the later 1980s in continuing to por­
tray Russia as America's adversary, and global holocaust as imminent, 
even as the Cold War and the nuclear arms race wound down. Reluctant 
to abandon such a rich theme, the mass-culture producers only slowly 
acknowledged that a new order had dawned. Whatever the evidence to 
the contrary, the Cold War and its stark polarities—Washington vs. 
Moscow; NATO vs. Warsaw Pact; good vs. evil—together with the nu­
clear confrontation that was its by-product, would surely survive! In Star 
Trek: First Contact (1996), a U.S. nuclear missile left: over from World 
War III is discovered in the distant future. Cold Wars may come and go, 
but in the mythic realm of Star Trek, global nuclear holocaust still awaits. 
The burgeoning world of teenage video games, played in arcades and 
on home consoles, offered another arena of Cold War nostalgia in late­
1990s mass culture. A game called Soviet Strike remained popular. Silent 
Steel featured a nuclear-armed submarine. "They said the cold war was 
over," snarled the promotional copy; "—it ain't." An ad for Tunnel Bl 
warned darkly: "Welcome to your tomb. The light at the end of the tun­
nel is a heat-seeking thermonuclear missile." 
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Like the Mad Max movies, several futuristic urban-combat video 
games ascribed the devastation and anarchy of their virtual cities to nu­
clear attack. Ads for Fallout promised a "Postnuclear Adventure." Mush­
room clouds proliferated, as did such terms as "overkill," "ground zero," 
"meltdown," and "radioactive fog." One company promoted a game 
called Scorched Planet. Ads for another new game of the later 1990s, 
MDK, featured images of blasted cities and proclaimed: "On a good day, 
only 1.5 billion people will die." 
But while the video game industry continued to exploit Cold War 
hostilities and nuclear showdowns, it also responded to changing reali­
ties. In Nintendo's Dixie Kong's Double Trouble, the villains were thinly 
disguised as "Kremlings." In Soviet Strike, the covert operations squad 
posted in eastern Europe to "make sure the cold war stays in the fridge" 
deploys such conventional weaponry as Apache helicopters, and snow­
plows to bulldoze Warsaw Pact encampments, but not nuclear weapons. 
In a variation on a long-term trend in the game world, many 1990s 
video games preserved the Cold War's absolutist moral framework while 
shifting the confrontation to some faraway time. Kings FieldII'was set in 
King Alfred's England; Blood Omen: Legacy ofKain unfolded in a vaguely 
medieval age, where the forces of righteousness struggle against usurpers 
bent on imposing a reign of terror. In Realms ofthe Haunting, "the Battle­
ground between Ultimate Good and Evil" is set in an apocalyptic fu­
ture age. 
The video games RedAlert and JRT.O. //(Pacific Theater of Opera­
tions) were particularly ingenious in avoiding scenarios of nuclear holo­
caust while preserving the Cold War's black-and-white moral polarities. 
Red Alert melded World War II and the Cold War. The action unfolds 
in the pre-nuclear 1940s, but the enemy is the Soviet Union, not Nazi 
Germany. (A time traveler kills Adolph Hitler, preventing the rise of Na­
zism, but also enabling the Soviet Union to invade Europe.) The player 
at last gets to engage in full-scale war with Russia—but with 1940s 
weaponry, not including a nuclear option. 
Players ofRT.O. //refought World War II in the Pacific "from Pearl 
Harbor to unconditional surrender," as the ads proclaimed. But the game 
rewrites history in one crucial respect: The options do not include 
the atomic bomb. The player must devise strategies for defeating Japan 
210 CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
without the "winning weapon" that scientists presented to Truman in 
July 1945. 
SOURCES OF NUCLEAR MENACE 
Chaos in the Former Soviet Sphere 
"Go to one of the old Soviet republics," says a character in the 1996 
movie Broken Arrow, "—they'll fix you up with a couple [of nuclear 
weapons] for the price of a BMW." While the Cold War and threats of 
global nuclear holocaust lived on in some novels, movies, and video 
games of the late 1980s and the 1990s, the more typical strategy was to 
adapt to the changed realities and offer more plausible scenarios of nu­
clear menace. Once the Soviet Unions collapse deprived Americans of a 
single, well-defined enemy, the mass culture introduced a multiplicity of 
threats, less terrifying than the ultimate nightmare of world cataclysm, 
but in some ways more troubling just because of their amorphous, hydra-
headed nature. 
Upheaval in eastern Europe, turmoil in the former Soviet republics 
(some of which housed nuclear-weapons facilities), and disorder verging 
on anarchy in Russia itself offered ample raw material for mass-culture 
narratives of nuclear danger arising within the former Soviet sphere. Like 
Stephen Hunter's Day before Midnight, several novels and movies of the 
1990s featured dissident groups or criminal elements in the domain once 
ruled by Moscow that seize nuclear weapons or engage in nuclear black­
mail. In the action movie Jackie Chans First Strike (1997), Chan pursues 
Russian mobsters who have stolen a nuclear warhead. Stephen Coonts's 
novel The Red Horseman (1993) involves corrupt Soviet military leaders 
who orchestrate a Chernobyl-like disaster to cover their theft of war­
heads from a base near the crippled reactor. In Tom Clancy's well-named 
1991 novel, The Sum of All Fears, a complex tale with many interwoven 
plotlines, one leader of the terrorist group that plots a nuclear detona­
tion in the United States is Giinther Bock, an East German Communist. 
Dismayed by capitalist Americas triumph and by Moscow's betrayal 
of Marxism, and embittered by his wife's suicide in a West German 
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prison, Bock seeks his apocalyptic revenge. In Sword of Orion, Robin 
White's 1993 novel of nuclear menace, the Russian Pavel Markelov, a 
disgruntled intelligence agent left jobless by the Soviet Unions collapse, 
plays a key role. 
The 1995 Hollywood thriller Crimson 7/Vjfe similarly viewed political 
turmoil in Russia as the spawning ground of nuclear holocaust. The plot, 
drawn from current headlines, featured an ultra-nationalist demagogue, 
Vladimir Radchenko, who exploits the international protests against 
Russia's brutal crushing of the breakaway province of Chechnya. Rallying 
dissident military officers against the Russian president, Radchenko 
gains control of much of eastern Russia, including Vladivostok, a nuclear 
missile base and home port to a fleet of nuclear-armed submarines. As 
the situation deteriorates and a nuclear attack on America appears immi­
nent, the Pentagon orders the commander of the nuclear sub Alabama, 
Captain Ramsey (Gene Hackman), to launch ten nuclear missiles on 
Vladivostok. A second command follows, but technical difficulties pre­
vent its delivery. Ramsey's subordinate, Executive Officer Hunter (Den­
zel Washington), urges that the launch be delayed until the second 
command can be read, but Ramsey insists on proceeding. After a tense 
period of verbal sparring, physical conflict, and a near-fatal attack by 
a Russian submarine, the second message finally arrives: Radchenko 
has surrendered, the attack order is canceled, and global holocaust is 
averted—for the moment. 
Rogue States, Terrorist Groups 
A closely related plotline in many novels and movies of the 1990s dealing 
with nuclear menace involved the acquisition of warheads or fissionable 
materials from the former Soviet Union by hostile states or terrorists 
from various trouble spots, often assisted by greedy middlemen. Some­
times, the terrorists are generic, with no specific identification. In the 
1992 movie Under Siege, armed men seize a decommissioned U.S. battle­
ship transporting nuclear missiles, with the intent of selling them to 
vaguely described foreign "investors." 
Most often, however, reflecting another major preoccupation of the 
1990s, the terrorists were explicitly identified as Muslim. Even in Under 
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Siege, the ultimate recipients of the stolen missiles are at one point gener­
ically referred to as "Francois and Muhammed." The enemy in Arnold 
Schwarzenegger's 1994 action comedy True Lies is the "Crimson Jihad," 
a band of Islamic fundamentalists led by the fanatic Aziz (played by Art 
Malik, a British-reared Pakistani who earlier starred in A Passage to India 
and the PBS special A Jewel in the Crown). Schwarzenegger plays Harry 
Tasker, a computer salesman who leads a double life as a member of the 
Omega Sector, a secret antiterrorist unit. Tasker and his Omega Sector 
associates batde Aziz and the Crimson Jihad, who have acquired a nu­
clear warhead from a former Soviet republic and threaten to destroy the 
Florida Keys unless their demands are met. 
In Robin White's Sword of Orion, the disgruntled Russian intelli­
gence agent Markelov helps Hezb Islami, a Muslim faction in Afghani­
stan, hijack a Russian army unit transporting a hydrogen bomb for 
dismantling. Hezb Islami then resorts to nuclear blackmail to force the 
cancellation of Afghan elections from which they have been excluded. 
After many plot twists, Russian and U.S. security forces find the bomb 
and disarm it. 
The anti-Islamic strain in this material illustrates the skill of mass-
culture producers at combining multiple sources of anxiety. Linking nu­
clear uneasiness with the much-publicized menace of "Islamic terrorism" 
(reenforced by such acts as the 1988 downing of Pan Am 103 over Scot­
land and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing), the mass-culture in­
dustry both reflected and aggravated these anxieties. Reacting to the 
stereotyping, Muslims picketed True Lies and otherwise protested movies 
and fiction that portrayed members of their faith in negative terms. 
In a variation on this theme, the source of menace was a hostile state 
intent on acquiring stolen nuclear components or co-opting renegade 
scientists. As early as 1976, in an episode entitled "The Plutonium Con­
nection," the PBS science program Nova had documented how readily 
nuclear-weapons materials and know-how could be obtained. In the 
same vein, a 1989 television movie, The Terror Trade: Buying the Bomb, 
documented the nuclear black market. It is no surprise, then, to find this 
theme in popular fiction and films of the edgy post—Cold War era. 
Several novels in this vein gained force by drawing on actual situa­
tions and familiar events. In Clancy's Sum of All Fears, the East German 
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Communist Glinther Bock joins forces with Palestinian extremists 
funded by Iran and led by the fanatic Ismael Qati. When Jack Ryan (now 
deputy director of the CIA) proposes a Mideast peace plan that involves 
Palestinian acceptance of Israels existence and shared rule in Jerusalem, 
Qati s followers grow desperate. Their opportunity comes when a farmer 
discovers an atomic bomb in the wreckage of an Israeli plane that crashed 
in Syria in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ibrahim Ghosn, a Palestinian 
bomb expert working for Qati, and Manfred Fromm, an East German 
nuclear engineer, upgrade the aging fission bomb to a thermonuclear 
weapon of devastating power. The terrorists conceal this superbomb out­
side Denver's Skydome and detonate it during the Super Bowl (a nice 
touch), while Fromm and Bock simultaneously instigate a confrontation 
between U.S. and Soviet troops in Berlin. The aim is to revive the Cold 
War, which the Palestinians hope to turn to their advantage. 
The plot nearly succeeds. Owing to last-minute glitches the bomb 
proves less devastating than expected, but the American president, Rob­
ert Fowler, rashly blames fanatical elements in a disintegrating Soviet 
Union, and prepares a massive nuclear retaliation. He is egged on in this 
misguided course by his hysterical national security adviser, who is also 
his mistress. (Clancy's novels are nothing if not imaginative.) But Jack 
Ryan, convinced that the bombing is the work of terrorists, not a Soviet 
plot, commandeers the White House hotline, negotiates a stand-down 
with the Russian leader, and captures Qati and his co-conspirators. Once 
again, global cataclysm is averted by the narrowest of margins. 
Frederick Forsyth's more realistic Fist of God (1994), unfolds during 
the Persian Gulf War and, according to the blurb, tells "the utterly con­
vincing story of what may actually have happened behind the headlines." 
Using the names of actual persons, among them U.S. secretary of state 
James Baker and Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz, Forsyth offers a fic­
tionalized account of the efforts of an international team of specialists to 
find and destroy Iraq's nuclear bomb. 
Like countless nuclear disarmament activists of the past, these au­
thors evoked the horrors of nuclear war as a means of heightening the 
drama of their story. Of the bomb-hunting team in The Fist of God, For­
syth writes: "They did not need to be scientists to know that the first 
explosion would kill more than a hundred thousand young soldiers. 
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Within hours, the radiation cloud, sucking up billions of tons of active 
sand from the desert, would begin to drift, covering everything in its 
path with death." 
Many authors took pains to link their fictions to real-world condi­
tions. In an afterword to The Fist of God, Forsyth warned of unstable 
or dictatorial regimes' ready access to nuclear technology, and accurately 
summarized how Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein (in the novel) made 
the country a nuclear power: "For a decade the regime of the Republic 
of Iraq was allowed to arm itself to a frightening level by a combination 
of political foolishness, bureaucratic blindness, and corporate greed." 
Tom Clancy, in an afterword to The Sum of All Fears, made a similar 
point: any "sufficiently wealthy individual could, over a period of from 
five to ten years, produce a multi-stage thermonuclear device." And de­
livery of such a doomsday weapon, he added, "is child's play." 
As Forsyth s novel suggests, the mass-culture industry of the 1990s 
found in Saddam Hussein an all-purpose villain. As the ads for the video 
game Back to Baghdad proclaim: "Time to Finish the Job . . . Time to 
Go Back to Baghdad." This is, indeed, what happens in R. J. Pinero's 
Ultimatum (1994), the story of a second Gulf War (led by President 
Clinton) against a nuclear-armed Saddam. Charlie Sheens 1991 comedy 
Hot Shots!, a parodic vision of the same theme, involves a mission to de­
stroy Saddam's nuclear-weapons facility. In the cathartic and (for Ameri­
cans) deeply satisfying climax of Coonts s Red Horseman, after Saddam 
has acquired the stolen warheads, they are recovered, Saddam and the 
renegade Russians are captured, and Saddam is shot through the heart 
by one of his Russian partners in crime. 
Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the 1990s replaced the Soviet Union as the 
paradigmatic nuclear threat. Demonized by the media (often with good 
reason), Iraq and its supreme ruler were seen as unambiguously evil and 
menacing. Having long associated nuclear danger with a single, clearly 
defined enemy, Americans for a time elevated Saddam (sometimes in 
tandem with North Koreas Kim II Sung) to that role. 
While "Islamic terrorists" were the preferred villains in these dramas 
of nuclear menace, other candidates surfaced as well. Tom Clancys Debt 
of Honor (1994) linked lingering nuclear fears with worries about Ameri­
cas trade imbalance with Japan. When a horrible accident involving de­
fective gas tanks on imported Japanese cars leads Congress to slam the 
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door on Japanese imports, the corporate leaders who (in Clancys world) 
control Japan retaliate with a combination of economic and military 
measures. Their campaign includes undermining the U.S. economy, 
gaining access to oil resources, and recovering the Mariana Islands, lost 
in World War II. 
To the shock of U.S. officials, Japan's military offensive includes a 
nuclear threat. Having acquired deactivated SSI9 missiles from Russia, 
supposedly for peaceful purposes, the Japanese have secretly built a small 
but deadly arsenal of twenty MIRV missiles, each with seven separately 
targeted warheads, giving Japan the capacity "to cut the heart out of 140 
American cities." 
Once again, indomitable Jack Ryan (now national security adviser) 
rises to the challenge, utilizing a combination of diplomacy, military 
measures, and parachute commando drops in Japan. The nuclear threat 
is forestalled, and an embargo threat forces Japan's surrender. (Advised 
by Ryan, the president rejects the Truman option of 1945 and magnani­
mously rules out an atomic attack on Japan.) Ryan becomes vice presi­
dent at the end of Debt of Honor, preparing the way for Clancy's next 
novel, Executive Orders (1996), in which he achieves the position for 
which he is obviously destined: president of the United States. 
A disgruntled Bosnian Serb, resentful of America's intervention in 
the Balkans conflict, is the villain of the 1997 nuclear-menace film The 
Peacemaker. Working with unscrupulous Russian middlemen, he hijacks 
a trainload of nuclear weapons scheduled for demolition, smuggles one 
into New York City, and prepares to detonate it. (This plotline revived 
a fifty-year-old scenario of atomic horror on Americas shores that first 
surfaced in the immediate post-Hiroshima period, before the era of 
ICBMs.) Only Nicole Kidman, playing the acting head of the "White 
House Nuclear Smuggling Group," aided by sidekick George Clooney, 
fresh from his starring role in the hit television series E.R., foil the plot 
and save Manhattan. "The Cold War Is Back, Nuclear Bombs and All," 
the New York Times captioned its review of The Peacemaker. 
Nuclear Technology Run Amok 
The hazards of nuclear technology past and present deepened Americas 
realization that the Cold War's end did not erase nuclear danger from 
the world. Even if all the missiles were deactivated, the legacy of decades 
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of nuclear testing would remain, along with the problem of disposing of 
tons of radioactive waste that would remain deadly for thousands of 
years, and the threat of more nuclear power plant malfunctions like those 
at Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986. These issues, too, 
figured largely in the representations of nuclear danger in post-Cold War 
mass culture. 
Harking back to the 1950s, several movies probed the nuclear-
weapons tests and the medical experiments with radioactive substances 
conducted in those years. Nightbreaker (1989), starring Martin Sheen 
and Emilio Estevez, explored the U.S. government's secret radiation test­
ing of civilians in the 1950s. In Desert Bloom (1986), set in the Nevada 
of the 1950s, John Voight plays Jack Chismore, a gas-station operator 
obsessed with the comings and goings of military brass involved in the 
top-secret atomic tests at a nearby site. A coming-of-age story, Desert 
Bloom alternates the tensions in Chismore s family with his rising anxiety 
about the governments mysterious activities. 
A series of documentaries heightened public awareness of the dan­
gers of nuclear technology. Building Bombs (1994), an Academy Award 
nominee, dealt with mismanagement at the Savannah River nuclear-
weapons facility in South Carolina. Plutonium Circus (1995) focused on 
the Pantex hydrogen-bomb assembly plant in Amarillo, a subject A. G. 
Mojtabai had earlier explored in BlessedAssurance: Living with the Bomb 
in Amarillo. 
Technological failure as a source of nuclear menace also propels sev­
eral Hollywood movies of the 1990s. In The Cape (1996), a nuclear-
powered Russian spy satellite malfunctions and threatens to crash to 
earth, spewing deadly radioactivity. An emergency NASA shuttle mis-
sion—including a Russian cosmonaut, in the spirit of post-Cold War 
amity—averts the catastrophe by the usual hair's-breadth margin. 
Fear of nuclear technology assumed many guises in 1990s mass cul­
ture. The video game Blast Corps involved transporting decommissioned 
nuclear warheads through populated areas where one mistake means ca­
tastrophe. In the movie Naked Gun 2V2: The Smell ofFear (1991), a par­
ody of the techno-menace theme, the bumbling antihero Frank Drebin 
(Leslie Nielsen) battles the nuclear power industry (as well as the oil, gas, 
and coal industries), which will do anything to thwart a new national 
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policy favoring safer, less exploitative energy sources. In a 1991 episode 
of the animated television comedy The Simpsons, dim-witted Homer 
Simpson, a nuclear power plant worker, manages by sheer dumb luck 
to prevent a meltdown. (He plays "eenie-meenie-miney-moe" to decide 
which button to push.) Hailed as a hero, he lectures at other plants on 
crisis management. In the 1986 movie Class of Nuke 'Em High and its 
1991 and 1994 sequels, all of which update many 1950s potboilers, mu­
tants from a nearby nuclear waste spill invade a suburban New Jersey 
high school. 
Terrorists, Loners, Madmen 
At the dawn of the atomic age, long before hydrogen bombs, ICBMs, 
nuclear submarines, and SAC armadas, the media seethed with anxious 
speculation about foreign agents who could smuggle in the components 
of an atomic bomb, secretly assemble it, and bring America to its knees. 
Half a century later, after decades when nuclear fears had focused on 
the Soviet superpower and on sophisticated doomsday technologies, the 
media turned again to the smaller-scale worries that had first surfaced in 
1945 and 1946. Marching through 1990s novels and movies of nuclear 
menace is a parade of bomb-brandishing terrorists, crazed madmen, 
grudge-bearing loners, or normally rational individuals driven over the 
edge by the stress of doomsday decision-making. 
A striking motif of these nuclear narratives is the villains' irrational­
ity. However menacing the nuclear prospect during the Cold War, people 
at least had the reassurance—or the comforting illusion—that the arms 
race was being managed from the top by responsible leaders of reason 
and restraint. As this assurance faded in the 1990s, the mass media re­
flected the resulting apprehensions. Nearly every work cited in this essay 
involves a highly unstable character. Ismael Qati, the mastermind in 
Clancy's Sum of All Fears, to cite but one example, is not only a religious 
fanatic; he is also dying, with nothing to lose. The villain of The Peace­
maker, a cultivated, mild-mannered Sarajevo piano teacher, initially gives 
no hint of his double life as a nuclear terrorist plotting the destruction 
of New York City. 
The madmen are sometimes heads of state, or are at least near centers 
of power. Forsyth's Fist of God portrays Saddam Hussein as an erratic, 
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sadistic leader willing to use any means, including nuclear devastation, 
to achieve his evil goals. The rantings of Vladimir Radchenko, the ultra­
nationalist Russian who threatens nuclear devastation in Crimson Tide, 
echo the scary sound bites of the actual Russian neofascist Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky. 
Sometimes, as we have seen, the individuals who precipitate the crisis 
are motivated not by religious zeal or political ideology, but simply by 
resentment or personal grievance. Glinther Bock in The Sum of All Fears 
is a disgruntled loner with a bone to pick against those who have done 
him wrong. 
Nor are these menacing loners always foreigners. In an America 
rattled by domestic terrorism, homegrown mad bombers, and antigov­
ernment militias, such anxieties readily found their way into the novels 
and movies of nuclear menace. While Captain Ramsey in Crimson Tide 
is not insane, his rigidly authoritarian personality borders on the irratio­
nal. In one scene, his contorted face dramatically illuminated by a de­
monic glow, he threatens to kill one of his own crew in his desperate 
eagerness to launch his missiles. The Sum of All Fears contains a similar 
scene, in which President Fowler, emotionally unhinged by the nuclear 
blast at the Super Bowl, frantically prepares to retaliate against Russia. 
In the 1996 film Broken Arrow, John Travolta plays Major Deakins, 
a Utah-based Stealth bomber pilot embittered by his low status, paltry 
pay, and lack of promotion. Slipping over the edge of sanity, he takes off 
with two live nuclear warheads and threatens to obliterate Denver unless 
his blackmail demands are met. Fortunately for Denver, Deakins's friend 
and copilot Captain Hale (Christian Slater), with an assist from a re­
sourceful park ranger, foils the plot and saves the city. 
In Under Siege, the crisis is initiated by a former CIA operative, Wil­
liam Strannix (Tommy Lee Jones), seeking revenge on the agency for 
having ordered him killed during an abortive earlier operation. Strannix's 
insanity manifests itself as an obsession with the "Looney Tunes" cartoon 
series. (Perhaps he saw the Tom and Jerry episode coTomic Energy/') As­
sembling a ragtag band of terrorists, and aided by the corrupt and greedy 
Commander Krill, skipper of the USS Missouri, Strannix organizes the 
raid to steal the nuclear missiles aboard the decommissioned battleship 
on its final voyage. 
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The "alienated loner" formula is repeated in Under Siege 2: Dark Ter­
ritory (1995). In this sequel, a computer genius gone bad (Eric Bogosian) 
develops a CD-ROM that enables him to control a super-sophisticated 
experimental U.S. spy satellite that is also capable of raining nuclear dev­
astation upon the earth. Bogosian, who designed the satellite in the first 
place, has now reprogrammed it to obliterate Washington, D.C., unless 
the federal government pays him one billion dollars. (How he plans to 
spend the ransom money remains unexplained.) Again the embittered 
lone madman, who had once contributed his technical genius to the gov-
ernment's purposes, turns on that same government as the enemy. 
The angry-loner-as-nuclear-menace theme was parodied in "Side­
show Bob's Last Gleaming," a 1995 Simpsons episode in which an embit­
tered ex-TV clown discovers a discarded ten-megaton missile in a trash 
barrel at an air force base. Resorting to nuclear blackmail, Sideshow Bob 
threatens to detonate the bomb unless all television is eliminated. When 
Lisa Simpson pleads, "Don't do it—that would be taking the easy way 
out," he replies, "I quite agree," and detonates the bomb. But it is a dud; 
Bob has missed the consumer advisory pasted on the missile: "Best before 
1959." This episode exploits the familiar ephemera of America's nuclear 
history. As Sideshow Bob prepares to detonate the bomb, he whistles 
"We'll Meet Again," which Kubrick had used in Dr. Strangelove, while 
Maggie Simpson plucks petals from a daisy, evoking the anti-Goldwater 
television commercial from the 1964 presidential campaign. In a world 
without television, one character mutters grimly, "the survivors will envy 
the dead." 
The madman scenario presumed that the nuclear option was never 
a rational alternative. This presumption (which also underlies the black 
humor of Dr. Strangelove) appears in President Truman's 1953 State of 
the Union address, quoted earlier: "The war of the future would be one 
in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow. . . . Such a 
war is not possible for rational man. We know this, but we dare not as­
sume that others would not yield to the temptation science is now plac­
ing in their hands." 
Truman's faith in "rational man," and his certainty that "we" would 
never use the bomb, ring hollow, coming only eight years after Hiro­
shima. The ironies become explicit in Crimson Tide when a crewman 
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aboard the USS Alabama, in a moment of self-consciousness rare in this 
cultural material, insists that the Russian nationalist Radchenko must be 
a "dangerous lunatic" for threatening nuclear war to achieve his goals. 
Another crewman retorts: "What's that make us, since we're the only one 
who's ever dropped a nuclear bomb on anyone?" A heated discussion of 
the Hiroshima decision ensues, as the nuclear past and possible nuclear 
future intertwine. 
Stephen Hunters Day before Midnight offers another twist on the 
madman motif. Arkady Pashin, mastermind of the Russian commandos 
who seize a U.S. missile silo, is repeatedly dismissed as "crazy" or "nuts." 
Yet his plan possesses a certain rationality. His first strike will not only 
assure victory for the Soviet Union, but also cripple the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal. Rather than await an eventual world-destroying nuclear Arma­
geddon, he will start a war that will leave only halfzht world in ruins. 
As he explains, "The fact is, I'll kill only a few hundred million. I'll save 
billions. I'm the man who saved the world." Pashin is mad, yet his first-
strike strategy is the brainchild of "Peter Thiokol," a famous U.S. strate­
gic theorist. "ThiokoPs" logic, in turn, echoes arguments seriously put 
forward by actual American military figures early in the Cold War (see 
chapter 4). 
Paralleling the "alienated loner" theme, in many post—Cold War cul­
tural productions ones own government is the enemy. In a 1994 opinion 
poll, only about 20 percent of Americans (down from about 80 percent 
in 1964) expressed confidence that the government "always or almost 
always does the right thing," and the mass culture mirrored this skepti­
cism. In The Hunt for Red October 2nd Red Storm Rising, lower-level mili­
tary figures frantically seek to thwart their own governments insane 
plans for a nuclear first strike. In Under Siege, the CIA has ordered the 
death of one of its own. In the horror movie Return of the Living Dead, 
because secret government experiments have produced the zombies that 
terrorize the city, the government must and does destroy the city with a 
nuclear bomb to prevent the zombies from spreading. 
The premise of Kevin J. Andersons Ground Zero (1995), based on 
the Fox network's popular X-Files series of the 1990s, is that despite the 
Cold War's end, government nuclear-weapons research continues. In a 
scene reminiscent of the "peaceful atom" propaganda of earlier days, visi­
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tors to the "Teller Nuclear Research Facility" view an upbeat video that 
glorifies the vast promise of atomic research, offers soothing reassurances 
about the facility's safety, and pooh-poohs the alleged dangers of radia­
tion. In these stories, as in the X-Files series as a whole, official candor is 
an illusion; those in power invariably conceal the truth. 
Even when not overtly sinister and deceptive, the governments in 
these novels and movies are impersonal, unthinking, inhumane bureau­
cracies. As an East German official says of NATO s nuclear-war strategiz­
ing in Red Storm Rising, "Their government reports are written by 
computers to be read by calculators. Just like ours. Just like ours." 
The post-Cold War mass culture visions of nuclear menace portray 
a world not of government versus government, but of individuals ma­
neuvering in an anarchic, film noir-like environment. Loners like Dea­
kins in Broken Arrow, Strannix in Under Siege, or Bock in The Sum of All 
Fears take desperate measures against the irrational, dangerous, or unfair 
actions of their superiors. But the nuclear catastrophes threatened by 
such alienated individuals are typically averted by other loners who must 
act in the face of the inept stupidity of their superiors. Tom Clancys Jack 
Ryan and General Alekseyev are only two of many such intelligent loners 
thwarted by bumbling, wrongheaded higher-ups. In Under Siege, a low-
ranking cook, Casey Ryback (Steven Seagal), emerges as the hero, foiling 
the embittered Strannix. Seagal reprises his Casey Ryback role in Under 
Siege 2: Dark Territory, saving Washington, D.C., from destruction at the 
hands of a mad computer genius. 
In the movie Bloodfist IV: Ground Zero (1994), an obscure military 
courier battles the terrorists who overrun a U.S. Air Force base to com­
mandeer its nuclear weapons. The hero of Hunters Day before Midnight 
is a semiliterate Vietnam War veteran released from military prison to 
help repel the missile-silo invaders. At the end, an army general soberly 
reflects that it wasn't the "professionals" who prevented catastrophe, but 
"the regular people, the Rest of Us." 
Amoral Scientists 
Brilliant but amoral scientists and technocrats often appear nearly as 
pathological as the nuclear madmen in these novels and films. Drawing 
on a very old "mad scientist" motif in Western culture, the representation 
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of science and scientists in this material is usually of the Dr. Frankenstein 
variety. A central theme of America's nuclear discourse from 1945 on— 
atomic energy as the ultimate example of scientific discovery out­
stripping ethics—took on fresh life as the moral certitudes of the Cold 
War era faded. Without a clear enemy, the ethical rationalizations for 
nuclear scientists and technologists seemed more ambiguous than ever. 
In Clancys Sum of All Fears, the nuclear engineer Manfred Fromm 
epitomizes the unscrupulous genius motivated solely by a project's tech­
nical challenges. Employed to repair and upgrade the aging fission bomb 
acquired by the Palestinians, Fromm displays no interest in how the 
weapon will be used. In Forsyth's Fist of God, the giant cannon that is to 
launch Iraq's sole nuclear weapon is the brainchild of Gerry Bull, a politi­
cally naive weapons designer embittered because his ideas have been re­
peatedly rejected by his superiors. 
Terminator II adds a feminist twist to the amoral scientist theme. A 
brilliant nuclear scientist realizes too late that his technical discoveries 
have horrendous implications. In a self-justificatory mood he asks rhe­
torically, "How were we supposed to know?" At this, the mother of the 
boy who is destined to lead the anti-Skynet rebellion explodes: "Right. 
How were you supposed to know. . . . Men like you built the hydrogen 
bomb. Men like you thought it up. You think you're so creative. You 
don't know what it's like to really create something, to create a life, to 
feel it growing inside you. All you know how to create is death and 
destruction." 
This mordant view of science pervades Kevin J. Andersons Ground 
Zero. In the opening chapter, a mysterious burst of radiation kills Dr. 
Emil Gregory, the nuclear-weapons designer in charge of Project Bright 
Anvil, which is supposed to develop a radiation-free nuclear bomb. Re­
flecting on the problematic nature of such research in the post—Cold 
War era, an FBI agent investigating Gregory's death muses: "Here we are, 
still building bombs to fight against the bad guys—yet we're not at all 
certain who the bad guys are anymore." 
But Gregory's successor as head of Bright Anvil defends the project 
in classic technocratic language: "Is a gun manufacturer responsible for 
the people killed in convenience-store robberies? My team has created a 
tool for our government to use, a resource for our foreign policy ex­
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perts. . .  . I have no more business dictating this country's foreign policy 
than . .  . a politician has coming into my laboratory and telling me how 
to run my experiments." Warming to his subject, however, the scientist 
quickly abandons his apolitical, technocratic pose: "Bright Anvil is fall­
out free, man! . .  . It removes the big political stigma of using a nuclear 
weapon. Bright Anvil finally makes nuclear weapons usable, not just bluff 
cards. . .  . If some nutcase like Saddam Hussein or Moammar Khadaffi 
[of Libya] wants to lob their own homemade uranium bomb at New 
Jersey, I want to make sure that our country has the means either to 
defend itself or strike back." 
As a foil to this morally obtuse breed of scientist, the novel intro­
duces Miriel Bremen, a former Bright Anvil scientist who, after a visit to 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has founded the protest group Stop Nuclear 
Madness! Shortly before a planned test of Bright Anvil on a Pacific atoll, 
Bremen arrives with Ryan Kamida, the sole survivor of a group of Pacific 
Islanders displaced by a U.S. nuclear test in the 1950s. Kamida brings 
with him a barrel of dark powder—the ashes of his people and the mys­
terious focal point of their collective spiritual energy. In the novel's cli­
mactic scene—a classic X-Files denouement—the atoll, along with the 
Bright Anvil scientists and their weapon, vanish in a mysterious burst of 
radioactive energy such as had earlier vaporized Dr. Gregory. History has 
come full circle. The human spirit has triumphed over amoral science. 
Although themes of nuclear menace clearly pervaded post—Cold War 
mass culture, documenting nuclear-related material and cataloging its 
themes and motifs tell us little about its meaning and influence. The 
nuclear strand in a complex plot may, in fact, be relatively unimportant, 
hardly noticed consciously by readers, moviegoers, or video game 
players. 
The H-bombs, ICBMs, and nuclear devices that litter these mass-
culture products are often little more than gimmicks. In many of the 
post—Cold War films— Under Siege, Broken Arrow, Jackie Chans First 
Strike, and others—the nuclear bombs or missiles appear quite unthreat­
ening: We see the weapons, but not the destruction. In Jackie Charts First 
Strike, the characters toss around a "uranium core" concealed in an ordi­
nary oxygen tank. ("Talk about good clean fun," observed the New York 
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Times reviewer, "here it is.") While these films exploit the hard-wired 
cultural awareness that nuclear weapons are scary and dangerous things, 
they rarely bother to dramatize their actual effects. In the 1996 block­
buster Independence Day, a futile attempt to use nuclear warheads to de­
stroy the alien spaceship threatening Washington is little more than a 
minor diversion amid the spectacular special effects. 
Despite these caveats, however, the pervasiveness of this theme in 
post-Cold War mass culture demands that anyone interested in the con­
tinuing effects of the nuclear reality in contemporary America sit up and 
take notice. So, too, do the ways in which the danger was presented. 
Representations of nuclear menace in the 1990s differed radically from 
those of the 1950s or even the early 1980s. No longer involving two 
superpowers posturing across an Iron Curtain, the menace now unfolded 
in a destabilized, decentered world where deadly hazards arise in unex­
pected places and assume many guises. The emblematic slogan of this 
new genre of nuclear horror might be the incantatory phrase used on 
The X-Files: "Trust no one." The prospect of a future in which nuclear 
weapons and nuclear know-how form a constant of the human condition 
is hardly reassuring. 
Equally sobering is the fact that so many of these plots deal (admit­
tedly in fanciful ways) with actual post-Cold War nuclear realities: the 
hazards of nuclear-waste disposal, the dangers of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear materials in highly unstable if not anarchic settings, the risk that 
dictatorial regimes or terrorist groups could acquire doomsday weapons. 
To be sure, the nightmarish prospect of global annihilation envisioned 
by Cold War movies, novels, and nonfiction writers like Robert Jay Lif-
ton and Jonathan Schell had clearly faded by the end of the 1990s. But 
in place of one big menace, the latest wave of nuclear novels, movies, 
video games, and science fiction stories featured a mass of complex and 
shadowy dangers hardly less unsettling in their cumulative effect. 
The opportunistic way these themes are often treated, noted above, 
is itself noteworthy. Many earlier works in this genre had been marked 
by profound moral seriousness. Science-fiction stories like Walter Miller 
]t'sA Canticle'for Leibowitz(1959); the songs of Tom Lehrer; and movies 
like On the Beach, Dr. Strangelove, China Syndrome, or even The Day the 
Earth StoodStill(1951), with its message of global cooperation or global 
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annihilation, were deeply engaged with the issues they addressed in a 
fictionalized or satirical way. With some exceptions, post—Cold War nov­
elists, moviemakers, and video game designers exploited nuclear danger 
mainly for its capacity to stir fear and build tension. Seriousness of pur­
pose beyond the desire to elicit a passing frisson of fear was rarely evident. 
As Dean Devlin, cowriter and producer of Independence Day, conceded: 
"Our movie is pretty obvious. The closest we get to a social statement is 
to play upon the idea that as we approach the millennium, and we're no 
longer worried about a nuclear threat, the question is, Will there be an 
apocalypse, and if so, how will it come?" Time magazine's comment on 
Independence Day suggests the impact of this "social statement": "You 
leave saying 'Wow!' instead of a speculative cHmmm.'" (Interestingly, the 
one filmmaker who continued in the 1990s to bring moral seriousness 
to the nuclear theme was the octogenarian Japanese director Akira Kuro­
sawa. His Rhapsody in August of1991, for example, evokes an aging Japa­
nese woman's memories of the bombing of Nagasaki.) 
Whatever the level of trivialization, one thing was clear as the twenti­
eth century ended. Neither the reality of nuclear danger nor the contin­
ued presence of nuclear fear in American mass culture had disappeared 
with the end of the Cold War. Like the radiation-affected creatures in the 
science-fiction stories and movies of the 1950s, the cultural expression of 
that fear had simply mutated into sometimes bizarre new forms. 
15

HIROSHIMA IN AMERICAN MEMORY 
The year 1995—the fiftieth anniversary of both the end of World War II and the beginning of the atomic age— had powerful emotional overtones for America. When 
Michael J. Hogan, editor of the journal Diplomatic History, 
invited me to contribute to a special commemorative issue 
on the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, I readily ac­
cepted. The invitation not only provided an opportunity for 
me to revisit my own memories of August 1945 and of a 
1958 visit to Hiroshima but also to explore further the con­
tinuing role of Hiroshima in Americas cultural and political 
discourse. Ten years earlier, in 1985, I had written an essay 
for the New Republic on Americans' immediate reaction to 
President Truman's atomic-bomb announcement (see chap­
ter 2). In the 1995 essay below, I broadened the focus to 
reflect on the continued polemical and metaphorical reso­
nance of Hiroshima in U.S. life from 1945 to the present. 
Drawing on my earlier work as well as on considerable fresh 
research, I once again rethought America's effort to come to 
terms with these protean events that refused to recede qui­
etly into history, instead remaining vividly alive in the na-
tion's collective memory 
The essay from which chapter 15 is adapted appeared in 
the Spring 1995 issue of Diplomatic History. This special is­
sue, also including essays by Barton J. Bernstein, Herbert P. 
Bix, John W. Dower, Michael J. Hogan, Seitsu Tachibana, 
and J. Samuel Walker, was subsequently reprinted in Mi­
chael J. Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Both versions in­
cluded full scholarly citations, omitted here. 
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THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima invites 
reflection on the role of this event in American memory. For half a cen­
tury now, the word "Hiroshima" has resonated in U.S. culture and public 
discourse, as its meaning has been debated, contested, and exploited. For 
me, a 1958 visit to that city drove home the ambiguous quality of the 
memory. As my train entered the station, several Japanese passengers 
around me, smiling and apparently full of civic pride, repeated "Hiro­
shima: atomic bomb. Hiroshima: atomic bomb" for the benefit of the 
visiting American. How to respond? I felt acute embarrassment, yet my 
seatmates seemed clearly pleased to remind me of the event that had 
made their city famous. This memory now mingles with earlier recollec­
tions of my first confused encounter with Hiroshima, in a newspaper on 
August 6, 1945, four days after my tenth birthday. With the Hiroshima-
Nagasaki bombings now half a century in the past, perhaps the moment 
is opportune to explore our long effort to come to terms with Hiro-
shima—the city, the event, and the symbol. 
At least since the Romans leveled Carthage in 146 B.C., thereby im­
posing the first "Carthaginian peace," the names of certain sites have 
taken on powerful symbolic meaning. "Waterloo" evokes irrevocable de­
feat; "Gettysburg," the Civil War's turning point. "Verdun" has become 
shorthand for the futility of trench warfare, while "Guernica" and "Dres­
den" stir thoughts of the slaughter of civilians from the air. Allusions to 
"Pearl Harbor" rallied Americans during World War II, while the cham­
bers of commerce of Buchenwald and Dachau face an uphill task in extri­
cating their towns from associations that are only too familiar—and 
gruesome. In more recent times, "Dien Bien Phu" and "Bay of Pigs" took 
on their own symbolic resonances. 
Clearly certain place names serve as a shorthand in cultural dis­
course, based on a shared understanding of their symbolic meaning. 
When the event alluded to is sufficiently remote, the name is drained of 
emotion and serves a purely rhetorical function. We speak of a "Cartha­
ginian peace" or say that someone "met his Waterloo" with little con­
scious awareness of the specific events or the specific towns in North 
Africa or Belgium that gave rise to these expressions. Hiroshima is another 
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place name set apart by history, but unlike Carthage or Waterloo, its 
symbolic meaning continues to evoke passionate emotional responses. 
For many Americans, that meaning is clear and unambiguous. Since 
1945, Hiroshima, sometimes paired with Nagasaki, has been shorthand 
for the destructive capability of nuclear weapons. In medieval cartogra­
phy, Jerusalem was the navel of the world. In nuclear geography, it is 
Hiroshima. In We Can Do It! (1985), a "Kids' Peace Book" with defini­
tions for each letter of the alphabet, the entry for "H" reads: 
H is for Hiroshima. Hiroshima is a city in Japan, where 
an atomic bomb was dropped many years ago in 1945. 
Thousands of people lost their lives and the city was de­
stroyed. That's why we say "NO MORE HIROSHI­
MAS!" H is also for hope, happiness, and harmony. That's 
what the world needs instead. Another H is for hug. 
The page is illustrated with a drawing of a boy hugging his grandmother 
as she writes a protest letter, while grandpa sits nearby knitting a scarf 
with the slogan: "No more Hiroshimas!" In this rhetorical usage, to 
which we shall return, Hiroshima was removed from history and treated 
as a semimythic symbol of atomic menace. In the passive voice of the 
above passage, for example, the bomb was dropped, a city was destroyed, 
with no hint of who dropped the bomb or destroyed the city, or why. 
Such dehistoricizing characterizes not just juvenile peace literature but 
much of the rhetorical invocation of "Hiroshima" by antinuclear activists 
over the years. 
But the peace activists' use of "Hiroshima" is only part of a multivo­
cal discourse. At the other end of the spectrum, millions of Americans 
have over the years shared the view enunciated by President Harry S. 
Truman when he announced that a new weapon had destroyed the "mili­
tary base" of Hiroshima: that the atomic bomb was a wholly justified 
means of defeating a treacherous foe. In Truman's geographic calculus, 
"Hiroshima" avenged "Pearl Harbor." More important, the argument 
runs, the bomb saved thousands of American lives that would have been 
lost in an invasion of Japan. In the immediate postwar period, most 
Americans embraced this view. As Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, recalled in 1956: "With few exceptions, 
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public opinion rejoiced over Hiroshima and Nagasaki as demonstrations 
of American technical ingenuity and military ascendency." 
The lack of detailed visual evidence of the bomb's effects reinforced 
this initial positive response. Occupation authorities censored reports 
from the city and suppressed the more horrifying films and photographs 
of corpses and maimed survivors. Americans initially saw only images 
of the awesome mushroom cloud, which, as historian James Farrell has 
observed, presented the bomb as "a new but natural event, free of human 
agency." Indeed, Farrell notes, both elements of the quickly adopted 
compound term "mushroom cloud" suggested an unmediated natural 
phenomenon. 
As we saw in chapter 3, Henry Stimsons 1947 Harper's Magazine 
article "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" was part of a high-level 
effort to justify the use of the bomb and to define the meaning of Hiro­
shima and Nagasaki for Americans. The president of Harvard, James Co­
nant, a key figure in nuclear policymaking, both prodded Stimson, the 
former secretary of war, to publish his apologia, and edited the first draft 
(ghostwritten by McGeorge Bundy, the son of Stimsons wartime aide 
Harvey Bundy) to make sure it struck the appropriate justificatory note. 
Despite much revisionist scholarship on Truman's decision, the mantra 
"the atomic bomb prevented an invasion and saved American lives" is 
still repeated, particularly by veterans convinced that it saved their lives. 
This argument, more often expressed orally than in print, found its 
boldest—not to say its most reckless—articulation in Paul Fussells 1981 
New Republic essay "Hiroshima: A Soldier's View," later revised and pub­
lished in Fussell's Thank God for the Atomic Bomb (1988). Having spent 
the spring and summer of 1945 as an infantryman in France expecting 
imminent reassignment to the Pacific, Fussell implied that only persons 
in his precarious situation had the moral authority to evaluate the 
A-bomb decision. He pointed out that one critic of that decision, politi­
cal scientist Michael Walzer, was only ten years old in 1945. Revisionist 
historian Michael Sherry, he jeered, "was eight months old, in danger 
only of falling out of his pram." "The farther from the scene of horror," 
he said, "the easier the talk." "The invasion was definitely on," Fussell 
asserted, "as I know because I was to be in it." With equal assurance he 
dismissed the claim that postwar power calculations influenced Truman's 
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decision: "Of course no one was focusing on anything as portentous as 
that, which reflects a historian's tidy hindsight. The U.S. government 
was engaged not in that sort of momentous thing but in ending the war 
conclusively, as well as irrationally Remembering Pearl Harbor with a 
vengeance." 
Certainly the testimony of historical actors is useful, but Fussell 
moved beyond merely presenting combat soldiers' perspective to an anti-
intellectualism that ignored a large body of scholarship directly relevant 
to his topic. Fussell notwithstanding, most historians now view Japan as 
teetering on the brink of collapse by early August 1945 and agree that 
postwar considerations did indeed influence Truman's decision. By ig­
noring or ridiculing the relevant scholarship, Fussell vastly oversimplifies 
highly complex issues. Nevertheless, his outburst merits notice as an ar­
ticulation of a widely held and culturally influential view of the bomb 
decision—and of the meaning of Hiroshima. 
But the more familiar cultural role of the word "Hiroshima" has been 
as a symbol of what must never happen again. It is the definitive object 
lesson of nuclear horror. If the bomb's full meaning in terms of human 
suffering did not at first grip the American consciousness, the fact of the 
destruction of a city certainly did. In this sense, Conant's view of the 
salutary effects of actually dropping the bomb on a crowded metropolis 
proved prescient. While the obliteration of two cities did not lead to 
international control, as Conant had hoped it would, it did help to in­
spire successive antinuclear campaigns. The cautionary theme emerged 
quickly- Within hours of Truman's announcement, radio commentators 
and editorial writers somberly noted that the fate of Hiroshima could 
await any American city. For many atomic scientists, euphoria over the 
Alamogordo test and the Hiroshima blast quickly changed to dismay as 
the human toll became apparent in classified reports. Many Manhattan 
Project veterans plunged into the campaign for international control 
with speeches and articles in which future Hiroshimas figured as the fear­
ful alternative to the Acheson-Lilienthal plan. The image of Hiroshima 
as a preview of the atomic future gripped the American consciousness in 
August 1945, not to be dislodged thereafter. 
John Hersey's Hiroshima (1946) deepened popular perceptions of 
the word's meaning: not just the destruction of "a city," but the death 
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and suffering of scores of thousands of individual men, women, and chil­
dren, each with his or her own story. A skilled journalist, Hersey trans­
lated the mind-numbing statistics into a gripping interwoven narrative 
of six individuals. Of the first 339 readers to write Hersey, 301 offered 
glowing praise. Such articles were essential, observed one, "to counteract 
the 4th of July attitude most people hold in regards to the atom bomb." 
Another described "a fitful, drearn-laden night" after finishing the article. 
The San Francisco poet William Dickey later recalled his initial encoun­
ter with Hersey s work: 
I sat in the car one summer 
during lunch breaks at the frozen food plant, reading 
Hiroshima 
when it first came out. The picture that is in my mind 
is of people, vaporized by an unexpected sun 
and only their shadows left burned into the wall behind them. 
In their eyes it was shock of noon forever. 
While Hersey's work deepened emotional sensibilities, it had a 
broader cultural impact as well. As William R Buckley Jr. later observed, 
its appearance in a leading periodical "was both a spiritual acknowledg­
ment of the transcendent magnitude of the event, and an invitation to 
analytical meditation on its implications." With his cool, understated 
prose, Hersey helped position Hiroshima at the core of the debate over 
nuclear weapons—past, present, and future. In successive campaigns 
against the nuclear arms race, "Hiroshima" offered a stark, one-word en­
capsulation of the alternative. In the lexicon of symbolic geography, it 
was often linked to Alamogordo and Bikini as representations of the 
three faces of atomic danger: modern science, the bomb itself, and more 
terrible instruments of thermonuclear destruction around the corner. 
But the politico-cultural role of Hiroshima memories, brought to a 
keen edge by John Hersey in 1946, fluctuated over the years with the 
cycles of activism and quiescence in America's long encounter with the 
nuclear threat. As Michael Mandelbaum observed in 1984, "Americans 
have normally ignored the nuclear peril. Each episode of public anxiety 
about the bomb has given way to longer periods in which nuclear weap­
ons issues were the preoccupation of the nuclear specialists alone." With 
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the onset of the Cold War, the Soviet A-bomb test in 1949, and Truman's 
green light to the hydrogen-bomb project, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, like 
nuclear awareness in general, faded from public consciousness. Takashi 
Nagai s We ofNagasaki (1951) offered gripping testimony similar to that 
of Hersey s Hiroshima, but in an altered cultural and political climate, 
the work attracted much less attention. 
As activism revived in the mid-1950s, now aimed at halting nuclear 
testing and its deadly by-product of radioactive fallout, campaigners 
again invoked "Hiroshima," this time as an example of the lethal effects 
of radiation and as a benchmark to demonstrate the escalating nuclear 
threat. The H-bomb, they repeatedly emphasized, was "a thousand times 
more powerful" than the Hiroshima bomb. 
The resurgence of Hiroshima memories that accompanied the test 
ban campaign had many sources. Michihiko Hachiya's classic Hiroshima 
Diary (1955), published on the tenth anniversary of the bombing, 
brought the event sharply back into focus. So, too, did the "Hiroshima 
Maidens," twenty-five disfigured survivors of the blast who in 1955 
arrived in the United States for reconstructive surgery. The project 
had originated with Kiyoshi Tanimoto, a Methodist minister featured in 
Hersey's Hiroshima. Promoted by the antinuclear activist Norman Cous­
ins, editor of the Saturday Review, the project gained national attention 
on May 11, 1955, when Ralph Edwards's popular television show, This 
Is Your Life, showcased Tanimoto. The program evoked the terror of the 
bombing and featured a handshake between Tanimoto and Captain 
Robert Lewis, copilot of the Enola Gay, who gave the minister a check 
for the Hiroshima Maidens. Edwards invited viewers to contribute, and 
twenty thousand letters poured in. The 138 operations performed on the 
young women had mixed results, and the death of one from cardiac ar­
rest under anesthesia clouded the project. But despite criticism in Japan 
about the "publicity stunt" and the U.S. State Department's reservations, 
the project helped restore Hiroshima to the forefront of memory while 
furthering the test ban cause. 
As the test ban campaign intensified, so, too, did the cultural res­
onance of Hiroshima. "Nuclear War in St. Louis" (1959), the docu-
mentary-style narrative written by St. Louis antinuclear activists and 
published in the Saturday Review, was based on data from Hiroshima and 
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Nagasaki. Edita Morris's novel Flowers of Hiroshima (1959), an explora­
tion of the bomb's physical and psychological effects, was the work of an 
antinuclear activist who with her husband operated a center in Hiro­
shima for atomic-bomb survivors. Betty Jean Liftons documentary film 
A Thousand Cranes, on child victims of the bomb, appeared in 1962. 
In a different medium, Alain Resnais's 1959 film Hiroshima Mon 
Amour, widely shown in the United States, portrayed a brief affair be­
tween a Hiroshima architect (played by Eiji Okada) and a French actress 
(Emmanuelle Riva) who has come to the city to make an antiwar film. 
With a screenplay by Marguerite Duras, Hiroshima Mon Amour juxta­
posed grainy images of the devastated city of 1945 with the actress's rec­
ollections of a doomed wartime romance with a German soldier. As the 
images of destruction give way to scenes of bustling postwar Hiroshima, 
so the actress's wartime memories fade. But though the theme is one of 
forgetfulness, the atomic-bomb scenes early in the movie conveyed their 
own message to audiences of 1959. 
In 1962, as the test ban campaign crested, Robert Jay Lifton, an asso­
ciate professor of psychiatry at Yale, completing a year of research on 
Japanese youth, turned to a different project. Traveling to Hiroshima, 
Lifton interviewed some seventy hibakusha ("explosion-affected per­
sons"). Reporting his findings and speculations in a 1964 article in Psy­
chiatry, then more fully in Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima (1967) 
and subsequent writings, Lifton advanced the concept of "psychic numb­
ing" to explain how survivors dealt with their bomb memories and their 
guilt over escaping death when so many had not. Broadening his focus, 
Lifton speculated that psychic numbing could also illuminate patterns 
of nuclear denial in entire societies that faced not the reality but impossi­
bility of nuclear annihilation. "The encounter of people in Hiroshima 
with the atomic bomb has specific bearing upon all nuclear age exis­
tence," he wrote; "a better understanding of what lies behind this word, 
this name of a city, might enable us to take a small step forward in com­
ing to terms with that existence." 
Cultural historians tended to be critical of Lifton's bolder hypotheses 
for their lack of historical specificity. Liftons model, they suggested, did 
not explain the alternating cycles of engagement, apparent apathy, and 
renewed engagement that characterized Americans' response to the 
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bomb. It tended to reduce the complex texture of actual lived experience 
to a single procrustean psychological formula. 
Nevertheless, Liftons explanatory framework, and perhaps even 
more his clear moral engagement with nuclear issues, proved highly in­
fluential, as evidenced by the fact that Death in Life won the prestigious 
National Book Award for 1967. And in using Hiroshima as the template 
for the phenomenon of "psychic numbing," he kept the city in the fore­
front of awareness. 
British science writer Jacob Bronowski, reviewing Death in Life in 
the June 1968 Scientific American, made the point explicitly. The psychic 
numbing exhibited by the hibakusha of Hiroshima, he suggested, could 
help explain the decline of nuclear awareness in the later 1960s: 
Twenty years is too long for sorrow, which time does not 
so much heal as blunt. . .  . In that ebb tide of conscience 
. . . the moral impulse of 1945 has been eroded. We 
might have supposed that the sense of guilt had been 
washed away without a trace, had not Professor Lifton 
discovered it still haunting (of all people) the survivors 
of Hiroshima. The discovery gives his quiet and pene­
trating book a kind of cosmic irony that, more than any 
burst of righteousness, ought to shake us all out of our 
somnambulism. 
Lifton and Bronowski thus contributed to what by 1967 had become a 
well-established practice of using Hiroshima heuristically. The fate of 
this city and its inhabitants in 1945, they suggested, could illuminate the 
larger psychic dynamics of the nuclear age. 
The next surge of U.S. nuclear activism, arising in the late 1970s and 
cresting in the nuclear-freeze campaign of the early 1980s, once more 
brought Hiroshima to the cultural forefront. As in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, activists again contrasted the puny Hiroshima bomb with 
modern nuclearfirepower. The poet Sharon Doubiago, for example, not­
ing that the missiles carried by one Trident submarine packed the explo­
sive might of 2,040 Hiroshima-sized bombs, wrote in 1982: 
Say the word Hiroshima 
Reflect on its meaning for one second 
 235 Hiroshima in American Memory
Say and understand Hiroshima again. 
Say and understand Hiroshima two thousand and forty times. 
Testament, a 1983 television movie set in a northern California town 
as radiation from an attack on San Francisco creeps nearer, included an 
impaired Japanese-American boy called Hiroshi—a common Japanese 
name, but one obviously chosen for its historical resonance. The courses 
on nuclear war introduced on many college and university campuses in 
the early 1980s typically began with Hiroshima and assigned John Her-
sey's now classic work. For several years, Wisconsin antinuclear activists 
launched paper lanterns on the Mississippi River on August 6, emulating 
an annual commemorative ceremony held in Hiroshima on that date. 
Robert Penn Warren's 1983 poem "New Dawn' imagined the moment 
just after the Hiroshima blast, as the Enola Gay streaks away: 
Now, far behind, from the center of 
The immense, purple-streaked, dark mushroom that, 
there, towers 
To obscure whatever lies below, 
A plume, positive but delicate as a dream, 
Of pure whiteness, unmoved by breath 
of any wind, 
Mounts 
Above the dark mushroom, 
It grows high—high, higher— 
In its own triumphant beauty 
Hiroshima also provided freeze advocates with a wealth of medical 
evidence. In 1947 the National Academy of Sciences, with funding from 
the Atomic Energy Commission, had launched a research project in 
Hiroshima on the bombs radiological effects. By the 1980s, links had 
emerged between A-bomb exposure and heightened incidence of cata­
racts, leukemia, multiple myeloma, and other cancers. Persons exposed 
in utero or in infancy exhibited abnormally high rates of small head and 
body size and mental retardation. Such antinuclear organizations as 
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) used this evidence to build 
opposition to nuclear weapons. References to Hiroshima dotted The 
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Final Epidemic, a 1981 collection of essays by scientists and physicians 
on the effects of nuclear war. At a 1982 Washington conference of educa­
tors concerned with the nuclear threat, Dr. Stuart Finch of Rutgers Med­
ical School presented medical data from Hiroshima and expressed the 
hope that it would help deter "any future use of nuclear energy as an 
instrument of war." 
Meanwhile, Robert Jay Lifton continued to explore the larger appli­
cability of the Hiroshima experience. At the 1982 conference mentioned 
above, Lifton returned to his now familiar theme: "Hiroshima is impor­
tant to us, it is a text for us, and we must embrace it and learn from it." 
He also stressed, however, that Hiroshima could be a misleading text. 
Just as the "small" 1945 bomb served to dramatize the vastly larger de­
structive power of the H-bomb, so Lifton contrasted the hibakusha ex­
perience with the incomparably greater psychological impact of global 
thermonuclear war. At Hiroshima, outsiders had quickly arrived to aid 
the survivors; in a full-scale thermonuclear war, little outside aid would 
be available—the whole world would become "Hiroshima." Beyond the 
statistics of death, destruction, and long-term medical consequences, Lif-
ton contended, Hiroshima had introduced a new image into human self-
awareness: a "radical sense of futurelessness" that undercut people's hopes 
of living on through their work or their offspring. After August 1945, 
such forms of symbolic immortality could no longer be presumed. All 
this, he suggested, lay embedded in the historical meaning of Hiroshima 
and set it forever apart from other cities that had become symbols of 
war's horror. 
A variety of literary works helped reawaken Hiroshima memories in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Eleanor Coerrs children's book Sadako 
and the Thousand Paper Cranes (1979) told of a young bomb survivor, 
dying of leukemia, who tried to fold a thousand paper cranes, believing 
this would cure her. She died short of her goal, but her classmates com­
pleted the project. In 1982 Harper's issued a paperback edition of Chil­
dren of Hiroshima, a long out-of-print collection of writings by youthful 
survivors. Atomic Aftermath, an anthology of short stories about Hiro­
shima by Japanese authors, published in Japan in 1983, appeared in U.S. 
bookstores in an English edition the following year. In Kim Stanley Rob­
insons 1984 science-fiction story, "The Lucky Strike," the Enola Gay 
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crashes en route to Hiroshima, killing all aboard. The bombardier of the 
backup crew has qualms of conscience and releases the bomb far outside 
the city, with few casualties. This "demonstration shot" ends the war, but 
the bombardier is executed for disobeying orders. The activist climate of 
the early 1980s also assured a larger audience for Nasuji Ibuses brilliant 
Black Rain, a novel exploring the long-term effects of the Hiroshima 
bombing on a young woman and her relatives. Originally serialized in a 
Japanese magazine, Ibuses work appeared in English in 1967-68 in the 
small-circulation/^^^ Quarterly, but a 1985 Bantam paperback edition 
introduced it to a wider public. 
PSR lecturers, instructors in college nuclear-age history courses, and 
organizers of nuclear-freeze rallies made effective use of films of Hiroshi-
ma's devastation and photographs of survivors, including the horrifying 
(and once suppressed) documentary film Hiroshima-Nagasaki 1945. But 
the visual evocations of Hiroshima came in many forms. The artist Rob­
ert Morris's ambitious 1981 installation "Journado del Muerto," a highly 
theatrical and politically engaged work exhibited by Washington's Hirsh­
horn Museum in 1981—82, included large photographs of Hiroshima in 
ruins and close-ups of burn victims, together with replicas of missiles and 
photographs of Manhattan Project scientists. Unforgettable Fire (1977), 
originally shown on Japanese television, offered gripping watercolors by 
Hiroshima survivors. In the preface, Japanese television executive Soji 
Matsumoto stressed its contemporary relevance: "Thirty years have 
passed since the A-bomb was dropped. The memory of how things were 
in Hiroshima at that time is being forgotten. It is therefore necessary to 
appeal to the people of Japan and of the world that there be 'No More 
Hiroshimas.' . .  . To publish a collection of these pictures as a book is 
very significant, since we are living in a world in which the diffusion of 
nuclear weapons is threatening the existence of all humanity." 
In 1982, a San Francisco publisher issued "I Saw It," cartoonist Keiji 
Nakazawa's comic book—format account of the bombing, which he had 
lived through as a boy. In 1985 came a U.S. edition of the powerful Hiro­
shima Murals by the Japanese artists Iri and Toshi Maruki. A 1986 docu­
mentary film about the Marukis and their work, by historian John 
Dower and filmmaker John Junkerman, received an Academy Award 
nomination. Toshi Maruki also wrote and illustrated Hiroshima no Pika 
238 CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
(1982), a children's book about a Hiroshima family caught in the bomb­
ing. Like Hersey's Hiroshima, these fresh visual images—from naive wa­
tercolors, comic books, and children's stories to works by well-known 
artists—restored human and historical immediacy to an image con­
stantly at risk of being dulled by familiarity or drained of specificity by 
repeated use for symbolic or rhetorical purposes. 
Aging Hiroshima survivors added emotional intensity to the 
nuclear-freeze campaign. Several hibakusha spoke at the June 1982 Cen­
tral Park rally and participated in a television special on PBS. At a Wash­
ington forum arranged by Senate sponsors of the freeze resolution, four 
survivors recounted their memories. One, Dr. Mitsuo Tomosawa, fifteen 
years old in 1945, recalled lying awake all night on August 6 listening to 
the moans from a nearby hospital. 
The attention generated in August 1985 by the fortieth anniversary 
of the atomic bombings of Japan also served to focus renewed attention 
on Hiroshima. Time, in the issue that featured a cover photograph of 
the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima, published a special section, "The 
Atomic Age," that included a lengthy essay about Yoshitaka Kawamoto, 
director of Hiroshima's Peace Memorial Museum and himself a bomb 
survivor. The Yale sociologist Kai Erikson, in a fortieth-anniversary essay 
in the Nation, reflected on Hiroshima's significance for the present: "We 
need to attend to such histories as this . . . because they provide the clear­
est illustrations we have of what human beings can do . .  . when they 
find themselves in moments of crisis and literally have more destructive 
power at their disposal than they know what to do with. That is as good 
an argument for disarming as any that can be imagined." 
Hiroshima memories were often explicitly used by freeze activists to 
awaken people to the nuclear danger. As the editor of Atomic Aftermath 
put it: "The short stories included herein are not merely literary expres­
sions, composed by looking back at the past. . . . They are also highly 
significant vehicles for thinking about the contemporary world over 
which hangs the awesome threat of vastly expanded nuclear arsenals." 
More luridly, Peter Wyden's 1984 popular history Day One: Before Hiro­
shima and After contained a stark prefatory legend: "One millisecond 
after you read this, you and one billion other people could begin to 
perish." 
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From fall 1945 through the 1980s, in short, the role of Hiroshima 
in American memory was linked to the shifting rhythms of confronta­
tion with the threat of nuclear war and with campaigns to reduce that 
threat. In an official environment marked by concealment and evasion, 
Hiroshima remained jaggedly real. The missiles were out of sight, under­
ground or underwater, their horror only potential, but what happened 
at Hiroshima (and Nagasaki) could be instantly grasped and invoked: 
the print of a woman's blouse fabric burned into her skin, a battered 
pocket watch forever frozen at 8:15 A.M., shadowy images of human be­
ings vaporized by the blast. Such evidence offered a permanent reminder 
that the nuclear threat was not simply potential or theoretical. An actual 
city had been destroyed, actual human beings had died. As Robert Lifton 
wrote in 1980, "We require Hiroshima and its images to give substance 
to our own terrors, however inadequately that city represents what would 
happen now if thermonuclear weapons were dropped on a human popu­
lation. As much as we must decry the atomic bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, it is possible that these cities already have contributed sig­
nificantly to our tenuous hold on the imagery of extinction. They have 
kept alive our imagination of holocaust and, perhaps, helped to keep us 
alive as well." 
Hiroshima memories subversively undercut the techno-rational vo­
cabulary of the nuclear theorists. Artifacts from the shattered city, 
whether survivors' narratives, photographs or watercolors, or the prose 
of a Hersey or an Ibuse, cut through the strategists' bloodless prose. As 
Jean Bethke Elshtain has observed, "Human beings think most often in 
images; a terrible or delightful picture comes into our minds and then 
we seek to find words to express it, to capture it, to make it somehow 
manageable. Thus it is with the possibility of nuclear war. Our images 
are fixed. The scenes of utter destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki; 
two cities laid waste; people disappeared, remaining as shadows on ce­
ment or persisting in a terrible and painful twilight zone of lingering 
death from radiation." 
But precisely how, if at all, did Hiroshima memories actually affect 
nuclear policy? Evidence of direct influence on policymakers is scant. 
When I asked former secretary of defense Robert McNamara in 1985 if 
he could recall any film, novel, painting, or other imaginative work that 
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had shaped his view of nuclear war, he candidly replied: "No, I don't 
think so. . .  . I was so associated with the Defense Department and writ­
ings related to the Defense Department that were . . . scientific, or tech­
nical, or political in character that I think it was those rather than artistic 
expression that influenced my thinking." 
But the effect of Hiroshima images on grassroots opinion, and thus 
in defining the parameters within which policymakers operate, while 
difficult to quantify, has surely been important. From 1945 through the 
1980s, antinuclear activists usedfilms, photographs, paintings, journalis­
tic accounts, firsthand testimony, fiction, and poetry based on the Hiro­
shima and Nagasaki bombings to convey the human meaning of nuclear 
attack, rouse awareness of the continuing threat, and build support for 
disarmament. 
A few scholars, usually antinuclear activists themselves, have at­
tempted to measure this effect. In the late 1960s, disturbed by wide­
spread apathy about the nuclear threat, the sociologists Donald Granberg 
and Norman Faye showed the harrowing documentary film Hiroshima-
Nagasaki 1945 to students at the University of Missouri and then mea­
sured the results by questionnaire. After several screenings they reported: 
"It was our impression that the film was doing what we wanted: making 
concrete something that is ordinarily seen as an abstraction, and sensi­
tizing people to the victims and potential victims of nuclear war." The 
questionnaires confirmed this impression: The film increased most stu­
dents' "anxiety regarding nuclear war, decrease [d] the desire to survive a 
nuclear war, raise[d] the sufficient provocation threshold, and lower[ed] 
the maximum tolerable casualty threshold." 
A decade later, a doctoral student in history at Illinois State Uni­
versity devised a teaching unit on Hiroshima and then tested its results 
on undergraduates at Illinois State and on students in an Indiana high 
school. The unit included films documenting the devastation and 
suffering caused by the Hiroshima bombing, as well as material on Tru-
man's atomic-bomb decision. Results were mixed. For example, the high 
school students who completed the study unit showed greater agreement 
with the statement "War is not a satisfactory way to settle disputes" and 
heightened awareness of the "danger of nuclear extinction," but they also 
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showed greater agreement with the statements "The dropping of the 
atomic bomb was a moral act" and "The bomb was used to save lives 
and shorten the war." Apparently the visual material from Hiroshima 
heightened apprehensions about a future nuclear war, while the print 
material convinced some students that Truman's 1945 decision was justi­
fiable and wise. 
Other research suggested that many factors shaped attitudes toward 
nuclear-related issues, and thus toward the meaning of Hiroshima. In an 
attitudinal study of 477 Californians conducted in 1969-70, for ex­
ample, the sociologist Vincent Jeffries found the greatest readiness to 
accept nuclear war in defense of "our national interests" among the gen­
eration born before 1927, and the least readiness among those born be­
tween 1943 and 1949- In other words, Americans who had learned of 
Hiroshima as adults, and who had lived with the knowledge the longest, 
showed a higher tolerance for nuclear war than did those with no direct 
memories of the event. Such evidence casts doubt on the assumption, 
often implicit in the antinuclear camp, that the sharper the Hiroshima 
memories, the greater the aversion to nuclear war. For the older age 
group, news of the atomic bomb had come in a specific historical con­
text: at the close of a popular war against a hated enemy. The younger 
and more vehemently antinuclear group in Jeffries s study, by contrast, 
knew Hiroshima and Nagasaki in a more culturally mediated, less histor­
ically rooted framework. 
Political ideology as well as age affected how one read the Hiroshima 
story. For example, from the 1950s through the 1980s, antinuclear activ­
ists cited medical data from Hiroshima to show the long-term radiologi­
cal hazards of nuclear war. But others used the same evidence for 
different purposes. In 1955, just as the "Hiroshima Maidens" arrived, 
the conservative U.S. News & World Report published an upbeat inter­
view with Dr. Robert H. Holmes, director of the Hiroshima research 
project. The boldface summaries accompanying the interview conveyed 
the magazines rose-tinted slant on the story: "In 190,000 survivors: 100 
cases of leukemia, some mild eye cataracts, the next generation is normal 
. . . No genetic changes thus far in the first generation . . . Many within 
2,000 meters did not show radiation effects . . . Only 15 percent of 
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deaths due solely to radiation . . . Children of survivors appear happy, 
well adjusted . . . Usually fertility returns with general health . . . The 
Atomic Age is here, let's not be afraid of it." 
Three photographs illustrated the story: a devastated Hiroshima in 
1945; a healthy-looking young survivor being measured by a kindly re­
searcher; and three generations of a Hiroshima family, including a boy 
born before August 1945, one in utero when the bomb fell, and one 
born after the bombing, all apparently in the bloom of health. At the 
time this cheerful feature appeared, U.S. News was faithfully echoing the 
government's theme that through civil defense, atomic war would not be 
so bad. The message was clear: Hiroshima had been destroyed, but recov­
ery had been quick, and all was now well. 
Religious beliefs influenced perceptions of Hiroshima's meaning as 
well. For some biblical literalists (see chapter 9), the annihilation of two 
cities and the prospect of a vastly more destructive nuclear war repre­
sented essential steps in a foreordained sequence of end-time events. In 
this providential narrative, Hiroshima functioned not as a cautionary ex­
ample but as a sign pointing to a glorious future as God's divine plan 
unfolded. 
Not only was the meaning of "Hiroshima" contested, but the re­
peated use of this image by activists always carried the risk of exploiting 
the actual event and of subordinating it to one's own agenda. Paul Good­
man addressed this risk in a sardonic and doubtlessly unfair comment 
on Death in Life: "The survivors of Hiroshima, Dr. Lifton has shown us, 
are certainly fucked up, but they are not so fucked up as Dr. Lifton. After 
all, it is rather much to drop an atom bomb on people and then to come 
ask them how they feel about it." Hiroyuki Agawa made a similar point 
in his 1957 novel Devil's Heritage, which bitterly attacked the U.S. medi­
cal research project in Hiroshima for treating the hibakusha like guinea 
pigs. As Hiroshima memories were transmuted into literature and visual 
images, and as cautionary lessons were drawn from the ordeal of the city 
and its inhabitants, the reality of what actually happened on August 6, 
1945—and why—sometimes seemed to blur. As the Japanese architect 
repeatedly tells the French actress in Hiroshima Mon Amour, when she 
describes the photographs and artifacts displayed in the city's atomic-
bomb museum, "You have seen nothing." 
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The issues involved in manipulating and imaginatively reworking 
historical events can become exceedingly complex. In Death in Life, Lif-
ton reflected perceptively on the symbolic status of Hiroshima, distin­
guishing it from other cities devastated by war: "When we hear reports 
about the Hiroshima bomb, our emotions are not exactly the same as 
when confronted with equivalent evidence of bomb destruction in Lon­
don, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Dresden, or Tokyo. These cities, to be sure, 
convey their own messages of man's capacity and inclination to assault 
himself. But with Hiroshima (and her neglected historical sister, Naga­
saki) something more is involved: a dimension of totality, a sense of ulti­
mate annihilation—of cities, nations, the world." 
Yet this unique emotional power rested in part on extracting "Hiro­
shima" from history and elevating it to the realm of metaphor. Lifton 
himself, with admirable motives, contributed to this process, as he made 
the psychically numbed hibakusha symbols of a numbed world. But he 
was hardly alone. Many who spoke out against nuclear war over the de­
cades used memories of Hiroshima in this instrumental and potentially 
exploitative fashion. For some activists, invoking "Hiroshima" became a 
way to avoid hard thinking, an emotional button that could always be 
pressed, a high-voltage jolt to any discourse. 
But the effect of this jolt could not always be anticipated. For some, 
it simply roused terror. The Australian pediatrician and antinuclear ac­
tivist Helen Caldicott (see chapter 10) faced criticism in the early 1980s 
for what some saw as her irresponsible manipulation of fearful images. 
For others, repeated exposure to the "Hiroshima" image seems to have 
produced the very numbing that Lifton deplored. Symbols—even the 
most potent ones—decay over time. As Andy Warhol once observed: 
"When you see a gruesome picture over and over again, it doesn't really 
have any effect." Hiroshima was not immune to this process. As early as 
1981 a journalist wrote: "Hiroshima has become one more historical cli­
che, like Lexington or the Battle of New Orleans." Contributing to this 
deadening process was the ubiquitous practice of using Hiroshima as a 
convenient date marker in book titles, as in The American Past: A History 
of the United States from Concord to Hiroshima; Cold War America: From 
Hiroshima to Watergate; or From Harding to Hiroshima: An Anecdotal His­
tory of the United States from 1923 to 1945. New imaginative works in 
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different genres helped revive the image, but as 1945 receded further into 
the past, the loss of immediacy and resonance that eventually envelops 
even the most horrendous or momentous historical events inevitably 
took its toll. 
Hiroshima, then, has clearly played a crucial and a complex role in post­
war American thought and culture. The slowly dimming memory of Au­
gust 6, 1945, has functioned as a palimpsest on which many different 
fears, expectations, and political agendas have been imprinted. In the 
realm of cultural imagery, "Hiroshima" has functioned as a kind of 
empty vessel, replicating the literal void created in August 1945. As one 
survivor described his experience immediately after the bombing: "I 
climbed Hijiyama hill and looked down. I saw that Hiroshima had dis­
appeared. . . . Hiroshima just didn't exist." As the actual city was rebuilt 
and became the bustling metropolis of today, the "Hiroshima" of the 
imagination floated free, playing its ambiguous role in the first half cen­
tury of our encounter with nuclear weapons. 
And what of the future? Will Hiroshima gradually fade from our 
cultural and political discourse? The Cold War is over, and while nuclear 
menaces remain, the threats of the superpower nuclear arms race and 
of global thermonuclear holocaust have clearly ebbed. Under these cir­
cumstances, cultural attention to Hiroshima—always closely linked to 
broader cycles of nuclear awareness and activism—has diminished 
sharply. "For most people," the historian Richard Minear observed in 
1993, "Hiroshima has become a non-issue." 
Such judgments, of course, are relative. Hiroshima is obviously in no 
danger of vanishing entirely from the arena of either scholarly or cultural 
discourse. Atomic Ghost, a 1995 anthology of nuclear-age poetry contains 
several poems about the city and its fate. Evidence for its continued 
power to stir the imagination is provided, too, by a recent three-act play 
about Hiroshima by Walter A. Davis, a professor of English at Ohio State 
University. The drama begins realistically, in 1989 at an Ohio shopping 
mall, with a book-signing by Paul Tibbets, the Enola Copilot (an actual 
event in which Davis participated as a protester bearing a sign pro­
claiming: "Mourn: Hiroshima Was Mass Murder"). But it soon takes a 
surreal and expressionistic turn. Tibbets, kidnapped by a historian, re­
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calls his career, and Truman, Stimson, Oppenheimer, and a group of hi­
bakusha make appearances. In a hallucinatory final scene suggesting the 
enduring vitality of the Hiroshima memory, the historian shoots Tibbets, 
but the former pilot "rises from the dead and reclaims his spot and begins 
again to sign copies of his book for the queue in a never-ending process." 
Meanwhile, however, the ranks of those who actually remember the 
events of fifty years ago grow thinner. In another twenty-five years, when 
"Hiroshima" is nearly as remote as "Verdun" is today, what will be its 
symbolic status? If the danger of nuclear war continues to lessen, it will 
probably join Carthage and Waterloo in the graveyard of dead symbols, 
drained of urgency, a shorthand convenience for textbook writers. 
But given the human capacity for mischief and the nuclear knowl­
edge that is now an ineradicable part of our mental storehouse, the 
chances seem at least even for Hiroshima to play its symbolic role again, 
as the world confronts the nuclear threat in some new form. In Helen 
Caldicott's epidemiological language, the virus has entered a latent 
phase, but it survives. We still live with the new reality encoded in that 
innocuous-looking metal sphere as it lazily drifted six miles down from 
the Enola Gay to a point 570 meters above the Aioi Bridge: epicenter of 
the nuclear age. 
1  6

THE ENOLA GAY CONTROVERSY AND THE 
PERILS OF "HISTORICAL REVISIONISM" 
Athe fiftieth anniversary of the Hiroshima and Naga­saki bombings neared, a long-planned exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space 
Museum (NASM) became the focus of a bitter dispute. As 
early as 1989, NASM officials had decided to mount a major 
exhibit on the atomic bombing of Japan, using as a center­
piece the Enola Gay, the plane that dropped the Hiroshima 
bomb. Developed by the museum curators in consultation 
with historians and other scholars, the planned exhibit in­
cluded, along with the technical and military aspects of the 
story, exhibits conveying the bombs' immediate effects; the 
role of the atomic bomb in the early Cold War; and a spec­
trum of opinion about the decision to drop the bomb, pro 
and con. The critical voices included not only "revisionist" 
historians, but also respected figures of 1945—including 
political and military leaders—who at one time sharply 
questioned Trumans decision. 
As word of the exhibit spread, vocal protest erupted 
from veterans' organizations and Washington politicians, 
who insisted that the exhibit be patriotic and celebratory. 
Reacting to the pressure, the Smithsonian scuttled its origi­
nal plans, radically scaled back the exhibit, and eliminated 
all textual and visual material that could conceivably rouse 
controversy. 
This heavily publicized dispute—one of several involv­
ing government-funded exhibits around the same time—at-
tracted much attention among historians. When my friends 
246 
 247 The "Enola Gay" Controversy
Edward Linen thai of the University of Wisconsin—Oshkosh 
and Tom Engelhardt of Henry Holt (in an earlier incarna­
tion the editor at Pantheon with whom I had worked on By 
the Bomb's Early Light), asked me to contribute to a collec­
tion of essays on the controversy, I agreed. 
This concluding chapter is adapted from the essay I 
wrote for that book, History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other 
Battles for the American Past (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, Henry Holt, 1996). Seeking to place the 1995 con­
troversy in the larger context of Americas nuclear history, 
it sums up my fifteen-year scholarly engagement with the 
bomb—and an episodic personal involvement that covers 
nearly my entire life. 
"AS SOON AS you bring historians in, you run into problems. You get dis­
tortions." This comment might well have been made by one of the 
Washington politicians or veterans' organizations that in 1994 attacked 
the Smithsonian Institution's plans for an exhibit observing the fiftieth 
anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, In fact, 
a Shinto priest at Japan s Yasukuni shrine to the nation s war dead made 
it while criticizing proposals to add an educational component to the 
shrines commemorative functions. The priest's comment reminds us of 
the universality of the suspicions and hostility that historians can arouse 
when they become involved in matters about which great numbers of 
citizens feel passionate emotion. 
With the fiftieth anniversary of the Second World War's final events 
behind us, we can perhaps begin to gain some perspective on the remark­
able rancor the commemorative effort unleashed. The storm center of 
the controversy was, of course, the proposed Enola Gay exhibit at the 
Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum, which was to feature extensive 
treatment of the current state of historical scholarship on the decision to 
drop the atomic bomb and the ending of the war, as well as the bombs' 
immediate effects on the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the 
long-term implications of the development and use of nuclear weapons. 
As early drafts of the exhibit text became known, the 180,000-
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member Air Force Association, the 3-million-member American Legion, 
a small group calling itself the Committee for the Restoration and Proud 
Display of the Enola Gay, and conservative members of Congress, some 
genuinely offended, some sensing the issue's demagogic potential, de­
nounced the exhibit as "anti-American," insensitive to veterans, and 
overly sympathetic to the bomb victims. 
Enola Gay pilot Paul Tibbets blasted the planned exhibit as "a pack­
age of insults." President Bill Clinton, attuned as always to the ever-
shifting currents of public opinion, aligned himself with the veterans' 
organizations and unqualifiedly endorsed the actions of his predecessor 
in the White House half a century before. Editorial opinion overwhelm­
ingly lined up against the Smithsonian. The right-wing politician Pat 
Buchanan detected a sinister conspiracy in the whole affair: "In all this, 
friends, there is something less benign than the timidity of academics 
desperate to be seen as politically correct. What is under way is a sleepless 
campaign to inculcate in American youth a revulsion toward Americas 
past." 
Numerous meetings and extensive modifications in the exhibit text 
did no good. When the smoke cleared, the exhibit had been scrapped; 
the museum director had been forced out; and Republicans in Congress 
(joined by a few Democrats) were gearing up for hearings that for a time 
threatened to turn into a McCarthyite witch-hunt for the sinister and 
disloyal persons responsible for the shameful exhibit. When the Senate 
hearings began in May 1995, Chairman Ted Stevens (R.-Alaska) asked 
ominously: "What went wrong with [the Smithsonian's] management 
practices, and what steps have been taken to correct the revisionist and 
'politically correct' bias that was contained in the original script?" 
(Though marked by senatorial rancor and ill-temper, the hearings actu­
ally proved fairly tepid and inconclusive.) 
Reeling and shell-shocked, the Smithsonian mounted a cautious, 
scaled-back exhibit that simply portrayed the fuselage of the Enola Gay 
and videos of the crew, with minimal historical context on President Tru-
man's decision, the bomb's human toll, or the long-term consequences 
of its use. The air force historian Richard P. Hallion dismissed the new 
exhibit as "a beer can with a label." Another historian, Kai Bird, modi­
fying the chilling term "ethnic cleansing" coined by the genocidal Bos­
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nian Serbs, spoke of a "historical cleansing" of the museum. A cartoon 
in the Boston Globe pictured a totally empty museum with an official 
announcing: "We're returning to our original mission as the air and space 
museum." An ironic outcome of the episode, as we shall see, was that far 
more Americans undoubtedly became aware of the scholarly debate over 
the atomic-bomb decision than would otherwise have been the case. 
While the Smithsonian flap attracted the most public attention, the 
fiftieth-anniversary cultural struggle over the meaning of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki erupted on other fronts as well, even in the arcane realm of 
postage-stamp design. Because of their ubiquity, lowly postage stamps 
represent a significant visual means by which a nation's historical percep­
tion can be shaped; hence the controversy over a proposed stamp com­
memorating the atomic bomb. The original U.S. Postal Service plan was 
to issue an "atomic bomb" stamp as part of an ongoing series recalling 
the major landmarks of World War II. Those planned for 1995 release 
would have noted the principal events of 1945, including the atomic 
bombings—certainly the most notable war events of that year apart from 
the actual capitulation of Germany and Japan. 
Planning went forward in the recesses of the postal bureaucracy. At 
one point I received a telephone call from a historian friend who had 
been asked to evaluate an early draft of the proposed stamp. (I had not 
realized until then how carefully the planned textual and visual content 
of stamps is reviewed and evaluated. The Citizens Stamp Advisory Com­
mittee oversees the process, consulting specialists in various fields.) In 
this version, the mushroom cloud appeared to float in space, with no 
hint that a city lay below; the historical tag line read (as I recall) "Atomic 
Bombs Level Hiroshima and Nagasaki." I immediately agreed with my 
friend that some geographic features should be included to link the 
bomb to its target, and that the word "Level"—with its bland and even 
positive connotations (as in, "This is absolutely on the level")—be re­
placed by a more accurate phrase, perhaps "Atomic Bombs Destroy Hiro­
shima and Nagasaki." In fact, the message was softened, rather than 
made more precise, eventually evolving into: "Atomic Bombs Hasten 
Wars End." 
But the entire issue soon became moot. In December 1994, under 
protest from the Japanese government, with whom his administration 
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was already embroiled in trade conflicts, President Bill Clinton canceled 
the much-revised stamp entirely, relegating it to the limbo reserved for 
postage stamps that never actually reach the nation's post offices. 
In one way or another, across America, journalists, pundits, and or­
dinary citizens found themselves unexpectedly wrestling with the histori­
cal meaning of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the angry months leading 
up to the fiftieth anniversary of the bombings. In a Gallup poll jointly 
commissioned by USA Today and the Cable News Network, 59 percent 
of Americans expressed approval of Truman's decision, with 35 percent 
disapproving. Fifty years after the event, Americans remained uncertain 
and deeply divided about its meaning. 
THE BOMB AND THE "GOOD WAR" 
Why do Hiroshima and Nagasaki stir so restlessly in our national psyche 
after the passage of half a century? Why do we have such trouble not only 
reaching consensus about how we should view these events, but even 
discussing them calmly and rationally? The fiftieth anniversaries of Pearl 
Harbor, D Day, Germany's surrender, and other landmarks of World 
War II were observed by public ceremonies and general agreement about 
their significance, but Hiroshima and Nagasaki generated only recrimi­
nation and angry debate. 
One reason Americans have had so much trouble coming to terms 
with Hiroshima and Nagasaki lies in the fact that what our atomic 
bombs did to those cities did not lend itself to the prevailing public view 
of World War II as the "Good War"—a noble struggle against forces that 
threatened not only Western values but the survival of civilization itself. 
Particularly in the aftermath of the bitterly divisive Vietnam conflict, 
Americans looked back nostalgically to the 1941—45 period as a time 
when the nation's aims were unambiguously clear and just, a time when 
nearly all citizens had rallied behind the government. This show of una­
nimity was sharply at variance with the turmoil of the 1960s. No campus 
protesters in 1944 had accused Franklin Roosevelt of being a baby killer; 
no one had dubbed the conflict "Stimsons War." On the contrary, World 
War II symbolized a moment of shared national purpose and unity in a 
righteous cause. Studs TerkeFs decision to call his 1984 oral history of 
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World War II The "Good War" helped fix this image in the public mind 
(though his quotation marks suggest certain reservations about the ap­
propriateness of the popular label). 
Of course, even without the atomic bomb, this version of the war 
elided some awkward realities. The Roosevelt administrations grudging 
response to the plight of European Jewry, the arrest and internment of 
Japanese-American citizens, black-market chiselers and wartime profi­
teers, the persistence of racism in the military and on the home front, the 
incineration of Dresden and other German cities, and the firebombing of 
Tokyo on the night of March 10-11, 1945 (in which more people may 
have died than initially perished at Hiroshima), all complicate the Nor­
man Rockwell image of the war. Historians have explored these darker 
facets of the conflict, and some history textbooks deal with them, but 
they have not cast much of a shadow in either the public memory or the 
media's treatment of the war. 
Although the popular image of the "Good War" involved selective 
memory and the downplaying of certain awkward facts, it also contained 
much truth. By and large—and certainly in contrast to the Vietnam 
era—1941—45 did mark a time of national unity and moral clarity. The 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have long complicated this picture 
of a crusade pursued by a unified nation employing wholly justifiable 
means. They are the misshapen pieces that prevent us from completing 
the puzzle in an entirely satisfactory fashion. While some of the awkward 
realities noted above were partially redressed as the years passed—survi-
vors of internment camps were belatedly compensated; a Holocaust me­
morial arose in Washington; the civil-rights movement erased some more 
blatant forms of racial segregation—the issues posed by the atomic anni­
hilation of two cities remained contested terrain. As the semicentennial 
approached in 1995, the subject seemed further from closure than ever. 
Once the anniversary passed, the controversy no longer dominated the 
front pages, but the wounds and animosities remained. 
The inability to fit the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki com­
fortably into the "Good War" paradigm did not prevent those events 
from figuring prominently in the politics and culture of the Cold War 
years. As we saw in chapter 15, the very uncertainty that surrounded the 
meaning of those acts made them available for a variety of polemical uses. 
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President Truman initially presented the Manhattan Project as an awe-
inspiring scientific achievement and defended his decision to drop the 
bomb as a fully justifiable action that had ended the war, saved untold 
thousands of American lives, and repaid Japan for Pearl Harbor, the Ba­
taan Death March, and other atrocities. As the wartime enemy became 
the postwar ally, the argument that the bomb "saved American lives" was 
sometimes expanded to encompass the contention that it had also as­
sured the survival of thousands of Japanese who would otherwise have 
been killed in the invasion that supposedly would have become inevita­
ble had the bombs not been dropped. On the evidence of public opinion 
polls, a huge majority of Americans initially accepted this justification 
for the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and a majority— 
though a steadily dwindling one—has continued to do so ever since. 
This popular endorsement of the government's rationale for the 
dropping of two atomic bombs in 1945 may in part reflect the public's 
insulation from the human consequences of that action. From the first, 
Washington officialdom, often with the support of the media, offered for 
public consumption a selective, sanitized version of these events. In Ja­
pan, as Wilfred Burchett s memoir Shadows ofHiroshima describes, U.S. 
Occupation authorities strictly censored photographs and films showing 
bomb victims. Medical data on both the short-term blast-and-fire effects 
and the long-term consequences of radiation exposure (not only at Hiro­
shima and Nagasaki but also at later nuclear test sites in the Marshall 
Islands and the American Southwest) were kept from the public or dis­
cussed in bland and general terms. 
Preceding the publication of Henry Stimsons highly influential— 
and artfully misleading—1947 essay on the atomic-bomb decision, 
Stimson and his collaborators made their purpose crystal clear in letters 
discussing the article: to influence the larger public by reaching teachers 
and other opinion molders. In James Conant's words, the aim was to 
combat the "sentimentalism" that, if not resisted, could "have a great deal 
of influence on the next generation." Conant continued in a September 
1946 letter to Harvey Bundy, "A small minority, if it represents the type 
of person who is both sentimental and verbally minded and in contact 
with youth, may result in a distortion of history." From such concerns 
the Stimson essay took shape, and in the years that followed, it played a 
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significant role in sustaining the official version of events and warding 
off the inroads of "sentimentality" that Conant so feared. 
Hollywood films like The Beginning or the End{ 1947), a ludicrously 
fictionalized version of the Manhattan Project and the decision to drop 
the bomb, and Above and Beyond (1953), a formulaic tale of marital dis­
cord and reconciliation supposedly based on the life of Paul W. Tibbets 
Jr., the pilot for the Hiroshima mission, further shored up the official 
government version. Since most Americans very much wanted to believe 
the fundamental message of all this propaganda—that dropping the 
bomb was essential, wholly justified, and fully in keeping with the na-
tion's high war aims—the opinion-molding effort proved highly effec­
tive. The subtle process of creating a dominant hegemonic discourse (to 
use Gramscian analytic terms) unfolded in almost textbook fashion in 
the shaping of postwar American attitudes about the atomic bombing 
of Japan. 
The campaign to forestall criticism of Truman's decision was part of 
a larger government and media effort throughout the early postwar pe­
riod to soothe atomic fears and play down the true effects of nuclear 
weapons. In its August 11, 1951, issue, to cite only one of hundreds of 
examples, Collier's magazine published "Patty, the Atomic Pig." The ar­
ticle was based on an actual incident in which a piglet that was part of 
the "Noah's Ark" of goats, pigs, rats, and other experimental animals as­
sembled for the July 1946 Operation Crossroads nuclear test at Bikini 
atoll was later found swimming in the radioactive waters of Bikini 
lagoon. The Collier's story, presented as a whimsical fairy tale, began: 
"Once upon a time, there was a great group of generals, admirals, scien­
tists, newsmen and curious people who wanted to know more about 
atomic explosions." Illustrated with cute drawings, the story imagined 
Pattys thoughts before the blast ("cMy, oh, my,' thought the little piglet, 
'What will become of us all?'") and her adventures afterwards ("Patricia 
swam as fast as she could thrash her little legs, holding her nose high out 
of the water"). Patty not only survives (no scary radiation-exposure haz­
ards here!) but grows to be a six-hundred-pound porker under the benev­
olent care of kindly scientists at the Naval Medical Research Institute at 
Bethesda, Maryland, and ends her days as a coddled exhibit in a zoo. 
Sugar-coated propaganda like this, part of a mountain of material in the 
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media that reinforced the government's version both of the 1945 bomb­
ings and of Washington's subsequent nuclear program, served to deflect 
and neutralize serious scrutiny of the meaning and the implications of 
atomic weaponry, past, present, or future. 
For all its power and pervasiveness, however, the official justification 
for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki never achieved abso­
lute dominance; a "counterhegemonic discourse" was present from the 
beginning. The Hiroshima announcement immediately seized the atten­
tion of theologians, ethicists, pacifists, religious leaders, and other Ameri­
cans concerned about the moral implications of war. Many pointed to 
the instantaneous annihilation of that city, and then of Nagasaki, as the 
logical (and chilling) culmination of a long twentieth-century process by 
which the rhetoric of "total war" radically undermined the centuries-old 
"just war" doctrine (most fully articulated by Roman Catholic theolo­
gians) that sought to shield civilian populations from the worst horrors 
of wartime. 
The distinction between civilians and combatants had broken down 
badly in the course of World War II. The leaders of all the belligerent na­
tions, including President Roosevelt, spoke the language of "total war," 
insisting that every citizen, not just the military forces, share in the 
struggle. Wartime vegetable plots became "victory gardens"; the sale of 
government bonds became "victory drives." Even children were milita­
rized. I vividly recall the pressures in my third- and fourth-grade classes 
at Fairview Elementary School in Dayton, Ohio, to buy war stamps, col­
lect scrap metal, and turn in pencil stubs for the graphite they contained. 
(Worried about what my pacifist parents might think of these efforts, I 
once asked my teacher to return a pencil stub I had contributed, leading 
her to ridicule me before the class as an "Indian giver.") If an entire soci­
ety is mobilized for war, the argument goes, the entire society also be­
comes a legitimate target of war. President Truman, justifying the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, accurately pointed out that they 
were centers of military production—just as were Seattle, Los Angeles, 
and countless other U.S. cities. 
The atomic bombing was only the culminating act in the breaking 
down of a never wholly inviolable ethical barrier—already breached in 
World War I by Germany's U-boat attacks on passenger ships, at Guer­
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nica and Nanking in the 1930s, in the Nazi V-2 raids on London, 
Antwerp, and other Allied cities, and in the Allied firebombings of 
Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo, and other teeming urban centers. But the 
Manhattan Project's technological gift to President Truman rendered the 
mass extermination of civilians vastly more efficient, radically raising 
the stakes of the larger postwar debate over the viability of the just-war 
doctrine and the ethical implications of the total-war language so enthu­
siastically embraced by wartime leaders. 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki also naturally pervaded the discourse of 
antinuclear campaigners. As the Cold War deepened, and waves of nu­
clear fear periodically swept the nation, activists regularly invoked the 
two cities' names as reminders of what must never happen again. As we 
have seen, in each period of heightened nuclear fear and activism from 
1945 onward, Hiroshima and Nagasaki did polemical duty as emblems 
of a global fate to be avoided at all costs. 
HISTORIANS CONFRONT THE BOMB 
Despite the use of "Hiroshima" and "Nagasaki" as shorthand points of 
reference in various public discourses, the origins and consequences of 
the actual atomic bombings of August 6 and 9, 1945, already obscured 
by official censorship and deception, grew steadily dimmer in public 
memory with the passing years. In the early 1960s, however, historians 
and other scholars turned a fresh eye on those events, and especially on 
President Truman's decision to authorize the military use of the awesome 
new superweapon at a moment when Japan's warmaking capability was 
near collapse. Their cumulative findings made it increasingly hard for 
informed observers to view this decision from the simplistic and uncriti­
cal perspective of 1945. 
Even from the earliest moments of the atomic age, some had chal­
lenged the official rationale for dropping the bomb. In a radio broadcast 
on April 26, 1946, the liberal news commentator Raymond Gram Swing 
said: "I have heard it argued that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was 
in effect dropped on the Russians, since it was not needed to bring the 
Japanese war to a close, but to establish and demonstrate a vast margin of 
power superiority over the Soviet Union." The British scientist P. M. S. 
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Blackett, a political radical, developed the same argument in a 1948 
work, Fear, War, and the Bomb. 
Not all the criticism came from the left. General Dwight D. Eisen­
hower and other military figures expressed reservations about Truman's 
resort to the atomic bomb, as did such Republican stalwarts as Herbert 
Hoover and John Foster Dulles. Indeed, in the 1950s it was often right-
wing publications, such as William F. Buckley's National Review, that 
voiced retroactive skepticism about this momentous decision taken by a 
Democratic president. 
But not until the 1960s did this dissident viewpoint gain a signifi­
cant scholarly hearing. In Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End 
of World War II(1961), Herbert Feis, while generally supportive of Tru-
man's action, became the first major American historian to suggest that 
the calculations underlying it might have been more complex than offi­
cial dogma conceded. 
Only in 1965, though, with the publication of Gar Alperovitz's 
Atomic Diplomacy, did an American academic radically challenge the re­
ceived interpretation. Why the rush to deploy the new weapon when 
some top leaders of Tokyo's wartime government were urgently signaling 
a desire to end the fighting, asked Alperovitz? Why did Washington so 
vehemently insist on "unconditional surrender" prior to August 6, only 
to do an abrupt about-face and accept a whopping condition—Emperor 
Hirohito could remain on his throne—as soon as the bombs were 
dropped? 
Any meaningful response to these questions, Alperovitz concluded, 
required attention to broader strategic and economic considerations. 
A dramatic demonstration of the atomic bomb's destructive power, he 
suggested, promised to introduce a potent new factor in U.S. dealings 
with the Soviet Union, a wartime ally already shaping up as a postwar 
adversary. Doubtless the passions of war, the impulse to avenge Pearl 
Harbor, Japanese atrocities, and the appeal of ending the war with a 
fantastic display of American firepower rather than by painstaking nego­
tiations (which would later have to be explained to a restive public) 
all played their role—especially after the desperate and bloody Okinawa 
campaign of March—June 1945- But other considerations entered the 
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picture as well, considerations that scholars began to probe with in­
creasing insistence. 
Despite Truman's later claims, suggested Alperovitz (and soon other 
scholars as well), the grim prospect of a land invasion of the Japanese 
main islands, tentatively scheduled to begin November 1, was not neces­
sarily paramount in the president's mind in late July and early August 
1945. He was in fact, they argued, more concerned with how, precisely, 
the war might be ended in the coming few weeks or even days. If a spec­
tacular American blow demonstrating an awesome new secret weapon, 
not Russia's imminent declaration of war (pledged by Stalin at Yalta and 
again at Potsdam), were seen as having forced Japans capitulation, Amer-
ica's role in postwar Japan and in Asia, as well as Washington's bargaining 
posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in shaping the politics and the econ­
omy of postwar Europe, might be vastly enhanced. 
Combing the primary sources, Alperovitz—and an impressive group 
of historians that eventually included Martin Sherwin of Tufts Univer­
sity; Barton Bernstein of Stanford University; Robert Messer of the Uni­
versity of Illinois—Chicago; Michael Sherry of Northwestern University; 
J. Samuel Walker, historian of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 
James S. Hershberg, director of the Cold War History Project at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center; such independent scholars as 
Stanley Goldberg and Kai Bird; and a number of others—documented 
a variety of considerations that clearly seemed relevant to a full under­
standing of Truman's decision. Stanley Goldberg, for example, empha­
sized that Truman and his inner circle of atomic advisers, including 
General Leslie R. Groves, majordomo of the Manhattan Project, feared 
an angry public and congressional reaction if they failed to use a new 
weapon that they had secretly spent billions to develop. Hershberg, in a 
massively researched biography of James Conant, a member of the In­
terim Committee that advised Truman on atomic matters, revealed that 
the high-minded university president favored demonstrating the bomb's 
power in the most awesome possible way—by destroying a city—as the 
best hope of rallying world support for postwar international control of 
atomic energy. 
Meanwhile, John Dower's War without Mercy: Race and Power in the 
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Pacific War (1986) documented the racism that pervaded America's anti-
Japanese wartime propaganda (as well as Japan s anti-American wartime 
propaganda). Eagle against the Sun: The American Warwith Japan (1985) 
by the historian Ronald Spector (a Vietnam veteran and member of the 
U.S. Marine Corps Reserves) similarly emphasized the centrality of rac­
ism on both sides. This, too, it seemed, must be factored into the equa­
tion when evaluating Truman's readiness to drop two atomic bombs on 
a defeated Asian nation. 
Washington's original justification for the A-bomb decision arose in 
the specific context of the immediate postwar period, when wartime pas­
sions still ran high, and the Cold War and the nuclear arms race were 
just taking shape. The post-1965 wave of critical scholarship about the 
bomb was shaped by a very different historical moment. Alperovitz, born 
in 1936, represented a younger generation of historians who came of age 
politically in Cold War America, when the bomb (now called a "thermo­
nuclear weapon") evoked not so much the memory of victory over Japan 
as thoughts of nuclear tests, radioactive fallout, a grim struggle with the 
Soviet Union, and the threat of a world-destroying thermonuclear holo­
caust. As an undergraduate at the University of Wisconsin, Alperovitz 
encountered the historian William Appleman Williams, who was radi­
cally revising diplomatic history by insisting on the primacy of economic 
factors—especially the influence of corporate capitalism—in shaping 
U.S. foreign policy. 
After earning an M.A. in economics at Berkeley and a stint as legisla­
tive assistant to Robert Kastenmeier, a Wisconsin congressman known 
for his antimilitarist views, Alperovitz entered a doctoral program in po­
litical economy at Cambridge University, where he read with economist 
Joan Robinson, who, like Williams, stressed the interplay of politics, eco­
nomics, and diplomacy. Alperovitzs 1963 dissertation (published two 
years later by Simon and Schuster) was a product of all these experiences. 
Reflecting Joan Robinson's influence, his initial thesis topic had not been 
the atomic-bomb decision but wartime Washington's economic and 
political planning for postwar eastern Europe. This led him first to the 
larger topic of how Washington policymakers viewed the Soviet Union, 
and then to how these postwar calculations influenced the Truman ad­
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ministrations strategy for ending the Pacific war. The specific issue of the 
atomic bomb was originally quite peripheral to his research focus. 
When Atomic Diplomacy appeared in 1965 (timed by the publisher 
to coincide with the twentieth anniversary of the Hiroshima and Naga­
saki bombings), reviewers and scholars at once recognized it as a thor­
oughgoing challenge to a version of the atomic-bomb story that for two 
decades had enjoyed broad public assent and minimal critical scrutiny. 
The book and the times were made for each other. Early in 1965, Presi­
dent Lyndon Johnson massively escalated the Vietnam War—and he did 
so with a decision to launch an intensive bombing campaign against 
North Vietnam (after running as a peace candidate against Barry Gold-
water a few months earlier). That year saw the first major stirrings of an 
antiwar movement that soon came to question the official version of the 
war and the bombing campaign against the North Vietnamese. It was a 
propitious moment, indeed, to probe the motives that might have led an 
earlier American president to call tremendous destructive power down 
on an Asian people. 
Not surprisingly, the critical reassessment of the A-bomb decision 
launched by Alperovitz steadily gained ground after 1965 within acade­
mia, especially among younger scholars, as a succession of events eroded 
the credibility of public officials and their pronouncements: the optimis­
tic bulletins that flowed from Vietnam as the body bags and the shocking 
television images multiplied; the New Left's ideological assault on "the 
Establishment"; Henry Kissinger's secret bombing of Cambodia and 
wiretapping of his own staff; and, of course, the tangle of official crimes 
collectively known as Watergate, which ended with a discredited Richard 
Nixon driven from office. 
The timing of Martin Sherwins A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb 
and the Grand Alliance (1975), another major contribution to the schol­
arly critique of the atomic-bomb decision, further illustrates the link 
between the reassessment of Truman's action and the broader political 
climate. Like Atomic Diplomacy, Sherwins book was based on his Ph.D. 
thesis, completed at UCLA in 1971 as the controversy over the Vietnam 
War raged, and revised for publication as newspaper headlines screamed 
of secret Cambodia bombings, the explosive Pentagon Papers, the 
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Watergate hearings, and a president s forced resignation. These were not 
times that fostered the uncritical acceptance of official versions of public 
events! Indeed, the political-cultural climate of 1965—75 almost de­
manded the skeptical reassessment of accepted historical interpretations 
and even of the fundamental assumption—a legacy of World War II, 
really—that the government's version of the truth was ipso facto trust­
worthy, disinterested, and reliable. 
All this unfolded just as new methodological approaches and new 
areas of research were transforming the history profession. The rethink­
ing of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings was, in fact, only part of a 
much broader process whereby an older historiography that had focused 
mainly on elites—political, military, social, intellectual, or cultural— 
gave way to a "new social history" more attuned to the experiences of 
ordinary people, particularly the underclass, and more critical of the ac­
tions of policymakers, statesmen, corporate leaders, generals, and others 
who wield power. In the phrase of the day, the new social histo­
rians, some using computer-based quantitative techniques, proposed to 
study history "from the bottom up." In diplomatic history, the focus 
shifted from treaties and conferences to the larger economic, cultural, 
and ideological framework within which foreign-policy processes 
unfold. 
These new historiographical emphases, coupled with the broader po­
litical and cultural currents that flowed across America in the wake of 
Vietnam and Watergate, encouraged a skeptical reassessment of the re­
ceived wisdom on many topics. Inevitably this reassessment included at­
tention to the events of August 6 and 9, 1945, that had taken the lives 
of well over one hundred thousand human beings (including long-term 
deaths related to radiation exposure) and laid the groundwork for an ever 
more dangerous nuclear arms race between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 
ATOMIC BOMB SCHOLARSHIP IN THE 
ARENA OF PUBLIC OPINION 
By around 1980, the reassessment of the A-bomb decision launched by 
Alperovitz and others had been generally welcomed as stimulating and 
provocative. Within the guild, it was widely viewed as another manifesta­
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tion of the familiar process by which historians continually reassess the 
past and question received interpretations. Debated at scholarly confer­
ences and dissected in journal articles, the new analytic hypotheses were 
beginning to make their appearance in college textbooks and in class­
room lectures. 
For most Americans, however, historians' debates on this topic re­
mained arcane and remote, a matter of no concern. While the work of 
Alperovitz, Sherwin, and others certainly had some broader impact 
through the major newspapers, intellectual reviews, and journals of opin­
ion, the received wisdom about the justice of the atomic-bomb decision 
generally retained its sway in grassroots America. For those who had 
embraced the "Good War" paradigm, any questioning of Truman's oft-
repeated justification of his action challenged an image of World War II 
that had become a cornerstone of national self-identity. If the motives 
for dropping the atomic bomb could be probed and problematized by 
historians, what part of the American past was safe from skeptical critical 
scrutiny? As historian Michael Kammen wrote in the aftermath of the 
Smithsonian debacle and other cultural battles involving conflicting in­
terpretations of the American past, "Historians become notably contro­
versial when they do not perpetuate myths, when they do not transmit 
the received and conventional wisdom, when they challenge the com­
forting presence of a stabilized past"—and, it may be added, when news 
of what they are up to finally gets out. Perhaps no issue of the postwar 
era confirmed this generalization more dramatically than the angry 
struggle over who would finally determine the meaning of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki: historians or "the people." 
Exacerbating the populist (or pseudopopulist) reaction against the 
scholarship of the atomic-bomb historians was the widespread practice 
(adopted by many historians as well as by nonhistorians) of attaching to 
such scholarship the label "revisionist." Historians were engaged in a pro­
cess of revision, of course, but when the term was applied exclusively to 
this one group, it suggested that they were deviants who had departed 
from accepted norms of professional practice. In fact, these scholars were 
revisionists only in the sense that all good scholars are revisionists, 
continually questioning and revising standard interpretations on the ba­
sis of new evidence, deeper analysis, or the fresh perspectives offered by 
the passage of time. 
262 CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
Allusions to "the revisionist school" of atomic-bomb historians also 
conveyed a certain conspiratorial implication, as though these scholars 
had colluded, presumably with sinister or subversive motives, to concoct 
and foist on an unsuspecting public a single, agreed-upon new version of 
history In fact (as anyone familiar with American intellectual life would 
assume), the "revisionists" were a diverse and contentious crew, repre­
senting a wide range of often conflicting viewpoints that were based on 
different research findings and different weighings of the facts. Barton 
Bernstein, for example, criticized Gar Alperovitz for talking of Truman s 
"decision" to drop the bomb when in fact, in Bernstein's view, Truman 
inherited from the Roosevelt administration both the assumption that 
the bomb would be used and a tolerance for destroying entire cities. As 
a new president in office for only a few months, Bernstein argued, Tru­
man had simply fallen back on inherited assumptions and practices when 
confronted with the successful Alamogordo test. Bernstein also took 
both Alperovitz and Sherwin to task for treating as a virtual certainty the 
possibility that the war could have been ended well before the planned 
invasion date of November 1, 1945, without the atomic bomb. While 
agreeing that other alternatives were available and should have been 
tried, he remained skeptical about whether or not they would have suc­
ceeded in forcing Tokyo's surrender. Other historians criticized Alpero­
vitz, Sherwin, and others who were assessing the A-bomb decision for 
concentrating too much on U.S. sources and paying insufficient atten­
tion to the Japanese archives. 
Certainly, most historians who addressed the question agreed that 
the factors shaping Truman's actions in the war's climactic days were too 
complex to be summed up in a single, easily recited formula ("It saved 
American lives, ended the war, and repaid Japan for Pearl Harbor")—a 
formula that, if not demonstrably false, was demonstrably inadequate. 
But beyond this, one would be hard put, despite accusations to the con­
trary, to identify a monolithic "revisionist" position. The process of his­
torical reassessment on this subject is continually evolving, as it is on 
every topic of sufficient complexity to attract historians' interest, with a 
variety of arguments and hypotheses in play at any given moment. 
That the fury over historians' treatment of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki 
bombings exploded so spectacularly in 1994-95 was linked, I think, not 
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only to the fiftieth-anniversary observances, but also to the fact that U.S. 
society was racked by new kinds of cultural conflict and political turmoil 
in the 1990s. Conditioned by four decades of black-and-white Cold War 
thinking, many Americans in the aftermath of the Soviet Unions col­
lapse seemed to transfer the same outlook to the domestic sphere. From 
this perspective, the angry denunciations of the "revisionists" as unpatri­
otic and contemptible, and the refusal to grant their findings any shred 
of legitimacy, became simply another manifestation of a political climate 
marked by inflammatory, polarizing rhetoric. 
In this climate, the low-level irritation felt by many ordinary citizens, 
especially older Americans and World War II veterans, at historians who 
questioned an article of national faith was exacerbated and amplified by 
a vocal army of jingoistic politicians, editorial writers, and radio talk-
show hosts who saw this as another emotion-laden wedge issue—like 
attacking the National Endowment for the Arts for promoting obscenity; 
or advocating Constitutional amendments permitting school prayer, re­
quiring a balanced budget, and banning flag desecration. By such issues 
the New Right defined itself, rallied the faithful, and demonized its 
enemies. 
Conservative presidential aspirants made sure the issue would re­
main divisive and inflammatory. Senator Bob Dole, in a red-meat speech 
to the American Legion in September 1995, denounced the Smithso-
nian's original Enola Gay exhibit as another example of the insidious 
work of "intellectual elites" and other "arbiters of political correctness" 
who were contemptuous of patriotism, scornful of veterans and their sac­
rifices, and intent on waging "war on traditional American values." 
But even in this volatile climate, popular attitudes toward the 
atomic-bomb decision continued to resist easy generalization. Over the 
years, different groups had diverged markedly in their judgments about 
Truman's action. So, too, in the 1990s. The aggregate results of a 1995 
Gallup poll concealed important variations in opinion on the basis of 
gender, race, and age. The rate of approval of Truman's action, for in­
stance, was notably higher for men than for women. (A similar gender 
gap emerges in almost every poll dealing with military issues, including 
defense spending, the use of force to achieve U.S. aims, armed interven­
tions like the Persian Gulf War, and so forth.) As to race and ethnicity— 
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no surprise here—a significantly higher percentage of whites approved 
the atomic-bomb decision than did African Americans, Hispanics, or 
Asian Americans. From the first, nonwhite groups had raised the issue of 
racism in the A-bomb context and posed awkward questions about 
whether President Truman would have dropped the atomic bomb on 
Germans if the European war had continued into the summer of 1945. 
(Given the firebombing attacks that turned German cities into cremato­
riums, it is by no means clear that Truman would have refrained from 
using the bomb on white Europeans—but the nagging What if? can 
never be answered with certainty.) 
Another key division that shows up in public-opinion data as early 
as the 1960s, and again quite sharply in the 1995 poll, is a generational 
one. Broadly speaking, as we have seen, the older generation that remem­
bered World War II and that initially associated the atomic bomb with 
Japans surrender and frenzied V-J Day celebrations tended to be strong­
est in the conviction that dropping the bomb was justified. Succeeding 
generations, having very different associations with nuclear weapons and 
no direct memories of the war, tended to be more critical of Truman's 
action. 
Of course, none of these correlations of gender, race, or age is abso­
lute. Other factors, including religious beliefs, political views, and varia­
tions in individual temperament, enter in as well. Any generalization 
about how "the American people" have viewed these issues remains open 
to qualification and skeptical challenge. 
It would be misleading to frame the Enola Gay controversy as a 
simple conflict between historians (or academics) on the one hand and 
the general public on the other. Some historians continued to accept the 
Truman administrations justification for dropping the bomb as suffi­
cient; a few attacked the "revisionists" as scornfully as any conservative 
politician or outraged veteran. Academia is no tranquil domain cut off 
from the passions and ideological disputes that agitate the larger society. 
Nevertheless, broadly speaking, the controversy of 1994-95 did ex­
pose a considerable chasm between the methodology of historians and 
the way many Americans think about the past, especially that portion of 
it falling within their own experiences and memories. Historians con­
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stantly challenge the received wisdom and established interpretations of 
events. This is what we do. Usually this process unfolds in scholarly jour­
nals or at professional gatherings out of the public eye. As new interpreta­
tions filter into textbooks and classrooms, they may eventually modify 
the general publics historical understanding, but the shift: is typically 
gradual and almost imperceptible. 
Occasionally, however, the disjuncture between the scholarly ap­
proach to history and the public's highly personal, even semimythic view 
of the past is exposed with stark clarity, usually when the ongoing process 
of historical revision and reassessment focuses on an issue about which 
many citizens feel passionately, or that has great patriotic resonance. Such 
a moment occurred in 1913, for example, when Charles A. Beard argued 
in his Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States that 
the Founding Fathers had in fact pursued public policies that served their 
pecuniary interests. Beard was roundly vilified. He had questioned the 
motives of patriots revered by every schoolchild! This controversy over an 
issue of historical interpretation unfolded at a moment of highly charged 
ideological conflict, as conservatives and reformers battled over the gov-
ernment's role in regulating capitalism. 
A similar phenomenon, I suspect, underlay the reaction, ranging 
from annoyance to rage, roused by the historical profession's ongoing 
examination of the atomic-bomb decision—a long-term scholarly proj­
ect that the Enola Gay controversy suddenly thrust into public view. As 
the Air Force Association demanded in one of many press releases aimed 
at discrediting the Smithsonian exhibit, "All revisionist speculation 
should be eliminated." The Shinto priest at Japans Yasukuni war shrine 
could not have put it better. 
This reaction was undoubtedly intensified by the fact that August 
1945 remained a part of older Americans' living memory. As Edward T. 
Linenthal pointed out in a perceptive essay in the February 10, 1995, 
Chronicle of Higher Education, the fiftieth anniversaries of great public 
events, the "last hurrah" for most survivors, tend to bring out in a partic­
ularly volatile way the continuing tension between the commemorative 
impulse and critical historical scholarship. 
This particular fiftieth anniversary cast in bold relief a gap that had 
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been developing for years between the American historical profession 
and a significant portion of the American people. I myself had become 
acutely aware of this discontinuity in the early 1980s when, as the 
nuclear-freeze campaign unfolded and I pursued my research on the 
atomic bomb's cultural fallout, I often lectured to community groups. 
When asked about Truman's A-bomb decision (as I almost invariably 
was), I would discuss the work of Alperovitz, Sherwin, and others as in­
terpretive approaches that merited consideration. But often the ques­
tioner would have none of it, especially if he (usually it was a male) 
remembered World War II, and most especially if he was a veteran con-
vinced—beyond all argument—that the atomic bomb had saved his life. 
In August 1995, when I published an essay in the Chronicle of Higher 
Education reviewing the controversy over the A-bomb decision and (as 
I thought) offering a fairly balanced, uncontroversial assessment of the 
cultural issues and faultlines it had exposed, the response was revealing. 
While fellow historians and other scholars reacted positively, the scat­
tered responses from outside academia proved uniformly hostile. One 
early-morning telephone call, for example, came from a North Carolin­
ian who, though born after the war, was the son of a veteran who had 
fought in the Pacific. My caller therefore insisted that he also owed his 
life to the atomic bomb, since if his future father had died in an invasion 
of Japan, he, the son, would never have been conceived. To him, any 
questioning of the assumption that the atomic bomb "saved American 
lives" represented a kind of existential challenge. 
Shortly after this call, a Louisiana investment counselor wrote a sar-
casm-filled letter that attacked me as a typical "off-the-wall," anti-
American academic eager to besmirch the United States while glossing 
over all of Japan's misdeeds. He concluded with this thrust: "I await your 
political comments on the justification of the war between Athens and 
Sparta. I am sure that you have an opinion on this and I welcome your 
comments." 
Those who articulate such responses are not interested in debate. For 
them, unquestioning support for Truman's atomic-bomb decision be­
comes a test of patriotism. In fact, they reject the legitimacy of the histor­
ical enterprise. What right have you, a mere academic, such critics are 
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really asking, to publish dissenting views on matters about which true 
patriots cannot possibly hold differing opinions? As my Louisiana corre­
spondent put it: "No one can doubtthzt this horrible weapon saved Amer­
ican lives" (emphasis added). That precisely this assertion is, in fact, a 
matter of considerable doubt, and certainly open to historical inquiry 
and discussion, was a position whose legitimacy he simply could not ac­
knowledge. He was left, therefore, with no alternative but to impugn the 
character and the integrity of those who do hold it. The confrontation 
between popular memory and patriotic affirmation, on the one hand, 
and the norms of historical research and argument on the other, could 
hardly be more starkly revealed.. 
When even columnists (and World War II veterans) like Russell 
Baker of the New York Times and the late Mike Royko of the Chicago 
Tribune, normally bemused observers of the passing scene, were reduced 
to sputtering fury that anyone—especially anyone who did not actually 
fight in the war—could even hint that the atomic-bomb decision in­
volved motives beyond those publicly proclaimed by Truman, one real­
izes the depths of the ideological and generational chasms exposed by 
this debate. 
Even the Smithsonian's secretary, I. Michael Heyman, in a postmor­
tem on the canceled Enola Gay exhibit, gave the back of his hand to the 
historians who had helped plan it, and ignored his institution's mandate 
to promote "the increase and diffusion of knowledge," as he abjectly ca­
pitulated to the exhibit's detractors: "In this important anniversary year, 
veterans and their families were expecting, and rightly so, that the nation 
would honor and commemorate their valor and sacrifice. They were not 
looking for analysis, and, frankly, we did not give enough thought to 
the intense feelings such an analysis would evoke." Whether the "intense 
feelings" aroused by thoughtful analysis and a broader diffusion of the 
relevant scholarship might in the long run have been therapeutic as 
Americans continue to struggle with the meaning of Hiroshima and Na­
gasaki, he did not consider. In the face of assumptions like this—that 
"analysis" and "feelings" are mutually exclusive, and that when passions 
run high, analysis must give way to feelings—it is understandable that 
historians, with their boring insistence on research and their readiness to 
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question established interpretations and mythic versions of the past, 
should be viewed as a threat. 
For all the rancor it generated, the Enola Gay controversy was only the 
latest manifestation of a half-century process by which the events of Au­
gust 6 and 9, 1945, figured rhetorically in a variety of public discourses. 
For many, the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought victory 
in a just cause, spared countless American lives, repaid the treachery of 
Pearl Harbor, and demonstrated a powerful nations scientific and tech­
nological mastery. For others, it was needless slaughter, symbolizing the 
utter collapse of all ethical restraints in modern warfare. Still others 
viewed it as a calculated move on a larger strategic chessboard. For anti­
nuclear activists, it was the ultimate warning. 
In the fiftieth-anniversary year, with the cultural mood both retro­
spective and ideologically charged, attention focused once again on the 
original events in all their jagged immediacy. In the process, many citi­
zens grasped—perhaps for the first time—that for several decades, schol­
ars had been questioning the official justifications originally advanced by 
President Truman and endlessly reiterated thereafter. The result was not 
thoughtful discussion and the search for a new, more historically defens­
ible consensus, but recrimination and accusations of bad faith and dis­
loyalty. The Smithsonian exhibition simply provided a context for this 
unfolding cultural psychodrama. The Smithsonian's location in the 
fishbowl of Washington guaranteed that the drama would be played out 
with shameless political posturing and the glare of media publicity. 
Though muted, the controversy will probably persist so long as politi­
cians see capital in it and vast numbers of Americans—especially World 
War II veterans—remain convinced that the atomic bomb was an essen­
tial, wholly justifiable means to a righteous end. But historians, too, have 
their convictions and commitments, and one ought not underestimate 
the long-term power of critical historical inquiry, even on emotion-laden 
topics. Whatever the ultimate resolution of this divisive and unhappy 
national quarrel, Hiroshima and Nagasaki seem likely for the foreseeable 
future to remain the Banquo's ghost of World War II, perennially chal­
lenging comforting generalizations about the conflict and underscoring 
the disparity between the mythic past inscribed in popular memory and 
the past that is the raw material of historical scholarship. 
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